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ABSTRACT 
The Australian Imperial Force in the First World War had a deserved reputation as an 
effective fighting force, and at the same had the worst disciplinary record away from 
the frontline when compared with other Dominion forces and the rest of the British 
Army. Australian indiscipline is a subject that has been largely ignored, or when dealt 
with as in the Official History by C. E. W. Bean, has had to pass through the filter of 
the Australian Legend. This study examines the link between Australian indiscipline 
and the privileged position they held of being the only force immune from the death 
penalty, except for mutiny, desertion to the enemy and traitorous activity. This simple 
fact would have a major influence on the relatively high numbers of absentees and 
desertions within Australian ranks. General Headquarters in France (GHQ) saw these 
high levels of indiscipline as a direct result of Australian authorities not allowing their 
soldiers to be placed under the Army Act in full. Further differences surfaced between 
the  British  and  Australians  when  it  came  to  punishment,  with  Australian  courts 
criticised  by  British  Army  authorities  for  not  using  the  powers  they  possessed  to 
impose penalties that would act as a deterrent, as well as their reluctance to impose 
Field Punishment No. 1. This study examines these general differences as well as 
dealing with a specific case of an Australian soldier charged with the murder of a 
French  civilian,  a  case  that  attracted  the  attention  of  senior  political  and  military 
figures when it transpired Australians were immune from the death penalty for murder. 
Maintaining discipline was a constant struggle for the authorities when faced with 
those  determined  to  avoid  frontline  duty  either  by  committing  military  crime  or 
through self-maiming. In this context the high venereal disease rate is discussed and  
ii 
evidence presented that this could be considered as a self-inflicted wound. The mutiny 
in the 1st Battalion of September 1918 is examined as well as a mutiny in a military 
prison in France in 1919. It is not the purpose of this study to tarnish the reputation of 
the many thousands of brave men who fought in the AIF, rather it is an attempt to 
understand the high levels of indiscipline within the context of the war on the Western 
Front and the disciplinary code under which they operated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the historiography of the First World War there has been surprisingly little written 
about discipline in general and Australian discipline in particular. What has aroused 
great interest in recent years is the application of the death penalty by the British 
Army, with debate surrounding the justification of what was the ultimate deterrent in 
maintaining discipline. The absence of the death penalty for Australian troops is a 
major theme of this study, focusing on how it affected levels of Australian indiscipline. 
The Australian Imperial Force (AIF) earned the reputation as a formidable fighting 
force and was recognized as such by General Headquarters in France (GHQ). At the 
same  time,  senior  British  and  Australian  officers  despaired  at  the  high  levels  of 
Australian  indiscipline  away  from  the  frontline  when  compared  with  both  other 
Dominion and British forces. Explanations for this Australian paradox have often been 
incorporated into the Anzac Legend, which the Australian official historian C. E. W. 
Bean helped to create. The legend has it that colonial society produced stronger, fitter, 
more self-reliant men who were democratic and civilian in outlook and who viewed 
military service as a job, having little time or respect for unnecessary British discipline 
and the class and privilege that this seemed to represent.
1  
In Australia, public opinion perceives the Australian troops’ capacity to become 
very effective fighters to be the result of their capacity for independent action. At the 
same time this independence gave the troops a healthy disrespect for unnecessary 
British Army discipline and, when they encountered it, the English class system. The 
Australian officer selection system (they were drawn from the ranks and promoted on 
                                                 
1 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: vol. vi, The Australian 
Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive 1918, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1942, pp. 
1078-1093.  
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merit) is often compared favourably with the British system of drawing its officers 
from a specific class in society, even though by the close of the war British officers 
were  increasingly  drawn  from  a  wider  social  range.
2  Moreover,  the  main  body  of 
British troops are portrayed by Bean as being unable to think for themselves, lacking 
flexibility and relying too much on officers to make every decision. Bean claimed that 
a  deferential  and  subservient  relationship  existed  between  officers  and  men  in  the 
British Army, something he believed was generally absent in the AIF. At the same 
time it is necessary to recognize that there were differences in both societies, with 
Britain  more  deferential  and  Australia  more  egalitarian  and  democratic.  However, 
when the Australians volunteered in their thousands they left one culture and joined 
another in the shape of the British Army.  
Although the focus of this study is on the Western Front, McKernan’s study of 
the Australians in Britain is one of the few that deal with problems of Australian 
discipline and his comments are relevant. In The Australian People and the Great War 
McKernan thought these cultural differences were significant and he describes how the 
Australians  became  ‘transformed  in  the  eyes  of  Britons  from  heroes  to  criminals 
during their stay in Britain from 1915 to 1919’.
3 They were hailed as heroes when they 
first arrived in England because of the reputation they had gained at Gallipoli. Large 
crowds came out to greet them at the first Anzac march in London, with the King and 
Queen attending the Anzac service at Westminster Abbey. English newspapers urged 
people to come out in force ‘to give the Anzacs a hero’s welcome’. A grateful empire 
was  giving  thanks  while  Australia  ‘was  basking  in  the  glory  back  home’.  The 
Australian soldiers were viewed by some as ‘stronger, fitter than his British comrades’, 
with  the  Bishop  of  Willesden,  Dr.  Perry,  offering  his  own  assessment  of  the 
                                                 
2 G. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press), 2000, pp. 30, 62-63. 
3 Michael McKernan, The Australian People and the Great War. Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1980, 
p. 147. Chapter 6 is of particular interest ‘From hero to criminal: the AIF in Britain, 1915-1919’, pp. 
116-149.  
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Australians as ‘independent, democratic, easygoing’; even the way they walk ‘betrays 
their character’. McKernan noted that there were dissenting voices in the press on the 
praise heaped upon the Australians. Some felt that the part played by British troops 
was being neglected and that the Australians were indulging in ‘colonial swagger’. 
One letter writer complained of the tendency ‘to elevate their achievements far beyond 
those of other troops’.
4  
According to McKernan, after initially being excited at the thought of visiting the 
‘mother country’, tensions grew between the Australians and their hosts as the novelty 
began to wear off. Their behaviour on leave deteriorated from 1917, as men became 
more  homesick  and  started  making  unfavourable  comparisons  between  life  and 
standards in Australia and those in Britain. Differing social attitudes surfaced in regard 
to  women  in  the  workforce,  with  the  Australians  critical  of  female  labour,  which 
McKernan believes caused deterioration in relations with English women.
5 On leave, 
tensions  grew  as  men  on  six  times  the  pay  of  the  average  British  soldier  took 
advantage of the services on offer by the numerous prostitutes that were now plying 
their trade, especially in London and the garrison towns of Weymouth and Salisbury, 
places  where  large  numbers  of  colonial  soldiers  were  concentrated.  By  1917, 
Australians were being seen as ‘amorous, dangerous, even lustful’, and were gaining a 
reputation for causing trouble. 
6 
Australian relations with civil authorities began to deteriorate in 1917, according 
to McKernan. Magistrates in garrison towns had been lenient in 1916 on offending 
Australian soldiers, but now they started taking a tougher line as the crimes became 
more  serious.  Apart  from  petty  thefts  and  drunken  brawls,  which  were  the  most 
common Australian crimes, there was the occasional riot, usually caused by attempts 
to rescue a mate from the civilian police. As the Australians’ reputation for making 
                                                 
4 Ibid., pp. 120-25. 
5 Ibid., pp. 129-30. 
6 Ibid., p. 139.  
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trouble grew by 1919, magistrates were responding by handing out severer sentences 
to offenders. “When Canadians rioted at Epsom and killed a policeman’, according to 
McKernan, ‘early newspaper reports labelled the affair another Australian riot – so 
synonymous had the two words become’.
7 
There was deep concern regarding Australian behaviour after the signing of the 
Armistice, with Prime Minister Lloyd George and Colonial Secretary Walter Long 
recommending that ‘it was necessary to remove the Australians from London as soon 
as possible’. Overall, McKernan thought the Australians’ unpopularity was ‘derived 
more from differences in temperament between host and guest than from really wicked 
behaviour’.
8  This  conclusion  is  somewhat  surprising  considering  the  evidence  he 
presented, but in one way demonstrates the power of the Anzac Legend in that bad, 
drunken and riotous behaviour can somehow be explained or excused by reference to 
alleged colonial attributes of egalitarianism and a more democratic outlook. 
The Australians were not the only troops causing trouble in the country in 1919, 
as many British soldiers expressed their frustration at delays in demobilization. British 
Army discipline began to fall apart under the strain. Soldier strikes in both England 
and France in 1919 were not treated as mutinies, as both the British Army and the 
government, faced with the scale of this internal opposition, could not put down the 
protests  by  the  use  of  excessive  force.  Although  the  main  motive  of  most  of  the 
soldiers was to return to civilian life, a few would have been aware that the British 
Cabinet  was  considering  retaining  troops  for  intervention  in  Russia  against  the 
Bolsheviks.
22 British discipline held up before the signing of the Armistice, but at 
war’s end it seems the social divide between leaders and led began to widen and the 
bonds that bound them during the war began to slacken. 
                                                 
7 Ibid., pp. 145-47. 
8 Ibid., pp. 148-49. 
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The British Army is very often depicted as callous and unfeeling in its imposition 
of a harsh disciplinary code, and in particular the death penalty. However, Christopher 
Pugsley in On the Fringe of Hell: New Zealanders and Military Discipline in the First 
World  War  states  that  the  British  High  Command  often  tempered  the  zeal  New 
Zealand  officers  displayed  for  imposing  the  death  penalty.  He  suggests  the  same 
enthusiasm was also evident in other Dominion forces in their attempt to be the best or 
to maintain the reputation of their forces. He argues the same approach was true of 
Canada  and  Australia,  emphasizing  that  it  was  the  Dominion  courts  martial  that 
imposed the sentences.
9 Contrary to current Australian belief, Field Punishment was 
administered  to  Australian  soldiers  in  France.  The  Anzac  forces  in  Egypt  and  on 
Gallipoli  were  exempt  from  Field  Punishment  at  Birdwood’s  request  as  ‘being 
unsuited  to  the  colonial  temperament’.  However,  in  France  Field  Punishment  was 
centralised to a Corps Field Punishment Compound, out of sight, which conflicted 
with the intended purpose of Field Punishment. According to Pugsley, this led to the 
false belief that Field Punishments were not carried out on Australians nor indeed 
imposed by Australian officers. Further, many of these punishment centres set up to 
deal with Field Punishments reflected a failure in command. Officers unfit for frontline 
duty were often in charge, with the day to day running left to NCOs whose actions at 
times were in breach of the regulations for punishment and went largely unchecked. 
This was often the case when the punishment was carried out by the military police. 
8 
Field punishment is discussed in chapter three and it will be seen that there were major 
consequences  that  flowed  from  Australian  reluctance  to  impose  this  type  of 
punishment. 
                                                 
9 Christopher Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell: New Zealanders and Military Discipline in the First 
World War (Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 298; see chapter six ‘Field punishment’, pp. 91-
102.  
8 Ibid., p. 92.  
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One of the questions posed in Eric Andrews’ Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian 
relations during World War I was whether Australian soldiers were more effective 
than  others  and  he  challenged  the  myth  of  the  Digger.  He  was  critical  of  Bean’s 
approach in writing the Official History, as Bean revealed that his primary question in 
writing the history was ‘How did the Australian people – and the Australian character, 
if there is one – come through the universally recognized test of this, their first war?’. 
Andrews believed this approach weakened Bean as an historian from the outset and 
influenced his selection of evidence. He saw far more diversity in Australian troops 
than Bean was prepared to accept. His view was that ‘they were more than larrikins: 
they ranged from thugs, heavy drinkers and gamblers to sensitive men and teetotalers, 
who were often deeply religious and patriotic’.
10 He thought the Anzac myth did not 
take into account that Australian battle performance improved as the war went on and 
that the quality of Australian officers was much better by 1918, having been purged of 
many incompetent officers who were in part responsible for indiscipline in Egypt, 
mistakes at Gallipoli, and ‘fiascoes’ in France. Andrews could reach no conclusion as 
to  whether  the  Australians  were  better  fighting  men,  preferring  to  see  Australian 
performance  peak  in  1918  as  a  consequence  of  improved  training  and  battle 
techniques. For Andrews, the Anzac Legend was a myth ‘in every sense of the word’.
11 
He thought elements of it were untrue, and yet it became a powerful instrument in the 
formation of Australian national identity. 
The Digger stereotype came under scrutiny in Dale Blair’s Dinkum Diggers: An 
Australian Battalion at War, a study of the 1st Battalion. In his conclusion Blair notes 
that the alleged attributes of egalitarianism, initiative and resourcefulness were not 
‘sufficiently evident’ in the 1st Battalion to warrant them being advanced as national 
characteristics. Many soldiers, on the surface at least, displayed attitudes that fitted the 
                                                 
10 Andrews, E. M., The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian relations during World War I, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 214. 
11 Ibid., p. 215.  
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Digger stereotype of a civilian and democratic outlook, but they soon realized that the 
Australian Army was not a democracy and that ‘autocratic and adversarial’ methods 
were employed (as in most armies) to maintain discipline. This caused resentment in 
some and found expression in frequent acts of indiscipline, such as refusing to obey 
orders, insubordinate language, and at times striking a superior officer.
12 For Blair, the 
key to good officer-man relations was the establishment of a ‘rough equality’, by 
which officers sought to gain the respect of their men by taking the same risks as them. 
This  ‘rough  equality’  did  not  mean  the  officers  treated  the  men  as  equals,  Blair 
observed,  as  the  biases  employed  in  the  selection  of  officers  in  the  1st  Battalion 
mitigated against that. The need for officers to earn respect of their men was not just a 
characteristic of the AIF, Blair observed, as research by Sheffield and Liddle into the 
British Expeditionary Force indicates. Blair’s study revealed a lack of harmony in 
officer-man  relations,  describing  the  conflicts  that  existed  in  that  relationship  as 
forming ‘a significant and unpleasant undertone to battalion life, one which persisted 
throughout the war’.
13 These relationships would reach their lowest point in the mutiny 
of September 21, which is discussed in chapter five. 
In Glen Wahlert’s The Other Enemy? Australian Soldiers and the Military Police 
an insight is gained into the acrimonious relationship between Australian soldiers and 
the  military  police  who  were  charged  with  keeping  them  under  control.  Wahlert 
describes  raw  Australian  recruits  as  having  a  ‘civilian  attitude’,  which  in  part  he 
believes explains their indiscipline while in Australia and which also suggests that they 
were not completely under the control of their officers and NCOs.
14 In the manner of 
Bean, Wahlert says that ‘unlike Great Britain, Australian society did not provide a 
class of young men who had been bred to lead and another, more compliant group bred 
                                                 
12 Dale Blair, Dinkum Diggers: An Australian Battalion at War, Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 2001, pp. 188-89. 
13 Ibid., pp. 189-90. 
14 Glenn Wahlert, The Other Enemy? Australian Soldiers and the Military Police (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 22-23; chapter two, 'Policing the 1st AIF', pp. 18-47 .  
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to follow’.
15 However, Wahlert does take issue with Bean’s uncritical account of the 
notorious Wazza riots in Cairo on Good Friday, 1915 involving Anzac troops. He 
describes Bean’s version, which compared these riots to ‘university ragging’ or high 
spirits, as being consistent with his desire to create the Anzac Legend, and criticised 
Bean for relegating the riot to a note in the Official History.
16 Military discipline was 
hard to inculcate into men by officers who were inexperienced and learning on the job, 
according  to  Wahlert,  and  there  occurred  a  ‘shortfall  in  command’  that  was 
compensated for by the creation of a military police to enforce military discipline on a 
youthful and vigorous group of men. The tension that this caused between the two 
groups would last the duration of the war and was aggravated by the poor selection 
process for the military police. Wahlert, quoting statistics from Australian provost 
marshals, showed that arrests and convictions of Australian troops in all three theatres 
of war were approximately twelve times greater than those of other troops. However, 
even with these figures Wahlert thought that the question as to whether indiscipline 
was  inherent  in  the  AIF  was  difficult  to  assess.  His  major  cause  of  Australian 
indiscipline centred around notions of ‘Australian’ characteristics, their ‘incorrigibly 
civilian’  attitude  and  individualism,  attributes  which  he  sees  as  absent  in  British 
society. He contrasts the democratic attitudes of his Australian with the supposedly 
representative  British  stereotype  of  the  rural  worker’s  humility  and  deference.
17 
Wahlert  produced  a  useful  study  of  a  topic  that  is  rarely  written  about,  but  his 
conclusions are well within the parameters of the Anzac Legend that sees Australian 
characteristics as accounting for Australian indiscipline. 
In The Australian Army Jeffrey Grey discusses the paradox of Australian combat 
achievements and the AIF’s reputation for indiscipline. He states that much of the 
evidence used to support notions of widespread indiscipline among Australians is often 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 22. 
16 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
17 Ibid., pp. 29-30.  
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anecdotal  and  unreliable,  and  pointed  to  the  lack  of  detailed  studies  done  on  the 
question of discipline. The popular view of Australian soldiers as ‘warriors’ rather than 
‘soldiers’,  according  to  Grey,  is  interpreted  to  mean  that  they  maintained  battle 
discipline  and  thought  that  while  away  from  the  front  military  discipline  was  an 
infringement of their citizen’s rights. He thought this to be only true of a ‘proportion of 
the  force’  and  that  overall  Australian  behaviour,  when  the  context  was  taken  into 
account,  was  ‘probably  neither  especially  better  nor  markedly  worse’  than  troop 
behaviour in other armies. 
18  
Grey had touched on the major problem I found when beginning this study: the 
lack of a detailed examination of discipline in general in the AIF. One of the major 
questions  asked  in  this  study  is  whether  GHQ  was  over-reacting  to  Australian 
indiscipline and whether their persistent call for the Australians to be placed under the 
Army Act in full was justified by the need to maintain discipline. In short, did GHQ 
have a case against the Australians? The War Office records held at the Public Record 
Office  in  Kew  provided  GHQ’s  view  of  the  problems  they  encountered  with 
Australian troops regarding discipline. From these records it was apparent they were 
not complaining about larrikin-type behaviour, but more serious offences of absence 
and  desertion.  The  belief  existed  throughout  the  war  that  the  execution  of  a  few 
Australian  deserters  would  radically  improve  discipline.  Throughout  these  records 
there are recommendations and numerous Army Circulars providing guidance to the 
framing of charges, dealing with cases of self-inflicted wounds, accidental wounding, 
and sentencing. Overall, these records reveal the determination of GHQ to bring the 
Australians  into  line  with  the  rest  of  the  Army  as  far  as  the  death  penalty  was 
                                                 
18  JeffreyGrey,  The  Australian  Centenary  History  of  Defence,  Volume  1,  The  Australian  Army, 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 62; chapter 2 ‘The Army and World War I, 1914-1919, 
pp. 37-69. 
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concerned, for they feared Australian battle effectiveness would suffer if discipline did 
not improve.  There was a danger that they could infect the rest of the Army.  
With  the  authorities  being  unable  to  execute  Australians  for  capital  military 
crimes, the records reveal that they could not even try for his life an Australian charged 
with murdering a French civilian, as it transpired that Australians were immune from 
the  death  penalty,  even  for  murder.  The  British  government  put  pressure  on  the 
Australian Government to amend their laws to allow soldiers charged with civilian 
murders to be handed over to French or British civilian courts to be tried for their life. 
The  case  of  Private  Banks  who  was  charged  with  murdering  a  French  civilian  is 
discussed in chapter two and provides the first case study. 
I have used both London and Canberra archives in this study, with the latter 
yielding sources that have hardly been used before, or opened up at my request. This 
has enabled me to assess problems from a better perspective and knowledge base as a 
result.  The  courts  martial  and  service  records  of  Australian  soldiers  held  in  the 
National  Archives  in  Canberra  (Series  B2455)  made  it  possible  to  analyse  the 
disciplinary  record  of  soldiers  discussed  in  this  study  allowing  me  to  make 
observations  on  charging  and  sentencing  procedures  adopted  by  Australian  courts. 
These archives provided details of the mutiny of 1st Battalion men in September 1918, 
which  is  the  subject  of  chapter  five.  I  found  details  of  a  further  mutiny  in  these 
archives that occurred in a military prison at Calais in March 1919, which resulted in 
Australians being convicted of mutiny and which is examined in detail in chapter six. 
The Australian War Memorial in Canberra was widely used and provided the bulk of 
the official records regarding the AIF.  
Throughout  the  war  there  was  a  constant  struggle  between  those  who  were 
determined to avoid frontline duty, either by committing military crime or through 
self-maiming, and the military authorities who were trying to make sure that crime did 
not pay. The high venereal disease rate is discussed in chapter four and the evidence  
xv 
presented points to the distinct possibility that some men deliberately contracted the 
disease. Thus it could be considered a self-inflicted wound. The work of the Australian 
physician and medical historian, Colonel A. G. Butler, in The Official History of The 
Australian  Army  Medical  Services  in  the  War  of  1914-1918,  volume  iii,  Special 
Problems  and  Services  proved  a  most  useful  source.  This  neglected  work  proved 
invaluable in discussing venereal disease rates, self-inflicted wounds, the education 
campaign waged against venereal disease, as well as containing detailed appendices 
and tables dealing with statistics of the war.
19. 
In the absence of detailed studies, the causes and extent of Australian indiscipline 
have previously been difficult to assess. This study endeavours to find reasons for 
Australian indiscipline that are not tied to alleged Australian national characteristics 
but instead looks for explanations in the context of the war on the Western Front and 
the need for the British Army to maintain discipline. Its conclusions, nevertheless, 
raise considerable doubts about the validity of the Anzac Legend. 
 
                                                 
19 Colonel A. G., Butler, The Official History of The Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 
1914-1918, Volume III, Special Problems and Services, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1943.  
xvi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAG  Assistant Adjutant General 
AAMC  Australian Army Medical Corps 
AIF  Australian Imperial Force 
APM  Assistant Provost Marshal 
ANZAC, Anzac  Australian and New Zealand Army Corps  
Aust.  Australian 
AWM  Australian War Memorial 
BEF  British Expeditionary Force 
CIGS  Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
Cpl  Corporal 
CO  Commanding Officer 
CSM  Company Sergeant Major 
DAC  Division Ammunition Column 
DADO  Deputy Assistant Director Ordnances 
DCM  District Court-Martial 
DPS  Department of Personal Services 
Div.  Division 
FGCM  Field General Court Martial 
Gen.  General 
GHQ  General Headquarters (France) 
GOC  General Officer Commanding 
GSW  Gun Shot Wound 
JAG  Judge Advocate General 
L/Cpl  Lance Corporal 
Lt.  Lieutenant 
Lt-Col.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Lt-Gen.  Lieutenant-General 
Maj.  Major 
Maj. General  Major General 
MP  Member of Parliament 
NAA  National Archives of Australia 
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer 
NZEF  New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
OC  Officer Commanding 
OTC  Officer Training Corps 
Pte.  Private 
RE  Royal Engineers 
RSM  Regimental Sergeant-Major 
Sgt.  Sergeant 
TPE  Termination of Period of Employment 
TNA  The National Archives of the UK 
VD  Venereal Disease 
  
 
1 
C h a p t e r   1  
 
UNFAVOURABLE COMPARISONS 
 
The reputation of the all-volunteer army that formed the first Australian Imperial Force 
(AIF) as an effective fighting force has come down to us through the writing of C. E. 
W.  Bean,  the  Australian  official  historian.  He  argued  in  The  Official  History  of 
Australia in the War of 1914-19 (hereafter Official History) that the AIF, along with 
other Dominion troops, were among the best military forces on the Western Front.
1 
Australian military success is often attributed by Bean to the national character, a 
product of colonial life with its less stratified society and a vigorous democracy, which 
imbued  the  Australians  with  the  ‘bush  values’  of  ‘mateship’,  toughness,  and  self-
reliance, even though the vast majority of the AIF were urban-dwellers, and a sizable 
group were born in Britain.
2 Bean’s belief in the benefits colonial life bestowed on an 
individual  leads  him  to  compare  Australian  troops  with  the  home  forces,  who,  in 
almost every instance, suffer by comparison in fighting qualities, physique, officer 
selection, officer-man relations, and self-reliance. However, the Australian discipline 
record suffers by any comparison with the home forces, or other Dominion troops, 
especially away from the front line. A major cause of this indiscipline lay in the fact 
that  the  AIF  remained  the  only  force  immune  from  the  death  penalty,  except  for  
 
                                                 
1  C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: vol. vi, The Australian 
Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive 1918, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1942, p. 
1078 (hereafter, Official History). 
2  Jeffrey  Grey,  The  Australian  Centenary  History  of  Defence,  vol.  i:  The  Australian  Army, 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 40.  
 
2 
mutiny,  desertion  to  the  enemy  and  traitorous  activity.
3  At  the  heart  of  these 
comparisons is Bean’s belief that the British Army was ‘almost feudal’ in its outlook 
to  discipline,
4  with  its  officer-man  relations  based  on  class  and  characterised  by 
deference to the point of subservience. By contrast, the Australian Army is portrayed 
as  democratic,  employing  a  meritocracy  in  officer  selection  with  more  informal 
officer-man relations, and a reliance on self-discipline.
5 The Australian soldier was 
therefore  ‘less  amenable’  to  the  British  type  of  discipline,  and  the  merging  of 
Australian troops within this British disciplinary system was bound to cause friction 
and a healthy disrespect for a military authority that was based on class and privilege. 
Bean’s views did not go unchallenged in the writing of the Official History as 
Brigadier General Sir James Edmonds, the British Official Historian of the Great War, 
commenting upon Bean’s draft chapters, thought that Bean ‘misunderstood’ the British 
Army,
6 and that he had not taken account of the great changes that had taken place 
during  the  war.  However,  Bean  was  not  swayed,  and  his  views  have  been  very 
influential, setting the tone of the historiography of Australia’s involvement in the 
Great War, and helped create the Anzac Legend. Although the ‘Legend’ has been 
undermined by recent studies, a residue of it remains, and acts like a filter by which all 
histories  must  pass.  In  many  ways  it  has  been  a  hindrance  in  our  attempts  to 
understand Australian involvement in the Great War and to treat the war itself as 
history. To understand the relatively poor disciplinary record of the Australians this 
                                                 
3 The relevant part of the Defence Act (Section 98) states: ‘No member of the Defence Force shall be 
sentenced  to  death  by  any  court-martial  except  for  mutiny,  desertion  to  the  enemy,  or  traitorously 
delivering up to the enemy any garrison, fortress, post, guard, or ship, vessel, or boat, or traitorous 
correspondence with the enemy’.  
4 C. E. W. Bean, Official History, vol. vi, p. 1084. 
5 Ibid., pp. 1085-87. 
6 Australian War Memorial (hereafter AWM) AWM 38, 3DRL 7953/34, part 2, Edmonds to Bean, 
December 8, 1938.  
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‘Legend’ must be stripped back, so that Australian indiscipline can be understood in 
the context of the war on the Western Front, and life beyond the front-line.  
The benefits a colonial life bestowed upon the Australian soldier appeared self-
evident  to  Bean  as  he  contrasted  the  character  and  attitudes  to  discipline  of  the 
Australian  troops  against  the  products  of  what  he  saw  as  a  class-ridden  English 
society. In explaining Australian success in their operations holding back the German 
Spring Offensive in 1918, Bean acknowledged that having been rested they were less 
exhausted and ‘suffered less strain, and loss’ than the ‘English, Scottish, and Irish 
divisions’.  With  this  caveat  in  place,  Bean  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  key  to 
understanding Australian success ‘lies in the character of the men who carried them 
out’.
7  Australian  infantry  contained  more  veterans  than  the  rest  of  the  British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF), and although it ‘appeared’ to British observers that by 
1918 their discipline had improved Bean thought it was more a case of learning that it 
was fruitless to rail against unnecessary restrictions and impositions behind the lines. 
Paradoxically, this perception of improvement in discipline was not reflected in the 
number of crimes committed, which actually increased in 1918. Despite having to 
accept the disciplinary regime of the army, Bean explained, the Australian soldier 
remained ‘incorrigibly civilian’, possessing an individualism ‘so strongly planted’ that 
it withstood years of subordination and with it came an unwillingness to be reconciled 
to ‘continuous obedience to order, existence by rule, and lack of privacy’.
8 For Bean, 
the Australian infantryman ‘contrasted sharply’ in outlook to most English soldiers, 
whom he depicted as deferring to an officer-class drawn from the upper and middle 
classes, unable to act independently, needing officer approval for actions out of the 
ordinary; and with a lack of interest in the affairs of the world, these being best left to 
                                                 
7 C. E. W. Bean, Official History, vol. vi, p. 4. 
8 Ibid., p. 5.  
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their social betters. As class distinction was resented in Australia, the recruitment of 
officers’  batmen  and  grooms  from  Australian-born  men  was  difficult.  However, 
English born migrants to Australia who had no such qualms filled a large proportion of 
these posts.
9  
It was in early childhood, Bean argued, that the Australian became imbued with 
the sense that he was master of his own life, something Bean thought brought a closer 
affinity with the Scots and the Americans than with most of the English. Unlike the 
English soldier, the Australian was a decision maker, whether it be saving a mate, 
‘securing a souvenir’, or going on ‘unlicensed’ trips. The threat of punishment did not 
appear to concern him as much as it affected the other troops. Bean states that: ‘He 
was bound to his fellows, and to the Old Country and the Allies, by a tense bond of 
democratic loyalty – a man must “stand by his mates” at all costs; and as he knew only 
one social horizon, that of race, most of his officers came within that category.’
10 
Australian ‘effectiveness’ is down to country life, but Bean is forced to admit that 
only  one  quarter  of  the  soldiers  ‘had  acquired  their  powers  of  determination, 
endurance,  and  improvisation  from  country  occupations’.  Troops  from  the  over-
crowded European cities are described by Bean as being ‘visibly poor in physique, 
mentally more helpless, and morally less virile and capable of endurance, than those 
from country parts’.
11 
Bean’s Social Darwinist approach to the writing of the Official History led him to 
over-emphasise Australian performance and make unfavourable comparisons with the 
home  forces,  views  that  were  challenged  on  several  occasions  by  Edmonds.  The 
correspondence  of  Edmonds  and  Bean  on  their  draft  chapters  of  their  respective 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
10 Ibid. p. 6. 
11 Ibid. p. 1079.  
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histories reveals a contested Australian history. Edmonds believed most Dominion 
forces exaggerated their performance, and he in turn was criticised for his ‘grudging’ 
praise of them.
12 He was critical, too, of Dominion historians, whom he thought lacked 
the necessary knowledge of staff work, and who were too concerned with protecting 
the reputation of their respective countries to write an informed history. Edmonds, 
commenting  in  1926  upon  a  Canadian  account  of  Second  Ypres,  wrote:  ‘if  the 
Canadian Historical Section wants a vainglorious account it better write its own as the 
Australians have done. I am afraid nothing I can write will satisfy them.’ Bean did not 
escape criticism in Edmonds’ 1928 report where he says that Bean ‘conceives that 
everything  happening  to  the  Australians  is  unique  and  unparalleled’,  a  recurring 
criticism of Bean’s lack of understanding of the wider picture and his emphasis on 
Australian performance.
13 Edmonds’ approach as an official historian was to write a 
description  of  events,  largely  devoid  of  praise  or  criticism  of  British  leadership, 
leaving it to the readers to form their own conclusions on individual faults. Edmonds 
has been criticised for this approach as being a way of protecting the reputation of 
senior  British  commanders  and  the  General  Staff,  although  at  times  the  informed 
reader could pick up the implied criticism of individuals.
14  
This difference in approach and emphasis came to a head in 1932 over comments 
made on Bean’s draft chapters for volume iv that brought out the underlying tension 
between the two over bias concerning Australian success and the nature of the British 
Army. Edmonds’ letter to Bean in September raised the ire of the Australian Official 
Historian by labelling his work a ‘corps history’. Furthermore, Edmonds stated that: 
‘the draft chapters do not seem to me to be up to the standard of your published 
                                                 
12 T. H. E. Travers, ‘From Surafend to Gough: Charles Bean, James Edmonds, and the making of the 
Australian Official History’, in Journal of the Australian War Memorial 27 (October 1995), p, 15. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. pp. 15-16.  
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volumes, and, as regards matters touching the higher command and really outside the 
scope of an ordinary corps history, they seem to me sometimes to be misleading’.
15  
Edmonds, perhaps reacting to Bean’s own lack of generosity when alluding to 
British units, felt justified in casting a few aspersions of his own on the Australians 
when he wrote: 
We all feel that the historian of the A.I.F. could afford to be a little more generous in his 
allusions to British units and formations. You are now aware perhaps that the home 
troops regarded the Australians and Canadians as the spoiled children of G.H.Q., who 
were given most rest, the pick of the fighting pitches and most of the praise – not that it 
was grudged. What they envied most was the corps formations of the Dominion divisions 
which gave them many advantages.
16 
Edmonds hoped, somewhat mischievously, that his words would not be misinterpreted 
and that he was only trying to be helpful so the ‘history of the AIF may be in every 
way worthy of the fighting achievements of the Australian troops, in admiration of 
whom I yield to no one’.
17 
Bean  was  incensed  by  Edmonds’  comments,  which  reduced  his  history  of 
Australian involvement in the Great War to ‘a corps history’. Furthermore, Edmonds 
had indicated that Bean was not qualified to comment upon the workings of the higher 
command,  and  that  he  exercised  bias  when  dealing  with  British  units.  Worse, 
Australian  success  was  owing  to  factors  other  than  Bean’s  cherished  view  ‘that 
colonial life and conditions produce, on the whole, a stronger fighting people’. Bean 
replied within a day of receiving Edmonds’ comments, a measure of his indignation. 
He toned down his original drafts, but still replied in quite emotional terms. He told 
Edmonds  that  he  was  aware  of  the  home  troops’  view  of  the  Australians  and 
Canadians as ‘spoilt children’. As for the Australians getting ‘the pick of the fighting 
pitches’,  he  questioned  whether  any  impartial  observer  would  consider  ‘Pozieres, 
                                                 
15 AWM 38, 3DRL 7953/34, part 2, Edmonds’ letter to Bean, September  2, 1932. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid.  
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Mouquet Farm, Bullecourt, and Fleurs [sic] in November 1916’ to qualify as such.
18 
Bean  further  took  issue  with  Edmonds’  view  that  matters  concerning  the  higher 
command were outside the scope of the Australian history when he wrote: ‘If you do 
not recognise that the Australian official history of the war is more than an “ordinary 
corps history”, then you will forgive my saying that it shows me that, far from having 
written too strongly, I must make my points even more clear in future chapters, and 
this  I  will  endeavour  to  do’.
19  Furthermore,  according  to  Bean,  this  view  was 
symptomatic of the attitude that prevailed during the war that was responsible for most 
of  the  difficulties  that  arose  between  British  and  Australian  organizations.  He 
reminded  Edmonds  that  Australia  ‘voluntarily  entrusted  her  forces  to  British 
commanders and staffs’ and that the wisdom or otherwise of decisions made by them 
affecting Australian troops ‘is a matter of proper concern for the Australian Official 
History and could well influence whether this particular form of cooperation might in 
the future, be deemed “unsuitable”’.
20 
 Bean is at his most revealing in his claim to impartiality. He stated that for his 
part he would not withhold facts ‘whether they tell against Australians or for them’.
21 
He claimed that English commentators (not necessarily Edmonds himself) wished the 
Australians to admit that their successes were in part due to their getting the pick of the 
fighting  pitches  [fronts],  most  of  the  praise,  as  well  as  being  in  ‘homogeneous 
formations which gave us all sorts of advantages’. This last point was surely worthy of 
more consideration by Bean who dismissed it as a cause of Australian success. He 
claimed the British really want the Australians to ‘admit that our reputed success was 
due to these advantages arising from chance and from supposed favours, and not, in 
                                                 
18 AWM 38,  3DRL 7953/34, part 2, Bean’s letter to Edmonds, October 11, 1932. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.  
 
8 
the main, to the fact colonial life and conditions produce, on the whole, a stronger 
fighting people’.
22 
Bean made sure that in the Official History Australian success was credited to a 
frontier ethos, rather than counter-explanations put forward by British leaders of the 
benefits of operating in homogenous formations. ‘The blessed word “homogenous”’, 
Bean wrote, as applied to the Australian and Canadian Corps, ‘was then assumed to 
explain everything’. Although Bean admitted that Dominion troops were better under 
their own leaders, he would not accept the British view that Australian effectiveness 
was due to ‘the fact that their divisions seldom left their Corps, and therefore operated 
constantly under leaders and staff who knew them’.
23 
He was understandably prickly over charges that the Australians and Canadians 
‘were the spoiled children of G.H.Q.’, pointing out that when colonial troops received 
more than their share of publicity it did not occur to some Englishmen that their efforts 
merited it and that at times ‘it worked quite the other way’. At the heart of Bean’s 
complaints is non-acceptance by some of the benefits a colonial life bestows on the 
individual and the focus on other causes: ‘You Englishmen, however, are constantly 
impressing upon us that these chance advantages were the root of the matter; and this I 
believe to be radically wrong and untrue’.
24 Bean’s cherished view of the benefits of 
colonial  life  in  producing  a  stronger  fighting  people  leads  him  to  minimise 
instrumental causes of Australian success and undermines his claim to impartiality. 
This exchange with Edmonds was a turning point, for Bean hardened his subsequent 
views  regarding  his  bush  ethos,  and  became  less  willing  to  accept  Edmonds’ 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 C. E. W. Bean, Official History, vol. vi, p. 1080. 
24 AWM 38, 3DRL 7953/34, part 2, Bean’s letter to Edmonds, October 11, 1932.  
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comments, particularly over matters which challenged Bean’s view of the English 
officer class. 
Edmonds replied dryly that Bean’s letter ‘is of more than usual interest, and it 
puts me in possession of the Australian point of view, of which I shall avail myself’. 
He assured Bean that in dealing with the 8th of August, 1918 he would ‘appropriate’ 
Bean’s phrase that ‘colonial life and conditions produce, on the whole, a stronger 
fighting people’. Edmonds, in a conciliatory mood, said he believed it to be true, and 
in his experience of the engineers, men who had worked overseas in Australia, South 
Africa or the Argentine, benefited from the experience and turned out to be better 
engineers and fighting men ‘than the product of the great engineering firms at home’.
25 
However,  Edmonds  cautioned  Bean  that  comparisons  made  when  the  Australians 
arrived in France between the Australians and the home divisions there should take 
into account that these divisions ‘had lost so heavily and had been so much diluted by 
very young officers and untrained other ranks that they did not fairly represent the old 
country’s fighting force’. He also admitted that the Army and Navy did not attract the 
‘best brains’ due to the poor financial prospects. He quoted Dr Wheldon of Harrow, 
who forty years earlier had told Edmonds, ‘No clever boy goes into the Army’, and 
Edmonds thought it ‘fairly true’.
26 He lamented the fact that the Army made little 
effort to ‘attract talent’ and added that the few ‘clever’ boys generally go into the 
Royal Engineers ‘and are soon lost to soldiering, indeed, acquire a contempt for it!’. 
Edmonds, commenting upon British Staff Officers, stated that at the start of the war 
there would have been ‘no more than a couple of dozen really competent ones, and 
that the situation was worse now’. He admitted to Bean that those in a position to 
know  at  GHQ  were  of  the  view  that  the  staff  work  of  the  Australian  Corps  and 
                                                 
25 Ibid., Edmonds to Bean, November 14, 1932. 
26 Ibid.  
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Divisions (except the 2nd) was by 1918 of a higher order than the rest. In an attempt to 
repair some of the damage of his previous letter, Edmonds suggested that in future 
they would have ‘to look to Australia for a future C-in-C [Commander-in-Chief] or at 
least the C.G.S [Chief of the General Staff]’.
27 
It seems clear from Edmonds’ reply that he accepted he had been provocative, 
and  was  now  prepared  to  concede  ground  to  Bean  on  the  benefits  colonial  life 
bestowed upon the individual. He went further than he needed to in appeasing Bean 
with his observation of the Army’s inability to attract ‘talent’, and his criticism over 
the quality of British staff work at the start of the war. He prudently did not respond to 
Bean’s reply concerning his comments on the perceived advantages the homogenous 
formations  gave  Dominion  troops,  preferring  instead  to  re-establish  good  working 
relations for the future.  
Bean was not alone in believing that the British Army disciplinary regime was 
‘feudal’; in fact German leaders envied the severity of the British military code. Crown 
Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria noted in his diary in December 1917: ‘The administration 
of discipline by the English is very rigid. Whilst on our side there is known to me only 
a single case in which a soldier on account of aggravated refusal of duty in the face of 
the enemy was shot.’
28 The rigidity of the British disciplinary code was also envied by 
General Erich von Ludendorff, First Quartermaster-General 1916-18, who lamented in 
his  memoirs  the  fact  that  the  absence  of  a  British-style  military  discipline  was  a 
significant  factor  in  Germany’s  defeat.
29  The  British  Army  executed  351  British 
soldiers, which represents just over eleven per cent of those who were condemned to 
death. By contrast, the much larger German Army executed forty-eight of the 150 men 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Mien  Kriegstagebuch, vol. vii, pp. 303-4, quoted in C. E. W. Bean, Official History, vol. v, p. 25.  
29 Gerard Oram, Military Executions during World War I (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
p. 19.  
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it condemned to death.
30 Far fewer Germans were executed, but of those condemned 
the  execution  rate  was  much  higher  than  the  British  at  over  one  third.  Liberal 
politicians in Germany resisted the protests of their High Command by modifying the 
military code by a gradual ‘tightening’ of the rules regarding evidence and trials which 
constrained German commanders in their attempts to secure death sentences. Further 
alterations  were  made  to  the  military  code  in  1917  that  effectively  banned  field 
punishments, allowed more lenient sentences for the crimes of absence and desertion, 
and abolished restraints on prisoners. These reforms came at a time, paradoxically, 
when Germany was effectively under military control. Ludendorff, who presumably 
did not have the power to prevent these reforms, commented in his memoirs: ‘Those in 
the homeland constantly pushed to liberalise military law while the enemy stiffened 
his. They simply couldn’t accept the necessity to inflict heavy sentences let alone the 
death penalty.’
31 
The  number  of  French  soldiers  executed  numbered  approximately  600,  the 
numbers  remaining  comparable  with  the  British  figures  due  to  their  much  larger 
army.
32 A further comparison shows that 340 civilians were executed in Britain for 
criminal offences during the period from 1901 to 1924.
33 Therefore, the AIF and other 
Dominion Forces that made up the British Army on the Western Front during the 
Great  War  faced  a  tougher  disciplinary  regime  than  either  of  the  two  major 
combatants, France and Germany. It was on the Western Front that British soldiers 
were especially vulnerable as the death penalty was applied there, proportionately, 
more than anywhere else. With the Australians immune from the death penalty, two 
                                                 
30 A. Babington, For the Sake of Example (London: Leo Cooper, 1983), pp. 3, 189; G. Sheffield, 
Leadership in the Trenches (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press), 2000, pp. 62-63. 
31 Gerard Oram, Military Executions during World War I, p. 36. 
32 Ibid., p. 18. 
33 G. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p. 63.  
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levels of discipline were imposed on British troops that caused great consternation to 
the British High Command. Because of the rigidity of the British military code the 
British Army remained the only army on the Western Front not to experience serious 
disciplinary problems at the frontline. The French, whose losses had been far more 
severe than the British, had to resort to a defensive role owing to large sections of their 
army refusing to attack after the failed Nivelle offensive in 1917. The German Army, 
too, in the latter part of 1918 began to crumble. It can therefore be argued that the strict 
British disciplinary code held up in the face of major setbacks and appalling losses. 
The Australians held up too, in battle, but experienced problems with discipline at the 
front in late 1918 when the 1st Battalion refused to return to the line. But away from 
the frontline their discipline remained a problem. Their disciplinary record was worse, 
too, in all other areas where the death penalty was not an option of punishment.  
Although Bean overstates the benefits colonial life bestowed on the individual in 
the Official History and in his exchanges with Edmonds, cultural differences played a 
part in Australian success on the battlefield. While it is difficult to see how an army 
drawn largely from Australian urban centres produced a better fighting people, it can 
be argued that civilians joining an army that encouraged initiative would produce a 
more effective fighting force, especially if they remained in homogenous units as the 
Australians largely did. The Australian formations were in many ways a reflection of 
the values of the civilian population back home in that there were less formal inter-
rank relations, a product of a less hierarchical society, and with it came a civilian 
attitude to the task of soldiering. In contrast, the British Army, at the start of the war, 
was less likely to mirror ‘civilian values directly’ than the continental armies of France 
and Germany, according to Watson, owing to the fact that it was a smaller, volunteer 
professional  army,  given  the  task  of  garrisoning  the  empire  and  not  linked  to  
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mainstream  British  society  through  conscription.
34  During  1915-16  the  BEF 
experienced a massive expansion under Lord Kitchener, which gave the Army a more 
‘civilian  character’  than  before.  On  September  10,  1914,  British  Prime  Minister 
Asquith reported to Parliament that ‘practically 439,000’ men had volunteered in a 
ten-day period. A further 2,500,000 volunteers, who came from across the social range 
in Britain, would follow this first wave.
35 By contrast, in the pre-war period the army 
was unable to attract citizens of ability and made do with the least educated and the 
less intelligent, which in many ways justified the retention of strict command and 
disciplinary structures, and as a consequence stifled initiative. The Army was therefore 
out of step with the British perception of themselves as ‘open-minded and freedom-
loving people’ and with its experience on arduous colonial campaigns behind it had 
seen the need to maintain a strict disciplinary code to keep the lowest in society in 
check.
36 However, as Edmonds told Bean (above) the Army changed during the course 
of the war, so by the second half there was increased delegation of command and a 
more enlightened approach to the better quality civilian soldiers that were now in their 
ranks. This helped cultivate initiative that was so lacking in the pre-war army. The 
Australians therefore left their culture to join another one, the British Army’s culture, 
and brought with them the positive attribute of initiative. This cultural factor was not 
lacking in British society. It was more a case that the Australians, without a pre-war 
army infrastructure to contend with, were able and willing to foster initiative within 
their ranks.  
                                                 
34 Alexander Watson, ‘Culture and Combat in the Western World, 1900-1945’, in The Historical 
Journal, 52, 2 (2008), pp. 536-7. 
35 Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of The First World War, London: Sidgwick & 
Jackson, 1993, pp. 42-43. 
36 Alexander Watson, ‘Culture and Combat in the Western World, 1900-1945’, p. 537.  
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The  authority  to  discipline  soldiers  in  the  Great  War  came  from  Parliament, 
which annually reviewed and approved the Army Act that provided the disciplinary 
conditions under which troops lived and worked. Minor offences could be dealt with 
summarily by the commanding officer with more serious offences being dealt with by 
a court-martial. The most common form of court-martial convened in France was the 
field  general  court-martial,  which  handed  down  the  vast  majority  of  the  death 
sentences  passed  on  British  soldiers.  The  fate  of  these  men  lay  entirely  with  the 
commander-in-chief, who was charged under the Manual of Military Law ‘to maintain 
discipline among the troops and other persons forming part of or following an army’. 
Although the last word lay with the commander-in-chief, opinion was sought from 
various officers in the chain of command, including the convicted man’s immediate 
commanding officer, his brigade and divisional commanders, and their reports had the 
potential to influence his eventual decision. There was no avenue of appeal for the 
condemned men, as existed in the civilian courts,
 37 and justice was left to be dispensed 
by the commander-in-chief who had also to weigh up the current state of discipline in 
the man’s unit. The Proceedings of Courts Martial from 1914 to 1920 (see Table 1.1 
below) indicate the type of sentences that courts martial imposed on offenders.  
Field punishment, as a means of punishing troops for less serious crimes, became 
more  prevalent  after  flogging  was  finally  abolished  in  1881.
38  Field  Punishment 
Number 1, in addition to a sentence of hard labour, involved public humiliation for the 
soldier by having hands and feet fettered to a fixed object for a period of two hours per 
day,  but  not  exceeding  three  out  of  four  days,  in  view  of  his  comrades.  Field 
Punishment Number 2 was similar; however, the prisoner could not be tied to a fixed 
object but could be kept in restraints to prevent escape. It was seen as a better option to 
                                                 
37 Gerard Oram, Military Executions during World War I, p. 34. 
38 Ibid., p. 21.  
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Table 1.1 
Summary of Analysis of Proceedings of Courts Martial  
at Home and Abroad: August 4, 1914 to March 31, 1920.
39 
Officers:    Other Ranks:   
Death  3  Death   343 
Life Penal Servitude  0  Life Penal Servitude  143 
15 Years’ Penal Servitude  0  15 Years’ Penal Servitude  461 
Penal Servitude: (3-12 years)  8  Penal Servitude: (3-12 years)  6,812 
Imprisonment/Hard Labour  (6-24 
months) 
46  Imprisonment/Hard Labour (6-24 
months) 
38,041 
Imprisonment (6-24 months)  24  Imprisonment (6-24 months)  1,873 
Detention (3 months, 6 months,  
6 months+)  
0  Detention (3 months, 6 months,  
6 months+) 
105,231 
 
Field Punishment No. 1  0  Field Punishment No. 1  60,210 
Field Punishment No. 2  0  Field Punishment No. 2  20,759 
Discharged with Ignominy  0  Discharged with Ignominy  970 
Cashiered  377  Cashiered  0 
Dismissed  1,085  Dismissed  0 
Forfeiture/Seniority/Rank  954  Forfeiture/Seniority/Rank  27,639 
Reprimand  2,638  Reprimand  0 
Fines/Stoppages  34  Fines/Stoppages  33,469 
Quashed/Not Confirmed/Remitted  86  Quashed/Not Confirmed/Remitted  4, 900 
Suspended  0  Suspended  9,468 
detention, which would keep the convicted soldier out of operations. The regimental 
police  who  were  nominally  under  the  control  of  the  battalion  RSM  usually 
administered Field Punishment when the battalion came out of the line. It was carried 
out in view of the soldier’s comrades to humiliate the accused and at the same time to 
act as a deterrent. By 1916, Field Punishments could be summarily imposed by a 
commanding officer for up to a period of twenty-eight days without a court-martial, 
                                                 
39 Source: Reproduced from Julian Putkowski, “The Pardon Campaign’,  
website http://www.association14-18.   
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with a maximum period of up to three months that a court-martial could impose.
40 
Therefore, Bean’s view of the ‘feudal’ nature of discipline in the Army has merit when 
Field  Punishment  and  executions  are  considered.  The  severity  of  the  disciplinary 
regime is evident in the figures that indicate that 92 per cent of all men tried by court-
martial were found guilty.
41 These issues will be discussed in future chapters, but the 
table of convictions does indicate that British soldiers, like the Australians, were by no 
means passive when facing the military hierarchy. 
Of all the unfavourable comparisons Bean makes with the home forces none is so 
demonstrably  wrong  as  his  view  of  the  English  officer  class  and  the  gap  that  he 
believed existed between leader and led. As good officer and other rank relations play 
a vital role in the maintenance of discipline and morale in a unit it is worth examining 
these perceived differences. In 1938, Edmonds, commenting upon Bean’s draft chapter 
for volume vi of the Official History, was clearly at odds with his understanding of 
how the British Army had changed during the course of the war with regard to the 
social  distinction  between  officers  and  men,  and  the  methods  of  commissioning 
officers from the ranks. Bean had contrasted the system that operated in the AIF where 
a man commissioned would invariably stay with his old unit, to the British principle of 
placing the commissioned man with a different unit. Behind this was Bean’s view that 
the  social  gulf  that  existed  between  the  classes  afforded  the  newly  commissioned 
officer  an  in-built  deference  necessary  for  military  discipline,  and  therefore  that 
previous familiarity with men from his unit would jeopardise that. For Bean, social 
distinctions within the AIF were ‘unrecognised’,
42 therefore officers had to earn the 
respect of their men, as deference was not a means of control. Edmonds did not agree, 
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and quoted General H. R. Davies (Oxford & Bucks, L.I.): ‘in the war N.C.O.’s were 
often promoted in their own battalions. A company sergeant major of my Regiment in 
1914 became temporary commanding officer in 1918.’
43 
Edmonds added that this was the case in the cavalry, ‘even in peace time’, with 
the commissioned ‘ranker’ being given financial assistance from other officers to pay 
his way in the cavalry mess. He added: ‘Many mechanics, labourers, &c., became 
officers in British regiments, and no social distinctions were made between them and 
other officers . . . It did not matter whether a man was Jew or Gentile, Duke’s son or 
cook’s son, we took him for what he was as a man.’
44 
Bean appropriated Edmonds’ sentiments to apply to the selection of Australian 
officers in the Official History, stating that by 1918 few Australian commanders paid 
any regard to the social status of the men whom they selected to be officers. Education 
often figured in the selection, as did manners occasionally, but Bean, paraphrasing 
Edmonds, wrote: ‘it mattered not whether a man was a labourer or barrister, tradesman 
or clerk, mechanic or farmer, engine-driver or policeman, baker or stockbroker, the -
average battalion commander now had his eye only on those qualities that fitted him 
for leadership, intelligence, courage, reliability, and strength of will; and knowing that 
he was selecting his own officers he was all the more careful about the choice’.
45 
Earlier,  Edmonds  commented  upon  what  appears  to  be  a  piece  of  appalling 
snobbery by Bean who wrote ‘that it was distasteful for Australian officers to have to 
associate  with  the  officers  of  the  New  Army’.  Edmonds  asked  Bean  whether  this 
comment was really necessary, adding that ‘if you must say it point out that the old 
type of British regimental officer had died in 1914. I myself did not relish associating 
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in hospital and elsewhere with the officers of the New Army.’
46 Bean was to omit this 
from his history but made the point that: ‘to many of the finest Australian officers it 
was a new and distasteful experience to be plunged (as occasionally happened during 
their  war  service)  into  English  circles  where,  though  they  themselves  were  often 
received with great kindness, people of the circles from which they had enlisted were 
obviously held to be outside the social pale’.
47 
Edmonds added that the old type of British soldier ‘preferred to be led by what he 
called ‘‘a bit of blood’’ and loathed the ‘‘ranker’’ officer if he retained as he generally 
did N.C.O. manners’. Edmonds was referring to an army that no longer existed and 
accused Bean of misunderstanding ‘the Army which promoted from the ranks and 
loved  old  Wally  Robertson’.  However,  Edmonds  made  little  impact  on  Bean’s 
ideological conception of the British, their army, and his perceived notions of the 
social mores of the day.  
Edmonds commented further upon the draft chapter responding to Bean’s claim 
that English officers’ messes reflected the social class from which the officers were 
drawn with conditions there quite superior to what the common soldier had to endure. 
By contrast, Bean had referred to the Australian tradition that ‘forbade’ officers from 
eating food and drink different from the other ranks. Edmonds, who was in a position 
to know, being stationed for long periods at GHQ, wrote: ‘Not even Staff messes, not 
even at G.H.Q. We drew the same rations as the men, went without tablecloths and our 
servants did the cooking. When dear old Professor David joined our mess we took a 
little more trouble. We did get port.’
48 However, this would not interfere with Bean’s 
view of the English officer class and in the Official History he wrote: ‘Whereas, for 
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example, in the British Army it was accepted as healthy – indeed almost essential – 
condition that, even at the front, officers’ messes should be maintained with at least 
some  faint  reflection  of  the  style  to  which  the  officer  class  in  England  was 
accustomed’.
49 Conditions at GHQ were described as ‘sparse’ by Bean in a footnote, 
the only recognition of Edmonds’ comments. 
Bean contrasts the Australian system of selection of officers from the ranks to 
what he sees as selection by the British from a specific stratum of society. He ignored 
Edmonds’ protests on the matter as well as the fact that over 100,000 officers were 
commissioned from the ranks of the home forces during the war. In almost every 
comparison he makes between the home forces and the Australians, it is the home 
forces that suffer. He claimed that the beneficial result of the Australian selection 
process of officers was that the Australian officer was much closer to his men than his 
British  counterpart,  adding  that  he  had  to  rely  on  his  strength  of  personality  as  a 
natural deference did not exist. The notion that the social gap between officers and 
other ranks could not be bridged is one that Peter Liddle sees as one of the great 
misconceptions of the Great War. As the former curator of a significant collection of 
World War One letters and diaries, he states that: 
Of all the misconceptions purveyed about the First World War, few so flagrantly deny 
the truth as the implication that across the socio-military gap between officer and man in 
the ranks there would be little kinship, no common identity in their wants, needs, fears, 
no understanding and sympathy based upon mutual respect. The letters and diaries of 
men on both sides of the divide between regimental leaders and led, conclusively refute 
such an interpretation.
50  
Furthermore, German officers noted the respect other ranks had for their officers when 
they examined British prisoners. They also commented on their ability to maintain 
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morale, and their ‘iron discipline’, which they saw, perhaps in an exaggerated fashion, 
as being maintained by a ‘severe code of punishments’.
51 
Bean’s  claim  that  British  officers  were  drawn  from  a  specific  social  class  is 
largely true for the pre-war army, but the pressure of war was to change that radically. 
As  far  back  as  1910  the  Adjutant-General,  commenting  upon  the  Regular  Army, 
stated: ‘We are coming to the end of our tether as regards candidates from the limited 
class  which  has  hitherto  supplied  the  commissioned  ranks’.
52  On  August  1,  1914, 
733,514 men served in the British Army and this figure had grown to an estimated 
3,563,466 by November 1918, with a total of 5,704,000 having served during the 
war.
53 Exceptionally high casualty rates sustained by junior officers, many drawn from 
an elite class, which suffered disproportionately to other groups, meant that change 
was forced upon the Army. Although the Army did try to maintain the existing social 
structure of the officer-corps by insisting that officer candidates possess an Officer 
Training  Certificate  (OTC),  graded  A  from  a  public  school;  or  B,  gained  from  a 
University; the sheer number of casualties forced the ‘abandonment’ of this policy. 
However,  by  adopting  a  policy  of  awarding  temporary  commissions  (regular 
commissions  were  much  harder  to  come  by),  the  radical  change  in  the  social 
composition of the officer-class was limited to the war period, as these officers were 
demobilised in 1918-1919. As Sheffield observes, ‘the post-war officer-class more 
closely resembled that of 1913 than that of 1918’.
54 
An analysis of the occupations of demobilised officers up to 1920, conducted by 
the War Office, shows that the social composition of the wartime officer class had 
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undergone a radical change. On November 11, 1918, 164,255 officers were serving in 
the  army.  An  analysis  by  the  War  Office  of  the  dispersal  certificates  of  144,075 
officers, who had been demobilised since May 12, 1920, placed these men in broad 
categories of occupation. Sheffield examined the three largest groups: ‘commercial 
and clerical’, ‘students and teachers’, and ‘professional’, to gain an insight into the 
social composition of the 1918 Army officer corps. Sheffield showed that although the 
‘commercial and clerical’ group included men from a lower social status they still 
managed  a  significant  36.5  per  cent,  or  58,706  serving  officers.  Within  each 
occupational group of those enlisted it was found that 44 per cent of ‘professional 
men’, 38 per cent of all ‘students and teachers’, 8 per cent of clerical workers, and 0.2 
per cent of labourers served as officers.
55 These figures illustrate that social change 
was forced upon the army as they had already drawn heavily on the ‘gentleman’ class, 
which was just too small to cope with the demands on it. This left men from social and 
educational backgrounds not normally considered suitable for a commission serving as 
officers during the war. Furthermore, many of them were craftsmen, as the figures for 
‘engineering’ indicate. It is no surprise that the middle classes represent the largest 
group  from  which  officers  were  drawn.  However,  Sheffield  makes  the  point  that 
considering the number of working class soldiers serving they ‘were grossly under-
represented  in  officers’  messes’,  which  leads  him  to  conclude  that  ‘a  limited 
meritocracy emerged in the British Army during the Great War’.
56 A similar pattern of 
selecting  officers  disproportionately  from  non-manual  backgrounds,  such  as 
commerce, the professions and clerical work, emerges in the AIF.
57 There are clear 
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indications  that  many  men  were  promoted  on  merit  in  the  British  Army,  and  the 
picture that Bean paints of a class-ridden wartime army needs amending. 
In his idealizing the Australian infantryman and officer Bean is left with the 
thorny problem of explaining the high levels of Australian indiscipline, particularly 
absence without leave and desertion, against his central thesis of a bush ethos. After 
all, the Canadians and New Zealanders could well claim similar frontier values and yet 
their  disciplinary  record  was  much  better  by  comparison.  By  1916  the  levels  of 
desertion and absence without leave were causing great concern to the High Command 
and senior Australian officers. It seems clear from the prevalence of these military 
crimes that Australian troops were fully aware of where they stood in respect of the 
Defence Act (Section 98), which states: ‘No member of the Defence Force shall be 
sentenced to death by any court-martial except for mutiny, desertion to the enemy, or 
traitorously delivering up to the enemy any garrison, fortress, post, guard, or ship, 
vessel, or boat, or traitorous correspondence with the enemy; and no sentence of death 
passed  by  any  court-martial  shall  be  carried  into  effect  until  confirmed  by  the 
Governor-General’.
58 
Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, commander of I Anzac Corps, thought 
that if this were legal, then it should be removed, so soldiers serving side by side were 
subject to the same law. The War Office, however, recognised its legality and cabled 
the Commonwealth Government in July 1916 seeking their agreement to place its 
troops under the Army Act without restriction. The request came at a time when the 
first campaign over conscription was about to begin and so the Australian Government 
was to delay its answer by several months. There was no reply by December 1916. 
Birdwood shared his fear with Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commander 
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of Fourth Army, to which I Anzac Corps was now attached, that Australian discipline 
would suffer ‘when the men realise that they are not on precisely the same footing in 
all respects as all the other soldiers serving in France’.
59 In the same month three files 
of  Australians  convicted  of  desertion  in  I  Anzac  were  sent  to  GHQ  with  the 
recommendation from the brigadier and divisional commander that in each of these 
cases the death sentence be applied. It seems clear that an example was needed in 
Rawlinson’s army as of 182 men who were convicted of absence without leave, 130 
were members of I Anzac. Not surprisingly, Rawlinson wrote to the Commander-in-
Chief, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, saying that ‘I cannot be responsible for the 
maintenance of discipline among the Australian forces under my command unless the 
required alteration in the law is made forthwith’.
60 
Haig had written to the War Office in May and December 1916 calling for an 
amendment  of  the  Australian  Defence  Act  as  a  matter  of  ‘grave  urgency’.  He 
considered the lack of the death penalty to be the cause of an ‘alarming’ increase in 
desertion rates among Australian troops. Young reinforcements and more experienced 
men returning from convalescence were deserting on their return from England to the 
front. Furthermore, in February 1917 the I Anzac sector came under the jurisdiction of 
the Fifth Army Police who reported that in recent weeks, of forty-three prisoners who 
had escaped their custody, thirty were Australians.
61 In the same month, Haig again 
pressed the War Office on the matter and the Army Council cabled Australia: ‘The 
matter  is  of  utmost  gravity  for  the  discipline  of  whole  army’.
62  The  Australian 
Government replied, and on the recommendation of Senator Pearce, would not agree 
to  the  full  application  of  the  Army  Act.  Having  failed  to  carry  the  conscription 
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referendum in October 1916 the Australian Government would have had little chance 
of success in a future referendum if they had agreed to the execution of Australian 
troops convicted of military crimes. 
 It was a decision that was unacceptable to the British High Command and the 
call for its amendment came again as early as May 1917, this time by two senior 
Australian officers. The Australian 4th Division was experiencing high numbers of 
absences and an example was needed. Brigadier William Glasgow, commander of 
13th  Brigade  and  Major  General  William  Holmes,  Division  commander,  pressed 
Birdwood to ask for the Act to be amended so the death penalty could be inflicted ‘in a 
few cases’. Birdwood agreed, and told Pearce the high levels of desertion could be 
stopped with the infliction of the death penalty ‘in one or two extreme cases’.
63 
Haig, in his letter to the War Office in July 1917, refuted the argument that the 
freedom that colonial life offered made men ‘less amenable to discipline’. He believed 
the situation had deteriorated with regard to the high rates of desertion and absence 
without leave among Australian troops since he wrote in January, a state of affairs he 
attributed ‘solely’ to the lack of the death penalty. He feared that unless the Australian 
Government agreed to remove the restriction regarding the death penalty ‘the fighting 
efficiency of these Divisions will deteriorate to an extent which may gravely affect the 
success of our Arms’. The comparative figures he provided with the rest of the BEF 
(see below) Haig described as ‘striking’, and needed no further comment from him.
 64 
Convictions for desertion in the BEF, January to June 1917. 
      Average number 
    Total  per Division  
  5 Australian Divisions  171  34.2  
  57 Remaining Divisions in BEF  506      8.87 
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When comparisons are made with the New Zealand Division, to which the death 
penalty could be applied, only eight cases of desertion are recorded in the same period. 
This led Haig to conclude that ‘the argument that is occasionally put forward that the 
men from the Overseas Dominions are less amenable to discipline, as the result of the 
freedom of their ordinary life, is not borne out by the facts’. He said that similar results 
are found when other offences are examined, although Haig did not provide figures for 
the New Zealand Division. The offence of absence without leave, Haig defined as 
being ‘akin’ to desertion, because those cases, which result in a court-martial, are 
usually of men whose absence has kept them out of the ‘firing line’. He wrote: ‘One 
Army reports that this offence is very prevalent in the three Australian Divisions’, as 
the figures provided by Haig indicate.
 65 
Convictions for Absence in One Army, June 10 to June 30, 1917. 
       Average number 
    Total  per Division  
  3 Australian Divisions  63  21  
  22 Remaining Divisions in the Army  42       1.9 
 
Haig thought that once the Australian Government became aware of these facts 
they would consider amending the Defence Act. He set out to assure them by stating 
that: ‘the power of inflicting the death penalty is very sparingly used. It is only in cases 
where the offence is of a very deliberate character and an example is urgently required, 
that such sentences are confirmed.’ However, he warned them, too, that unless this 
restriction was lifted he would not be responsible for the ‘serious consequences’ that 
may ensue.
66 His concern was not just with deteriorating Australian indiscipline but 
how  their  example  would  affect  the  rest  of  the  army.  Birdwood  had  suggested, 
independently of GHQ’s position, that only desertion would carry the death penalty 
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and the Australian Government could sanction this, if and when conscription was in 
place and enlistments were assured.
67 However, the Australian Government refused to 
amend  the  Act  as  enlistments  were  waning.  They  had  behind  them  a  failed 
conscription referendum and the prospect of a further referendum in 1917.  
Bean, although he quoted extensively from Haig’s July 1917 letter in the Official 
History, made no mention of Haig’s dismissal of the argument that Dominion forces 
were ‘less amenable to discipline’, nor did he comment upon the low desertion rate 
among the New Zealanders, except to present the figures. Bean’s approach was to 
isolate  the  men  who  committed  these  offences,  whom  he  sees  as  slighting  the 
reputation of the AIF, as well as to provide mitigating circumstances. According to 
Bean, the problems with absences in the 4th Division, discussed above, came after an 
‘exceptionally severe trial at Bullecourt’ and became worse when the Division was 
reinforced and sent north to Messines.
68 This Division, Bean explained, whilst training 
in Egypt had been forced to accept many men rejected by the 1st and 2nd Divisions. 
Therefore, the Division had more than its fair share of ‘hard cases’ and ‘ne’er-do-
wells’. Persistent deserters, Bean stated, ‘were always men of this type – in some cases 
actual criminals who had enlisted without the intention of serving at the front, and 
ready to go to any length to avoid it’.
69 Bean thought it was a small, hard-core group 
who, by refusing frontline duty, were ‘recognised by their comrades as well as by their 
officers to be worthless to any community’.
70 However, Bean believed that this group 
was having a bad influence by leading astray younger members as well as some of the 
more war-weary veterans of the AIF. But as every Australian knew, any death penalty 
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that was passed would have to be commuted. The only deterrent was prison, and as 
harsh as this could be, it was preferable to duty at the front. 
Bean left out of the Official History his private frustrations, which he confined to 
his notebook, regarding the proper enforcement of courts martial.
71 In these notes he 
does not see prison as a deterrent, rather as a place where offenders meet others of bad 
character, and the process of repeat offending starts. He posed the problem of an 
offender [only] doing three months of his sentence, and then returning to his battalion. 
In turn he influences three more who end up in prison with him doing six months of 
their  sentences.  On  returning  to  their  battalion,  he  and  ‘his  drunken  companions’ 
escape custody and get to Paris, where they are recaptured, only to escape from the 
guardroom again. Bean thought that prison sentences were not being enforced, and that 
offenders were released from prison if they behaved, even where no suspension of 
sentence had been requested. A sentenced man could also be held at a Divisional or 
Corps compound at the request of the battalion, until the papers for commitment were 
sent to a governor of a prison. Bean appeared to be saying that the delay is intentional, 
however, he does say that ‘this is due to a policy of weakness’
72 which does indicate a 
degree of slackness about the enforcement of sentences. 
The level of Australian indiscipline can be seen in the comparative figures for 
courts martial convictions during the war for soldiers on active service from New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada. Out of 100,444 New Zealanders on overseas service 
2,009  courts  martial  were  imposed,  compared  with  approximately  23,000  courts 
martial for 331,814 Australians in the AIF, and approximately 18,000 courts martial 
for 458,218 Canadians.
73 One in fourteen Australians, one in fifty New Zealanders, 
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and one in twenty-five Canadians faced a court-martial. The ratios of courts martial 
per country are approximate, as some men would have been court-martialed more than 
once. The Australian figure, however, is a clear indication of the disciplinary problems 
the  AIF  faced.
74  Australian  indiscipline  may  partly  have  been  the  consequence  of 
incurring heavy losses, lack of adequate leave and reinforcements. But this did not 
prevent  Australian  courts  martial  handing  down  severe  sentences,  with  Australian 
courts sentencing 121 Australians to death, of which 117 were in France. Furthermore, 
it was the belief among senior British and Australian commanders that their ‘inability 
to carry out these sentences’ was a contributing factor to Australian desertions.  
Desertion remained a serious problem in the AIF in 1917 and 1918 and the true 
figures may never be known owing to the interpretation of the charge of desertion that 
was often downgraded to the lesser charge of absence without leave. Nevertheless, the 
convictions for desertion increased markedly from 288 in 1916, to 1,283 in 1917, with 
1,807 desertions in 1918. The figures for 1917 are four times higher than any other 
division in the British Army.
75 It must also be borne in mind that Australian courts and 
Australian officers handed down these sentences. 
In writing the Official History Bean was able to develop arguments about the 
Australian character and nationhood, views he held before the war as a journalist with 
the Sydney Morning Herald.
76 The comparisons Bean makes with other troops and 
nations reveals a deeper need to demonstrate that colonial society, free from social 
barriers,  produce  an  improved  version  of  the  Anglo  Saxon  race:  stronger,  more 
independent and resourceful. This view was not confined to Bean as ‘The Coming 
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Man’ had many advocates in England, with many prominent commentators praising 
the physical attributes and confidence of the average Australian soldier compared with 
the products of Britain’s industrial areas.
77 The Great War put Australia on the world 
stage, and for Bean it was as much a test of the Australian character as it was for the 
coming nation. In 1932 Bean stated his objectives in writing the Official History: ‘The 
first question for my fellow historians and myself clearly was. How did the Australian 
people - and the Australian character, if there is one -come through the universally 
recognised test of this, their first great war?’
78 
The  unfavourable  comparisons  Bean  made  with  the  home  forces,  and  his 
depiction of a class-ridden British Army, although this was not his main purpose, 
nevertheless created the context in which Australian indiscipline could be understood. 
The British Army of 1918 bore little resemblance to the 1914 Army, and Bean failed 
to  take  that  into  account,  partly  because  of  his  beliefs  regarding  the  Australian 
character. The Australians had changed, too, during the course of the war, and Bean 
was cautioned by Edmonds against trying ‘to persuade the Australian public that in 
1916 the Australian Corps was the fine instrument it was in 1918’.
79  
Bean,  in  the  Official  History,  laid  the  foundations  of  the  Anzac  Legend  by 
exaggerating the differences between Australian and British performance in the war. 
Australian prowess on the battlefield provided a heroic base for a nation that was only 
federated some thirteen years before the outbreak of war. Recent research has cast 
doubt on whether those distinctive and allegedly Australian attributes of mateship and 
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egalitarianism made a significant difference in Australian battlefield performance.
80 
Edmonds, earlier, had pointed to other factors: the corps formations of the Dominion 
Divisions; and by 1918 the high quality of the staff work of the Australian Corps and 
Divisions (except the 2nd), which suggest that military success owed more to factors 
such as training and organization than any alleged ‘Australian’ traits.
81 
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C h a p t e r   2  
THIS PRIVILEGED POSITION 
The British High Command, by 1918, had great difficulty in accepting the fact that the 
death  penalty  could  not  be  applied  to  Australian  soldiers  for  military  crimes.  Senior 
commanders  were  still  calling  for  an  end  to  the  ‘privileged  position’  the  Australians 
enjoyed under the Army Act that had restricted the range of punishments that Australian 
courts martial could impose. Complaints continued from GHQ that Australian courts were 
not using the powers they did possess, citing, as an example, Australian ‘unwillingness’ 
to impose Field Punishment Number 1. Further, they emphasised the comparatively large 
numbers  of  acquittals,  some  ‘quite  against  the  evidence  presented’.
1  The  anomaly  of 
having soldiers under the Army Act with the restriction of being immune from the death 
penalty was galling and viewed as divisive by GHQ, but now it seemed the Australians 
were in a further privileged position when being tried for non-capital offences by courts 
martial  composed  of  Australian  officers.  Moreover,  in  June  1918  the  Australian 
authorities were calling for all trials involving Australian soldiers to be tried by courts 
consisting of exclusively Australian officers. However, in the weeks before the Armistice 
this differentiation in the treatment of offences came into sharp focus with the alleged 
murder, on October 31, of a French civilian by an Australian soldier, Private (6944) W. 
H. J. Banks, a case that caught the eye of GHQ. Further, according to Brigadier General 
B. E. W. Childs of the Department of Personal Services (DPS), an Australian soldier 
Private (1828) J. Richmond, who had been under arrest since June 1918, was charged and 
                                                 
1 (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 83, letter from Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in 
France to The Secretary, War Office, London, dated June 23, 1918.   32 
found guilty of murdering an Australian sergeant, the proceedings not being confirmed 
due to the inadequacy of the sentence that could be imposed.
2  
Under the existing Australian Military Regulation 490 (Regulation 2), as it stood, 
no sentence of penal servitude could be imposed on an Australian convicted of murder, 
and it seemed two years would be the maximum that would apply.
3 In contrast, all 
other troops within the British Army facing similar charges either would be tried for 
their lives by field general court-martial or be liable for trial in British or French 
courts. The Banks’ case would occupy GHQ and government officials at the highest 
level in their attempts to get the death penalty applied in this case, for they feared 
ramifications  with  the  French  if  it  came  to  light  that  their  inhabitants  could  be 
murdered without the sanction of the death penalty. However, there was more at stake 
than upsetting the French, for if Banks was found guilty of murder and executed, it was 
a way of forcing accountability on the Australians which GHQ had been unable to do 
for serious military crimes because of their immunity from the death penalty. With 
Germany in retreat by October 1918 the High Command  had one eye on a future 
armistice, and a capital conviction in this case could provide the example they needed 
to  curtail  the  behaviour  of  Australian  troops  waiting  embarkation  from  France  It 
                                                 
2 (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 6, Brigadier General B. E. W. Childs, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, 
DPS, December 6, 1918. 
3 Ibid., comments made by Brigadier General B. E. W. Childs, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, 
DPS in a Minute dated December 6, 1918. Richmond was retried by a general court-martial held at 
Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, on 17th, 19th and 20th November, 1919. He faced two charges: ‘(1) 
Committing  a  civil  offence,  that  is  to  say,  unlawfully  and  maliciously  wounding  with  intent  to  do 
grievous bodily harm, in that he near Frechencourt in France, on the night of the 25th and 26th June 
1918 unlawfully and maliciously wounded Sergt. Arthur Edward Beresford, 26th Battn. A.I.F. with 
intent to do him grievous bodily harm, by causing an explosion in a dugout in which the said Sergt. 
Arthur Edward Beresford then was’. The alternative charge ‘(2) Committing a civil offence, that is to 
say, unlawfully and maliciously wounding, in that he at the place and time mentioned in the first charge 
unlawfully and maliciously wounded the said Sergt. Arthur Edward Beresford by causing an explosion 
in a dugout in which the said Sergt. Edward Beresford then was.’ Richmond pleaded not guilty, but was 
found guilty on the first charge and not guilty on the second. He was sentenced to four years’ penal 
servitude (see NAA: B2455, Richmond, J.) Sergeant Beresford had died from this wound within three 
days of the explosion on June 29. His next of kin were told that he died from ‘accidental gunshot wound 
back’. This they accepted until his father, J. A. H. Beresford, Commander RAN (retired), read in the 
Hobart Mercury on November 19, 1919 that Richmond was being tried for maliciously wounding his 
son. An irate father wrote to the Officer-in-Charge, Base Records, Melbourne the same day demanding 
an explanation as to why next of kin had not been informed of the circumstances of his son’s death. See 
NAA: B2455, Beresford Arthur Edward, service record.   33 
appeared to Childs that not only did Australians escape the extreme sanction of the 
Army’s  disciplinary  code  but  that  it  extended  to  ‘the  right  to  free  murder’  if  the 
perpetrator could not be tried for his life, as would be the case for civilians and soldiers 
of either Britain or France.
4 Furthermore, individuals convicted of capital offences in 
Australia during this period would face possible execution, as they would for another 
generation. 
The visit of the Australian Prime Minister, William M. Hughes, to London in 
October 1918 provided the opportunity for the Secretary of State for War, Lord Milner, 
to try and meet with Hughes to express concerns over Australian indiscipline. In an 
attempt  to  impress  upon  Hughes  the  gravity  of  the  situation  a  report,  detailing 
Australian misconduct and criticism of Australian courts martial was compiled for 
Milner  by  the  Adjutant  General’s  Office,  General  Headquarters,  France  in  August 
1918.
5 Attached to this report was a Secret Minute addressed to the Secretary of State 
for  War  in  which  the  Adjutant-General’s  office,  commenting  upon  Australian 
misconduct, wrote: ‘The information was hurriedly collected in view of your possible 
interview with Mr. Hughes, but it throws a very lurid light upon the conduct of the 
Australian  troops,  and  from  what  I  have  heard  for  the  past  two  years,  does  not 
exaggerate the gravity of the situation’.
6 Further comments in the Secret Minute stated 
that ‘no one wishes to enforce the death sentence, but there is no question that it is the 
only remedy to restrain even disciplined troops in war time’. It is clear from this Secret 
Minute that the War Office and the Adjutant General feared the worst if the Australian 
Government did not bring their Army Act into line with the Acts of New Zealand and 
                                                 
4 (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 9, Brigadier General B. E. W. Childs, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, 
DPS, DPS, December 6, 1918. 
5  Ibid.,  items  71-74,  Lieutenant-General  G.  H.  Fowke,  Adjutant-General,  signed  this  letter  dated 
August  2,  1918  and  also  commented  on  matters  concerning  comparative  rates  of  imprisonment, 
absentees and desertions. 
6 Ibid., item 70, comments in a Secret Minute to the Secretary of State for War, August 14, 1918 
(signature unclear).  Why the Adjutant General’s report was gathered at short notice is not clear from this 
record as Milner was not meeting with Hughes until October, but one can surmise that Milner had asked 
for an urgent report.   34 
Canada. Without this restraint they believed Australian conduct would lead to a serious 
situation developing between Britain and the French authorities.
7 
The report gives examples of the apparent inability of Australian courts martial 
properly to examine cases, as well as producing a damning indictment of Australian 
behaviour away from the front. Nowhere in this report is there a sense of British 
effrontery to ‘larrikin’ type behaviour, failure to salute, etc, nor is there any mention of 
Australian battle discipline breaking down. The concern here is with serious military 
offences and criminal behaviour. The examples given by the Adjutant General’s office 
of acquittals are for crimes of rape, murder and unlawful shooting, crimes that should 
not elicit the sympathy of any court, whether British or Australian.  
Although in some of these cases the rulings appear perverse, they should not be 
taken completely at face value. They had been selected to make a point concerning 
Australian  courts  in  their  dealings  with  crimes  against  civilians  and  therefore  the 
claims made by GHQ need to be tested against the trial transcripts. For example, in the 
case of Private J. H. Maslin, the Adjutant General’s Office mistakenly assumed he was 
acquitted. They stated that: 
23rd June 1918. No. 1953, Pte J. H. MASLIN, 27th Btn. A.I.F., was tried on 13-6-18 for 
shooting with intent to do grievous bodily harm. On 9-5-18, when in AMIENS without a 
pass, the accused fired a revolver at a French Gendarme, who then fired back. Five shots 
were fired before Private MASLIN was arrested. Pte. MASLIN was acquitted.
 8 
This case was updated 2nd August, 1918. 
This  was  a  very  perverse  acquittal  by  an  Australian  Court.  MASLIN  was  roaming 
AMIENS with a revolver, and made a determined attempt to shoot a French Gendarme 
who fired back in self-defence.
9 
The claim that an Australian court acquitted Private Maslin is in fact incorrect. 
His military service record states that he was tried on May 13, 1918 (not June) charged 
on two counts: ‘shooting with intent to do grievous bodily harm; and secondly, being 
                                                 
7 Ibid., item 70, comments in a Secret Minute to the Secretary of State for War, August 14, 1918  
 
8 Ibid., item 82, Enclosure C, attached to Haig’s letter to the War Office, June 23, 1918. 
9 Ibid., item 72, Enclosure C, from the Adjutant General Office, GHQ to the War Office, August 2, 
1918.   35 
found beyond fixed limit without a pass’. He was found guilty on both counts and was 
given a sentence of two years’ imprisonment with hard labour. Maslin’s Suspension of 
Sentence document verifies that he was convicted and that his sentence was suspended 
on May 23, 1918.
10  
However, Maslin was armed with a revolver and did fire at a French gendarme, 
who presumably was about to arrest him. The leniency of the sentence, two years, is 
highly questionable, not only from the viewpoint of the Adjutant General but also of 
the French police officer who could have been shot dead by an ally while performing 
his duty. Maslin, for his crime, was only inconvenienced for a few days before his 
sentence was suspended and he was back with his unit. It is worth noting here that 
imprisonment in hard labour (IHL) could not be awarded for a term longer than two 
years. A sentence of penal servitude (PS) could not be awarded for less than three 
years, with the maximum being life.
11 The Maslin case was used twice to demonstrate 
the willingness of Australian courts to acquit, first by the Adjutant General and later by 
Haig to make a point about Australian indiscipline and Australian courts not making 
full use of their powers. 
The Adjutant-General’s office, in pressing their case against the reluctance of 
Australian courts to convict and thoroughly to examine the cases brought before them, 
gave the following example of what they considered a miscarriage of justice: 
No. AM/6036, M. T. Driver G. H. LANAGAN, 1st Austrn. M.T. Coy. A.I.F., was tried on 
5-5-18, on a charge of Murder. On 23-4-18 an altercation was heard between 2nd-Lt. 
BURKITT, 2nd/Yorks Regt., and a soldier alleged to be the accused. After some heated 
words and a scuffle the man fired a revolver at the officer and ran down the road, the 
officer followed him. Two or three more shots were fired and then 2nd-Lieut. BURKITT 
fell to the ground. The accused was acquitted on the strength of an alibi, which was of a 
feeble nature. He was identified by several witnesses for the prosecution.
12  
This case was updated 2nd August, 1918. 
                                                 
10 National Archives of Australia  (NAA) NAA: B2455, Maslin James, service record. 
11 Christopher Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell: New Zealanders and Military Discipline in the First 
World War, Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991, p. 343.  
12 (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 82, Enclosure C attached to Haig’s letter to the War Office, June 23, 
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This  man  ought  to  have  been  convicted.  The  identification  was  sufficient,  but  he 
produced a number of pals who put up an alibi. The Court made no attempt whatever to 
get at the truth by asking questions, which might test the truth of the alibi.
13 
In the example below the Adjutant General’s office accused Major C. Speckman, 
and other Australian officers, of perverting the course of justice:  
Major C. SPECKMAN, M.C., 1st Austrn. Pnr. Bn. Was tried on 24-5-18 on a charge of 
attempting to rape Mlle I. DEGROOTE, of Staple, a civilian inhabitant, in particularly 
brutal  circumstances.  At  the  Court-Martial  Mlle.  DEGROOTE  refused  to  incriminate 
Major SPECKMAN in any way although in a previous statement she declared that she 
had  been  most  seriously  assaulted  by  this  officer.  Major  SPECKMAN  was  in 
consequence acquitted. Subsequent enquiries established the fact that the accused with 
other Australian officers had paid several visits to Mlle. DEGROOTE and induced her 
not to give evidence against him. 
14  
This case was updated 2nd August 1918 
This was a very notorious case, and caused a great deal of stir at the time. I am perfectly 
certain that the French girl was intimidated. The attempted rape was aided and abetted by 
another Australian officer who held SPECKMAN’S horse during the operation, and tried 
to prevent Mlle. DEGROOTE’s father from going to the assistance of his daughter.
15 
In the case below of the alleged murder of a French youth the Adjutant-General 
was drawing attention to the activities of a lawless gang of Australian ‘desperadoes’ 
and not serving soldiers. 
1083/318 The body of a French youth was found in the Somme at Ailly on the 10th June. 
It is established that he was deliberately thrown into the river by a party of Australians, 
who prevented him from leaving the water, and kept him there until he was drowned. 
Enquiries are now proceeding.
16  
This case was updated 2nd August, 1918. 
This was a most determined murder committed by a gang of Australian desperadoes. The 
French youth had remonstrated with an Australian who was apparently insulting a small 
French girl. A fracas ensued, during which the Australian was struck. He then collected a 
party of his friends. They searched for the Frenchman and found him after some hours. 
They took him down to the river and threw him into the water. Some of them jumped in 
and  repeatedly  struck  the  Frenchman  in  the  water,  while  others  crossed  the  river  to 
prevent the victim from getting out the other side. The body of the youth was found some 
days  later. The  incident  was  witnessed  by  several  civilians  who  were  apparently  too 
terrified to interfere. The Police are investigating, but little hope is entertained of finding 
the men.
17 
                                                 
13 Ibid., item 72, from the Adjutant General Office, GHQ to the War Office, August 2, 1918. 
14 Ibid., item 82, Enclosure C, attached to Haig’s letter to the War Office, June 23, 1918.  
15 Ibid., item 72, from the Adjutant General Office, GHQ to the War Office, August 2, 1918. 
16 Ibid., item 82, Enclosure C, attached to Haig’s letter to the War Office, June 23, 1918. 
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This  catalogue  of  offences  could  well  be  seen  as  senior  British  commanders 
overstating  the  case  of  Australian  indiscipline  and  being  highly  selective  in  the 
evidence they wanted to present to Prime Minister Hughes. However, there is little 
doubt  that  they  were  expressing  their  frustration  at  their  inability  to  curtail  the 
behaviour of a section of their troops. They believed that restraining men in time of 
war was difficult enough, even with the full force of the Army Act. The tenacity with 
which  they  pursued  this  matter  could  well  indicate  real  concerns  over  serious 
Australian indiscipline once hostilities ended. They feared that if large numbers of 
Australians were, by necessity, still in France, they would have no effective deterrent 
against  offenders  who  committed  serious  civil  crimes.  Moreover,  this  would  be  a 
constant source of divisiveness among British troops and adversely affect relations 
with the French government and their citizens.
18  
One of the recurring complaints made against the Australians by the Adjutant 
General’s office was the willingness of Australian courts ‘to accept any story told by 
the accused, however improbable, and to acquit whenever they can, especially in cases 
of offences against inhabitants’.
19 The Adjutant-General produced figures of crimes 
against inhabitants for the five-month period from March to July 1918 showing that 
Australian  acquittals  ‘more  than  equal  convictions’,  by  contrast  with  other  troops 
where  acquittals  are  approximately  half  of  convictions.
20  This  is  supported  by  the 
statistics  (see  Table  2.1,  below),  which  indicate  that  in  crimes  against  inhabitants 
involving  Australians,  50.89  per  cent  of  those  charged  were  acquitted,  with  57 
 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid., item 70, these views were expressed in a Secret Minute from the Adjutant General’s office to 
the Secretary of State for War, August 14, 1918. 
19 Ibid., item 71, letter signed by Lieutenant-General Sir G. H. Fowke, dated August 12, 1918 from the 
Adjutant-General’s  Office, General Headquarters, France, forming part of the information gathered for a 
possible interview with Australian Prime Minister Hughes. 
20  Ibid.,  item  81,  which  shows  number  of  convictions  since  March  1,  1918,  for  offences  against 
inhabitants, attached to correspondence dated August 1918.    38 
Table 2.1 
Offences against inhabitants tried since 1 March 1918 until end of July 1918.
21 
Offences Tried        Offences Tried      
Australian  112    Other troops  443 
Number committed to Prison:      Percentage  Number committed to Prison:      Percentage 
Penal Servitude  9  16.36  Penal Servitude  14  4.74 
Imprisonment (I.H.L.)  11  20  Imprisonment (I.H.L.)  80  27.11 
Total imprisoned  20  36.36  Total imprisoned  94  31.86 
Number sentence to:      Number sentence to: 
Field Punishment Number 1  5  9.09  Field Punishment Number 1  156  52.88 
Field Punishment Number 2  25  45.45  Field Punishment Number 2  22  7.45 
Loss of pay, etcetera  5  9.09  Loss of pay, etcetera  23  7.79 
Total number of convictions  55  49.10  Total number of convictions  295  66.59 
Total number of acquittals  57  50.89  Total number of acquittals  148  33.40 
acquittals and 55 convictions. For all other troops during this period the acquittal rate 
was  33.40  per  cent  with  295  convictions  and  148  acquittals.  Significantly,  of  the 
convictions handed down by Australian courts, only 5 per cent were awarded Field 
Punishment No. 1, compared with 52.88 per cent for all other troops. Field Punishment 
No.  2,  however,  was  imposed  by  Australian  courts  on  twenty-five  offenders,  by 
comparison  with  twenty-two  for  all  other  troops,  vindicating  Haig’s  claim  of 
Australian reluctance to impose the harsher type of punishment.
22 Up to September 
1918, the AIF maintained, on average, a force of 118,883 men on the Western Front 
compared  with  an  average  in  the  rest  of  the  BEF  up  to  November  11  (excluding 
followers or labour) of 1,758,435 men. In this period, of the offences tried for crimes 
against inhabitants, the Australians were committing 25.28 per cent of them and they 
only represented 6.76 per cent of the BEF on the Western Front.
23 
                                                 
21  Table  compiled  from  (TNA)  WO  32/5484,  item  81.  The  record  of  these  statistics  starts  from 
1  March,  but  there  is  no  indication  as  to  when  they  finish.  As  these  statistics  were  included  with 
correspondence dated in August I have assumed that the figures are up to July 31, 1918. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Colonel A. G., Butler, The Official History of The Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 
1914-1918, Volume III, Special Problems and Services, p. 907. These figures were extracted from Table 
35: Approximate average ration strength of the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front in 
France  and  Flanders;  and  Table  36:  Maintenance  of  A.I.F.  on  the  Western  Front  (in  France  and 
Flanders). From these tables it can be seen that the AIF maintained a force on the Western Front of 
87,643 by the last quarter of 1916, an average of 119,512 in 1917, and an average of 113,091 in 1918.   39 
It is difficult to find a motive for the unwillingness of Australian courts to convict 
in cases against civilians, even allowing for the antipathy that existed between most 
sections of the British Army and French civilians. GHQ seemed to be suggesting that 
either the Australian officers conducting these courts martial were incompetent, or that 
a culture of ‘mateship’ existed that was expressed in a preference to give the benefit of 
the doubt, no matter how slight, to their own men. They stopped short of saying that 
the misconduct of Australian troops was owing to the quality of leadership provided by 
Australian officers and NCOs. But the implication was there, and they had in the past 
complained about the laxity in imposing discipline behind the lines and had viewed the 
comparatively high rates of absenteeism, looting and other crimes as a consequence of 
this.  
During the period under discussion, but not confined to crimes against civilians, 
the Australians commuted 127 sentences of penal servitude to two years with hard 
labour compared with a total of only 133 commuted sentences for all other troops.
24 
Whether this was an attempt to get their prison numbers down is not clear, but the 
figures for the number of troops in prison for July 1918 show that Australia had 782 
soldiers in prison (7.86 per 1,000). By comparison, other colonial troops imprisoned 
totalled 339 (1.88 per 1,000) and the British 1,373 (0.97 per 1,000). The number of 
Australian absentees for July 1918 was 414, or 4.16 per 1,000, compared with the 
combined total for other colonials of 84, or 0.49 per 1,000, and British absentees at 697 
or 0.49 per 1,000.
25 Absenteeism was seen as a major problem among the Australians 
as the figures for Fourth Army in Table 2.2 (below) signify. Caution must be exercised 
in interpreting these statistics as they do not give an indication of how long a soldier 
                                                                                                                                         
The rest of the BEF (excluding followers or labour) had an average strength of 1,246,731 in 1916, 
1,786,462 in 1917, and 1,758,435 in 1918 up to November 11. 
24 Ibid., item 81. 
25 (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 80, report on absentees and rejoins from June 1 to August 3, 1918.   40 
has been absent. Nevertheless, the British figures for Fourth Army show a total of 
4,447 absentees in this period and the Australians, 3,850.
26  
Table 2.2 
Absenteeism in Fourth Army 
(These figures are a snapshot of the total of absentees at that date with 
no indication of the length of time the soldier had been absent.)
27 
      British  Australian 
  June 1, 1918  438  364 
  June 8, 1918  420  343 
  June 15, 1918  417  343 
  June 22, 1918  415  339 
  June 29, 1918  381  277 
  July 6, 1918  459  404 
  July 13, 1918    483  441 
  July 20, 1918  477  441 
  July 27, 1918  487  459 
  August 3, 1918  480  439   
A  more  detailed  picture  of  absentees  emerges  in  Table  2.3  where  there  is  a 
summary of absentees and rejoins and where an absentee is defined as someone absent 
for more than seven days. The British figures actually show a net gain of rejoins over 
absentees with 1062 absent and 1168 rejoining their units. The Australian absentees 
remain proportionately very high with 934 absentees and 898 rejoins.
28 
Table 2.3 
Summary of Absentees and Rejoins reported during the period from 
June 1 to August 3, 1918. (Absentees: absent for more than seven days).
29 
  British       Australian   
    Absent   Rejoined  Absent         Rejoined 
  June 8, 1918  134  127  118  94 
  June 15, 1918  135  161  104  136 
  June 22, 1918  94  107  104  118 
  June 29, 1918  104  151  97  98 
  July 6, 1918  108  112  60  86 
  July 13, 1918  116  175  82  79 
  July 20, 1918  80  91  114  58 
  July 27, 1918  173  138  134  128 
  August 3, 1918  118  106  121  101 
  Totals  1,062  1,168  934  898 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Ibid., item 75, table compiled from extract of weekly returns for week ending June 1, 1918. 
28 Table compiled from (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 80. 
29 Ibid.   41 
The statistical evidence available for the period from March 1, 1918 to the end of 
July 1918 goes someway towards dispelling the notion that GHQ were exaggerating 
their  case  to  pressure  Hughes  into  a  change  of  policy  on  the  death  penalty.  The 
absentee figures show that many soldiers were prepared to take absence without leave, 
but most of them voluntarily returned. It was the permanent absentees that troubled the 
High Command because they had no effective deterrent to deal with them. 
To add insult to injury, the Australian authorities proposed that in all cases where 
Australian soldiers were to be tried by courts martial the court should be composed 
only of Australian officers. Haig, in responding to the proposals to the Secretary of 
State for War, outlined the contemporary practice in Australian formations where the 
courts were formed exclusively of Australian officers. In the Lines of Communications 
the order was that courts should be composed of Australian officers wherever possible. 
However, Haig regretted the fact that at the front the courts convened to try Australians 
were composed ‘exclusively’ of Australian officers and put forward his preference for 
an interchange system whereby Australians could sit on British courts martial and 
British officers on courts martial of Australians.
30  
While  the  Australian  authorities  were  pressing  for  Australian  courts  to  be 
‘exclusively’ Australian,  Haig  was  displaying  a  distinct  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
existing system because Australian courts were not making full use of the powers they 
possessed. The interchange system that he advocated was a means of imposing a more 
rigorous implementation of the military code on the Australians and at the same time 
bringing  the  punishments  imposed  in  line  with  the  rest  of  the  British Army.  Haig 
identified the reluctance of Australian courts to award Field Punishment Number 1 to 
their belief that it was ‘degrading’. The Australians were not alone in this view, as there 
was disquiet in Britain over the degrading nature of this punishment (a campaign was 
                                                 
30 Ibid., item 83, letter from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in 
France to The Secretary, War Office, London, June 23, 1918.   42 
launched to abolish it, see chapter 3, pp. 70, 85-88). Haig conceded it was a view that 
the Australians had held before the campaign, which does suggest recognition on his 
part of a cultural difference between Australian and British attitudes towards discipline. 
For Haig, it was the immunity from the death penalty that was the root cause of serious 
indiscipline among Australian troops and he reminded the Secretary of State for War 
that he had, in previous letters, deplored the privileged position which the Australians 
enjoyed. He quite fairly acknowledged the fact ‘that this immunity so far has not 
hitherto resulted in a deterioration of the fighting qualities of Australian troops’, but 
added that it had resulted in ‘serious evils’ in three main areas.
31 Firstly, he referred to 
the large numbers of men who were permanently absent from their units. These men, 
he stated, knew that imprisonment was the worst that could happen to them, and as a 
result, this ‘produces a completely lawless and defiant attitude’. His second concern 
was that Australian soldiers, with their laxity in discipline at ‘training or at rest’ behind 
the line, might infect the British troops with whom they came into contact. He added 
that  it  was  ‘bound’  to  affect  their  battle  discipline.
32  Interestingly,  while  Haig  had 
conceded  earlier  that  so  far Australian  battle  discipline  had  not  been  affected  by 
Australia’s special immunity, he saw British troops as more vulnerable when exposed 
to a more lax disciplinary regime. He perhaps feared their battle performance could be 
adversely affected as a consequence of the disparity between the Australian and British 
disciplinary codes, which could have affected morale and resulted in British troops not 
trying as hard. Thirdly, Haig was concerned with the poor relations with the French 
civilian population, owing to the high levels of looting, ‘of which Australian soldiers 
set an example’. Admitting that cases of looting were not confined to Australian troops, 
he argued that the evidence shows ‘they are the worst offenders in this respect’. He 
                                                 
31 Ibid., Haig had warned in a previous letter to the Secretary of War in 1917 that he feared Australian 
battle discipline would break down because of the lack of the death penalty. His concession here that it 
did not is significant. 
32 Ibid.   43 
cites the example of a patrol of French gendarmes in Amiens who were fired upon by 
Australian soldiers when trying to defend the property of evacuees from looters.
33 
Believing  that  Australian  courts  were  unwilling  to  convict  their  soldiers, 
especially in crimes against civilians, the last thing Haig wanted was to be compelled 
to order exclusively Australian courts in the Lines of Communications. He feared that 
if this were implemented it would result in a pronounced difference in punishment for 
Australian troops compared with other troops for similar crimes. Although he thought 
the Australians had a tendency towards indiscipline he diplomatically suggested that 
‘everything  possible  should  be  done  to  foster  community  in  methods  and  ideals 
between  British  and  Dominion  troops  rather  than  to  accentuate  the  differences’. 
Furthermore,  Haig  foresaw  an  administrative  problem  if  offences  were  committed 
jointly by British and Australian troops. He thought it undesirable that British troops 
should  be  tried  by  an  exclusively  convened  Australian  court  and  perhaps 
disingenuously  suggested  that  two  courts  martial  would  have  to  be  held  in  these 
cases.
34 
A further proposal from the Australian authorities to gain Australian control over 
their officers and soldiers suggested that in trials where the confirming officer was not 
Australian  the  proceedings  should  not  be  confirmed  until  the  General  Officer 
Commanding the Australian troops had considered the case and attached his remarks. 
Haig did not think the Australians had much to gain from this proposal, for of the 
1,467 courts martial of Australians from the beginning of January to the end of May, 
only 125 were held in the Lines of Communications area. Moreover, he thought the 
discipline  of  any  Base  should  be  the  responsibility  of  its  Commandant  and  that 
referring  to  the  General  Officer  Commanding Australian  Imperial  Force,  who  was 
already overburdened with work and who could not know local conditions, would not 
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give the proceedings the careful consideration they deserved. Additionally, addressing 
the issue of Australian control, Haig said he already referred to the General Officer 
Commanding Australian Imperial Force in all cases of officer dismissals or severer 
sentences, and also referred to him questions concerning the confirming of sentences 
of penal servitude. He therefore recommended that the following reply should be sent 
to the Governor General of Australia: 
Courts  entirely  composed  of Australian  officers  try  92  per  cent Australian  cases.  In 
remaining 8 per cent, there is at least one Australian officer on the Court. It would cause 
great delay and administrative inconvenience to arrange for all members in the latter 
cases to be Australian. 
As regards second proposal, the 92 per cent cases mentioned above are confirmed or 
reviewed by an Australian Commander. There would be serious difficulty in referring all 
remaining  cases  to  General  Officer  Commanding Australian  Imperial  Force.  But  all 
sentences of dismissal of officers are referred to him and no sentence of penal servitude is 
carried into effect without reference to him.
35 
The High Command’s attempts to impose a stricter adherence to the military code 
on Australian courts and to bring the sentences awarded in line with the rest of the 
Army  were  being  frustrated  by  Australian  insistence  on  control  over  their  men. 
However, the issue of Australian immunity from the death penalty would be brought 
into sharp focus, twelve days before the Armistice, with the alleged murder of a French 
civilian by Private Banks. Building on the anomaly of the Richmond case GHQ were 
determined to force accountability on the Australians for crimes of murder. 
The intense interest shown by the British authorities in the case of Private Banks 
needs to be seen in the context of their failure to bring the Australian Army Act in line 
with the rest of the Army; their growing anxiety over Australian indiscipline; and their 
fear of how that indiscipline might manifest itself once peace was declared. Perhaps, 
above  all,  a  conviction  in  this  case,  followed  by  the  implementation  of  the  death 
penalty,  would  provide  the  much-needed  deterrent  GHQ  felt  was  required  to  curb 
Australian indiscipline. 
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The case of Private Richmond, who was tried by court-martial in France and 
convicted of murdering an Australian sergeant, exposed the legal anomaly that existed 
under the Australian Defence Act. Although Richmond was found guilty, the legal 
problems in not being able to pass an appropriate sentence meant that the proceedings 
could  not  be  confirmed.  Lord  Milner  had  written  to  Hughes  on  the  9th  and  23rd 
November directing him to the anomaly in the Defence Act, whereby a charge of 
murder could not be punishable by penal servitude unless the law was changed.
 In 
contrast  to  the  diplomatic  approach  by  Milner,  the Adjutant  General’s  Office  was 
seething, believing both Richmond and Banks should be brought to England for trial, 
and the Adjutant General had obtained advice that this was legally possible. Childs 
displayed a disdain for the Australians when he stated that: ‘in view of the revelation of 
the lowliness of many of the Australian soldiers in France . . . and the danger of 
creating ill feeling between the people of France and this Country . . . I strongly press 
that these two men should be tried for their lives in this Country’.
36 He was scathing of 
the existing law by which two years was the maximum sentence that could be imposed 
for murder, less than that for manslaughter. He stated that: ‘In my opinion such a 
suggestion is really ridiculous and amounts to nothing less than giving the right of free 
murder to Australian soldiers’.
37 He hoped that Hughes’s option of ‘imprisonment’ 
included ‘penal servitude for life’ as he believed that to be the minimum sentence that 
should be applied on a soldier convicted of murder, and written in hand over the 
transcript added, ‘I do not even agree with that’.
38 
However, the alleged murder of a French civilian by Private Banks caused Milner 
to write again to Hughes expressing his anxiety over the situation in which a French 
national could be murdered and the alleged murderer could not stand trial for his life. 
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For  Milner,  whatever  agitation  had  arisen  from  the  leniency  of  a  sentence  in  the 
Richmond case was a matter for the Australian Government, but he expressed ‘grave 
concern’ at what might transpire when the ‘French authorities realize that a French 
citizen can be murdered by an Australian and that he cannot suffer the extreme penalty 
for that offence’. Milner explained to Hughes that under the Convention, which was 
arrived at between Britain and France early in the war, British and French soldiers 
‘were to be amenable to the respective military codes’. It seems extraordinary that the 
British authorities did not anticipate such an occurrence, but Milner told Hughes: ‘It 
never occurred to the contracting parties that the advent of Australian troops in France 
would create a situation whereby in the event of a French inhabitant being murdered 
the death penalty could not be passed’.
39 Milner, in outlining the dilemma to Hughes, 
feared  that  once  the  French  became  aware  that  one  of  their  inhabitants  could  be 
murdered and the accused be not ‘amenable’ to the death penalty, they would make 
strong representations that the accused be tried before a French court. He suggested the 
alternative of trying Private Banks in an English civil court, where the death penalty 
applied. However, in requesting French witnesses to travel to England for the trial he 
thought the French would require an explanation, and once they grasped the fact that a 
military  court  acting  under  the  Convention  did  not  have  the  ability  to  pass  an 
appropriate sentence to deal with such a serious offence, they might still demand that 
Banks be tried in a French civil court.
40  
Hughes  studiously  ignored  the  two  alternatives  of  trials  in  English  or  French 
courts, favouring imprisonment as the best option. Replying to Milner at the War 
Office, Hughes stated the necessary amendment to the Defence Regulations was now 
in place and it would provide that the offence of murder should be punishable by penal 
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servitude for life. His comment that ‘This will meet the technical difficulty to which 
you  have  called  my  attention’  reflected  his  unwillingness  to  deal  with  the  vexing 
questions put to him by Milner.
41 These questions, and more, would surface, as the 
British authorities were not about to let the matter rest.  
The High Command and the Adjutant General’s Office, despite the impending 
change in the law to allow for penal servitude for life for murder, had already begun 
arrangements for Banks to be tried in an English civil court. French witnesses in the 
case had been approached and their consent to travel to England with appropriate 
expenses  had  been  arranged.  However,  by  February  1919  the  case  had  not  been 
disposed  of  and  G.  H.  Fowke  of  the  Adjutant  General’s  Office,  writing  for  the 
Commander-in-Chief, mounted the case to the War Office for bringing Banks for trial 
in a French court. He advised the War Office that the French were noting an increase 
in  crimes  against  their  inhabitants  by  Allied  troops.  A  communication  had  been 
received by the French Mission attached to GHQ from Prime Minister Clemenceau, 
whose attention had been drawn to the increase in crimes against civilians by Allied 
troops by his minister of justice. Fowke stated that ‘a case such as the above would be 
likely to impress itself on the mind of Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice’.
42  Although 
the Banks case had not been raised by the French authorities, Fowke believed the delay 
in disposing of the case would create an ‘unfavourable impression’ with the French 
and therefore proposed that Banks be handed over to the French judiciary for trial. The 
justification for this course of action was the Convention that Fowke referred to as the 
‘formal document’ in existence that allowed offenders belonging to the British Army 
to  be  ‘handed  over’  to  the  French  judiciary.  He  thought  that  in  this  case  ‘any 
inconvenient precedent would not be established by adopting this course of action’.
43 
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Earlier, Milner, in his letter to Hughes, had described the Convention quite differently: 
‘The Convention, of course, was merely a working agreement and I feel that if the 
French with a knowledge of the fact that the soldier concerned is not amenable to the 
death penalty, press us to hand the man over for trial before the French Civil Courts, it 
is a request which it would be impossible to refuse’.
44 
Fowke recognised that this proposal to try Banks in a French civil court would be 
unlikely ‘to commend itself to the Australian Authorities’. Nevertheless, Fowke argued 
that  the  Australians  should  realize  that  maintaining  good  international  relations: 
‘demand that a case in which so serious an accusation is made should be brought to 
trial, and it may serve to further their efforts to remove the flagrant anomaly, which has 
resulted in the present unfortunate state of affairs’.
45 
In January 1919 it was Winston Churchill, now Secretary of State for War, who 
would take up the cudgel of getting Banks tried for his life. Writing to Hughes on the 
23rd he appeared resigned to the fact that there was no alternative to bringing Banks to 
England for trial, believing the French would be ‘aggrieved’ if he were tried by court-
martial. In a blatant pre-judgement of the impending trial of Banks, and in an attempt 
to  apply  pressure,  Churchill  added:  ‘having  regard  to  the  fact  that  a  perfectly 
inoffensive  French  civilian  was  brutally  murdered  under  conditions  which  do  not 
disclose  any  extenuating  circumstances  whatever’.
46  By  early  March  the  DPS  was 
debating whether to hand over Banks to the French judiciary without the consent of the 
Australian Prime Minister. It was the intervention of Childs who insisted that Hughes’s 
consent was necessary ‘in view of the fact that GHQ propose to hand over to the 
French authorities for trial and possibly for execution an Australian soldier’.
47 
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Frustrated by the lack of response from Hughes to his previous letter on the Banks 
case, Churchill wrote again to Hughes on March 17. He brought up the case of Private 
Richmond, presumably as a means of applying the sentence of penal servitude for life 
if re-convicted. In the Banks case, however, Churchill stated that he was in agreement 
with the Commander-in-Chief that Banks should be handed over to the French because 
of the objection the French might raise to a court that could only award penal servitude 
for the crime of murder. Churchill sought agreement from Hughes saying that in this 
case: ‘trial by court martial is out of the question, and it is therefore, for decision 
whether or not Private Banks should be handed over to the French for disposal or 
brought to this country for trial’.
48 
The Australian Military Regulation 2 of Regulation 490 had been repealed early 
in December but the official notification of this fact had not reached Churchill. The 
regulation had been amended as follows: ‘Being the Military Force while on War 
Service or deemed to be on War Service shall be subject to Section 41 of the Army Act 
with the following adaptation, that is to say, if a member is convicted of murder he 
shall be liable to suffer penal servitude or such less punishment as is in the Army Act 
mentioned’.
49  
Hughes’s reply to Churchill was short and to the point. Writing from the Hotel 
Majestic in Paris he told Churchill that the Banks case did not require action from him 
as the French authorities had not yet objected to the application ‘of the Australian 
Court Martial Law, the extreme penalty of which is penal servitude’.
50 
By April 1919, six months after the alleged murder, the legal position regarding 
Banks  (and  Richmond)  became  clear.  Legal  opinion  from  the  Judge  Advocate 
General’s Office (JAG) interpreted the amended regulation as follows: 
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(1) Opinion that regulation applies to any conviction for murder after the date when it 
came into force even though the murder was committed before such date’ 
(2) Banks could be tried under Section 41 of the Army Act as varied by Australian law 
and if convicted sentenced to penal servitude for life or any less punishment. He could be 
tried under Section 6(1) for an offence against the person of an inhabitant of the country 
in which he was serving on active service for which offence he could also be sentenced to 
penal servitude for life or any less punishment.
51 
The  way  was  now  clear  for  Banks  to  be  tried  by  field  general  court-martial. 
Private  Richmond,  already  convicted  of  murder  and  not  yet  sentenced,  would  be 
retried; his second trial would be delayed until November 1919. The High Command 
had pressured the Australian authorities but was unable to move them. The French had 
not intervened to demand a trial by a French civil court. The Banks trial was held on 
the May 31, 1919, seven months after the murder and without the full glare of a hostile 
High  Command.  The  need  for  an  example  was  receding  as  troops  were  being 
repatriated from French soil and the serious disturbances expected from Australian 
troops in France had not eventuated. However, the case provided a revealing insight 
into the seedier side of life away from the front line on the Western Front, and the case 
would not be as clear cut as Churchill supposed. 
Banks was more fortunate than most defendants facing a serious charge in that his 
Prisoner’s Friend was a barrister at law in London, Major F. S. Laskey, MC, Tank 
Corps. The President of the Court was Major G. H. Roberts, 5th AHA Brigade, with 
Captains  N.  H.  Hobbs,  MC,  18th  Battalion,  C.  Morgan-Jones,  20th  Battalion,  and 
Lieutenant C. O. Manning, DCMO, B. Aust Group. The prosecutor in the case was 
Lieutenant J. Payne of the 26th Battalion, quite a low ranking officer for such an 
important case.
52  
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Private (6944) W. J. H. Banks, of the 22nd Battalion Australian Imperial Force, 
was charged as follows: 
Offence charged: when on active service committing the offence of murder in that he at 
Longpré-les-Corps Saints on the night of 31st October, 1918 when on active service did 
feloniously  wilfully  and  of  malice  aforethought  kill  and  murder  one  M.  Vertighen, 
proprietor of Café de Commerce, Longpré-les-Corps Saints. 
Alternative: AA Sec 41: when on active service committing the offence of manslaughter 
in that he at Longpré-les-Corps Saints on the night of 31st October, 1918 when on active 
service did unlawfully kill M. Vertighen, proprietor of Café de Commerce, Longpré-les-
Corps Saints. 
Alternative: AA Sec 6: when on active service committing an offence against the person 
of an inhabitant of the country in which he was serving in that he at Longpré-les-Corps 
Saints on the night of 31st October, 1918 when on active service did unlawfully kill M. 
Vertighen, proprietor of Café de Commerce, Longpré-les-Corps Saints.
53  
Banks pleaded not guilty to all three charges.  
The prosecution case against Banks was that he was in the Café de Commerce in 
Longpré-les-Corps  Saints  on  the  evening  of  October  31,  1918  between  7pm  and 
7.30pm and was seen by several witnesses carrying a revolver. They would testify that 
Banks was worse for drink, although he could ‘walk and talk’. He was seen talking to 
the  café  proprietor,  Monsieur  Vertighen,  who,  according  to  one  witness,  took  the 
revolver from Banks and placed it in the accused’s pocket. No clear motive for the 
killing  was  established  but  one  witness  testified  that  Banks  and  Vertighen  had  a 
conversation  in  which  Banks  threatened  to  close  down  the  café  because  of  an 
infringement of opening hours. As a result, an aggrieved Vertighen determined to see 
the town commandant to sort out the matter. This, the prosecution claimed, was why 
both men left the café around 7.30pm. Approximately two minutes later, a shot was 
heard, and Vertighen lay dead, about thirty metres from his café, from a bullet wound 
to his chest. Banks was arrested approximately one hour later in the Deputy Assistant 
Director  Ordnance’s  (DADO)  store.  The  witnesses  involved  in  his  arrest  would 
describe Banks as being drunk and incapable when he came into the store at 8pm and 
at his arrest at 8.30pm. His revolver, which was unloaded, was found on his person 
                                                 
53 Ibid., Proceedings Sheet.   52 
with five live and one spent cartridge found beside him on the ground. No one was 
called who witnessed Banks shoot Vertighen. 
 The first witness was the deceased’s sister-in-law, Mademoiselle Germain, who 
stated that she knew Banks and that he was in the café from 7pm to 7.30pm. She 
served him with a glass of wine, after which he went into the dancing room. Banks, she 
claimed, was carrying a revolver. When questioned by the Prisoner’s Friend, Major 
Laskey, she stated: ‘Accused came into the café and went out and came in again. The 
second time accused came into the dancing room. He had a revolver the second time 
he came in. Accused had a revolver and the live ammunition he loaded in the café. I 
have never heard accused speak French. I don’t know whether he can speak French.’
54 
To the court she stated that the ‘accused was very drunk . . . could walk and talk 
but was unsteady in his gait’. Further, she saw Veritghen and Banks talking, but added 
that they had not known each other before that night. She said she saw Banks carrying 
his revolver in his hand but did not see him hand it to Vertighen.
55 
The second witness, M. Cordier August, the grandson of the deceased, testified 
that around seven o’clock in the café he saw the accused and Vertighen talking in the 
kitchen and that Banks was not speaking in French. He stated that Vertighen took the 
revolver from Banks, who was carrying it in his hand, and put it into the accused’s 
pocket. Then Banks went to the bar, returning to the kitchen ten minutes later, and said 
to Vertighen, ‘that he would get the café put out of bounds because soldiers had come 
in before opening time’. The witness, Cordier August, did not speak English, but said 
he was told this by Vertighen, who could not understand why Banks wanted to close 
his café. Vertighen had told him that he and Banks were going to see the ‘Town 
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Major’ to sort it out. The accused, the witness stated, ‘was drunk but could walk and 
talk’.
56 
Answering questions put to him by Major Laskey, Cordier August admitted that 
he  had  a  problem  identifying  Banks  as  the  man  in  the  café.  He  stated:  ‘On  3rd 
November [at the Summary] I called accused Brigand, Assassin and threatened him 
with a knife, but I am not sure that accused was the man. It is probable too.’ He 
insisted that the accused did not offer the revolver to Vertighen, but added that he did 
not think ‘accused wanted to shoot M. Vertighen when he showed the revolver in the 
kitchen’. When questioned by the court the witness said Banks spoke in ‘pure English, 
but not in Pidgin English’. Crucially, he stated that he saw the accused and Vertighen 
leave the café together.
57 
The shooting of Vertighen occurred outside of the house of the third witness, M. 
Lamont  Gorton,  who  was  in  his  front  room  when  he  heard  Vertighen  talking  in 
‘broken English’ to a man who spoke ‘good French’. After hearing the shot fired he 
ran outside and saw a man running away very fast, but could not say whether the man 
was a civilian or a soldier as it was dark. Questioned by Major Laskey, he stated: 
The voices were in an ordinary tone. Both men spoke quite clearly. I cannot say what 
kind of clothing the man who ran away was wearing. I don’t remember saying on 31st 
October 1918 that I thought it was a civilian who ran away. Anyone going from the Café 
de Commerce to the Town Major would have to pass my house. The Australian soldier 
was about 30 metres away from M. Vertigen when I first saw him. He was approaching 
my house from the direction of the Café de Commerce. The man who ran away was 
running in the opposite direction to the Café.
58 
Unfortunately, there is no record of what actually was said between both men 
outside Lamont’s house, and no indication that Major Laskey asked the witness what 
was said. What counts in Banks’s favour here is that whoever Vertighen was talking to 
spoke ‘good French’, according to this witness, something the other witnesses for the 
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prosecution had never heard Banks do. Furthermore, the voices were not raised in 
anger, and this witness, under examination, appeared to have said, at a hearing held 
shortly after the event, that he thought it was a civilian who ran away.
59 
The next four witnesses were all Australian soldiers whose testimony would shed 
light as to why Banks, a private, was carrying a revolver, and his physical and mental 
state when he was arrested. Conductor R. Johnson, AAOC 1st Australian Division, 
was working in DADO’s store and saw an Australian soldier in the street about 8pm, 
whom he later identified when the Summary was taken. Johnson stated that the man 
‘was drunk’ and that they had had an argument. Then the man fell down and ‘appeared 
as if he was in a fit’. He called for assistance and removed the revolver from the 
accused. The revolver was empty, Johnston stated, and he did not examine the barrel. 
When questioned by Major Laskey, Johnston added: 
The man who came into the store was in a dazed condition and did not know what he was 
talking about. He thought the store was a YMCA and said that he was no. 1 and a Lewis 
Gunner in the Engineers. I told Private Smith 1st D.H.Q. to take the revolver away. The 
revolver produced in court is the service issue revolver. I cannot identify the accused as 
the man who came into the store. 
60 
Private W. R. Smith, of the 1st Aust DHQ attached AAOC, confirmed that he was 
in  the  store  around  8.30pm  and  described  Banks,  who  was  wearing  an  Australian 
overcoat, as drunk. He stated that Banks ‘was rolling about at the Summary’. He 
admitted that he ‘could not identify any soldier as being the one I saw in the store’. To 
Major  Laskey  he  confirmed  that  he  never  examined  the  barrel  of  the  gun.
61  Like 
previous  witnesses,  Private  Smith  had  a  problem  with  identifying  Banks  and  the 
confusion  could  have  been  caused  because  the  man  who  was  charged  was  clean-
shaven and Banks was wearing a moustache at his trial. 
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The sixth witness called by the prosecution was S. M. R. Godfrey of the 1st 
Australian  DAC  [Division  Ammunition  Column]  who  was  billeted  in  the  Café  de 
Commerce. He testified that he was in the dancing room around 7.30pm when he saw 
Banks enter: ‘He was under the influence of drink and was a bit flaky. The man took a 
MP's [Military Police] brassard out of his pocket put it on his left arm, and was playing 
about with some handcuffs.’
62 Godfrey could not swear that the ‘accused is the man I 
saw’. He was in DADO’s store around 8.30pm and described seeing a man lying in the 
yard: ‘I had a look at him and saw that he was drunk and was incapable of speech. The 
man in the yard was the same man in the bars and in the café.’
63 
Under  questioning  from  Major  Laskey,  Godfrey  provided  details  of  Banks’s 
activities working with the military police to round up a gang of Australian soldiers 
who were involved in criminal activities behind the lines. Sergeant Selmes, a key 
witness for Banks, who was not in France to provide evidence, had told Godfrey of 
Banks’s work. Selmes, like Godfrey, was billeted at the Café de Commerce. According 
to Godfrey, Selmes told him that ‘Banks was I believe the man who tracked a man 
who was badly wanted by the police’. Further, Selmes had told him: 
That he had supplied Banks with an overcoat with artillery colours and a revolver, acting 
under instructions from Major Sheppard, 1st D.A.C. Sergeant Selmes told me that about 
the 15th [October] I took Banks to Lieutenant Dunne D.A.C. Dunne told me that he had 
seen Lloyd in civilian clothes in Longpré. Banks was working in conjunction with M.P.’s 
to roundup the gang. Lieutenant Dunne told Banks that he was to be very careful in 
approaching Lloyd, as Lloyd was a man who would not hesitate to shoot. I know Lloyd. 
Lloyd received 20 years Penal Servitude about six weeks ago for shooting with intent.
64  
Further questioned by Major Laskey, Godfrey stated that he did not know whether 
Lloyd was in the café on the 31st, and further, that he would not have recognised him 
if he had been dressed as a civilian. Godfrey, in response to Major Laskey, replied that 
he was unaware that Lloyd had tried twice to kill Banks. He added that Banks, ‘was 
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shaky, it may have been nervousness. I don’t now think it was nervousness Banks was 
suffering from.’
65 
The seventh witness, B. W. Ashmore of the 1st Australian DAC, stated he was in 
the café around 7.30pm and thought the accused had been drinking, although he could 
walk. He saw Vertighen and the accused leave the café together, but did not notice the 
accused carrying anything. At 9.30pm he was placed on guard over the accused who 
was lying on the ground and could not walk and had to be carried to the car. Major 
Laskey  asked  whether  a  blow  to  the  head  could  have  caused  Banks’s  condition. 
Ashmore thought it possible, although it is unclear how he was qualified to make that 
medical assessment. The accused and the deceased ‘appeared to be friendly or on 
ordinary terms’ he told Major Laskey. To the court the witness stated that the accused 
‘had no more than three drinks in the café’ and that his conduct in the café did not 
attract any ‘particular attention’. He added that he would have noticed if the accused 
was  carrying  a  revolver  in  his  hand.  He  stated  to  the  court  that  from  9.30pm  to 
10.20pm, whilst guarding the prisoner, no words were exchanged between them.
66 
Corporal F. M. Carrican of the Australian Provost Corps proved to be a most 
important witness as he knew Banks and was able to shed light on the detective work 
in which Banks was involved. He had seen Banks around 5.30pm on October 31, 
‘when he appeared to be slightly under the influence of liquor’. The accused told him 
‘I’m alright, I am after something’. The next time he saw the accused was in DADO’s 
store at 9pm where the accused ‘smelt strongly of liquor and could not walk without 
assistance. He appeared as if he were in a trance.’ He confirmed that when Conductor 
Young handed him the revolver it was not loaded.
67 When questioned by Major Laskey 
he related the events of October 30 when he and Banks were attempting to apprehend a 
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man  named  Crundill.  In  the  process  of  making  an  arrest  Corporal  Carrican  had 
requested  Banks’s  revolver  to  ‘cover’  Crundill  while  Banks  tried  to  handcuff  the 
prisoner. However, Crundill broke his escort and Carrican, using Banks’s revolver, 
fired, and hit Crundill in the thigh. On completing the arrest Banks went away with the 
prisoner as escort. Carrican had handed the revolver back to Banks without cleaning 
the gun, or knowing how many cartridges were left in the chamber. He did not notice 
whether Banks had any more ammunition.
68 He confirmed that Banks’s revolver was 
of a similar pattern to the one produced in court and that powder marks were still 
present. Commenting upon Lloyd, Carrican said he knew that Lloyd was a dangerous 
man and that he was seen on the morning of October 31 at 1st DCO dressed as a 
soldier, and the day before was seen dressed as a civilian. Lloyd, he explained, was a 
member of the Kelly gang, but he could not confirm whether this gang had a grudge 
against  Banks.  He  added  that  he  thought  Banks  was  feigning  intoxication  in  the 
afternoon as he ‘pulled himself together’ when they spoke. However, by 9.30pm he 
‘could not wake him up’. Carrican explained to the court that when on duty in the 
service of the Provost Corps he had pretended to be drunk.
69  
The final witness, Captain W. I. Hayes, AAMC [Australian Army Medical Corps] 
stated that he and Major Shepperd went to DADO’s store on October 31 at 9pm. There 
he saw a man named Banks in custody and stated that Banks was drunk. He then went 
to the Military Post Office and saw the dead body of Vertighen, who had been shot in 
the chest. He performed the post mortem on the November 1 which confirmed that 
death was due to a bullet wound, with the bullet lodging in front of the neck of the first 
right rib. He produced the bullet he recovered from the body stating the revolver must 
have been ‘within three feet of the dead man when the shot was fired’. Commenting 
upon Banks’s physical and mental state, his medical opinion was that ‘It is possible, 
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but not probable, that accused’s condition was caused by a hit to the head. Accused 
was in comatose state.’ Answering questions from Major Laskey, Captain Hayes stated 
that ‘I ran my hand over his head but noticed nothing’. Captain Hayes also testified 
that he had seen Banks on the 31st around 5.30pm in the café, ‘lurching about unsteady 
in his gait and talking thickly’.
70 His evidence concluded the prosecution’s case against 
Private Banks. At this stage the Prisoner’s Friend, Major Laskey, addressed the court, 
but whatever he said was not recorded in the trial transcript. 
Although  the  prosecution’s  case  against  Banks  was  very  strong  they  had  not 
established a motive for the murder nor did they have any witnesses to it. What they 
did have was Private Banks under arrest an hour after the murder carrying a revolver, 
with one spent cartridge and five live ones. They had established that when Banks was 
in the café between 7pm and 7.30pm he was seen by two witnesses carrying a revolver 
and  speaking  with  Vertighen.  Cordier  August,  the  second  witness,  testified  that 
Vertighen had taken the revolver from Banks and put it into Banks’s pocket. He also 
provided the reason, the alleged closing of the café for an infringement of opening 
hours, that prompted both men to leave together to see the Town Commandant at 
7.30pm. Two witnesses heard the shot that killed Vertighen within two minutes of both 
men  leaving  the  café.  All  the  witnesses  had  testified  to  the  degree  of  Banks’s 
intoxication from the time he was in the Café de Commerce to the point when he was 
arrested in a drunken state. The medical examination of Banks by Captain Hayes, 
although cursory, seemed to rule out a blow to the head as the cause of his condition 
when arrested in the military store. What complicates this case is the fact that Banks 
was working with the Military Police in the round up of a notorious gang that was 
operating behind the lines. The Australian witness Godfrey provided the background 
of some of Banks’s activities and Corporal Carrican testified that he had borrowed 
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Banks’s revolver, a day before the murder, when shooting Crundill escaping arrest. His 
testimony could account for the spent cartridge but the thorny problem of whether 
Banks reloaded remained. Most of the witnesses said they could not positively identify 
Banks as the man in the café and later in DADO’s store. Banks would put this issue to 
rest when he began his defence, as he would not deny that it was he. Facing an almost 
overwhelming case against him Banks would present an extraordinary defence, and at 
the same time provide an insight into the dangers of dealing with a criminal element 
operating behind the front lines. 
The  thirty-five-year-old  Banks,  an  engineer  in  civilian  life  from  Parkville, 
Victoria, began his defence by outlining his encounters with the gang associated with 
Lloyd. According to Banks, on October 13, while in Comfaures with Sergeant Bryant, 
some men tried to steal Bryant’s horse. A man named Cody, who had mounted the 
horse, shot Sergeant Bryant in the arm and then fired at him, before getting away. This, 
he said he reported to the Assistant Provost Marshal. A few days later he was sent to 
Belloy-sur-Somme to identify gang-members Cody, Lloyd, Bevan and O’Shea.
71 On 
the 16th, at Ailly-sur-Somme, Banks claimed Lloyd fired at him and that he reported 
the matter to the commandant. Banks was not injured and Lloyd and the others all 
escaped. He claimed the Assistant Provost Marshal had warned him about Lloyd. On 
returning to his Battalion he was assigned to help the police in identifying Cody and 
his gang and was told to remain in his billet by the sergeant major. Talking about his 
undercover activities Banks stated that: ‘On one occasion I was given an English cap 
and tunic and on another occasion a coat with 1st Aust Div colours and it was my duty 
to go about with the police’.
72 
Sergeant  Selmes  gave  him  the  revolver,  Banks  explained,  because  of  an 
impending raid on the Caves [probable hideout for long-term absentees]. It was fully 
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loaded  in  all  six  chambers  when  he  received  it  and  added  that  he  had  no  further 
ammunition, or belt or pouch, as a means of carrying more. Trooper Marshall had 
given him the military police brassard and handcuffs. The incident on October 30 with 
the man named Crundill, on which Trooper Carrican gave evidence, was supported by 
Banks’s  version.  Trooper  Carrican  had  challenged  Crundill,  who  was  wearing  a 
[Royal]  Welsh  Fusilier’s  badge.  Banks  explained:  ‘Carrican  asked  me  to  handcuff 
Crundill. I handed Carrican my revolver and he covered Crundill. Crundill bolted and 
was fired at and hit by Trooper Carrican.’
73 
The encounter with Crundill happened at 11pm on October 30, and Banks had to 
escort  Crundill  to  the  41st  South  African  Stationary  Hospital  at  Abbeville  by  car. 
There, Banks was warned by a sergeant that there would probably be an enquiry. He 
returned to Longpré at 7am on October 31. He stated: ‘I did not open or clean the 
revolver when Carrican handed it back to me . . . I gave the hospital all particulars of 
Crundill. I still had my revolver. I never cleaned it. I had no ammunition.’ According 
to Banks, Sergeant Selmes had given him the revolver in the presence of Vertighen on 
October 23 and on October 29 had asked Banks to return his revolver as he was 
attending a course at Corps School. On the night of the 31st, Banks admitted that he 
was in the Café de Commerce between 7pm and 7.30pm and that he was looking for  
Sergeant Selmes to return the revolver. Banks had asked Vertighen if Selmes was in: 
Vertighen shook his head. I took it that Sergeant Selmes was out. I offered the revolver to 
M. Vertighen saying “Tres bon” meaning that it was unloaded. I had unloaded it earlier 
that evening. I did not say Bon pour soldats. I cannot talk French.  I never said anything 
further. Vertighen was present when Sergeant Selmes gave me the revolver. Vertighen 
took the revolver and put it in my pocket.
74 
Banks said he could remember everything up to leaving the café. He was out all 
night of the 30th with the Crundill shooting and claimed he was out the previous night 
as well. On the afternoon of the 31st Banks said he was in the Café Caron speaking to 
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Carrican: ‘Carrican said to me you look as though you have been drinking. I said I am 
all right. I’m after somebody, meaning Lloyd.’
75 
He claimed that he had only five drinks, two of them at the Café de Commerce 
between 7pm and 7.30pm. On entering the dance room Banks claimed: ‘I noticed in a 
corner the man named Lloyd. Lloyd was the only one of the gang who I think could 
not recognise me. I saw Lloyd the day before He was dressed as a civilian. This day he 
was dressed as an English soldier wearing RE [Royal Engineers] badges.’
76 
The sighting of Lloyd in the café prompted Banks to speak to Veritighen of the 
danger this man Lloyd posed, but he had difficulty making him understand. Banks 
continued: ‘I saw S. M. Godfrey before I spoke to Vertighen in the kitchen. I went 
outside into the dance room. Lloyd was still there. I spoke to Vertighen but could not 
make him understand. He wanted me to arrest Lloyd. I told him I had no authority, as I 
was not a member of the Police force. Vertighen did not speak English. I left the café 
with M. Vertighen to find Carrican and Trooper Marshall.’
77 
Vertighen,  as  far  as  Banks  understood  from  him,  was  going  to  see  the 
commandant. Both men walked together, ‘three or four yards’, before stopping by a 
shop next to an estaminent. At this point, Banks claimed, he parted company with 
Vertighen because he had spotted Lloyd. ‘I saw Lloyd come out; turn to the right 
towards the bridge. Lloyd entered the Café de Allies and I followed him. Vertighen did 
not come with me. Vertighen when I saw him last was walking up the hill to the 
Commandant’s office. I looked in the café and saw Lloyd.’
78  
On seeing Lloyd in the café Banks claimed he ran down a side lane that led to the 
Café Caron, where he hoped he would find Corporal Carrican or Trooper Marshall. 
Unable to find them, he went to the café on the square, but did not find them there 
                                                 
75 Ibid., pages 17-18. 
76 Ibid., page 17. 
77 Ibid., page 18. 
78 Ibid.   62 
either. He stated that he did not hear a shot fired on his way to the Café Caron. He 
went to relieve himself near a munitions lorry where he claimed he was smacked on 
the head near his left ear, close to an injury he had received in 1914 in an accident on a 
banana boat. When falling forward under the impact of the blow a kick was aimed at 
him. Although he caught sight of a puttee he could not see who the man was as it was 
dark.
79 
Banks claimed he could not remember anything more until he was brought before 
Major Denton at Lang who told him he was going to be charged with murdering a 
civilian. Banks thought the major was joking, but Denton assured him he was not. 
Banks concluded his statement by saying that his health was good and that he never 
suffered from fits. He added that he had ‘no cause whatever for any ill feeling against 
the deceased man’ and that he had no idea who caused his death. On completing his 
statement Banks disclosed that since his arrest on October 31, 1918 he had been put on 
‘his honour’ and allowed special privileges.
80 It is interesting to note that on such a 
serious charge, and one that had attracted so much high profile interest, Banks was 
trusted not to abscond. 
The prosecution questioned Banks about his revolver and whether he had more 
ammunition, and asked for clarification of his movements on October 31. Banks told 
the prosecutor that the revolver was fully loaded when Sergeant Selmes handed it to 
him. When he offered the revolver to Vertighen he said he was not aware that Lloyd 
was in the café. When he saw Lloyd in the dance room he went outside the café to load 
his  revolver.  He  maintained  that  he  did  not  say  anything  to  Vertighen  regarding 
placing the café out of bounds and that it was Vertighen who proposed seeing the 
Town Commandant. On the afternoon of the 31st he asserted he was sober and ‘was 
pretending to be drunk’. This he did again later when he saw Lloyd in the Café de 
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Commerce around 7.30pm.
81 Banks assured the prosecutor that he was not a heavy 
drinker, maintaining that his alleged drunkenness was pretence, and that the real cause 
of his later apparent drunkenness was a blow to the head. He stated: 'I have still a lump 
on my head from where I was struck. I had my head washed the next morning. There 
was only a little blood on my head from where I was struck.’
82 Banks said he could not 
account for the fact that five full cartridges and one empty cartridge were found beside 
him, as attested to by Sergeant Selmes at the Summary. 
On re-examination by the prosecutor, Banks was asked to clarify why he carried 
an empty cartridge: ‘When I loaded my revolver outside the café I put the five full 
cartridges and the blank one in the revolver. I put the blank one in because I was told 
by  the  Sergeant  at  the  hospital  that  there  would  probably  be  an  enquiry  into  the 
shooting of Crundill.’
83 
Banks stated that he unloaded the revolver when he left the Café de Francis as he 
was returning to the Café de Commerce to hand over the revolver to Sergeant Selmes. 
Further, the Prosecutor wanted to know why Banks was now wearing a moustache 
when he was clean shaven at the time of the alleged offence, a factor in the inability of 
some  of  the  witnesses  to  identify  him.  Banks  explained  that  he  had  shaven  his 
moustache off before the 31st ‘so as not to be recognised by members of the Cody 
gang’. Banks, answering further questions, said there were no strict orders concerning 
the opening and closing of estaminents and that Vertighen had said nothing to him 
when he left him to go after Lloyd. He claimed he was struck on the head about forty-
five minutes after he and Vertighen parted. Asked about his ability to speak French 
Banks replied: ‘I have been in France about 18 months and understand a few words of 
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French  –  the  French  soldiers  use  in  the  line.  I  don’t  know  the  meaning  of  the 
expression “Ca re fait rien”.’
84 
This concluded the examination by the prosecution of Banks and it was now left 
to the Prisoner’s Friend to address the court. Major Laskey, as recorded in the trial 
transcript, was brief and his address consisted of only three sentences. He pointed to 
the fact that a long time had passed since the murder was committed and that Sergeant 
Selmes, ‘a most important witness for the defence’, had been demobilised. He claimed 
the civilian witnesses were unreliable, without mentioning why. Furthermore, the case 
for prosecution ‘rests on inferences; no proof of shooting; no proof that revolver had 
been fired on 31st October’.
85 The case for the defence of Banks rested on those points. 
Banks’s defence seems extraordinary if it had not been for the fact, corroborated 
by Godfrey, Carrican and Marshall, that Banks was indeed involved in operations, 
involving undercover work, to round up a notorious gang. A ballistic examination, 
which was not available at the time, would have determined whether the bullet came 
from  Banks’s  revolver  and  would  have  settled  the  matter.  But  Banks  had  an 
explanation for the spent cartridge with the shooting incident when he and Carrican 
had attempted the arrest of Crundill only the day before the murder. Whether Banks 
had  more  ammunition  and  reloaded  is  the  question.  What  is  clear  is  that  Banks’s 
alleged level of intoxication rose dramatically half an hour after Vertighen’s death 
when he entered DADO’s store, and whether his condition was caused by a blow to the 
head would be a matter for the court to decide. 
This was always going to be a difficult charge to defend and it is not surprising 
the court would decide on what was probable. Although not recorded in the court 
transcript, they must have come to the conclusion that Banks, while in a drunken state, 
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shot Monsieur Vertighen. He was found guilty by the court on the alternative charge 
AA Sec 41 of committing the offence of manslaughter: 
when on active service committing the offence of manslaughter in that he at Longpré-les-
Corps Saints on the night of 31st October, 1918 when on active service did unlawfully 
kill M. Vertighen, proprietor of Café de Commerce, Longpré-les-Corps Saints.
86 
Banks was awarded five years’ penal servitude, which was later confirmed. 
There  is  no  record  of  the  court’s  deliberations  but  we  can  surmise  that  they 
believed  Banks  was  drunk  when  he  and  Vertighen  left  the  café.  They  must  have 
accepted  the  testimony  of  August  Cordier,  the  grandson  of  the  deceased,  whose 
evidence  concerning  the  threatened  closure  of  Vertighen’s  premises  provided  the 
reason why both men left the café together. Captain Hayes, the medical officer who 
examined  Banks  on  his  arrest,  had  seen  him  worse  for  drink  in  the  afternoon. 
Furthermore, he had testified that he thought it ‘improbable’ that Banks’s condition in 
the evening was caused by a blow to the head, and that he had in fact examined him 
and found no head injury. An Australian witness, S. M. R. Godfrey, had testified that 
he had seen Banks put on a military policeman’s brassard and ‘was playing about with 
some handcuffs’. This may have suggested to the court that an over-tired Banks, who 
was worse for drink, abused what authority he had vested in him by threatening to 
close Vertighen’s café. But most telling of all is the fact that two witnesses testified 
that they heard the shot that killed Vertighen around 7.30pm, about two minutes after 
Banks said he parted company with Vertighen. Significantly, Banks in his defence, 
never  claimed  that  Lloyd,  Cody  or  other  members  of  the  gang  might  have  killed 
Vertighen. Probably, under advice from his barrister, Major Laskey, this was left to the 
court to conclude. But the insinuation was there and the possibility that Vertighen was 
killed to ‘set Banks up’ provided a motive for Vertighen’s death and was something 
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the court had to consider. If that was the case then it was a most opportunist killing as 
the gang members had less than two minutes to execute the plan. 
After  confirmation  of  his  sentence  Banks  was  imprisoned  in  No.  2  Military 
Prison, Rouen for a few days before being transferred to Portland Prison, England. On 
August 29 the Australian Imperial Force headquarters in London decided to return 
Banks to Australia to serve what was left of his sentence. Their intention was to have 
his case reviewed by the Defence Department and any remission of sentence to be 
made in Australia.
87 In September, the Governor of Portland Prison, S. H. J. Creedy, 
stated that a petition had been received from Private W. J. H. Banks and that his trial 
had been reviewed and it was found there were ‘no grounds for interference’. In his 
Petition  Banks  claimed  ‘he  was  “drunk”  at  the  time  he  committed  the  offence’.
88 
Whether this amounted to an acknowledgement that he was guilty of manslaughter or 
just a plea in mitigation of his sentence is unclear. There is nothing in Banks’s service 
record that indicates he was involved in ‘undercover activity’. His disciplinary record 
shows  that  he  had  absences  that  resulted  in  detention,  with  one  case  of  violently 
resisting a military policeman. He faced a court-martial on July 11, 1918 and was 
convicted of being absent from May 20 to June 3, drunkenness, and ‘committing an 
offence against the property of an inhabitant of the country he was serving, in that he 
damaged a camera, the property of Mme. Bratazan’, for which he was awarded twenty-
eight days’ Field Punishment No. 2. Banks embarked for Australia on January 5, 1920, 
disembarking at Melbourne on February 26. By March 27, 1920 Banks was a free man 
having  been  discharged  from  the  Australian  Imperial  Force,  ‘services  no  longer 
required’, an indication of his status as a disciplinary case.
89 
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The intransigence displayed by the Australian government to their soldiers being 
subject to the death penalty for murder most likely saved the lives of Private Richmond 
and Private Banks. Although Banks was found guilty of manslaughter, that verdict 
could well have been murder if he had been tried earlier under the glare of a hostile 
High Command in an English or French court. It would be interesting to know whether 
Banks  was  aware,  while  he  was  ‘on  his  honour’  awaiting  his  trial,  that  his 
Commander-in-Chief, and successive Secretaries of State for War, Lord Milner and 
Churchill, had tried to get him tried for his life. All their efforts came to nought in the 
end. The Australian government stalled over the issue of the death penalty for murder, 
delayed  replying  to  correspondence,  and  settled  for  penal  servitude  for  life  as  the 
maximum sentence that could be imposed for murder. The High Command did not get 
the example they so badly wanted, and by the time Banks was tried the need for an 
example  was  receding  as  soldiers  were  being  repatriated.  It  could  have  been  so 
different if the French had insisted that Banks should be tried in a French civil court 
where the death penalty applied. If that had happened it would have been very difficult 
for the Australian government to resist the combined pressure of GHQ and the French, 
and the necessity of maintaining good international relations could well have ended the 
privileged position the Australians enjoyed. 
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C h a p t e r   3  
FIELD PUNISHMENT 
On the face of it the British Army’s disciplinary code had enough force to keep 
men to their duty. A closer examination, however, reveals that the sanctions they 
could impose were quite limited when taking into account the overriding need to 
keep men available for combat. At the extreme end of this disciplinary code was the 
death penalty that frightened the vast majority of British and Dominion forces and 
proved  to  be  an  effective  deterrent  against  high  incidences  of  absenteeism  and 
desertion.  Exemption  from  this  sanction  resulted  in  exceptionally  high  rates  of 
absenteeism  and  desertion  among  Australian  troops.  Imprisonment,  as  discussed 
earlier, was seen as ‘rewarding’ the offender by keeping him out of harm’s way, as 
the  regimen  of  prison  life,  as  miserable  as  it  was,  did  not  compare  to  frontline 
combat. The awarding of Field Punishment Numbers 1 or 2 provided an alternative 
to imprisoning offenders whose crimes would normally attract a prison sentence. It 
remained one of the few options available to the British Army as a means of control, 
as branding – marking a prisoner with a letter ‘D’ for deserter, or ‘BC’ for bad 
character  –  was  abolished  in  1871
1,  and  flogging  (corporal  punishment)  was 
eventually  was  banned  in  1881.
2  It  offered  the  flexibility  of  being  administered 
behind  the  lines  when  a  man’s  unit  had  been  stood  down.  However,  Field 
Punishment No. 1 attracted much controversy and had been dramatically portrayed 
as ‘crucifixion’, a reference to the practice of physically tying the offender’s legs and 
arms outstretched when fettered to a wagon wheel, or more generally after 1917, to a 
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post with arms tied at the back.
3 It has been argued, with some justification, that this 
degrading punishment reflected ‘an old idea that a soldier is a low and violent fellow 
who  can  only  be  ruled  by  brute  force  and  savage  torture’.
4  During  the  war  the 
severity of the disciplinary code was often mitigated by officers acting out of a sense 
of noblesse oblige, which entailed taking care of their men and protecting them, 
when appropriate, from the full rigour of the disciplinary code.
5 Australian officers 
too adopted these principles, but crucially their men did not have the death penalty 
hanging  over  them.  Furthermore,  there  was  a  reluctance  of  Australian-convened 
courts  martial  and  commanding  officers  to  award  Field  Punishment  No.  1. 
Explanations  for  this  would  normally  centre  on  the  sensitivities  of  the  colonial 
temperament that saw this degrading punishment as an affront to a man’s dignity. 
However, when the fettering of offenders was again raised in 1919 and opinions 
were sought on retaining this punishment the views expressed by the majority of 
British  corps  commanders  were  remarkably  similar  to  the  Australian  position 
throughout  the  war.
6  The  British  High  Command  detected  this  unwillingness  to 
award this punishment during the war and urged senior Australian officers to award 
Field  Punishment  No.  1  and  not  to  ‘reward’  offenders  with  detention  or 
imprisonment.
7 Their reluctance to do so contributed to the high imprisonment rates 
for Australian soldiers, tainting many of them with unnecessary prison convictions 
and reducing the disciplinary options at their disposal. 
Field  Punishment  No.  1  was  not  just  abhorrent  to  Australian  troops.  It  also 
aroused  a  great  deal  of  adverse  feeling  in  Britain  after  a  soldier  died  undergoing 
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punishment and the details of its administration became widely known. In 1916 the 
popular Illustrated Sunday Herald printed an article under the headline: ‘Why Crucify 
Tommy?’ In this story Robert Blatchford, a former soldier, voiced the rank and file’s 
hatred of this degrading punishment. Blatchford asked: ‘Why should any penalty be 
tolerated in the Army which would not be tolerated in civil life?’. For Blatchford, this 
type of punishment only reinforced GHQ’s view of the ordinary soldier as less human 
than themselves and who needed threats and acts of terror to keep him in line.
8 The 
disquiet this brand of punishment aroused in Britain caused David Lloyd George, then 
Secretary  of  State  for  War,  to  write  to  his  counterparts  in  the  French  and  Italian 
governments to ask whether they had a similar form of punishment in their armies. His 
letter to them in November 1916 laid out the manner in which Field Punishment No. 1 
was administered in the British Army. He stated the offender may be punished as 
follows: 
(a) He may be kept in irons, i.e. in fetters or handcuffs, or both fetters and handcuffs; and 
may be secured so as to prevent his escape. 
(b) When in irons he may be attached for a period or periods not exceeding two hours 
in any one day to a fixed object, but he must not be so attached during more than three 
out of any four consecutive days, or during more than twenty-one days in all. 
(c) Straps or ropes may be used for the purpose of these rules in lieu of irons. 
(d) He may be subjected to the like labour, employment and restraint, and dealt with in 
like manner as if he were under sentence of imprisonment with hard labour. 
There is, however, the following important provision: 
‘Every portion of a field punishment shall be inflicted in such a manner as is calculated 
not to cause injury or to leave any permanent mark on the offender; and a portion of 
field punishment must be discontinued upon a report by a responsible medical officer 
that the continuance of that portion would be prejudicial to the offender’s health.’ [This 
comment  added  to  the  letter.]  Further,  the  sentence  cannot  extend  for  more  than  3 
months if inflicted by a court-martial, or 28 days if inflicted by a commanding officer.
9 
Lloyd  George  was  careful  not  to  admit  to  his  ministerial  counterparts  that 
soldiers in the British Army would consider committing crime in order to be sent to 
                                                 
8 (TNA) WO 32/5460 Part 1, Illustrated Sunday Herald, October 29, 1916. 
9 (TNA) WO 32/5460, David Lloyd George’s letter to the French Minister, November 21, 1916.  
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prison to avoid frontline duty, or that Field Punishment was a way to counter this by 
not rewarding this type of crime with imprisonment. The justification for this type of 
punishment, Lloyd George went on to say, was twofold: 
(1) In order to avoid keeping a soldier away from his duties as a combatant for so long 
a period as would be involved by an equally severe sentence of imprisonment. 
(2) In order that it may be necessary to employ as few men as possible to guard the 
offenders.
10 
The French Minister for War, Roques, replied that their military regulations ‘do 
not provide either at home or in the field for punishments analogous to those which 
Field Punishment No. 1 authorises’. He stated that ‘the punishment of irons does not 
even exist with regard to soldiers detained in military prisons’ and restraints of any 
sort are only used as a precaution when a prisoner is a danger to himself or others.
11 
The Italian War Minister, Morrone, reported that use of irons was permitted under 
their  military  regulations  ‘to  increase  the  severity  of  rigorous  imprisonment’,  to 
constrain  difficult  prisoners,  and  to  use  against  prisoners  charged  with  a  serious 
crime.  He  explained  that  ‘this  measure,  however,  must  be  considered  as  entirely 
exceptional and should never be enforced merely as a punishment but only as a 
measure of temporary coercion’. He believed that it was justifiable in time of war to 
increase  the  rigorous  punishment  for  serious  crimes  by  the  use  of  field  irons.
12 
However, there was little comfort for Lloyd George in these replies as the French 
had no equivalent of Field Punishment No. 1, and the Italians, although prepared to 
restrain men in irons, confined their use to serious offences – unlike the less serious 
offences which led to British soldiers being awarded this punishment.
13 The practice 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11  (TNA)  WO  32/5460,  Part  1,  letter  from  Ministère  de  la  Guerre,  Roques,  December  13,  1916 
replying to Lloyd George’s letter of  November 21, 1916. 
12 (TNA) WO 32/5460, Part 1, Letter from the Ministro della Guerra, Morrone, Roma, Dicembre 11, 
1916, replying to Lloyd George’s letter of November 21, 1916. 
13 Many corps commanders were of the opinion that Field Punishment No. 1 was awarded too often 
for less serious crimes when they were canvassed for their opinion concerning retaining fettering of 
soldiers in 1919. See (TNA) WO 32/5461.  
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was  thus  anachronistic  in  Western  Europe  and  peculiar  to  the  British  Army.  It 
reflected an old view, prevalent in the High Command, that men drawn from the 
lower echelons of society required harsh measures to keep them in line.  
In  the  same  month  Lloyd  George  cabled  the  General  Officers  Commanding 
forces  in  France,  Egypt,  Salonica,  East  Africa  and  Mesopotamia  to  canvass  their 
views. The cable indicated that opinion in both Houses of Parliament and the press was 
that Field Punishment No. 1 should be abolished, and that ‘popular feeling against this 
punishment was growing daily’, with a motion down for discussion in the House of 
Commons. It was the controversial Rule 2(b), the tying of offenders to a fixed object, 
which aroused the most anger. The cable went on to add that the implementation of 
Rule  2(b):  ‘has  been  carried  out  under  conditions  which  lead  to  extreme  physical 
inconvenience and various methods devised whereby soldiers suffer extreme pain and 
that some cases of death have resulted’.
14  
What had aroused anger in the community and adverse comments in the Press 
was the death of a Liverpool soldier who died undergoing ‘crucifixion’. The post 
mortem concluded the soldier died of ‘an acute attack of the dilation of the heart’. He 
had been tied up for half an hour; and then had been given a ten-minute break in 
which period he died. The official report used the fact that the soldier did not die 
undergoing punishment under Rule 2(b), but during a rest period. General Childs 
defended the report and the methods used to discipline men in this way. It is little 
wonder that the press labelled this report ‘a whitewash’.
15 Public antagonism was 
also fuelled by eyewitness accounts of abuses of soldiers undergoing punishment 
under Rule 2(b). One soldier claimed that in Franvillers he saw a soldier handcuffed 
behind his back and tied around the chest and ankles with straps and ropes to a 
timber wheel in full view of the public in the village square. British soldiers reported 
                                                 
14 (TNA) WO 32/5460, Part 1. 
15 (TNA) WO 32/5460.  
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that the comment ‘even the Germans do not do that’ was frequently heard in northern 
France. Protests poured in from the trade unions, mothers with sons in France, as 
well as from people across the social and political spectrum in Britain.
16 None of 
these protests made any difference to the outcome. The general consensus amongst 
officers commanding British forces in all theatres was in favour of its retention. This 
matter would re-surface in 1919 in the reading of the Army Bill in the House of 
Commons with a motion set down for the fettering of offenders to be abolished.
17 
Haig,  writing  to  the  Secretary  of  War  in  June  1918,  acknowledged  that  the 
Australians held the view that Field Punishment Number 1 was degrading before the 
campaign in England to have it abolished began. He persistently drew attention to the 
fact  that  the  range  of  punishments  available  to  Australian  courts  martial  was 
restricted due to the fact they are unable to award the death penalty. In particular, he 
commented upon Australian ‘unwillingness to award sentences of Field Punishment 
No.  1’
18  as  part  of  a  general  criticism  of  Australian  courts  martial  not  using 
effectively  the  powers  they  possessed,  thus  contributing  to  the  high  levels  of 
Australian indiscipline. In previous correspondence to the Secretary of State for War 
Haig  had  pointed  to  the  exceptionally  high  rate  of  imprisonment  of  Australians 
compared with British and other colonial troops. In July 1918 the Australians were 
imprisoned at a rate of 7.86 per 1,000 compared with 0.97 for British and 1.88 for 
other colonial troops.
19 Haig was urging the awarding of Field Punishment No. 1 in 
place  of  a  custodial  sentence  which  in  turn  would  not  reward  the  offender  with 
imprisonment, and would naturally reduce the high rates of Australian imprisonment. 
There is evidence to support Haig’s claim when the punishments for crimes against 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 (TNA) WO 32/5461, the 1919 debate is discussed later in the chapter. 
18 (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 83, letter from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to The Secretary of State 
for War, June 23, 1918. 
19 (TNA) WO 32/5484, item 81.  
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inhabitants are examined for the period from March to July 1918. Of the fifty-five 
Australian convictions, only five were awarded Field Punishment No. 1, compared 
with 156 out of 295 convictions for other troops
20 (see table 2.1, chapter 2). In this 
snapshot of crimes against inhabitants, 9 per cent of Australian convictions resulted 
in the award of Field Punishment No. 1 compared with 53 per cent for other troops.  
In  July  1917  Australian  brigade  commanders  were  urged  to  use  Field 
Punishment No.1 as a means to curb Australian indiscipline and reduce the excessive 
number of courts-martial. The brigade major of the 12th Australian Infantry Brigade, 
in a confidential memo to his Brigade commanders, drew attention to the ‘excessive’ 
number of courts martial of NCOs and men in his unit. To reduce the number of 
courts  martial  the  Brigade  Major  used  an  example  of  one  of  his  battalion 
commanders who, while deployed on the Somme, found Field Punishment No. 1 to 
be very effective in keeping discipline. This commander, the major explained, used 
Field Punishment No. 1 ‘fearlessly and successfully, with the result that crimes for 
drunkenness  and  absence  without  leave,  refusing  duty,  etc.,  became  an  almost 
unknown  quantity’.
21  For  this  reason  the  Brigade  Commander  directed  his 
commanders in future to award Field Punishment No. 1 and ‘that it be rigorously 
carried out’ when the Unit is out of the line so ‘the remainder of the Unit can see and 
realize for themselves what it means’.
22 This was not always possible as punishment 
was sometimes administered in the transport lines or in special compounds. Although 
the order to award this punishment in future was clear enough from this brigade 
major,  there  was  some  confusion  over  which  crimes  could  be  awarded  Field 
Punishment No. 1.  
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 AWM 25, 807/6, 12th Australian Infantry Brigade, Administrative Memo No. 17, July 14, 1917 
(signature unclear). 
22 Ibid.  
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The framing of charges was a critical factor in deciding whether a commanding 
officer had the power to deal with a soldier summarily or whether the crime was such 
that a court-martial was mandatory. It will be recalled that by 1916 a commanding 
officer had the authority to award Field Punishment No. 1 and 2 up to a maximum of 
twenty-eight days. The administrative instruction from the Third Australian Division 
sought to clarify the position for commanding officers, but it came late in the war in 
September 1918. This stated that care had to be taken when charges were framed so 
it  was  clear  the  commanding  officer  had  the  authority  to  deal  with  the  case 
summarily. The example given illustrates just how much discretionary power could 
be exercised. A minor case of insubordination would be sent for trial by court-martial 
if  the  accused  were  charged  with  ‘disobeying  a  lawful  command’,  or  ‘using 
insubordinate language to a superior officer’. To avoid this commanding officers 
were instructed to frame the charge to read ‘hesitating to obey an order’, or ‘making 
an improper reply to an NCO’,
23 so that the case could be dealt with summarily and 
avoid the costly loss of time and effort in convening a court-martial. For cases not 
considered  serious  enough  to  make  the  convening  of  a  court-martial  essential, 
permission could be sought to deal with such cases summarily if it was felt that the 
awarding  of  Field  Punishment  up  to  twenty-eight  days  would  be  appropriate. 
However, as the instruction indicated, ‘the power to deal with other offences under 
the direction of a superior authority is practically never exercised’.
24 The thrust of 
this administrative instruction was to remind commanding officers that by not fully 
exercising the powers they possessed they were contributing to the ‘marked increase’ 
in  the  number  of  cases  ‘forwarded  for  trial  by  court-martial’.
25  The  framing  of 
charges to avoid the convening of a court not only saved administration, but also 
                                                 
23 AWM 25, 233/1, Administrative Instruction No. 56, September 9, 1918, R. Jackson, Lt.-Col., AA & 
QMG, Third Australian Division. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
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prevented the offender from suffering the stigma of a prison sentence and kept him 
available for duty. Cases handled by the Australian Provost Marshal, such as absence 
without  leave  and  less  serious  offences,  could  also  be  dealt  with  summarily  by 
obtaining the sanction of brigade headquarters.  
There  existed  a  lack  of  uniformity  in  sentencing  men  convicted  of  absence 
without leave, which caused confusion for commanding officers. The guidelines laid 
down to show the recommended scale of punishment for absence appear harsh and 
one wonders how rigorously they were enforced. Cases of absence, when a Unit was 
engaged in active operations, would automatically be sent for court-martial. If the 
offence were committed after a man had been warned for duty then the charge would 
be upgraded to desertion. For absence over two hours but not exceeding forty-eight 
hours a minimum of seven days’ Field Punishment No. 2 was recommended, with 
the offender forfeiting seven day’s pay. Up to seven days’ absence could attract 
twenty-eight  day’s  Field  Punishment  No.  1  and  forfeiture  of  fourteen  days’  pay. 
Absence over seven days, the guidelines state, ‘should be sent for Field General 
Court  Martial’.  Non-commissioned  officers  were  dealt  with  more  severely  as  all 
cases of absence required a court-martial.
26 As absence without leave was the most 
prevalent  crime  amongst  Australian  troops,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Army 
authorities  were  getting  bogged  down  with  too  many  trials  and  were  urging 
commanding officers to use every means at their disposal to prevent them. 
The above guidelines, if carried out to the letter, would have caused a further 
increase in Australians being court-martialled for absence. An administrative memo 
from the First Australian Division in September 1917 commented upon the ‘disparity 
of awards in recent cases of trial by F.G.C.M’. The memo urged brigadier-generals to 
exercise their discretion as to whether cases should be sent for trial by field general 
                                                 
26 AWM 25, 233/1, A233/5/47, Scale of Punishment for Absence Without Leave, guidelines. (No date, 
and one can speculate that these rules were laid down early in the war).  
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court-martial or whether the regiment could deal with these cases summarily. The 
suggestions made to deal with absence made by the signatory of the memo, Major F. 
Millner, DAAG, differ significantly from the guidelines above. Under these guidelines, 
brigadier-generals could exercise a greater degree of discretion, as can be seen below:  
(1)  All cases of A.W.L. for 3 days or under, in which the accused rejoins his unit of his 
own accord or surrenders, to be dealt with summarily. 
(2)  All other cases of over 3 days and under 21 days absence, where the man rejoins his 
unit  or  surrenders,  to  be  submitted  by  the  C.O.  to  the  Brigadier  General  for  his 
decision  as  to  whether  the  case  should  be  tried  by  F.G.C.M.  or  dealt  with 
regimentally. 
(3)  All cases where a man is arrested or where the A.W.L. is of a period over 21 days to 
be dealt with F.G.C.M.
27 
Whereas in the previous guidelines seven days’ absence was automatically a 
court-martial offence, under Millner’s suggestion an absentee could be away up to 
twenty days (if he rejoins or surrenders to his unit) and not be tried by court-martial, 
if a brigadier-general so directed. With this much leeway brigadier-generals had the 
discretionary power dramatically to reduce the number of offenders being sent for 
trial. 
Determining whether a soldier should be charged with absence without leave or 
desertion was problematic, even if a soldier gave himself up to his unit. A memo 
marked  ‘Secret’  from  the  5th  Australian  Division  in  November  1917  alerted  all 
officers to the increase in cases of absence, which bordered on desertion, that had 
occurred since the Division had been engaged in active operations. The ‘commonest 
cases’, the memo pointed out, were where men absented themselves just before the 
Unit proceeded to the frontline, and then later surrendered, or reported to the ‘Nucleus 
Camp or Transport Lines’. Some men, the memo stated, ‘have boasted that they will 
not go into the line’. Furthermore, it was proving difficult to secure a court-martial 
                                                 
27 AWM 25, 233/1, Administrative Memorandum No. 36, First Australian Division, September 5, 
1917.  
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conviction for desertion in many of these cases as ‘it is found difficult to prove the 
essential fact the accused was warned the unit was about to proceed to the line’.
28 To 
counter this, the memo instructed officers personally to warn men liable to abscond of 
the Unit’s movement to the line and to caution them that a charge of desertion will be 
preferred  for  cases  of  absence.  Furthermore,  at  the  time  of  an  absentee’s  arrest 
arrangements should be made, should his Unit still be at the front, for him to rejoin 
them.
29  There  is  a  sense  of  alarm  in  this  memo  at  the  number  of  men  absenting 
themselves,  and  more  importantly,  avoiding  frontline  duty.  General  Birdwood 
expressed his dismay over the number of desertions in the 2nd Division in his telegram 
to the Australian Defence Minister, Pearce in the same month. He told Pearce that in 
the last month fifty-three men, whose battalions had been ordered to the front to join 
the rest of 2nd Division, ‘quietly slipped away at night back to the rear, where they 
were either apprehended or gave themselves up some days later’. Birdwood admitted 
to Pearce that the deterrents in place were not working and that he would resort to 
shaming the convicted men by having their convictions for 
desertion ‘published in all the Australian papers’, hoping that this would ‘act as a 
deterrent in a way which other things do not.’
31 
Although  there  existed  a  degree  of  flexibility  in  dealing  with  absentees,  as 
discussed above, men found a way to exploit the requirement for a court-martial 
conviction  for  desertion.  The  Australian  Provost  Corps  alone  dealt  with  nearly 
26,000 cases of absence from 1917-18 (see Table 3.1 below), an indication of the 
severity  of  the  problem.  Detention  proved  of  little  use  as  a  deterrent,  and 
commanding officers were continually urged to use the powers they possessed to 
award Field Punishment in its place. There is little evidence to show that they did so. 
                                                 
28 AWM 25, 233/1, memo marked ‘Secret’, 5th Australian Division, Headquarters November 6, 1917, 
DAG, Major-General Commanding 5th Australian Division. 
29 Ibid. 
31 AWM 92, 3DRL 3376, Birdwood papers, letter to Pearce, November 5, 1917.  
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The  Australian  military  authorities  were  in  a  real  tangle  in  framing  charges  that 
would keep men out of prison, sorting out what was appropriate punishment and 
providing a deterrent. 
Table 3.1 
Australian Provost Corps:  
Summary of cases dealt with from January 1, 1917 to December 31, 1918.
32 
 
Offences 
Six Months 
Ending 
30.6.1917 
Six Months 
Ending 
31.12.1917 
Six Months 
Ending 
30.6.1918 
Six Months 
Ending 
30.12.1918 
  
TOTAL 
Absence  7,232  6,367  6,086  6,205  25,890 
Drunkenness  656  400  161  180  1,397 
Insubordination  118  32  23  10  183 
Conduct to the Prejudice  949  746  401  539  2,635 
Resisting Arrest  104  51  45  61  261 
Escaping from Custody  82  33  17  44  176 
Disobedience  303  90  109  17  519 
Neglect to Obey  1,906  3,474  2,463  1,980  9,823 
Larceny  48  30  11  15  104 
Forged Pass  240  263  78  26  607 
Assault  48  20  12  59  139 
Bounds  321  17  33  17  388 
Failing to Salute  580  407  290  168  1,445 
Breach of Traffic  20  51  15  3  89 
Dissension  17  20  99  92  228 
Allowing to Escape  41  1  -  -  42 
Improperly Dressed  31  249  70  160  510 
Striking Superior  17  18  4  6  42 
Altered Paybook  16  -  13  7  45 
Trespassing  41  71  94  128  334 
Trafficking in Govt. Stores  1  5  8  3  17 
No means of Identification  -  -  22  35  57 
TOTALS  12,771  12,345  10,054  9,755  44,925 
 
The  awarding  of  Field  Punishment  No.  1  by  the  British  Army  was  a 
discriminatory form of punishment. Officers, of course, were exempt, and although 
senior  NCOs  were  often  awarded  Field  Punishment,  commanding  officers  were 
urged  to  commute  their  sentences  to  something  less  degrading.  There  was  good 
reason for this as Army authorities feared the effect that the humiliating of NCOs in 
                                                 
32  Source:  AWM  25,  233/6,  Part  53.  (This  table  does  not  indicate  whether  these  crimes  were 
committed either in France or England, or both.)  
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front  of  their  own  men  might  have  on  discipline.  Non-commissioned  officers 
provided  the  crucial  link  between  officers  and  other  ranks.  These  were  the  very 
people who did the shouting, swearing and bullying on behalf of their officers. They 
were generally treated more harshly when they transgressed, incurring more severe 
sentences for their crimes.
33 A confidential memo from Third Army in July 1917 
expressed the hope that reviewing authorities would use the powers they possessed to 
commute  the  sentences  of  NCOs.  They  gave  the  following  examples  of 
commutation: 
(1)  Sergeant X. Sentenced to reduction to the ranks and 90 days Field Punishment No. 1 
or No. 2. 
(2)  Sergeant X. Sentenced to 90 days Field Punishment No. 1 or No. 2 without anything 
being said as to his rank. 
  Either of these sentences may be commuted in the following terms:- 
(a)  “90 days Field punishment No. 1 or No. 2 commuted to 90 days (or less) forfeiture 
of pay, reduction to the ranks to stand”. 
(b)  “I remit the Field Punishment awarded, reduction to the ranks to stand”, i.e. the 
accused is merely reduced to the ranks. 
(c)  “Commuted  to  reduction  to  the  rank  of  Corporal”  i.e.  the  Field  Punishment  is 
remitted and also part of the sentence of reduction. 
(d)  “Commuted to reduction to Corporal and 90 (or less) days forfeiture of pay”. 
(e)  “Commuted to 90 days (or less) forfeiture of pay”. In this case the accused would 
remain a sergeant but would lose 90 (or less) days pay.
34 
Despite  Australian  distaste  for  Field  Punishment,  the  decision  was  made  by 
Birdwood, GOC I Anzac Corps, to establish a Corps Field Punishment Compound 
for all men awarded Field Punishment Numbers 1 and 2 over seven days. Under the 
command of Major R. Reilly of the AIF, and staffed by members of the Anzac 
Provost Police Corps, the Compound at Poperinghe was opened on September 29, 
                                                 
33  This  is  demonstrated  in  the  sentences  NCOs  received  for  their  part  in  the  ‘mutiny’  in  the  1st 
Battalion in September 1918 (see chapter 5). 
34 AWM 25, 807/1, Confidential Memorandum from Third Army Headquarters, DAAG, July 24, 
1917.  
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1916. Its task was to administer Field Punishment and not act as a place to keep men 
in ‘safe custody’ while under arrest, waiting trial, or promulgation of court-martial 
sentences.  It  was  not  always  the  case  that  men  sentenced  to  periods  of  Field 
Punishment  served  their  full  term,  as  commanding  officers  could  request  release 
before the sentence was completed.
35 By setting up a compound, out of sight of the 
troops from the offender’s Unit, the Australians were losing the deterrent effect of 
public  humiliation,  one  of  the  main  reasons  given  for  the  efficacy  of  Field 
Punishment.  
This policy of Birdwood’s differed from that of Lieutenant General Alexander 
John Godley, commander of New Zealand Forces II Anzac Corps, who continued the 
implementation  of  Field  Punishment  within  his  divisions.  This  policy,  Pugsley 
believes,  helped  to  create  the  impression  amongst  Australians    ‘that  field 
punishment, and particular Field Punishment No. 1 was not awarded or carried out 
on Australians by Australians’.
36 He asserts that Field Punishment was awarded by 
Australian commanders to the same degree as in the New Zealand Division. Further, 
that ‘by 30th April 1918 the Australian Corps Field Punishment Compound reported 
total admissions of 2504 men on field punishment’.
37 Comparisons with British and 
Australian awards of Field Punishment No. 1 are difficult to make due to the lack of 
consolidated  records  on  the  subject.  However,  it  will  be  recalled  that  Field 
Punishment No. 1 was awarded 60,210 times by courts martial in all theatres from 
August 4, 1914 to March 31, 1920 (see Table 1.1, chapter one),
38 and this figure does 
not include those men sentenced summarily by their commanding officers, who had 
the power to do so from 1916. 
                                                 
35 AWM 25, 8071, Memo from Headquarters, Australian Division, September 26, 1916, 1st Australian 
and New Zealand Army Corps. 
36 Christopher Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell, p. 101. 
37 Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell, p. 101. 
38  See  chapter  one,  page  15.  Source:  Julian  Putkowski,  “The  Pardon  Campaign’,  website 
http://www.association14-18.  
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The general routine of the Central Field Punishment Compound was designed to 
make the offender’s life as miserable as possible and therefore act as a deterrent. 
Reveille was at 6am, with roll call/sick parade and fatigues until 7.15am. At 8.30am 
the offenders were paraded and inspected by the officer commanding the compound. 
Parading and drilling would follow from 9.30am to noon and again from 1pm to 
3.30pm. Pack drill was also required from 6pm to 6.15pm, which was followed by 
roll call at 7pm and silence from 7.30pm. In addition offenders were to be given all 
possible fatigues, and those undergoing Field Punishment no. 1 were to be tied to a 
fixed object for two hours (not more than three out of four consecutive days) and 
preferably between the hours of 2pm and 4.00pm. Breakfast was taken at 7.30am, 
dinner at noon, and tea at 5pm, with the diet restricted to bully beef, biscuits and tea. 
Not surprisingly they were denied life’s small pleasures of tobacco and rum, with 
reading material restricted to drill books and sacred texts. Blankets were provided as 
offenders had to sleep on the floor, with the possible concession of straw for a stone 
floor. Communicating with sentries or other soldiers was forbidden and any requests 
had to be made to the sergeant or corporal of the guard. All orders had to be obeyed 
at the double, and all complaints, should an offender be foolhardy enough to make 
one, had to made to the Officer Commanding the Compound, and any considered 
frivolous would result in further punishment for the complainant. Undergoing Field 
Punishment in a compound of this nature was considered to be more severe than 
being  administered  at  brigade  level.  Although  an  offender  undergoing  Field 
Punishment within his Unit was exposed to the humiliation of being tied up in front 
of his comrades, he at least knew that men were observing his plight and any abuses 
by those carrying out the punishment would be remembered and retribution might 
possibly follow. 
A report from the officer commanding the Australian Corps Field Punishment  
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Compound in May 1918 indicates that Field Punishment No. 1 was not as freely 
imposed  on  Australian  offenders  compared  with  British.  The  commander  of  the 
Compound stated that: ‘prisoners sentenced to F.P. No. 1 usually have anything from 
five to twenty entries on their conduct sheets, and it is generally a last chance given 
to  them  by  their  Commanding  Officers  before  they  are  sent  to  a  F.G.C.M.’.
39 
Considering the high number of Australian courts martial there should be evidence of 
more men being given a last chance, that is undergoing Field Punishment rather than 
being sent for court-martial.  
The  report  also  highlights  the  degree  of  flexibility  this  commander  could 
exercise as he reported ‘that in the past five months Field Punishment No. 1 had not 
been  carried  out  in  the  Compound  owing  to  the  offenders  being  fully  employed 
during the periods of daylight and the various moves of the Compound that have 
taken place’. In an attempt to allay fears of ill treatment this commander claimed that 
when  Field  Punishment  No.  1  is  carried  out  it  is  under  the  supervision  of  two 
‘responsible’ NCOs, and that he personally inspects men undergoing this punishment 
every 15 minutes.
40  
By March 1918, according to a graph showing the number of men in military 
prisons in the field, nine Australians per 1000 were in prison compared with one per 
1000  British  and  less  than  two  Canadians.  The  graph  also  shows  the  British 
imprisonment rate reached over five per 1000 in 1915
41 and its reduction to the level 
of 1918 could in part be explained by the introduction of suspended sentences. Bean 
believed  the  comparatively  high  imprisonment  rate  of  Australians  to  be  a 
consequence  of  the  British  and  other  colonial  troops  suspending  sentences, 
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something that he states ‘could not be so general in the AIF’.
  42 The reason why 
suspended sentences could not be readily adopted by the AIF is not expanded upon 
by  Bean.  However,  in  his  notebook  Bean  had  expressed  his  frustrations  at  the 
sentences of courts-martial not being properly carried out. He complained that men 
were let out of prison if they gave no trouble despite the offender’s battalion not 
recommending a suspension of sentence. Furthermore, he thought this was a policy 
of  weakness  that  had  placed  undue  burdens  on  commanders  of  battalions.
43 
Instructions were given to commanders to the effect that men under suspension of 
sentence could be returned to prison to serve the full term should their conduct be 
unsatisfactory. Provision was also made to allow suspended sentences to be fully 
remitted in cases of acts of gallantry or ‘constant devotion to duty’, but not in cases 
of just ‘a negative abstention from crime’.
44  
At the end of the war the High Command held firm to their belief that Field 
Punishment No. 1 was essential to the maintenance of discipline. In 1919, when the 
Army  (Annual)  Bill  was  being  considered  in  Committee  stage  in  the  House  of 
Commons, the disquiet this punishment had caused in 1916 found expression in an 
amendment moved to abolish the fettering of soldiers. The amendment included a 
proviso that ‘Field Punishment should not be of the character of personal restraint by 
being kept in irons or other fetters but that Field Punishment should be of the character 
of hard labour’.
45 
The Secretary of State for War undertook the task of canvassing the opinion of 
senior  commanders  in  all  theatres  in  an  attempt  to  find  an  alternative  to  Field 
                                                 
42 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: vol. vi, The Australian 
Imperial  Force  in  France  during  the  Allied  Offensive  1918,  Sydney:  Angus  and  Robertson,  1942,  
pp. 30-31 
43 AWM 38, 3DRL 606/198/1, Bean’s Notebook (date unclear). 
44 AWM 25, 233/1, Army Administrative Instruction No. 56, ‘Discipline’, September 9, 1918, Lt.-Col. 
R. Jackson, AA & GQMG Third Australian Division. 
45 (TNA) WO 32/5461.  
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Punishment No. 1 which would still have the effect of maintaining discipline and 
which, in a future war, would avoid ‘a more free infliction of the death penalty than 
has been the case in this war’.
46 Haig, now Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, 
writing in June 1919, was ‘quite certain’ that without Field Punishment No. 1 the 
high standard of discipline in the British Army could not have been maintained. 
Furthermore, Haig stated, ‘it is not beside the point to recall the effect on discipline 
in the Australian Corps of the absence of capital punishment for desertion’.
47 Haig, 
echoed the opinion of most of his senior commanders when he wrote: ‘A few officers 
from a sentimental point of view wish that it could be dispensed with but are unable to 
find a substitute other than flogging and are generally in agreement that its abolition 
would result in an increase of death sentences’.
48 
A wider range of opinion was canvassed by the commander-in-chief in Ireland, 
Lieutenant-General Sir F. Shaw, who consulted with formation commanders, officers 
commanding  units  and  representatives  of  warrant  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers. They came to the unanimous conclusion that the tying up of men in ‘a fixed 
position in public, should be abolished’. Shaw acknowledged the degrading nature of 
the punishment and made the interesting point that Field Punishment No. 1 was ‘in the 
majority of cases, awarded for offences such as insubordination, which do not call for 
punishment of a degrading nature’. As an alternative he advocated the formation of 
penal  companies  or  battalions  where  men  awarded  more  than  fourteen  days  Field 
Punishment or more could be sent. Furthermore, Shaw wanted the offender to face the 
same dangers as the rest of his comrades but recognised this was difficult in France as: 
the only method of doing so was to send men behind the lines and therefore out of 
immediate danger. Consequently many men preferred to do several Field Punishments 
well behind the lines, than to run the risks attendant on the so-called period of ‘Rest’ in 
close support of the Trench Line, where long and arduous night working parties under 
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fire, caused the soldier to prefer his tour of duties in the trenches to that of his short tour 
of ‘Rest’.
 49 
There was a measure of agreement from a corps commander of the British Army 
of  the  Rhine  to  Shaw’s  position.  Lieutenant-General  Sir  T.  L.  N.  Morland, 
commanding X Corps, thought fettering should be maintained on active service but 
was in agreement with Shaw in believing that Field Punishment No. 1 ‘should be 
restricted to cases of a serious nature, e.g., striking or threatening a superior officer, 
insubordination,  etc.,  and  should  not  be  awarded  for  cases  of  drunkenness  or 
overstaying leave, as has been the tendency during the present campaign’.
50 Further 
support for its abolition came from Major-General C. Hull, commanding IX Corps, 
who advocated the alternative of pack drill, physical training, and ‘military training of 
arduous nature’.
51 Lieutenant General C. Haldane, commanding VI Corps, said the 
consensus was against fettering offenders. He took issue with the Secretary of State’s 
view that abolition would result in an increase in the death penalty, believing this was 
based on a ‘misconception’, and that ‘such cases can be dealt with by the award of 
Penal Servitude and this sentence may or may not be suspended’.
52 Major General P. 
Hambro, commanding II Corps, was in favour of abolishing irons, except to use as a 
restraint in cases of violent offenders, and would substitute hard labour.
53 In favour of 
its retention were Lieutenant General Sir A. J. Godley, commanding IV Corps,
54 and 
Brigadier-General H. S. Rogers, British Army of the Rhine, who stated ‘the way in 
                                                 
49 (TNA) WO 32/ 5461, reply by Lt-Gen. F. Shaw, Commander-in Chief, Ireland, May 20, 1919. 
50 (TNA) WO 32/ 5461General Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine, Lt-Col. T. L. N. Morland, 
commanding X Corps. 
51  (TNA)  WO  32/  5461,  General  Headquarters,  British  Army  of  the  Rhine,  Maj.-Gen.  C.  Hull, 
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53 (TNA) WO 32/ 5461, General Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine, Maj.-Gen. P. Hambro, 
commanding II Corps. 
54 (TNA) WO 32/ 5461, General Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine, Lt-Gen. Sir A. J. Godley, 
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which Field Punishment has been carried out during this war could not have been 
bettered’.
55 
The commander of British troops in France and Flanders, Lieutenant-General Sir 
J. J. Asser, reported that, on balance, opinion favoured its retention, but admitted that 
NCOs and men were ‘equally divided’, with older men in favour of its retention and 
younger ones against. Asser believed that Field Punishment No. 2 was in practice 
‘little more than confinement to barracks with the added penalty of forfeiture of pay’. 
Non-commissioned officers pointed to the defects of administering the punishment in 
cases  where  offenders  were  left  tied  up  when  under  enemy  fire,  and  therefore  in 
greater danger than their comrades. Sergeant Erley, DCM, stated that he had seen men 
killed  in  these  circumstances  and  was  in  favour  of  its  abolition.  The  regimental 
sergeant-major thought it should be retained, ‘but considered it detrimental to a man’s 
health’.
56 General E. H. H. Allenby of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was in favour 
of abolition, but of retaining Field Punishment No. 2.
57 
The High Command’s position that Field Punishment No. 1 was essential to the 
maintenance of discipline during the war may well have been overstated considering 
the evidence of the officers consulted above. Many reported that it was awarded for 
minor offences that could have been dealt with by other, less degrading means. It is 
questionable whether tying men up in front of their comrades instilled a sense of fear 
of similar punishment. It was reported by one commander that this punishment more 
often  than  not  enlisted  sympathy  rather  than  fear  of  a  similar  fate.
58  Sir  William 
Robertson, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the 
Rhine in March 1919, summarised GHQ’s view that it should be retained. Ignoring the 
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degrading nature of the punishment and the counter views of his corps commanders, 
his reply was based purely on practicalities. He did not want offenders rewarded with 
safety  and  ‘relative  comfort’  because  of  their  crimes.  The  administration  of  Field 
Punishment  required  the  employment  of  few  personnel  and  ‘elaborate 
accommodation’, had the advantage of being speedily carried out, ‘and at the same 
time be sufficiently distasteful to those undergoing it to act as deterrent’. Robertson 
also  believed  that  Field  Punishment  saved  many  soldiers  from  ‘the  taint  of 
imprisonment for a military offence’. 
59 
British commanding officers and British-convened courts martial more readily 
awarded Field Punishment No. 1 than their Australian counterparts. The evidence of 
the Australian Field Compound Commanding Officer indicates that when they did 
award Field Punishment No. 1 it was reserved for habitual offenders. Furthermore, 
the British were far more flexible in framing charges so they could avoid court-
martial offences and therefore not reward offenders with detention or imprisonment. 
In the snapshot of crimes against inhabitants, the reluctance of Australian courts 
martial  to  award  Field  Punishment  No.  1  makes  a  striking  comparison  with  the 
British  awards.  The  considerably  higher  imprisonment  rate  for  Australian  troops 
suggests  first  of  all  that  they  were  actually  committing  more  crimes  than  other 
troops, especially absence, and therefore we should expect more of them to have 
been  imprisoned.  Secondly,  if  Bean  is  correct  in  his  belief  that  suspension  of 
sentences was not carried out to the same degree as with other troops, then crime did 
pay for some Australian offenders as it kept them out of the firing line. Overall, 
Haig’s criticism of Australian disciplinary procedures in this case is not so much a 
call  for  more  severe  sentences,  but  rather  for  them  to  exercise  the  powers  they 
possessed in imposing Field Punishment No. 1 so as not to ‘reward’ crime. 
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The difference in opinion between GHQ and corps commanders in 1919 over 
Field  Punishment  No.  1  is  significant,  as  it  appears  to  reflect  a  similar  division 
among  Australian  commanding  officers  during  the  war.  The  evidence  also 
overwhelmingly underscores that Australian soldiers detested the practice and were 
willing to take action in some cases to free men undergoing Field Punishment No. 
1.
60 In this case the much heralded attribute of the Australian colonial temperament 
played its part in that Australian commanding officers were not as willing to inflict 
degrading punishment on their men as were officers drawn from the upper echelons 
of British society. Even at war’s end, after all the troops had endured and achieved, 
GHQ held on to their belief in the efficacy of Field Punishment No. 1 for rank and file 
troops on active service. They had seen how their strict disciplinary code had been 
successful in turning working men and those from the bottom rung of society into 
effective soldiers by instilling in them the qualities of ‘soldierly discipline’.
61 Through 
drill and training the soldier learned to obey promptly, achieved skill at arms, learned 
to have faith and trust in his comrades, and attained a pride in the unit to which he 
belonged. Essentially, military discipline was designed to prepare men for the trauma 
of battle. Its aim was to produce men immune from natural instinctive reactions of fear 
so they could keep their cohesion in battle and act as a corporate body. To achieve this 
there was a negative side to military discipline, as Wilson observes, in that ‘it helped to 
safeguard the positions of bungling or vicious officers and to reconcile rank-and-file 
troops to low pay, poor conditions, and unwarranted ill-treatment’.
62 However, all this 
was seen as necessary by GHQ if they were to mould men into an effective fighting 
force; and they were not prepared to get ‘sentimental’ over the tying up of military 
offenders. They remained unimpressed by the fact that no comparable punishment 
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existed in the armies of Britain’s allies, or even the German army, as these armies 
suffered  far  more  serious  disciplinary  problems  than  the  British.  Nevertheless,  by 
insisting on retaining the right to tie-up offenders they can be accused of clinging to 
pre-war notions of the type of men who had traditionally made up the rank and file of 
the army, as well as being out of step with changing social conditions This view did 
not take into account that the men who volunteered, and those conscripted into the 
British  Army  in  the  Great  War,  were  from  a  much  broader  social  spectrum  than 
previously. In fact, as the war progressed, many officers were recruited from their 
ranks  and  altered  the  dominant  pre-war  social  divide  between  leaders  and  led. 
Although this was not to last as the social background of officers in the post-war army 
came  more  to  resemble  the  army  of  1914,
63  nevertheless,  the  efficient  army  that 
emerged  by  1918  could  not  have  been  achieved  without  the  skill  and  intelligence 
demonstrated by rank and file troops. Despite this, and the fact that Field Punishment 
No. 2 was efficacious as a punishment and was considered ‘severe’ when administered 
in a compound, they still persisted with their belief that an example had to be made. 
The fettering of offenders, as an example to their comrades, was largely lost as very 
often the punishment was carried out in an enclosed compound; and further, was more 
often a cause of anger towards the staff who administered it, rather than instilling a 
fear of incurring the punishment. By believing that the dignity of offenders could be 
sacrificed in the cause of maintaining military discipline, the High Command had left 
themselves open to the charge, made by Blatchford earlier, that fettering offenders 
reflected an ‘old idea’ of the type of man who had previously made up other ranks in 
the  British  Army.  Although  they  had  canvassed  the  views  of  all  their  corps 
commanders  they  could  not  find  anything  suitable  to  replace  it.  In  reaching  this 
decision they were hampered by pre-war thinking, exemplified by Haig’s labelling 
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the views of those corps commanders in favour of abolition as being ‘sentimental’.
64 
The High Command’s view that the army needed the death penalty and degrading 
means of control to keep men in line proved difficult to shake off. The unspoken 
contract of noblesse oblige, deference in return for paternalism, was, in the case of 
Field Punishment No. 1, surely broken.  
The degradation of soldiers sat less easily with Australians, and although Field 
Punishment was effective in keeping offenders out of prison, the unwillingness of 
Australian courts to award Field Punishment No. 1 was a contributing factor in high 
levels of Australian indiscipline. Because of this attitude they were left with few 
options, apart from imprisonment, to control their men. This led to a flourishing of 
indiscipline, for they were operating within a different military disciplinary code to 
other troops, which paradoxically was at times harsher because of their willingness 
to imprison, but had the effect of rewarding offenders by keeping them out of harm’s 
way.  
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C h a p t e r   4  
THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR 
The maintenance of discipline in the British Army was an unceasing struggle between 
Army authority and the regulars, volunteers and conscripts who were subjected to its 
military code. Ever-watchful senior commanders used the full array of disciplinary 
powers at their disposal to keep their men in check. As the figures for offences indicate 
(see Table 1.1, chapter 1), they were not dealing with subservient, docile men. On the 
contrary,  many  soldiers  became  educated  in  how  far  they  could  manipulate  the 
disciplinary code to their favour. Among British and most Dominion troops the death 
penalty  acted  as  a  deterrent  in  curtailing  absence  and  desertion.  However,  the 
Australians, free of this restraint, had far more scope to manipulate the system, as their 
figures  for  absence  and  desertion  indicate.  Military  crime  as  a  means  to  avoid 
dangerous duty at the front remained an option to many. Therefore, the Army dealt 
severely with suspected cases of self-inflicted injury, with ‘accidental injury’ that was 
proven to be due to the soldier’s negligence attracting the same penalty as wilful self-
maiming.
1 The dilemma the Army faced was that in punishing crime, they did not want 
to ‘reward’ the offender with a period of detention or imprisonment that would keep 
him  out  of  frontline  duty.  Locking  up  men  was  a  waste  of  resources,  and  in  the 
Australian  case  seemed  counter-productive,  according  to  Adjutant-General  Fowke, 
who stated in August 1918 that ‘they give more trouble in the prisons than all the other 
troops put together’.
2 Field punishments were an option widely used to avoid sending 
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men  to  prison,  in  particular  Field  Punishment  Number  1  which  was  designed  to 
humiliate the offender and offered the flexibility of being administered during periods 
when the unit was away from the front trenches. But the Army had little control over 
the wastage of manpower caused by the contraction of venereal disease by Dominion 
troops,  which  was  never  less  than  100  in  every  1000  soldiers  and  probably 
‘considerably’  higher.
3  The  authorities  would  have  had  great  difficulty  in  proving 
intent  to  contract  the  disease  as  a  way  of  avoiding  duty,  as  indeed  do  historians. 
However, the Australians, owing to the medical campaign waged by General Howse of 
the Department of Medical Services, were the best-informed soldiers regarding this 
disease, and yet the figures for the Australians remained consistently higher than other 
Dominion  troops.  This  is  a  situation  that  deserves  investigation.  The  disciplinary 
powers the Army employed seem severe from this distance, but they were determined 
by the need to keep men available for duty. At the same time they were up against a 
formidable enemy in the ‘savvy’ shown by the men under their command, particularly 
the Australians, who ‘worked the system’ better than most. It is also crucial to consider 
the intense strain the men were under at times in 1917 and 1918 when they suffered 
high  casualty  rates,  which  may  well  have  caused  men,  who  would  not  normally 
consider  other  options  to  avoid  frontline  duty,  to  put  their  survival  first.  High 
incidences of venereal disease, and exceptionally high numbers of ‘accidental injuries’, 
especially in 1918, point to a general lowering of morale, which could well have led to 
the mutinies in the 1st Battalion in September 1918, and may have been instrumental 
in standing the Australians down in October 1918, a month before hostilities ceased. 
                                                                                                                                         
3 Colonel A. G. Butler, The Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914-1918, 
Vol. III, Special Problems and Services, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1943 (hereafter A. G. 
Butler, Special Problems and Services), p. 152. Butler believes that it is ‘probable the number was 
considerably greater’. He added that some men were infected many times, which would lower the 
proportion of men infected. 
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The  procedures  the  Army  had  in  place  to  deal  with  suspected  self-inflicted 
wounding or ‘accidental’ wounding started with the premise of a presumption of guilt. 
A ‘Blighty wound’, that is a wound that is not too debilitating but enough to get a man 
out of the trenches and back to England (Blighty), was for some an ideal way of 
avoiding further danger at the front, and at the same time keeping their honour intact in 
the knowledge that they had done their duty. The temptation to ‘manufacture’ such a 
wound was an option the more desperate considered. The Army authorities appeared to 
have all the angles covered in dealing with suspect cases, as the procedures laid down 
in the Third and Fifth Army memorandum circulars of 1916 indicate. According to the 
Third Army circular, ‘whenever a soldier is found to be suffering from a wound or 
injury which appears to have been self-inflicted, and which involves his absence from 
duty,  he  is  to  be  placed  under  arrest  at  once’.
4  A  soldier  ‘accidentally’  wounding 
himself may not find himself under arrest immediately but he would be at the mercy of 
his  General  Officer  Commanding  (GOC)  the  Brigade,  as  it  would  be  left  to  his 
determination  as  to  how  the  injury  was  caused,  whether  wilfully,  negligently,  or 
through no negligence of the injured man.
5 If the GOC found that the injury was 
caused  wilfully  or  negligently,  the  injured  soldier  would  be  kept  at  the  Field 
Ambulance and not evacuated to a casualty clearance station. The severely wounded 
had to be evacuated but with notification that they had been charged with self-maiming 
and therefore they were not to be treated as ordinary patients returning to base or to 
England.  Furthermore,  the  names  of  men  considered  to  have  maimed  themselves 
wilfully or negligently were published in regimental orders indicating that they were 
under arrest. The accused, if not too badly wounded, would face court-martial at the 
Field Ambulance as soon as possible to ensure that witnesses to the incident were 
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available.
6 Therefore, soldiers who were suspected of wilfully injuring themselves, or 
who did so by their negligence in handling equipment, similarly faced arrest and trial 
by court-martial. 
The army authorities were fully aware of the difficulty in proving that a wound 
was self-inflicted, particularly if nobody came forward who witnessed the incident. To 
counter this, and to prevent acquittals, the circular memorandum from Fifth Army 
states  that  in  cases  where  men  are  tried  by  field  general  court-martial  for  self-
wounding, ‘the charges should, in almost all cases, be brought under section 40 for 
‘neglect to the prejudice’ and not under section 18(2) for ‘wilful maiming’.
7 As the 
memorandum indicates, both charges attract the same maximum penalty and that while 
proving ‘intent’ under section 18 (2) is difficult, ‘it is always easy to prove neglect, 
e.g., by showing that the accused, when cleaning his rifle, did not remove the bolt and 
magazine, kept his hand over the muzzle of his rifle or pointed his rifle towards his 
foot’.
8 If these procedures were followed the accused would have little chance of being 
acquitted.  Once  sentenced  the  authorities  were  faced  with  the  old  dilemma  of 
appropriate punishment as imprisonment meant avoiding trench duty, the motive for 
the  crime  in  the  first  place.  Therefore,  the  memorandum  recommended  Field 
Punishment for the first offence, and, should a prison sentence be awarded, suggested 
that the GOC Brigade exercise his power to have the sentence commuted to Field 
Punishment.
9 
For Butler the only significant incidence of self-inflicted wounding occurred at 
Gallipoli, where he reported ‘repeated short epidemics’. These, as well as the large 
evacuation of troops suffering from ‘psycho-physical and psycho-somatic breakdown’, 
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he put down to the ‘intolerable strain’, with little or no relief in the form of leave or 
recreation (as would be available on the Western Front).
10 Butler was of the opinion 
that the outbreaks of self-inflicted wounding were not deliberate attempts to avoid 
duty. He states: 
These outbreaks were not so much sophisticated and deliberate attempts to shirk, as a 
crude and instinctive reaction against a psychic impasse which in less determined and 
morally-poised men would manifest itself as hysteria––the “flight into disease”. So far as 
records show, the outbreaks took the form entirely of personal maiming by rifle, or by 
exposure to enemy fire. 
Though not unique this episode is the only important one in the history of the A.I.F.
11 
The figures overall for the Western Front are not surprising inasmuch as many of 
the self-maimers would fit into the category that Butler described. The statistics in 
Table 4.2, below, for accidental injury appear remarkably low for 1916, and even for 
1917 when the peak months of April and May are isolated. In April 1918 the number 
of  self-inflicted  wounds  peaked  at  ninety-six  with  accidental  injury  increasing 
dramatically from May to October. These months are usually the main fighting season 
in each year, but the contrast with 1917 is stark. In the comparable months in 1917 
there were 369 cases of accidental injury. The 1918 figures for the same months show 
a more than 630 per cent increase, with 2,341 cases recorded. After the German Spring 
offensive of March 1918 the war of movement replaced the more static nature of 
trench  warfare,  and  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  increased  risk  of  ‘accidental 
injury’ that movement would incur. Butler could not provide figures of just how many 
men were actually charged with negligently wounding themselves, owing to the main 
records of the Provost Marshal’s Department in Australia being destroyed after the war 
and the official conviction forms not being consolidated.
12 In light of the procedures 
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97 
Table 4.2 
AIF Casualties Caused by Self-Inflicted Wounds and Accidental Injuries sustained on the 
Western Front from March 1916 to December 1918.
13  
  1916  1917  1918 
  Self-inflicted 
Wounds 
Accidental 
Injured 
Self-inflicted 
Wounds 
Accidental 
Injured 
Self-inflicted 
Wounds  
Accidental 
Injured 
January  -  -  14  71  11  22 
February  -  -  13  80  13  27 
March  -  2  13  76  49  34 
April  4  4  17  107  96  88 
May  5  14  17  113  63  305 
June  14  20  18  70  42  385 
July  19  21  20  80  66  464 
August  20  56  6  38  29  517 
September  16  51  15  32  20  436 
October  16  41  23  36  4  234 
November  21  39  15  17  4  49 
December  11  41  15  33  -  27 
Totals  126  289  186  753  388  2,588 
that were laid down to secure a conviction for self-inflicted wounding by the apparent 
downgrading  the  charge  to  accidental  wounding  through  negligence,  the  official 
statistics regarding self-maiming must be treated with suspicion.  
Although 1918 was the year of victory it was also a year of appalling losses on 
the Western Front, with men’s nerve and courage stretched to the limit. During the war 
there were 3,894 convictions for self-inflicted wounds in the BEF.
14 Morale is a big 
factor,  identified  by  Butler,  and  one  can  only  speculate  as  to  the  number  of 
‘manufactured’ injuries. Butler states: ‘It may be noted that the recorded details of 
such “epidemics” at once suggest a relation between the occurrence of such injuries 
and the morale of the units in which they happened’.
15 The actual figures for men 
charged with ‘accidental wounding’ are not available. ‘Accidentally’ injuring oneself, 
                                                 
13 Statistics extracted from Appendix (iv) ‘AIF. Battle and Non-Battle Casualties Sustained on the 
Western Front’ in A. G. Butler, The Official History of the Australian Medical Services in the War of 
1914-1918, vol. ii, The Western Front, Canberra; Australian War Memorial, 1940, pp. 864-65. 
14 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p. 90. 
15 Ibid., p. 90.  
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however, must have seemed a better option than death or severe wounding in the push 
for victory. Corresponding figures relating to the AIF alone cannot be obtained. How 
many men took the option of injuring themselves to avoid further frontline duty we 
may  never  know.  For  men  on  leave,  however,  there  was  a  further  option;  the 
contraction of a venereal disease offered a temporary respite to the dangers of the 
front. 
 
Venereal disease 
There seemed to be plenty of opportunity for men to indulge in ‘illicit’ sex out of the 
line if the descriptions from two British soldiers are anything to go by. Sergeant Alfred 
West of the Monmouthshire Regiment described how the ‘boys were always on the 
lookout for women’. He states: ‘And the women knowing this, used to put up a sign in 
the window saying “Washing done here for soldiers”. I’ve seen up to twenty men 
waiting in one room, and there were probably others upstairs. Afterwards these women 
used to sit on the end of the bed, open their legs and flick this brownish stuff around 
their privates, ready for the next man.”’
16 
 Sergeant George Ashurst of the 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers described the 
scene in a crowded estaminent in Armentières where five women were plying their 
wares: 
. . . it was five francs a time if you went with them, up the stairs in the bedrooms. And 
fellows were going in, coming out, going in, coming out . . . There was a man on every 
step waiting his turn to go in with a woman . . . I didn’t fancy the women at all. They 
were so common. . .  The first thing she does is grab your five franc note. Then she 
unfastens your flies and has a feel and squeezes it, see if there’s anything wrong with it. 
Then she just throws this cloak off and she’s on the bed, you know, ready for you . . . 
Then when you have finished, she has the kettle boiling there with some herbs in it to 
give a bit of a swill with it, for safety sake, for disease you know. . . But no, I didn’t go 
up there, not with that lot. Most of the troops did, because I tell you the stairs were lined 
with them.
17 
                                                 
16 Max Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War, London: Ebury Press, 2003, p. 94. 
17 Ibid., pp. 94-5.  
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These accounts surely give weight to the notion that increased alcohol consumption 
leads to a loss of self-control. 
The Australians had little leave in France, except occasionally in Paris, and in 
numbers in Amiens when they were stationed in the Somme valley in the winter of 
1916-1917.  Venereal  disease  amongst  the  Australians  had  not  been  a  problem  in 
France up to late 1916 until large numbers of Australians took leave in Amiens.
18 The 
seriousness  of  the  situation  prompted  a  letter  from  Major  E.  R.  Cordner,  No.  51 
General Hospital, to Colonel Victor Hurley of Howse’s staff in January 1917. Cordner 
asked that his letter be treated as ‘entirely private and confidential’. He wrote: 
We have noticed here a remarkable number of cases coming in from Amiens especially 
among Australian troops and nearly all of them are gonorrhoeal in origin. Really the 
incidence from there has been appalling . . . It seems from the men’s stories that they get 
leave and go into Amiens and then come back and pass on to their pals the addresses of 
the houses where they have had connection. Their pals follow and each gets V.D. of 
some description.
19 
Cordner explained that over a five-week period ending December 1916 his hospital 
had seen an increase from 1,000 patients to 1,600. Of the additional 600 cases for that 
period half had come from Amiens, and nearly all were Australians. He stated that he 
had orders to increase the hospital size to 2,000 but considered that would not be 
enough as ‘the cases keep rolling in’. Cordner was well qualified to give an opinion of 
the demeanour of the men coming into his hospital. ‘The men seem to think it is their 
duty  to  get  V.D.  They  really  consider  it  a  joke  altogether  and  laugh  and  rag  one 
another about it.’ Cordner goes on to complain that there is ‘no attempt to get at the 
cause’  and  fears  that  his  hospital  will  soon  be  overwhelmed  with  patients. 
Interestingly, Cordner makes the point that he was not receiving cases until eight to ten 
days after the disease has been diagnosed, reminding Hurley that ‘every day beyond 
three after the disease comes out puts about half a week on to the treatment.’ Cordner’s 
                                                 
18 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p 167. 
19 Ibid.  
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final point, and one that troubled him most, was the unfavourable comparison with the 
number of British venereal cases. He wrote: ‘. . . and it makes one sick to see 1,200 
Australian venereals to 400 British venereals when one knows that this base is perhaps 
the biggest British base in France’.
20 
The difference between the British and Dominion venereal disease rates is usually 
accounted for by the fact that Dominion troops had no home leave and what leave they 
had was usually taken in London, or occasionally in France. Also, with their higher 
pay they became a target for prostitutes, and may have been actively looking for them, 
and were therefore more likely to be exposed to infection. Investigations into the risk 
of infection from ‘illicit’ sexual intercourse, without precautions, was conducted in the 
American and British armies and found the overall risk of infection to be 3 per cent.
21 
In short, the social factors that existed during the war operated strongly in raising the 
venereal disease rate, with Dominion soldiers being more likely to be having casual 
sexual intercourse, either with prostitutes, or with women they had met on a casual 
basis, and who would not strictly be considered as prostitutes. Over 60 per cent of 
infections in the British army came from the second category; in the Australian army 
approximately 60 per cent of infections were attributable to professional prostitutes. It 
was on the rise of the ‘amateur’ prostitute, particularly in London, that Butler laid the 
blame for many of the infections. In France members of the BEF could use maisons de 
tolérance until they were placed out of bounds to all troops of the BEF in April 1918 
in response to public pressure from the United Kingdom.
22 The maisons de tolérance 
could offer some protection as they were subjected to periodic medical examination. 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p 168 
21  Major-General,  Sir,  W.  G.  McPherson,  Major-General  Sir  W.  P.  Herringham,  Colonel  T.  R. 
Elliott, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Balfour (eds.), History of the Great War, Medical Services: Diseases of 
the War, vol. ii, London: HMSO, 1923 (hereafter W. G. Macpherson et al, Medical Services: Diseases 
of the War), p. 120. Investigations into venereal disease rates were conducted in the American army 
by Colonel Ashburn, and by Colonel Harrison in the British.  
22 Ibid., p 125.  
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Infected soldiers were normally questioned to find out from whom they contracted the 
disease. There was also reluctance amongst Australian troops to give the woman away, 
which  compounded  the  problem.  Once  a  woman  was  identified  as  the  source  she 
would be subjected to a medical examination, but in many cases, unless the infection 
was  well  advanced,  it  was  difficult  to  detect  and  many  were  declared  free  of  the 
disease.
23  
The contraction of a sexually transmitted infection was not strictly a ‘crime’, but 
the concealment of venereal disease was, under King’s Regulations 462 and Section II 
of the Army Act.
24 The Australian approach to dealing with infected soldiers differed 
from that of the British Army, in that the Australians introduced a system of fines for 
the  period  infected  soldiers  were  hospitalised.  As  early  as  February  1915  the 
Australian Command and Commonwealth Government introduced ‘a special military 
order’ into the Australian Finance and Allowance Regulations which stated that ‘No 
pay will be issued while abroad for any period of absence from duty on account of 
venereal disease’. What this meant in practice was that any pay allotted by the soldier 
to his family was also stopped and had to be made good when he recovered before he 
could again draw on his own pay. The soldier was punished further, as the reason for 
the forfeiture of pay was entered into the soldier’s pay book. Because of the stigma 
attached to venereal disease, many soldiers feared that the contraction of the disease 
could be made known to their kin back in Australia. The anxiety this caused for some 
was worse than the imposition of the fine. Many of those affected reacted in the only 
possible way, by ‘losing’ their pay books. As a tactic it worked very well, as the 
authorities  later  adopted  a  form  of  entry  that  disguised  the  true  nature  of  the 
forfeiture.
25 The soldier’s pay was only deducted for the time he spent in hospital 
                                                 
23 Ibid.,, p 124. 
24 Ibid., p. 123; A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p. 153. 
25 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p. 153.  
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undergoing treatment. This proved to be unfair, as hospitalisation varied depending on 
the type of venereal disease contracted. Soldiers suffering from gonorrhoea could lose 
as much as six to eight weeks pay while the syphilitic soldier would only lose a few 
days’ pay. The unfairness of these measures was brought to the attention of Birdwood 
from an unlikely source, the British Adjutant-General, who was made aware of the 
bitterness many felt by another British officer commanding a venereal disease hospital 
in France. Changes were made so that by January 1, 1918 the stoppage of pay would 
be  2s  6d  a  day  for  venereal  disease  with  officers  losing  their  field  allowance.
26 
Adopting this measure brought the AIF in line with British procedures only as far as 
charging  hospital  stoppages.  By  1918  Australian  soldiers  hospitalised  for  venereal 
disease were still left with 3s 6d a day while in hospital, still two-and-half-times the 
normal pay of his counterpart in the British Army. 
The British Army has had a long history in dealing with venereal disease and this 
experience had shown that adopting severe punishment only led to the concealment of 
the  disease.
27  Throughout  the  war  the  British  Army  had  the  authority  under  the 
allowance regulations to charge hospital stoppages of 7d per day for men and 2s 6d for 
officers for all cases of sickness that required hospitalisation that were not the direct 
result of service in the field. However, during the war the army authorities treated all 
admissions to hospitals as if they were attributable to service in the field, with the 
exception of alcoholism and venereal disease. In this sense the British Army was not 
imposing fines on the alcoholics or venereal disease sufferers but rather withdrawing a 
privilege that applied to other diseases contracted during the war. Field allowances for 
officers and warrant officers were forfeited while hospitalised as they were while on 
leave. Whether a soldier lost his proficiency pay while undergoing treatment was left 
                                                 
26 Ibid., pp. 153-54. 
27 W. G. McPherson et al, Medical Services: Diseases of the War, p. 123.  
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to the discretion of his commanding officer.
28 The British soldier was left with 5d per 
day while he was hospitalised with venereal disease but would face much tougher 
measures by 1917. 
The army authorities were looking for a real deterrent to counter the spread of 
venereal disease and the wastage of manpower it caused. On January 27, 1917 an order 
was signed cancelling all leave for men suffering from venereal disease for twelve 
months from the time they left hospital.
29 These severe measures were designed as a 
deterrent and at the same time as a means of preventing the disease being carried back 
to England to the soldier’s family and into the wider community. As the official British 
medical historian points out, these measures were ‘possibly inoperative’, as it was 
probable that a soldier would be evacuated to England due to sickness or wounding 
within twelve months on the Western Front.
30 Apart from taking the British soldier’s 
5d a day off him it is hard to imagine what more punitive measures could be taken. 
Although the Australians were brought into line with British procedure of hospital 
stoppages,  there  was  little  doubt  who  was  better  off.  The  British  venereal  disease 
sufferer was left with 5d per day while hospitalised and all leave cancelled for twelve 
months, while the Australian sufferer was financially better off, retaining 3s 6d per day 
of his pay. In February 1918, on account of the high venereal disease rates among the 
AIF, a measure was introduced to cut the leave of units which showed more than half 
of a per cent increase in venereal disease in any week. Leave was also stopped for six 
months for the infected soldier.
31 How much of a deterrent this was is difficult to 
assess, as the taking of ‘unlicensed’ trips was not exactly a rare occurrence in the AIF. 
However, the downside for the Australians was that leave did not mean ‘home leave’. 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p. 168  
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The incidence of venereal disease among the AIF troops in France, according to 
Butler, ‘did not greatly exceed that among the British; whereas in Great Britain it was 
approximately four times as great’.
32 The disease, by its very nature, was primarily a 
disease of ‘leave time’, and as most AIF leave was spent in England the figures are not 
surprising. A summary of the medical measures the AIF took was outlined to the Inter-
allied Sanitary Conference in 1918. It was recognised quite early on in the war that 
with few restraints on the men there would be more illicit sex and with it an increase in 
the venereal disease rate. At the same time they feared that by educating the men in 
sexual matters they might initiate the men into ‘the knowledge of methods which later 
might be used to prevent conception––undoubtedly a serious matter in a country like 
Australia,  whose  vital  need  is  population’.
33  This  seems  a  little  naive  from  this 
distance, but represents the prevalent attitude towards sex education at the time. It was 
decided to take the risk, and by using every means of persuasion at their disposal, it 
was hoped that a ‘moral, social, and an education campaign’, would limit the ‘harm’ 
caused by the knowledge gained.  
By lifting the taboo on sex education the Australian Medical Authorities were 
able to wage a thorough sex education and preventative treatment programme. The 
British medical historians considered the ‘prophylactic measures [of Dominion forces] 
were  much  more  thorough  than  those  of  the  British’,  and  that  the  reason  for  the 
difference in disease rates between British and Dominion forces cannot be found in the 
‘medical methods of prophylaxis adopted’.
34 Each new detachment of troops on arrival 
at a new posting was given lectures on the nature and dangers associated with the 
diseases and their prevention. These lectures also addressed the myth that continence 
was unhealthy or that ‘incontinence is an essential attribute of manliness’, and also 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 156. 
33 Ibid., p. 157. 
34 W. G. Macpherson et al, Medical Services: Diseases of the War, p. 120.  
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warned  of  the  link  between  heavy  drinking  and  the  increased  risk  of  becoming 
involved in ‘illicit’ sex. The lectures were repeated to all ranks at monthly intervals. 
Men going on leave were similarly lectured and were given prophylactic outfits, and 
condoms were made available for purchase if they wished. The prophylactic outfit was 
a small box containing ‘three collapsible tubes of calomel with camphor and carbolic 
cream  and  a  packet  of  potassium  permanganate  tablets’  with  instructions  for  use 
enclosed. The advice given was that calomel cream was to be used before and after 
intercourse, and further recommended the use of a condom, something that the soldier 
had to buy. The men could obtain further outfits by applying to ‘Blue Light’ Depot.
35 If 
a soldier put himself at risk of infection he could refer to his ‘card of instruction’ 
which advised him of the necessity of attending an Early Treatment Centre as soon as 
possible for prophylaxis treatment. It was spelled out to him in lectures and leave 
instructions that getting abortive treatment within twelve hours of the first sign of 
infection a cure could be affected in 86 per cent of cases, and within six hours the cure 
rate  was  90  per  cent.  The  soldier  reporting  to  these  early  treatment  centres  was 
normally detained for eight days within the lines; his name was not taken, and he lost 
no pay.
36 A soldier going on leave therefore was armed with a prophylactic outfit, 
condoms if he wished, a card advising of early treatment centres, as well as being 
subjected to repeated lectures on the benefits of early treatment. It is hard to imagine 
what  more  the  Australian  medical  authorities  could  do,  apart  from  issuing  free 
condoms. And yet, the Australian venereal disease rate remained consistently higher 
than among all other troops. In short, a man showing signs of the disease knew how 
long  the  treatment  would  take.  By  holding  back  at  the  first  signs,  and  delaying 
treatment, a soldier knew he would most likely be hospitalised and away from his unit 
                                                 
35 Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
36 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p 158.  
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for several weeks. Although technically he was committing a crime by concealment, 
there is no indication that men were actually charged and convicted of this crime.  
The British medical historian in reviewing the measures taken during the war in 
the  prevention  of  wastage  caused  by  admission  to  hospital  for  venereal  disease, 
considered that the two most effective measures were disinfection by skilled attendants 
and abortive treatment of gonorrhoea. The Australian and New Zealand forces had set 
up stations, or early treatment centres, where soldiers ‘could be disinfected by skilled 
attendants’.
37  In  addition  to  the  medical  disinfection  these  centres  undertook  the 
abortive treatment of early gonorrhoea. By catching the disease in its early stages these 
centres saved large numbers of troops from being admitted to hospital. During the 
period from August 1916 to February 1919, 222,882 treatments for the two above 
procedures were carried out at the Australian centre in London alone. In the other 
eighteen Australian centres throughout England the weekly average attendances during 
the  final  six  months  of  the  war  was  4,623.  Furthermore,  in  1918  out  of  7,366 
Australian soldiers who were treated using the abortive method, 5,350 were cured.
38 
They  did  not  require  hospitalisation,  nor  did  they  appear  on  any  official  figures 
regarding the venereal disease rate amongst Australians. 
The Australian medical historian, Butler, included in his history an account given 
by Colonel Raffan of the AIF campaign against venereal disease to the members of the 
British  Demobilisation  (Infectious  Diseases)  Committee  in  February,  1919.  Raffan 
broadly agreed with the British summary of the efficacy of the prophylaxis treatment. 
Of the methods described above he could not single out one particular measure as 
being the most beneficial. He did believe that without these measures being taken the 
                                                 
37 W. G. Macpherson et al, Medical Services: Diseases of the War, p. 127. The disinfecting process 
was as follows: ‘(1) Washed with soap and water. (2) Washed with 1:2,000 mercury perchloride. (3) 
Meatus and first half-inch of urethra swabbed with argyrol or protosil. (4) Urethra injected with 10 per 
cent argyrol or protosil. (5) Parts well rubbed with 30 per cent calomel lotion.’ 
38 Ibid., pp. 127-28; A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p 165.  
 
107 
venereal disease rate ‘would be enormously greater’. He conceded that the number of 
cases admitted to hospital had not shown a marked decrease but thought the methods 
employed had merit because of the large increase in the numbers attending the Blue 
Light Depots. Overall, he thought the number of men ‘exposed to risk was probably 
much larger’ and considered that the ‘men were now more reckless’.
39 He made the 
point that the venereal disease rate rose in areas where the Blue Light Depots had not 
been set up, or where the prophylactic methods were not as well organised. He states: 
Where, by accident, in France a unit arrived in a town before the Blue Light Depot had 
been set up, there was an immediate increase in V.D., and the rate was markedly higher 
where prophylactic methods were not well organised. “Amateur” infections had been 
greater than professional, but the Australians’ view of what was a “professional” was 
rather uncertain, and of late more came from this class.
40 
Raffan was referring here to the ‘amateur’ prostitute, a woman not belonging to 
an organized brothel and who was not subject to routine medical checks as would the  
 ‘professional’. However, the evidence from the statistics in Table 4.3, below, does 
support the view that the venereal disease rate would have been considerably larger 
without these Early Treatment Centres. The cure rate of 74.7 per cent of those who 
showed signs of the disease saved a great deal of time and trouble in hospitalising 
these men.  
Table 4.3 
Details of prophylactic and early treatment given at AIF Depots, UK, and at Early Treatment 
Section at AIF Administrative Headquarters, Horseferry Road, London, 
 from June 1917 to June 1918.
41 
 
 
 
 
 
Nargol and  
Blue Light 
outfits issued 
 
 
Condoms 
issued 
Number 
reported 
for Early 
Treatment 
Number 
received 
Prophylct. 
Treatment 
Number 
received 
Abortive 
Treatment 
Number 
cured 
after 
signs 
 
 
Percentage 
of cures 
London 
Depots 
47,472 
225,508 
64,564 
132,261 
213,064 
209,823 
223,424 
143,107 
654 
16,671 
439 
12,504 
 
Total  272,980  196,825  422,887  366,531  17,325  12,943  74.7 
                                                 
39 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p 166. 
40 Ibid., p 166. 
41 Table reproduced from A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p 189.  
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The prophylactic treatment mentioned above was universal in Australian units by 
March 1917. According to Colonel McWhae, who was chiefly concerned with the 
campaign in the United Kingdom, ‘the number of patients in hospital was lessened by 
practically  one-third  .  .  .  from  2,047  in  January-March  1917  (3.66  per  cent.  of 
strength), to 1,168 (or 2.88 per cent.) in January-June 1918.’ McWhae, however, was 
at a loss to explain the figures for the last six months of 1918 (see Table 4.4, below) 
when the numbers in hospital inexplicably climbed to reach their original levels before 
the preventative measures were in place.
42  
Although the Australian medical officers remained convinced that their work in 
these centres had prevented large numbers of men being hospitalized, there is a sense 
Table 4.4 
The rate per thousand per annum of recorded admissions to hospital for  
Great Britain and Australia.
43  
  1915  1916  1917  1918 
British troops:         
In Britain 
In BEF 
23.51 
29.65 
29.73 
 18.23 
31.93 
25.60 
33.36 
32.36 
 
Australian troops:         
In Britain 
In BEF 
134.05 
58.7 
148.1 
72.6 
129.2 
  59.6 
137.12 
 63.65 
of them fighting a losing battle against the disease. The comparison in the above table 
between British and Australian rates of disease is quite marked and must have given 
the  Australian  authorities  cause  for  concern.  McWhae  expressed  this  sense  of 
disappointment, when he wrote ‘Despite these measures, which were carried out by 
medical  officers  and  orderlies  with  wholehearted  enthusiasm,  V.D.  maintained  a 
comparatively large hold on A.I.F. troops’.
44 
                                                 
42 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p 164. 
43 Ibid., p. 180.  
44 Ibid., p. 165.  
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Table 4.5 
The ratios of admissions per 1,000 per annum of Canadian and Australian Forces 
supplied to the Interdepartmental Committee on Prophylaxis  
 Against Venereal Disease.  
  Canadian  Australian 
  U.K. only  U.K.  France 
         1915  222.0  ––  –– 
1916  200.4  ––  –– 
1917  114.0  2nd half 168.8
*  85.0 
1918  81.6  148.0
*  64.2 
In  Table  4.5,  above,  some  comparison  can  be  made  between  Australian  and 
Canadian force rates of venereal disease. In a footnote the British Medical History 
states that to these rates marked with an asterisk must be added 78.4 for 1917 and 
101.1 for 1918 on account of cases of gonorrhoea treated successfully by the abortive 
method and not admitted to hospital’.
45 The venereal disease rates for Canada show 
high incidences of the disease when Canadian troops were stationed at Salisbury Plain 
from  1914  to  1915.  Their  figures  do  show  a  sharp  decline  in  hospital  admissions 
caused by venereal disease, and by 1918 they were down to 81.6 per thousand, nearly 
twice the British figure but closer to half of the Australian and New Zealand figures.
46 
The Canadians were more successful in curtailing this disease and yet the methods 
used were similar to Australian procedure, with the emphasis on education, lectures, 
Early Treatment Centres and a special department created within the Canadian force to 
deal with venereal disease. Although Butler claimed that the figures for Canada and 
the other Dominion troops did not differ ‘materially’ from the others,
47 it is clear the 
Canadians  were  winning  their  battle  with  venereal  disease,  while  the  Australians, 
despite their best efforts, were facing rising rates in the latter part of 1918.  
Butler makes the valid point that the high incidence of venereal disease, as with 
the incidence of self-maiming, amongst Australian troops is linked with the morale of 
                                                 
45 W. G. Macpherson et al, Medical Services: Diseases of the War, p. 118.  
46 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p. 179.  
47 Ibid., p. 152.   
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a particular unit. Indeed, Butler makes the point of its primary influence when he 
wrote: 
The  influence  of  “moral”  factors  in  limiting  the  amount  of  venereal  disease  is  very 
difficult to assess though there is no question of the paramount and urgent need for its 
limitation; but what may be said with certainty is that, despite striking exceptions, the 
higher the morale of a unit the less V.D. there was in it. It would indeed be difficult to 
refute  the  contention  that  this  was  the  most  potent  of  all  the  influences  availed  or 
available. V.D. in the Army was pre-eminently a disease of leave-time, and to dominion 
troops “leave” did not mean, “home leave”. 
48  
Unfortunately, Butler does not expand on this theme as his emphasis shifts to the ‘vital 
need of recreation’, as there was no home to return to, nor any comfort that could be 
provided for by home life.  
The contraction of a sexually transmitted disease as a deliberate attempt to avoid 
duty  was  difficult  to  prove.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  cases  of  gonorrhoea, 
according to Butler, required a minimum of six weeks in hospital for treatment, and 
although cases of syphilis required only a few days hospitalisation, the infected men 
went on to military convalescent camps to recover. Bulford (No. 1A.D.H.) hospital for 
the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases in England detained their patients longer 
than Butler indicated. Syphilis cases were detained for twenty-seven days in April to 
June 1917; reducing to eleven days from January to March 1918; and only decreasing 
to six days in October to December 1918. At the same hospital for gonorrhoeal cases 
the average for the period April 1917 to December 1918 was 46.9 days, nearer eight 
weeks than Butler’s six.
49  
The wastage of men owing to venereal disease was compounded by the need to 
segregate  infected  soldiers.  In  the  AIF,  Butler  states:  ‘venereal  disease  contracted 
otherwise  than  in  the  sexual  act  was  very  rare.  The  immense  trouble  caused  by 
gonorrhoea ophthalmia
50 in Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt, had no reflection in this 
                                                 
48 Ibid., p. 154.  
49 Ibid., p. 188.  
50 Gonorrhoea opthalmia, inflammation of the eyes, can be contracted from a person suffering from 
gonorrhoea through contact with the discharge contained on sponges, towels or clothing used by the  
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war’.
51 There were cases of cross-contagion which Butler confines to a footnote: ‘the 
infected  towel  of  the  gonorrhoeal  case  and  mug  of  the  syphilitic  were  both  held 
responsible for occasional cases in the AIF’.
52 The risk of cross-contagion was ever 
present among soldiers on active duty and isolation was necessary. Further, infected 
soldiers could not be let back into the community with a communicable sexual disease. 
Both British and Australian medical histories make the point that self-infection was 
comparatively rare with gonorrhoeal ophthalmia accounting for less that 1 per 1,000 
cases. However, the Adjutant-General Fowke held a different view, and his comments 
are concerned with problems caused by the military offender with venereal disease 
within the prison system. He states: 
Whereas we find that a period of imprisonment makes better men of the Imperial troops, 
for our prison regime is arranged to effect this, the Australians are not benefited in any 
way. They give more trouble in the prisons than all the other troops put together. They 
have been known to maim themselves by putting pieces of wire into their knees, and 
injecting  petrol,  which  makes  the  joint  stiff,  while  cases  of  gonorrhoeal  ophthalmia, 
which are considered self-inflicted, are of frequent occurrence, and special precautions 
have to be taken accordingly in the prison hospitals.
53 
Butler also commented upon the fact that military offenders with venereal disease 
‘caused vast trouble at Bulford’ until they could be transferred to Lewes Detention 
Barracks. British practice was to keep diseased men in France, a policy that caused 
problems  with  the  hospitals,  which  were  full  to  the  point  of  overflowing.  All 
Australian requests to transfer their infected men to Bulford were therefore denied. 
With  no  designated  hospital  for  Australians,  discipline  suffered  in  these  hospitals, 
especially as there were large groups of men who were confined and did not feel ill. 
Butler excuses Australian indiscipline in these hospitals by stating: 
                                                                                                                                         
infected person. (Harvey Marcotovich (ed.) Black’s Medical Dictionary 41st Edition, A & C Black 
Publishers, London, 2005.) 
51 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p. 149.  
52 Ibid., p. 150.  
53 (TNA) WO 32/5484, Enclosure C item 71-73, August 2, 1918, attached to Secret Minute to the 
Secretary of State for War, August 14, 1918, from the Adjutant-General Lt-General G. H. Fowke.  
 
112 
Treatment at a V.D. Hospital necessarily involved problems of discipline, and, for good 
discipline  Australians  required  Australian  officers.  The  Australian  idea  of  discipline, 
admirably suited for fighting, did not lend itself readily either to the prevention or the 
treatment of V.D.
54 
On reading the accounts of the Australian medical staff one gets the sense of their 
disillusionment that despite their best efforts a great number of Australians were still 
presenting with a venereal infection. Furthermore, the hospital admission rate that they 
had previously lowered considerably was by 1918 reaching its original high level. The 
Canadian troops were in a similar position to the Australians in that leave did not mean 
home leave and yet their rates had reached manageable proportions by 1918 after their 
exceptionally high rates of 1914-15. The Australians were well-informed as to the 
nature, progress and effective treatment of venereal disease and the high rates for 1918 
need  to  be  accounted  for.  There  is  strong  evidence  to  show  the  Australians  were 
‘becoming reckless’ when it came to exposing themselves to the risk of contracting 
venereal disease. There is no suggestion by Butler that men would deliberately set out 
to contract venereal disease as a way of avoiding frontline duty. However, considering 
the increasing numbers contracting the disease in 1918, despite the thorough education 
programme and safeguards in place regarding the disease, the high rates do suggest 
that some men were contracting the disease to avoid frontline duty. It was a ‘self-
inflicted wound’ that gave them a break of several weeks from the fighting at the front, 
without incurring a military charge. 
The  Army  authorities,  as  discussed  earlier,  were  highly  suspicious  of  any 
‘accidental wounding’ and adopted a presumption of guilt in these cases. If a charge of 
self-maiming could not be proved, then the charge of ‘neglect to the prejudice’, easier 
to prove, would be laid. Although there is no evidence here to point to how many men 
were  charged  ‘with  neglect  to  the  prejudice’  regarding  accidental  wounding,  the 
suspicion that many were deliberate has to be considered. The last year of the war 
                                                 
54 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, p. 172.  
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brought stunning victories for the BEF and the Australians, as well as experiencing 
some of the highest casualties of the war. At the same time it can be argued that there 
was a general lowering of morale in the AIF during the last period of the war which 
found  expression  in  September  when  over  one  hundred  men  of  the  1st  Battalion 
refused to return to the front. Butler made the link between high incidences of self-
inflicted wounds and increasing levels of venereal disease, with the morale of the units 
in which they occurred. To this could be added the six-fold increase in ‘accidental 
wounding’ that occurred from May to September 1918 among the AIF. The medical 
problems in the AIF during the last months of the war were linked to a lowering of 
morale and with it a deterioration of discipline. 
The harsh British disciplinary code became circumvented by men well versed in 
‘working the system’ to their advantage. It is against the context of the fighting on the 
Western Front, with all its attendant dangers of death and injury, that the actions of 
soldiers  must  be  measured.  None  of  the  above  comments  should  detract  from  the 
bravery and sense of duty showed by most men. Butler’s comments upon the high 
Australian venereal rates are worth noting. He wrote: ‘The figures will discourage 
those who (doing a great disservice) attach unwanted haloes to the very human heroes 
who fought and died in the Great War’.
55 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid., pp. 185-186. 
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C h a p t e r   5  
THE SEPTEMBER MUTINIES 1918 
In September 1918, just over a month after playing a crucial role in the 8th August 
Battle, the AIF was beset by unrest in the ranks which resulted in men declining to 
return to the front line and battalions refusing to disband. The first recorded mutiny in 
the AIF took place at Péronne on September 14, when three platoons of the 59th 
Battalion refused to return to the line to follow the enemy’s ‘retirement’. According to 
the Official Historian, C. E. W. Bean, their officers supported the men in this action, 
and  ‘the  refusal  was  eventually  overcome’.  Although  this  was  the  first  recorded 
mutiny, Bean indicated, in a footnote, that during this period there had been ‘slighter 
incidents, of which only hints are given in the records’.
1 The second mutiny, and by far 
the  most  serious,  occurred  on  September  21,  when  119  men  of  the  1st  Battalion 
refused to return to the front line after their relief was cancelled. These men were not 
supported  by  their  officers  and  would  face  a  court-martial  for  this  action.  Further 
mutinies occurred later in the same month, often dubbed the ‘disbandment mutinies’, 
in which men refused an order to disband and join their new battalions. These were 
different in character from the other two mutinies because they did not involve a 
refusal to fight and no one was charged for their part in these. September had proved to 
be a difficult month for the AIF with sections of the force willing to take action to 
redress their grievances. A climate existed in the AIF where men thought they could 
take action, especially industrial style action where men combine together, without 
fear of suffering severe penalties under military law. After the Australian success of 
August 8, of which he had made a great deal, Bean was now left with the thorny 
                                                 
1 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: vol. vi, The Australian 
Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive 1918, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1942, p. 875.   
115 
problem of explaining Australian mutinies. It is only on closer examination of the 
mutiny in the 1st Battalion that we see that Bean’s version of events is slanted in 
favour of the Australians at the expense of British troops. Bean, in his desire to keep 
his image of the ‘ideal Digger’ intact, was prepared to disparage the efforts of British 
troops in an attempt to provide mitigation for Australians refusing to fight. Before 
examining the mutiny in the 1st Battalion, however, we need to examine the Official 
History version of September 1918. 
In his account of September 1918 Bean said that a belief was growing among the 
AIF that because of their success the British High Command was using them more 
than their own troops ‘and for tasks that the British were unable to perform’.
2 Bean did 
not challenge this belief. The high value Australians placed on their own fighting 
abilities was in many ways fostered by Monash. According to Bean, Monash had 
ceased to appeal to his men’s sense of patriotism and was now seeking further efforts 
from them on grounds of prestige. To foster this in his troops he circulated extracts 
from British and French newspapers on their achievements. When the British Press 
failed  to  give  Australians  their  due  in  reports  of  the  battle  of  August  8,  Monash 
complained ‘strongly’ to GHQ of the ‘undoubted covering-up’ in Press reports of the 
role of Australians in this battle. Bean shared this view and went on to write that 
readers of The Times would have no notion of the part played by Australians in this 
battle, nor would people in England for many years afterwards.
3 What Bean seems to 
be implying is that GHQ was aware of British failings and loath to praise the effort of 
Dominion troops; it was quite willing to credit its own troops with the successful battle 
on August 8. Bean relegated the more obvious reasons why this happened to two 
footnotes. In the first he admitted that Haig, in a brief communiqué, had mentioned 
‘French, Canadian, Australian and English divisions’ in the August 8 battle. In the 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 875. 
3 Ibid., p. 876.  
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second footnote, Bean stated that GHQ replied ‘unofficially’ that the term ‘British 
troops’ was inclusive to mean the troops of the Dominions as well;
4 and that that was 
their  intent.  Bean  gave  the  example  of  Brigadier-General  Brand,  who  reported  to 
Monash that after his 4th Brigade ‘had snatched a costly victory from the difficult 
situation left by the failure of English troops on its left’, it had caused discontent 
among his troops and he feared they would not get the recognition they deserved. Bean 
was  not  averse  to  imagining  what  this  discontented  section  said  when  he  wrote: 
‘whatever we do they’ll say they won the battle; next time we’ll let them win it’.
5 
Monash pursued his policy of using press coverage to inspire his troops. He also spoke 
to British political leaders, employing a sporting analogy to demonstrate the point, 
characterising  the  Australian  as  a  ‘sportsman’  who  required  that  his  score  be 
‘displayed on the board’ or he would refuse to play. This argument, Bean stated, 
‘would have been detested by the best of his men’, but it brought the desired results.
6  
The Australian Prime Minister, Hughes, like Monash, wanted more publicity for 
Australians, but for quite a different motive. Having toured the battlefield at Amiens 
with an Australian war reporter he came away ‘astonished’ by the crucial role played 
by Australian and Canadian forces. Hughes thought they were ‘a decisive factor’ and 
believed that if this became widely known it would increase Australia’s influence in a 
future peace settlement. For this reason he invited prominent newspaper owners and 
journalists to the Australian sector on September 12 in an effort to boost publicity of 
the Australian contribution.
7 This, of course, helped Monash’s agenda of motivating 
his troops. This added publicity for the Australians could well have built on an existing 
prejudice against British soldiers and served to reinforce the belief that they were 
doing too much. 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., Bean does not attribute this; it is a representation of what he thinks this group was saying. 
6 Ibid., p. 877. 
7 Ibid.  
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Owing  to  the  strain  to  which  Australian  troops  had  been  exposed,  Bean 
explained, regimental officers were aware that ‘any chain of mischances increasing the 
burden might precipitate a local mutiny’. Bean said that Monash had been warned by 
General Hobbs on August 31 that the strain on the 5th Division was reaching critical 
levels and that after three more days’ fighting the strain on the 2nd and 3rd Division 
would become even greater.
8 But it was Monash who was exerting Australian troops to 
greater effort. An unnamed diarist, quoted by Bean, reported Monash as saying that 
‘six days’ rest and a bath restores the elasticity of a division’. Monash expanded upon 
this in Australian Victories, writing that it was essential that Australian troops ‘should 
be called upon to yield up the last particle of effort of which they are capable . . . I was 
compelled  to  disregard  the  evident  signs  of  overstrain  which  were  brought  to  my 
notice by the divisional generals and their brigadiers’.
9 Bean does concede that the 
Fourth British Army, too, was suffering considerable strain and that Haig did not want 
to draw on his reserves. It was Monash and Godley that ‘had really forced his hand’. 
At the same time Bean said that a view was developing among Australian troops that 
because of their success the British High Command was increasingly using them for 
tasks to which British soldiers ‘were unable fully to perform’.
10 This is not expanded 
upon by Bean and he allows this slur on British troops to go undefended, and in fact 
uses this as one of his causes of Australian mutinies in September.  
After setting the scene, Bean briefly discusses the first mutiny at Péronne. The 
59th  Battalion  had  been  subjected  to  ‘a  week  of  repeated  efforts  and  continuous 
strain’, he said, and had been relieved and had no sooner settled to sleep when they 
were recalled to ‘to follow the enemy’s retirement’. The reason given for the men’s 
refusal to go back in the line was that ‘they believed their actions to be the only way 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 875. 
9 Quoted in ibid., p. 875. 
10 Ibid., p. 875.  
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they can impress the authorities with their needs’.
11 The authority in this case was 
Monash.  How  this  mutiny  was  overcome  is  not  expanded  upon  but  Bean  put  the 
incident down to one of the symptoms of ‘overstrain’ to which Monash had referred 
earlier.
12 
In the period between March 1916 until the end of 1918, 306,243 men of the AIF 
were deployed in France and Belgium. During that period the ‘expeditionary wastage’ 
was  199,812  from  all  causes.  The  AIF  maintained  an  average  strength  of 
approximately  100,000  on  the  Western  Front.  Each  soldier,  according  to  Butler’s 
calculations, would spend an average of eleven-and-a-half months in the BEF, or 343 
days.
13 The statistics in Table 5.1, below, show the relative strengths of the AIF in 
France  and  Flanders  compared  with  the  surprisingly  large  numbers  of  Australian 
troops in the United Kingdom. Butler deduced from these figures ‘that during the 
period of active operations in France and Flanders, for every three “effectives” at the 
front at any time approximately two men were in hospital or depots in the United 
Kingdom’.
14  What  inflated  the  numbers  in  the  UK  was  the  Australian  policy  of 
maintaining the fighting force at full fitness. In practice this meant that only 40.3 per 
cent  of  wounded  men  evacuated  for  treatment  actually  rejoined  their  units.  This 
compares with the British figure in all theatres of 80.7 per cent of their wounded 
returning to duty. The AIF differed from the Imperial army in that they were limited as 
to where they could put men who had recovered from wounds but who were not 
considered fighting fit. These men were difficult to place as the AIF carried only 
relatively small numbers of ‘B’ and ‘C’ class men, and no frontline labour battalions or 
base supply units.
15  
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 876.  
13 A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, pp. 909-10. Butler’s calculation was based on the 
number of 105,289,248 personnel days over a period of thirty-three months.  
14 C. E. W. Bean, Official History, vol. vi, p. 892. 
15 Ibid., pp. 921-22.  
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Table 5.1 
The average strength of the AIF in France and Flanders (BEF) and in the United 
Kingdom (UK) for the months of January, April, July and October in each year 
from1916-1918.
16 
  1916  1917  1918 
  AIF (BEF)  AIF in UK  AIF (BEF)  AIF in UK  AIF (BEF)  AIF in UK 
January  644  10,570  117,219  67,013  116,969  59,390 
April  40,801  6,863  119,690  80,778  121,875  50,347 
July  91,649  90,227  121,259  66,875  114,945  54,717 
October  88,2344  90,504  116,249  56,422  91,998  60,152 
The ‘disbandment mutinies’ were given extensive treatment by Bean who saw in 
the men’s actions a reflection of his own view of the ideal Australian: fiercely loyal to 
his mates, and demonstrating ‘a public loyalty once conceived was sustained with a 
flaming zeal, disconcerting to those who had encouraged it’.
17 Disbanding battalions 
was inevitable as the fifty-seven Australian battalions were 8,500 men short, operating 
in many cases under strength. With future reinforcements estimated at 3,000 per month 
existing battalion strengths could not be maintained The matter became urgent as there 
was a current proposal to give the estimated 6,000 ‘1914 men’ furlough to Australia. 
The problem of under strength battalions had been overcome in the British Army by 
each  infantry  brigade  disbanding  its  fourth  battalion.  This  made  economic  sense, 
according to Bean, as ‘battalions which entered battle with 300-400 men were in some 
important respects uneconomic, requiring the same staff as a battalion that took in 
750’.
18 However, the men of Australian battalions earmarked for disbandment were 
unwilling to accept this and organised industrial action to prevent it happening. 
The men of the 37th Battalion were well organised and had a firm plan of action 
in place for the battalion’s final parade on September 22. They dutifully obeyed every 
order except the final one to join their new battalions. Officers and other ranks stood 
                                                 
16 Statistic extracted from Table No. 24 ‘Average Strength of the AIF in Each Theatre of War and in 
England’, in A. G. Butler, Special Problems and Services, pp. 892-93.  
17 C. E. W. Bean, Official History, vol. vi, p. 940. 
18 Ibid., p. 935.  
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firm until addressed by Brigadier-General McNicoll, GOC 10th Australian Brigade. 
The battalion’s officers were the first to obey the order to fall out, followed by the 
sergeants, a corporal and one private. Those left on parade were threatened with being 
posted as being absent without leave if they failed to join their new battalions that 
afternoon.  The  men  still  refused  to  fall  out,  returning  to  their  huts  to  organise 
themselves  as  a  battalion.  They  appointed  their  own  ‘commanders’,  maintained 
military  discipline,  keeping  men  under  guard  who  were  serving  detention,  even 
organising church parade for the following day which the padre attended.
19 According 
to Bean, the men were supported by other units who helped them out by ‘losing’ the 
odd box of food from their wagons as they passed their huts. Bean said there was 
‘keen sympathy for these troops throughout the force’, and that by the 24th and 25th 
the other battalions selected took the same action as the 37th by refusing to disband.
20 
Members  of  the  recalcitrant  battalions  told  the  senior  officers  who  were  trying  to 
negotiate a settlement that they were willing to go into the next battle ‘but demanded 
to be allowed to go in with their identity unchanged’. The disbandment order was 
deferred for a fortnight and these battalions went into battle on September 27 intact. 
The men’s refusal to disband was treated with great sympathy by Bean who thought 
that although these refusals technically constituted mutiny it ‘was not treated as mutiny 
by any authority, Australian or British’. Bean’s assessment was that ‘it had its origin in 
some of the best men and finest qualities of the AIF’,
21 in contrast with the mutiny in 
the 1st Battalion on September 21. No man was punished for his part in refusing to 
disband. However, the men of these battalions had defied military authority, won a 
temporary  reprieve  for  their  battalions,  demonstrated  that  solidarity  in  the  face  of 
military discipline could yield results, and walked away without any sanction against 
them. 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 938. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 939.  
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In  Bean’s  account  of  the  September  21  mutiny  he  presents  many  mitigating 
circumstances for the men’s refusal to fight. On reading this account one is left with a 
sense of a growing discontentment among Australian troops at being over-used, a lack 
of due recognition for their achievements, and most of all a disparaging view of the 
performance of British, or more accurately, English troops in the field. It is in this 
climate, as portrayed by Bean, that the most serious mutiny in the AIF occurred. Bean 
explained  that  the  proposed  attack  on  September  21  involved  the  3rd  and  1st 
Battalions who were already in the front line. General R. H. K. Butler, commanding III 
Corps, had organized the attack with his four divisions and Monash had agreed to 
cover the 500 yards of the southern sector of the attack. On September 20 at 10.30am 
the 1st Division was warned they would be in action.
22 The ‘order came at a difficult 
time’, according to Bean, as General Glasgow had arranged relief for ‘tired’ troops of 
the 1st Brigade. But because the proposed operation required knowledge of the terrain 
it made sense to use the troops already in the line to make the attack. However, it was 
decided that half the men could be relieved, with the 6th Battalion relieving the men of 
the 1st who then proceeded to a sunken road south of Hargincourt for food and rest. 
The 1st Battalion’s reserve, ‘D’ Company with Captain Steen in charge, was already 
bivouacked there having been relieved on the 19th. These men became aware of the 
order cancelling the relief in the afternoon and they made known their resentment at 
being  asked  to  fight  again  to  Colonel  Stacy.  By  evening  the  men’s  position  had 
hardened. According to Bean, the men made their feelings plain when they told Steen 
that ‘they were not getting a fair deal’ and felt they were being asked to do ‘other 
people’s work’. Bean summarized this feeling: “There was widespread feeling that 
British troops had repeatedly failed to keep up, and that the Australians, as well as 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 932.  
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fighting on their own front, were sometimes called on to make good their neighbours’ 
failure’.
23 
He did not challenge this view and let this slur on British fighting abilities stand. 
Bean tried to catch the mood of the men by imagining what was said: ‘That’s pretty 
rough’, and one of the ‘bad soldiers; (Bean tells us each battalion had some) would 
chime in ‘well they can bloody well go over without me’.
24 Bean did mention that 
Colonel Stacy, according to a friend’s diary, was of the opinion that the protest by the 
men was largely attributable to ‘over mention’ of the troops in the newspapers, so that 
they over-valued themselves in comparison with others’.
25 However, his account of the 
mutiny on September 21, or more accurately the account leading up to it, places the 
cause of the mutiny on overuse of Australian troops and British inadequacy to keep up, 
creating the conditions in which mutinies could occur.
 26  
Mutiny remained one of only two offences that was punishable by death in the 
AIF, the other being desertion to the enemy. During the war the Australian authorities 
had steadfastly refused to confirm the death penalty on Australians convicted of capital 
offences, but now they were faced with the dilemma that if these men were found 
guilty of mutiny some of the convicted could face a firing squad. It will be recalled 
that around ten per cent of those sentenced to execution in the rest of the British Army 
were shot.  
What  is  clear  from  examining  the  court  martial  of  the  119  men  of  the  1st 
Battalion who walked away from a planned attack on the September 21, 1918 was the 
crucial role played by their non-commissioned officers. Less clear is whether those 
who walked to the rear on the night of the 20th/21st September did so thinking they 
had been ‘relieved’, or did so in wilful defiance of the warning given them by their 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 933. 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 875.  
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officers  and  NCOs  of  the  proposed  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  21st.  The  trials 
concern Companies of the 1st Battalion who, after taking part in an attack on the 18th 
and holding their position in the front line, were relieved and made their way to an area 
known  as  the  sunken  road  approximately  600  yards  from  the  front  line.  The 
examination of the court martial begins with those charged from ‘D’ Company, who 
had been relieved from the front line on the 19th and gone into ‘reserve’ in the sunken 
road. It was amongst this Company that the first sign of unrest surfaced. 
 
The trial by court-martial of five NCOs of ‘D’ Company 
On October 15, 1918 five non-commissioned officers of ‘D’ Company faced a court-
martial charged with: ‘(1) When on active service joining in a mutiny. Alternative: 
When on active service desertion on or about 0300 on the 21/9/18 until around 0900 
on  the  21/9/18’.  The  accused  were  Corporal  (3002)  A.  E.  Alyward,  Temporary 
Corporal  (4963)  H.  E.  Slater,  Corporal  (3563)  R.  Cooney,  Corporal  (3490)  R.  C. 
Taplin, and Lance Corporal (2562) E. A. Besley.
27  
For the prosecution the court first heard from Lieutenant Steen, Officer-in-Charge 
of ‘D’ Company, who stated that the 1st Battalion took part in an attack on September 
18th and on the 19th around 8pm were relieved and moved back to ‘reserve’ some 600 
yards from the front line in an area known as the sunken road. Shortly after 2pm on the 
20th
.  Steen  gave  ‘certain  instructions’  to  Sergeant  Wilemett,
28  Acting  Company 
Sergeant  Major.  Steen  told  the  court  that  the  NCOs  paraded  before  him  at  3pm 
(although he was uncertain whether Corporal Besley was present) where they told him 
that the men of the Company ‘would not take part in the attack the following day’. He 
                                                 
27 AWM 51,122, part 4, 1st Battalion, AIF Field General Court-Martial. Joint trial of five NCOs of 
‘D’ Company. The President: of the Court was Major H. A. Youden, 2nd Btn; Members of the Court 
were Capt. O. F. J. Wolff, 4th Btn; Major G. E. McDonald, 3rd Btn; Captain C. W. H. R. Somerset, 1st 
Btn; and Capt. E. M. Johnson, H.Q. Aust. Corps. 
28 Throughout the transcript of this trial Sergeant (1642) E. N. Wilemett has been the spelling used for 
this man’s name. In other trials he is referred to as Sergeant (1642) Ernest Wentworth Wilesmith, which 
is most likely the correct spelling after checking his name against his service number at NAA.  
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then told the accused ‘that the orders were that there was to be an attack and that the 
orders must be carried out’, telling the NCOs to ‘inform their men to that effect’.
29 At 
around midnight Steen sent for Corporal Taplin and informed him that his platoon 
would be in support for the attack. Taplin made no comment to Steen and none of the 
other NCOs reported to him. When Steen checked his Company at 1.30am on the 21st 
all the accused were present. Steen stated that he did not give any orders to the accused 
that the Company would be relieved. He said the vicinity around the sunken road was 
under constant shelling and that he and Lieutenant Blake both received wounds that 
caused them to be evacuated around 2.30am. 
Steen, when cross-examined by the Prisoners’ Friend, stated that ‘no particular 
platoons were mentioned by the NCOs’ [when they paraded before him], but he gained 
the impression that the whole Company was refusing to go over.
30 Sergeant Halsthate, 
Steen said, was also present at the parade and did most of the talking and told him that 
the  men  refused  to  go  over.  When  examined  by  the  court,  Steen  said  that  when 
Sergeant Halsthate informed him of the Company’s refusal to ‘go over’, none of the 
accused contradicted him. The reason given by Halsthate for the men’s refusal ‘was 
that the men thought they were being called on to do too much and that their nerves 
were gone owing to the fighting they had gone through’.
31 The parade that Steen 
referred to was not a conventional one through the Company Sergeant-Major (CSM), 
but a gathering around his dugout. Steen, in his evidence in this trial, made no mention 
of what happened from the period of his meeting with the NCOs through until 11pm, 
other than to say that around 11pm Lieutenant Blake took charge of two platoons, later 
relieving Corporal Cooney of responsibility for a platoon.
32  
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 1. Lieutenant A. N. Buckley, 3rd Battalion, AIF, appeared as the Prisoners’ Friend, and 
Lieutenant W. J. Waller, 2nd Battalion, AIF appeared as the Prosecutor, as they did in all the trials of 1st 
Battalion men charged.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
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Sergeant E. N. Wilemett, the second prosecution witness, was Acting Company 
Sergeant Major on the 20th. He told the court he informed Corporals Alyward and 
Taplin  around  2.30pm  that  the  Battalion  would  be  involved  in  a  ‘hop  over’  the 
following morning and gave them orders to draw ammunition and issue it to their 
platoons. Around 3pm, according to Wilemett, Taplin made a remark to him ‘to the 
effect that the men would not take the ammunition’.
33 He stated that all the accused 
were present that afternoon and were still present at 2am on the 21st. Wilemett said 
that around 3am he saw members of ‘D’ Company moving out of the sunken road 
away from the front but could not positively identify any of the accused as being 
amongst them. Examined by the Prisoners’ Friend, Wilemett said on the morning of 
the 20th he passed the word that the Company would be relieved. On re-examination 
by the prosecutor, he said he had received his orders from Captain Steen that the 
Company would be relieved. Later, he understood that the relief had been cancelled 
when told they would be involved in an attack the following morning. Examined by 
the court, Wilemett clarified the situation by stating that he warned all the platoon 
commanders ‘that there would be a hop over’.
34  
Lieutenant Mortlock, the third prosecution witness, told the court that he took 
command of ‘D’ Company around 2.30am. Being aware of the unrest he sent for 
Captain Moffat,
35 who spoke with about eight NCOs of ‘D’ Company (there were ten 
NCOs in total in ‘D’ Company). Mortlock said that Corporal Cooney was present but 
could not say whether the other accused were. The NCOs told Moffat ‘the men refused 
to move forward’. Moffat told the NCOs ‘to get their men out’ and reminded them of 
their duty to the Battalion. Mortlock said that around five minutes later he saw some 
men of ‘D’ Company starting to file down the sunken road towards the rear. On 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 2 
34 Ibid. 
35 Captain Moffat, M.C., died of wounds on 21 September 1918. See footnote in C. E. W. Bean, The 
Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: vol. vi, p. 933  
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checking  his  Company  a  short  while  later  Mortlock  found  only  one  man  of  the 
Company  had  stayed,  Private  Berman.  He  told  the  Prisoners’  Friend  that  he  was 
certain Corporal Cooney was present when Captain Moffat addressed the men. 
36 
The fourth witness for the prosecution, Sergeant (5236) G. F. Wood stated that 
when passing the sunken road around 2.30am on the 21st he saw Corporal Cooney and 
three other men in a dugout. He asked Cooney if the men ‘were coming up’. Cooney is 
alleged to have replied: ‘I don’t think they are . . . the others would willingly come up 
only  their  own  principles  would  not  allow  them  to  leave  the  men’.  He  told  the 
Prisoners’ Friend that he knew Corporal Cooney ‘pretty well’.
37 
The fifth prosecution witness, Captain J. G. Bootle, Officer in Charge of 1st 
Battalion Nucleus, told the court that the accused had marched the ten miles to the 
Nucleus arriving between 8am and 9am on the 21st. When they paraded before him he 
asked the NCOs to appoint a spokesman to explain ‘what the trouble was’. Lance 
Corporal  Besley  spoke  for  the  NCOs  and  told  him,  in  the  presence  of  the  other 
accused, ‘that the men had come out because they considered they would not have 
done themselves justice in the attack as they were too tired and that they considered 
they would have been doing someone else’s job if they had gone over.’ After this 
parade the accused all went back into Reserve with the Company and around noon on 
the 23rd were placed under arrest. When examined by the court, Bootle said he asked 
the NCOs if what Besley said was ‘correct’, and none of the accused contradicted it. 
Captain Bootle, when asked by the Prisoners’ Friend, could not say for certain the 
exact words used by Besley. When examined by the court, Bootle re-stated that he 
asked the accused if what Lance Corporal Besley had said was correct, and that no one 
had contradicted it.
38 
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Corporal Alyward was the first defence witness and his evidence was the longest 
and the most detailed. He told the court that on September 20 the Company was told 
by the Sergeant Major that they would be relieved that night. The men were ordered to 
hand in containers and petrol tins, something that is always done before a relief. At 
around 4pm on the 20th, Sergeant Wilemett told him that the relief was cancelled ‘as 
there might be a stunt in the morning’. He told the court ‘he was dumbfounded at the 
thought of telling this to the men. In all my experience I had never seen men in such a 
state as my men were’.
39 On returning to his platoon Alyward instructed Corporal 
Cooney to draw ammunition and told his men ‘there might be a hop over in the 
morning’. The men asked Alyward whether the ‘hop over was a fact’, and he replied 
‘that he would find out later’. Alyward said the men were complaining that they were 
in no fit state to attack and that he was of the opinion that if they were involved in the 
attack ‘it would not be a success’. He and Cooney discussed the situation and decided 
to speak to Lieutenant Steen. They took Lance Corporal Muir with them and on arrival 
at Steen’s dugout saw other NCOs already there, including Sergeant Halsthate (who 
was tried separately), who explained to Steen the feeling of his platoon as to the 
proposed attack. Alyward explained to Steen that having no officer in his platoon he 
thought it his responsibility to ask about the morning attack. Steen told Alyward that 
‘there may be an attack in the morning’. [It will be recalled that in Steen’s evidence he 
stated that the ‘orders were that there was to be an attack.’]  Alyward then explained to 
Steen the men’s condition. Steen is said to have remarked, ‘I can’t tell the Colonel 
this’, and then left. Alyward returned to his platoon and told the men that he had 
received ‘neither details about the attack nor any satisfaction’. 
40 
It was around 9.30pm on the 20th, according to Alyward, that members of the 6th 
Battalion started to arrive and told him and the others that they were relieving them. 
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Around 1am on the 21st, according to Alyward, he saw men moving out who told him 
that they were members of the 1st Battalion and had been relieved. Some time later he 
said word was passed down the line, ‘Get your gear on ‘D’ Company and move out’. 
Alyward said he thought it was ‘an ordinary relief’ and ‘seeing everybody moving off 
went out with the Company’. Therefore, he was not present when Moffat addressed 
the men around 2.30am. On arrival at the Nucleus Alyward became aware that part of 
the 1st Battalion was still in the line and realized that ‘there must be some mistake’. 
Alyward went on to say that when the NCOs paraded before Captain Bootle at the 
Nucleus he could not hear what Corporal Besley said.
41 
When examined by the prosecutor, Alyward said ‘he was satisfied the relief was 
cancelled on the afternoon of the 20th September’. He told the prosecutor that he ‘did 
not think it a fair thing for the men to do the attack. There was great dissatisfaction 
amongst the men at the idea of an attack.’ Alyward said he told the men ‘they would 
have to do the attack if there were orders to that effect’. He claimed that Lieutenant 
Steen  told  him  ‘there  might  be  an  attack’  and  that  he  received  no  further  orders 
regarding it. Further, he stated that he did not tell Steen that the men would refuse to 
attack. Alyward admitted that he received no ‘definite orders about a relief’, which 
normally came from the company commander who passed on the order to platoon 
commanders. He left for the Nucleus with Lance Corporal Steel and Corporal Wilkins 
but did not take any of his men with him.
42 When examined by the court, Alyward 
refuted Captain Bootle’s claim that when the accused paraded before him he asked for 
a spokesman, or asked if what Corporal Besley had said (regarding the reasons why 
the men had walked out of the line) was correct. Alyward said he did not hand over to 
anybody when taking the relief. He told the court he had been a corporal for nearly 
four months and had never taken charge of a platoon.
43 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
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The second defence witness, Corporal (3563) R. Cooney, spoke of the meeting 
the NCOs had with Steen on the afternoon of the 20th stating that Lieutenant Steen 
had said, ‘In case of an attack in the morning D Company will be engaged’. Cooney 
told the court he was not present when Captain Moffat addressed the men nor did he 
see  Captain  Mortlock  that  night.  [Corporal  Cooney  had  been  identified  as  being 
present when Captain Moffat made his appeal to the men around 2.30am of the 21st in 
the previous evidence of Lieutenant Mortlock.] Cooney’s evidence, like Alyward’s, 
contradicted Steen’s assertion that he gave definite orders that the attack would take 
place. He said that Sergeant Wood’s testimony earlier regarding the conversation they 
had around 2.30am was ‘substantially correct’. He explained that at the time he was 
not sure whether they were attacking or being relieved when he answered Wood’s 
question as to whether the men ‘were coming up’. However, he made no comment 
about Wood’s recollection of a further conversation in which Cooney was alleged to 
have said that the men would ‘willingly come up only their own principles would not 
allow them to leave the men’. Cooney said he heard Corporal Besley speak at the 
parade before Captain Bootle but did not contradict what was said because he ‘was too 
tired to worry . . . [and] didn’t bother much what he said’. Cooney told the prosecutor 
that  he  ‘never  definitely  knew  there  was  to  be  an  attack’.  He  had  handed  out 
ammunition to his men and told them that he thought ‘the relief had come a Gutzer and 
in the event of an attack in the morning D Company are in it’.
44 He told the prosecutor 
that he ‘did not think the men were fit to attack’ and from what his men said he got the 
impression that ‘some of them would not hop over’.  Cooney said he did not take any 
of his men with him when he left the sunken road area around 3am and conceded he 
had no ‘special orders’ concerning the relief.
45 Cooney was vulnerable as Mortlock 
had placed him at the meeting with Moffat, and Wood had a damning conversation 
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with him when it seemed clear the men were moving out knowing full well they had 
not been relieved. 
Corporal (3490) R. C. Taplin, the third defence witness, stated that he did not 
parade before Lieutenant Steen on the afternoon of the 20th. He told the court that 
Steen had sent for him between 5pm and 7pm and told him to take over the platoon 
and make arrangements for the issuing of ammunition, which he did. Steen had said to 
him that ‘in case of an attack’ his platoon would be in support. Taplin passed on the 
orders to his NCOs Slater, Besley and Preston, and warned his platoon ‘that in case of 
an attack we would act as support to the Company’. He organized a fatigue to the 
frontline around 9pm to collect containers and petrol tins and then returned to his 
dugout.  He  said  between  midnight  and  2am  he  saw  several  groups  of  men,  who 
identified  themselves  as  1st  Battalion,  moving  out,  who  told  him  they  had  been 
relieved. It was around 3am that Taplin moved out on hearing somebody say ‘Get your 
gear on ‘D’ Company’. Taplin claimed he saw men moving out who told him they 
were ‘D’ Company, and he followed them out.
46 When examined by the prosecutor, 
Taplin said he had no trouble with his men when he told them they could be involved 
in an attack the following morning. Taplin admitted he received no definite orders to 
say they had been relieved and that he had responded to an order that was ‘passed 
along the line’ that ‘D’ Company had been relieved. He said that his platoon members 
had left the sunken road before he did and therefore he had given no orders about a 
relief. Taplin, referring to the meeting at the Nucleus with Captain Bootle, said that he 
could not remember what Besley had said, but stated that Besley did ‘not use the 
words Capt. Bootle alleges he used’.  Surprisingly, the prosecutor did not ask Taplin 
whether he was present when Moffat spoke with the NCOs at 2.30am.
47 
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The fourth defence witness, Lance Corporal (2562) E. A. Besley, said he was 
asleep in the dugout in the early hours of the 21st and when he awoke his Company 
had moved out, so he followed after them. On the way to Nucleus he learned from the 
other men that they had not been relieved, but he continued on to the Nucleus and fell 
in with the others. Besley did not go into details about the statement he made to 
Captain Bootle apart from saying he told him about the previous action they had been 
engaged in [on the 18th] and ‘then in the end I told him another stunt was rumoured 
and did he think that a fair thing[?]’
48 When questioned by the prosecutor, Besley said 
he ‘did not definitely hear there was to be an attack’, even though he had issued his 
men with ammunition in readiness. Further, Besley said he had walked out of the line 
alone and thought the 6th Battalion men who had joined them in the dugout around 
9.00pm had relieved the 1st Battalion. When he realised he had come out in error, 
Besley said that he did not feel fit enough to walk back to the front.
49 As Corporal 
Slater declined to give evidence, Besley was the last witness for the defence.  
Captain Bootle was recalled by the court and re-examined on the details of the 
parade of NCOs at the Nucleus. Bootle told the court that around twelve ‘D’ Company 
NCOs were gathered in a semi-circle around him, with no man further than seven 
yards from Besley when he was speaking and that he was certain that all could hear 
what Besley said. Bootle restated that when Besley had finished speaking he asked 
them if what Besley had said was right and ‘nobody dissented’. Examined by the 
Prisoners’ Friend, he said he had made it plain to the NCOs that ‘there was trouble’. 
He claimed Besley asked him whether ‘it was fair to send the men into another stunt’. 
Bootle said he might have replied ‘that it was not for me to say’.
50  
The case for the defence rested on the alleged ambiguity surrounding the warning 
the  men  were  given  for  the  proposed  attack.  However,  it  was  a  difficult  task  to 
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convince the court of that in view of the testimony of Lieutenant Steen and Sergeant 
Wilemett, who both testified that the men were duly warned. The meeting of NCOs 
with Steen in his dug out on the 20th where they told him of the men’s likely refusal to 
take part in the attack was also crucial. Sergeant Wood’s conversation with Private 
Cooney provided further evidence that the men were aware of the attack and had 
decided not to take part. Captain H. H. Moffat, who in Gammage’s view epitomised 
the ideal Australian officer, describing him as a ‘type of leader that men would follow 
cheerfully to hell’,
51 had reminded the men of their duty to the Battalion, but even he 
was  unable  to  dissuade  them.  Most  damaging  of  all  to  the  defence  case  was  the 
remarks allegedly made by Private Besley to Captain Bootle at the Nucleus Camp as 
to why the men had walked out of the line. 
It is clear enough that there was unrest in ‘D’ Company on the 20th and although 
this was brought to Steen’s attention there is no evidence that he did anything about it, 
other  than  to  remind  the  men  that  orders  must  be  obeyed.  In  fact  it  was  left  to 
Lieutenant  Mortlock,  who  took  charge  when  Steen  was  wounded  at  2.30am.  He 
assessed the situation quickly and called in Captain Moffat to make a final appeal to 
the  men.  As  the  officers  had  failed  to  persuade  their  men  to  attack,  the  question 
remains whether the men’s attitude could have been changed if their NCOs had taken 
a  firm  line  and  supported  their  officers.  According  to  Bean,  the  men  were  not 
‘unfriendly’ to their officers but that in Steen’s ‘D’ Company he and Lieutenant Blake 
had been ‘just wounded’. In fact, both Steen and Blake had been wounded around 
2.15am on the morning of the 21st, about forty-five minutes before the men were due 
to assemble for the proposed attack.
52 The wounding of Steen and Blake was so late in 
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the proceedings as to be irrelevant, and not a cause of the men’s refusal to go forward 
as Bean suggested in the Official History.  
After the finding, Captain Bootle, still under oath, told the court he knew the five 
accused. He said the four corporals were ‘very good NCOs both in and out of the line’. 
He said he had not known Besley for long but that he had been a good NCO. Bootle 
made special mention of Cooney, who had won the Military Medal in June. Lieutenant 
H. H. Elslen spoke up for Corporal Alyward, whom he had known for four months, 
describing him as ‘the best man both in and out of the line’. Lieutenant J. P. Deppe 
praised  Corporals  Alyward  and  Slater,  describing  them  as  ‘very  good  NCOs’.  He 
singled out Taplin, who he had known for six months, telling the court that his conduct 
had been excellent ‘both in and out of the line’. Corporal Alyward was the only one of 
the accused to speak and he told the court that he had three years’ active service.
53 
Despite the support the accused received from their officers, the NCOs in this trial 
were convicted of desertion and received sentences ranging from seven to ten years’ 
penal servitude. The court had taken the view that the NCOs played a critical role in 
the men’s refusal to attack on the 21st and therefore they were prepared to make an 
example of them. In short, the NCOs should have known better than to walk out of the 
line with their men. At one level it can be seen as a show of solidarity with men they 
had fought alongside. However, in examining the service records of the convicted 
NCOs  what  emerges  is  a  lack  of  experience  in  being  in  charge  of  men  and 
unfamiliarity with the men under their charge. 
 From  the  sentences  that  were  handed  down  it  was  clear  that  the  court  was 
prepared to make an example of the NCOs despite their previous clean disciplinary 
records. Corporal Alyward was twenty-one-years-old when he enlisted in June 1915, 
and despite his clean record, was reduced to the ranks and received ten years’ penal 
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servitude.
54 Temporary corporal Slater was twenty-three-years-old when he enlisted in 
June 1916. Like Alyward, his disciplinary record was good and he received seven 
years’ penal servitude.
55 Corporal Rollo Charles Taplin was eighteen-years-old when 
he enlisted in July 1916. He was the youngest of the NCOs convicted, and although no 
disciplinary charges appear on his record, he still received ten years’ penal servitude.
 56 
Lance  Corporal  Besley  was  twenty-one-years-old  when  he  enlisted  in  June  1915. 
Apart from receiving seven days’ detention Besley’s record is free of any military 
crimes. Although only a lance corporal, Besley received ten years, a sentence usually 
reserved for corporals. He probably attracted the full sentence because of his role as 
spokesman for the men at the Nucleus Camp.
57 Corporal Roger Cooney had enlisted in 
June  1915  when  he  was  twenty-one-years-old.  He  was  wounded  in  action  twice, 
suffering a gunshot wound to the abdomen in 1916, and in 1917 a gunshot wound to 
his left ankle caused him to be evacuated to England where he stayed for most of 
1917. While in England he faced a District Court-Martial and was found guilty of 
using insubordinate language to a superior officer for which he received 78 days’ 
detention.  There  is  some  irony  in  the  fact  that  Cooney’s  bravery  in  1918  was 
acknowledged with the awarding of the Military Medal, the gazetting of this occurring 
while he was in prison. Cooney’s bravery and his three weeks as a corporal were 
barely taken into account as he received a sentence of eight years’ penal servitude.
58 
What is clear from these records is that the convicted men had little time to gain 
experience as NCOs and they had spent quite some time away from their Battalion in 
1918. Alyward was appointed lance corporal on April 13, 1918 and by June 8 had 
progressed to temporary corporal, being promoted to corporal later that month. On 
August 17 he went to Corps School and only returned to his Battalion on September 7. 
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Within two weeks of his return from training he was facing a refusal from his Platoon 
to attack.
59 Slater was appointed lance corporal in September 1917 and was promoted 
to temporary corporal on August 31, 1918, just three weeks before he was involved in 
the  refusal  to  attack.
60  Taplin  was  appointed  lance  corporal  in  March  1917  and 
promoted to corporal by June that year. He did have time to gain experience as an 
NCO,  however  he  was  away  from  his  Battalion  for  three  months  in  1918  only 
returning on August 3.
61 Besley was appointed lance corporal early in 1917 and in 
December was transferred to 1st Training Battalion in England, only rejoining his 
battalion  in  France  on  June  27,  1918.
62  Corporal  Cooney  was  promoted  to  lance 
corporal in April 1918, in June to temporary corporal, and to full corporal on August 
29.
63 The majority of these promotions came only a few weeks before the September 
21st mutiny. 
A separate trial was held for Corporal (3661) George F. Wethered, a member of 
‘D’  Company  on  October  16.  The  evidence  presented  by  Lieutenant  Steen  was 
essentially the same as in the other trials except that he did add that Wethered, who 
had been at the meeting of NCOs around Steen’s dugout in the afternoon, had spoken 
to Steen about 11pm. According to Steen, Wethered had told him that the men ‘would 
not  leave  me  in  the  lurch  and  that  they  would  stick  to  me  and  support  the  other 
Companies  but  that  they  would  not  make  a  hop-over  themselves’.
64  Sergeant 
Wilesmith
65 added that he spoke to the accused about 4.30pm and warned him of the 
hop-over. He was with the accused most of the afternoon and reported him as saying 
‘that he thought it pretty rough on the men, and that they didn’t like the idea of going 
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over’. Lieutenant Mortlock placed the accused at the 2.30am meeting with Captain 
Moffat and added that after that meeting he spoke with about five NCOs, including the 
accused, and said to them, ‘What about the NCOs, surely you are coming up with 
me?’ The accused is alleged to have replied, ‘What’s the use of us going up without 
the men?’ To which Moffat replied, ‘If you come up we will find some work for 
you’.
66 
Wethered, in his defence, denied he was at the meeting addressed by Moffat and 
that he had moved out of the sunken road when word was passed along the line that 
the Company had been relieved. Lance/Sergeant Hasthorpe gave evidence that he and 
the  accused  arrived  too  late  to  hear  the  address  by  Captain  Moffat  and  told  the 
prosecutor that they did not enquire as to what the address was about. Wethered told 
the court he was twenty-one-years-old and that he ‘always tried to do the best I could 
with the men’. Captain Bootle told the court that he had known Wethered for thirteen 
months and that ‘he is one of the best men I have ever had both in and out of the 
line’.
67 Wethered received a sentence of eight years, with Bootle’s statement probably 
saving him from receiving the full ten years. 
The most senior NCO of ‘D’ Company to parade before Steen on the afternoon of 
the 20th, Lance Sergeant (3351) Milton Hasthorpe, was also tried separately. Steen 
told the court that he asked Hasthorpe what he thought of the views expressed to him 
that the men ‘considered they were being called upon to do too much, and they were 
unable to do it because they were too tired and worn out and their nerves were gone 
owing to the fighting they had gone through.’
68 Hasthorpe is alleged to have replied, ‘I 
think so too’. Steen, when examined by the court, said his Company was about sixty 
strong  and  that  he  was  the  only  officer  until  10pm  on  the  20th.  Referring  to  the 
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previous attack on the 18th, he said they had suffered only ‘slight causalities’ and that 
while in the sunken road the shelling was ‘fairly constant’.
69 
Sergeant G. F. Wood of Battalion Headquarters said he saw the accused in a dug 
out with another NCO and two privates around 2.30am. He told the court that the 
accused and the others said, ‘they were quite willing to hop over but as a matter of 
principle  they  did  not  like  leaving  the  Coy’.  The  fourth  prosecution  witness, 
Lieutenant Mortlock, placed the accused at the meeting with Captain Moffat at 2.30am 
on the 21st.
70 
In his defence, Hasthorpe explained to the court that in the attack on the 18th they 
had reached their objective by 10am and remained in the front line until relieved about 
9pm on the 19th. Referring to the meeting at Steen’s dug out, Hasthorpe said it ‘was an 
accident’  that  he  had  arrived  at  the  same  time  as  the  other  NCOs  as  he  had  not 
discussed the situation with them. He told the prosecutor that Steen had told them that 
‘probably there would be an attack the next morning’. He went on to say that his men 
‘never said they would not go’, adding that ‘they would go if the rest of the Coy. 
went’. Hasthorpe made it clear he was in sympathy with his platoon, saying ‘I was 
going to stick to my Platoon’. He said he believed that when he walked out of the line 
he was being relieved, and when at the Nucleus Camp he had heard what Corporal 
Besley had said but had not bothered to tell Bootle that the lance corporal’s statement 
was incorrect and that they were really being relieved. Hasthorpe claimed to have 
missed  the  meeting  with  Moffat  and  was  supported  in  this  claim  by  Corporal 
Wethered. Examined by the court, Hasthorpe said he did not try to stop his platoon 
moving out, adding that he had no influence on them. Further, ‘I was not the ringleader 
either in my Coy. or in the Platoon. I was really passive’.
71 After the finding Captain 
Bootle said he had known the accused for about a year and that he was very good man 
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under shellfire and a good NCO. Hasthorpe was reduced to the ranks and received ten 
years for his part in the mutiny.
72 
Hasthorpe was thirty-years-old when he enlisted in 1915 and his record is free of 
any military crimes. He was promoted to lance corporal on March 26, 1917, corporal 
June 8, 1918, and lance-sergeant on August 31. Like the other convicted NCOs his 
experience in his final promotion was confined to just a few weeks before he had to 
deal with the mutiny.
73  
 
Trial of thirty-four members of ‘D’ Company 
Each trial adds a different dimension, and in this trial a clearer picture emerges of the 
men’s grievances as well as sense of the friction within the Company that resulted in 
heated exchanges between Lieutenant Mortlock and some of the men who were filing 
out of the sunken road on the 21st. In this second trial of ‘D’ Company men thirty-four 
faced the same optional charges. Among them were Lance Corporals (3077a) E. C. 
Preston, (4651) J. R. Dawson, (3407) C. W. Muir, (3064) D. W. Humphreys and 
(3633) D. N. Steele.
74 Little in the way of evidence was presented against the Privates 
in  this  trial  with  the  focus  being  on  the  accused  NCOs.  However,  the  alleged 
comments made by Privates that do appear in the trial transcript are discussed, as well 
as the testimony of the only defence witness, Private H. H. Tickner. As in the first trial, 
Lieutenant  Steen  (Officer  Commanding  ‘D’  Company)  was  the  prosecution’s  first 
witness, and we pick up his evidence at the parade of NCOs around his dugout around 
2.30pm on the 20th of September.  
Lieutenant Steen told the court that he could not say for certain that the accused 
NCOs were present at the parade at his dugout but ‘was under the impression they 
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were’. Steen said that after that meeting, around 4pm, he went out along the Company 
lines and spoke with the men he saw of ‘D’ Company and asked them whether they 
were coming over with him in the morning. Some men said ‘yes’, while others said ‘I 
am going with the mob’. Steen estimated that he spoke with half of his Company, 
around thirty men, but could not positively identify any of the accused as being spoken 
to by him. However, he said he had checked his Company around 1.30am, one hour 
before he was evacuated wounded, and the ‘accused were all present’.
75  
Sergeant  Wilemett,  the  second  prosecution  witness,  added  more  detail  to  his 
previous evidence. He told the court that after he had warned his NCOs of the attack 
on the afternoon of the 20th he heard several of the men comment ‘that they were not 
fit to go over’, but could not identify who made those remarks. Wilemett told the court 
that when he and Lieutenant Mortlock watched the men file out of the sunken road, 
between 2am and 3am on the 21st, Lieutenant Mortlock shouted to some of the men 
‘you are a cowardly lot of bloody swine’, or ‘words to that effect’. Wilemett said he 
heard no reply, and he then proceeded to the place he was ordered to. He added that 
three men, who were present on the 20th and who had moved out with the accused, 
were still missing. Examined by the Prisoners’ Friend, Wilemett said he had seen men 
from other companies filing out of the sunken road before the men from ‘D’ Company. 
Examined by the court he said the majority of the accused were ‘strangers to him’ as 
he had recently been in England for three months. He told the court that the impression 
he gathered from the men was that ‘they considered they had been badly treated’.
76  
Lieutenant Mortlock, the third prosecution witness, told the court that after he 
took charge of the Company, shortly after 2.30am on the 21st, he instructed Wilemett 
to move the men to a forward position, some 300 yards away, prior to them joining the 
assembly point for the attack. Wilemett then reported back to him and five minutes 
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later he ‘saw some of the accused moving down the road towards the rear, some 
putting on equipment and some standing about’. He could only identify one of the 
accused, Private Couley. Mortlock said he shouted to the men, ‘Where are you fellows 
going?’ Somebody replied ‘We are going out’, and with that they moved out in groups 
of five or six with Mortlock still making remarks to them. Examined by the Prisoners’ 
Friend, Mortlock said he had shouted to the men of ‘D’ Company ‘that they were 
deserting their comrades’, and that he was certain that around a dozen men heard him. 
Examined by the court Mortlock said that one of the remarks he shouted was ‘You are 
deserting  like  a  lot  of  cowards’.  Private  Couley,  whom  Mortlock  knew  well,  was 
alleged to have replied, ‘No man can call me a coward’, or words similar. Mortlock 
admitted that he could not identify any of the other accused NCOs as being present 
when this exchange took place.
77 
Captain Bootle, the fourth prosecution witness, repeated his claim in his previous 
evidence  that  the  men  ‘fully  understood’  that  the  NCOs  were  acting  as  their 
spokesmen  when  they  paraded  before  him  at  the  Nucleus.  He  told  the  Prisoners’ 
Friend that they had marched in ‘with equipment, Lewis Guns etc., complete’, and 
‘went forward again the same day as they marched in’. Bootle, when examined by the 
court, said that he recalled Lance Corporals Dawson, Muir, Humphreys and Steele as 
coming forward with Besley, and that they all heard what Besley said. He alleged that 
Besley had told him that the men ‘were all knocked up and not in a fit state to do an 
extra attack’. The final prosecution witness, Corporal (6237) C. A. H. Cox, Orderly 
Room Clerk at the Nucleus Camp, was on parade with Captain Bootle and confirmed 
that Bootle had called the NCOs to come forward to explain.
78 
What remains unclear in the prosecution’s case is why Lieutenant Steen did not 
take further action after he had walked down the line and received quite open refusals 
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from the men under his command to attack. Whether he did discuss the situation with 
senior officers is not revealed here, but it does appear the situation was left to drift to 
the early hours of the 21st. Lieutenant Mortlock’s shouted remarks at the men leaving 
should have left those who heard it in no doubt that they were not leaving in error. 
Most interesting of all is the remark by Sergeant Wilemett that most of the accused 
were  ‘strangers  to  him’,  as  he  had  been  in  England  for  three  months  previously. 
Sergeants have a major influence on the attitude of the men in their units and it is 
significant that in this case Wilemett had very little. When his men were leaving the 
line, disobeying a direct order, Wilemett had the opportunity to say something to them, 
but did not, because he felt he could not change their decision. There is no indication 
here that Wilemett was in sympathy with them but it might explain his reluctance to 
speak out. Company sergeant majors are not known for their reticence. As discussed 
earlier, some of the accused non commissioned officers had little experience in their 
roles. Wilemett, however, was experienced, but claimed that due to his absence in 
England he was unfamiliar with the men under his command. 
The defence called only one witness, Private (6327) H. H. Tickner, who gave an 
account of the conditions the men of ‘D’ Company had to endure during the attack on 
the 18th September and afterwards. Tickner explained that at 3am on the 18th, as they 
waited for the attack to commence, they were in an open field exposed to shellfire and 
persistent rain. The attack was successful as they reached their objective, a forward 
trench, which Tickner described as being ‘up to the knees in water and mud’. They 
held this position until 9pm on the 19th and during this period they were obliged to do 
ration and other fatigues. They were relieved by ‘B’ Company and moved back to the 
sunken road where they were told they had to ‘dig in deeply’ due to the ‘very heavy 
shellfire’, a task that was not completed until around dawn.
79 On the 20th the majority 
of ‘D’ Company were on burial duties and the rest on gas guard. Tickner said that 
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around  4pm  on  the  20th  he  heard  rumours  of  an  attack  but  about  the  same  time 
advanced parties of 6th Battalion men arrived and told him they were relieving them 
that night. Later in the evening the other three companies of the 1st Battalion joined 
‘D’ company in the sunken road saying they had been relieved from the front line by 
the  6th  Battalion.  Tickner  described  the  sunken  road  as  being  three-feet  deep  by 
twelve-feet wide, with the 1st Battalion’s portion extending 200 to 300 yards, and due 
to the constant shelling the men were ‘scattered all over the place’. Tickner recalled 
that an order had been given to stay in the sunken road until further orders. After 
getting some sleep in their dugouts he and some others of ‘D’ Company were aroused 
by the noise of men moving out who told them they were ‘1st Battalion being relieved 
and going out’. Shortly after, ‘word was passed along for “D” Company to get their 
gear on and file out’. According to Tickner, at this juncture ‘D’ Company started to 
file out down the sunken road but because of the heavy shelling they got split up, only 
rejoining on the road back to the Nucleus.
80 
Tickner told the prosecutor that he had not made any remarks about the difficulty 
of attacking again, although he thought it hard to do so, and that he did not discuss the 
attack with anyone nor make any complaint to an NCO. Furthermore, he said he did 
not hear the men complain about being involved in another attack. Their complaints 
were more to do with being tired and having sore feet. He said Sergeant Halsthate 
(who  did  the  talking  at  the  parade  before  Steen)  told  him  that  an  attack  was 
‘rumoured’. Tickner could not say who passed the order down the line to move out. He 
conceded that he had not received any definite orders concerning the relief, adding that 
he had no orders where to go and that ‘we very seldom get orders where to go’. 
81  
Examined by the court, Tickner said he did not hear any remarks made to the men 
as they were leaving and that he had not seen any of his platoon NCOs until they had 
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gone about five miles. He stated that he received no orders from Sergeant Halsthate 
regarding the attack and, as far as he knew, ‘men of Sergeant Halsthate’s platoon were 
quite ready to go into the line if necessary’.
82 The other accused declined to give 
evidence or call witnesses. 
The defence had called only one man to give evidence, and he, according to the 
Prisoners’  Friend,  was  chosen  haphazardly  from  the  accused.
83  The  defence  was 
perhaps reticent about calling more witnesses, fearing a repeat of the type of statement 
that was attributed to Corporal Besley that had done so much damage to the men’s 
case. Tickner’s sworn statement was careful, as it gave no indication that the men had 
been discussing among themselves refusing to attack and thus avoid the charge of 
combining  among  themselves,  which  could  have  led  to  a  mutiny  conviction.  The 
Prisoners’ Friend in his final summation to the court countered that all the accused had 
moved out in good faith and that they had good reason to believe they had been 
relieved and had received an order to do so. To support this he pointed to the presence 
of the 6th Battalion in the sunken road.
84  
The prosecutor, when he addressed the court, said that the presence of the 6th 
Battalion  in  the  sunken  road  was  only  natural  as  they  were  part  of  the  ongoing 
operation. He drew the court’s attention to the evidence of Lieutenant Steen, Sergeant 
Wilemett, Lieutenant Mortlock, Captain Bootle and Corporal Cox.
85 
After the findings, Captain Bootle spoke up for nineteen of the accused telling the 
court that he had known the men for about a year and that they all had been ‘good 
soldiers both in and out of the line’. He described Private Couley as being a ‘very good 
man in the line’ and made special mention of him winning the Military Medal at 
Bullecourt.  Lieutenant  McDonnel  spoke  up  for  several  of  the  accused,  especially 
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Privates  Mackey,  Couley,  and  Lance  Corporals  Humphreys  and  Muir.  McDonnell 
spoke  of  Couley’s  courage  in  the  line  and  mentioned  that  Lance  Corporal  Muir, 
although he was gassed early in the Pozières attack, stayed in the line and saw the 
action through. Lieutenants H. H. Elsley and J. P. Deppe mentioned between them 
eighteen of the accused describing them as ‘good men both in and out of the line’. 
Only one of the accused made a statement, Private (2700) W. Robson, who told the 
court that the present officers of the Battalion did not know him as he had been absent 
from the Battalion due to special duties and being ill, and had only returned in July 
1918.
86  
All the accused were found guilty of desertion with the convicted lance corporals 
receiving a sentence of five years’ penal servitude. What may have prevented them 
receiving seven years was the fact that all of the senior NCOs of ‘D’ Company (apart 
from  CSM  Wilemett)  had  decided  to  follow  their  men  out  of  the  line.  What  the 
convicted NCOs had in common was that they all had been wounded in action while in 
France. Muir, who was just eighteen-years-old when he enlisted in July 1915, was 
wounded in action in April 1917 receiving gunshot wounds to his right calf and left 
thigh that kept him away from his unit until November 1917.
87 Preston was almost 
twenty-five-years-old when he enlisted in January 1916. He joined the battalion in 
France in November 1916 and was wounded in action in April 1917, suffering gunshot 
wounds to both thighs. This serious wound kept him away from his unit until late 
October 1917.
88 Humphrey’s was aged twenty-six when he enlisted in July 1915 and 
in July 1916 he was wounded in action receiving a gunshot wound to his arm, which 
kept him away from his unit until January 1917.
89 Dawson was twenty-one-years-old 
when he enlisted in September 1915 and was wounded in action in August 1916. He 
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spent most of 1917 in England with spells in hospital suffering from trench foot. In 
1918, bouts of sickness and recurring trench foot kept him away from his unit until late 
June, severely limiting his experience as an NCO.
90 Steele was twenty-eight-years-old 
when  he  enlisted  in  February  1916.  He  was  wounded  in  action  in  October  1917, 
suffering gunshot wounds to his left knee and arm, which caused him to be away from 
his  unit  until  February  1918.
91  Fear  of  being  wounded  again  could  have  been  a 
consideration for these men when deciding to walk out of the line. Muir was appointed 
lance corporal in November 1917; Preston, May 1918; Humphrey’s, November 1917; 
Dawson, September 1916; and Steele June 1918. Steele and Preston had the least 
experience as NCOs, but what needs to be taken into account with the others is the 
length of time they were away from their units. 
 
The trial of thirteen Privates of ‘B’ Company 
The trial of men of ‘B’ Company of the 1
st Battalion is significant because for the first 
time  no  non-commissioned  officers  were  among  the  thirteen  accused.  The  first 
prosecution witness, Lieutenant R. W. Sampson, commander of ‘B’ Company, told the 
court his Company took part in the attack on the 18th and remained in the line until 
being relieved on the evening of the 20th, arriving at the sunken road around 8.30pm. 
Sampson claimed to have warned all forty-four members of his Company, including 
the accused, that they would be involved in the attack on the 21st. Furthermore, this 
warning was given in the front line and in the sunken road. Referring to the proposed 
attack he told his men that ‘we had not far to go and did not expect much opposition’. 
He stated that he gave no indication to his men ‘which might lead them to believe we 
were going right out’.
  92 Examined by the Prisoners’ Friend, Sampson said he had 
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warned his men of the attack while in the front line, on the way out of the line and in 
the sunken road. He added that none of his men were on fatigue duty.
 93 
There was conflicting evidence from the second prosecution witness, Corporal 
(6211) W. Adam, who told the Prisoners’ Friend that when the Company was relieved 
in the front line he was unaware of an attack on the 21st and therefore did not warn his 
Section. When re-examined by the prosecutor he said that while in the front line he 
had heard rumours of an attack from one of the platoon sergeants but had not ‘repeated 
it  to  anybody’  or  discussed  it  with  anyone.  On  re-examination  by  the  court  he 
confirmed that Sampson had warned the Company of the attack in the sunken road.
94  
The third witness for the prosecution, Sergeant (3348) W. E. Hegton (Acting 
Company Sergeant Major) also said he had heard no word of an attack while in the 
front line, and did not hear of any warning while in the sunken road as he was on duty. 
He did report that he heard Private A. Lawrence say, ‘Well, I can’t go over the top I 
am  too  done  up’.  He  said  Lawrence  was  speaking  with  a  group  of  four  or  five, 
including Private Baker, one of the accused. Around 3am on the 21st when Hegton 
ordered the men to ‘fall in’ all the accused were missing. He told the Prisoners’ Friend 
that he was not present when Sampson walked along the line on the 20th and that 
nothing happened to indicate that the men were being relieved. He confirmed to the 
court that he heard no orders for the men to ‘file out’ and that he gave no orders to do 
so.
95  
Private  (3716)  J.  Johnson,  the  fourth  prosecution  witness,  told  the  court  that 
Privates Lawrence, Baker, Jeffries and Lindsay (accused) were with him in the front 
line when Samson warned them of the proposed attack. He said the men discussed the 
attack while in the sunken road but that he took no part in the discussion.
96 The fifth 
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prosecution witness, Private (3881) E. L. Myers, said that the accused Privates Earle 
and Barnett were with him when Sampson gave the warning of the attack as they made 
their way to sunken road. He told the Prisoners’ Friend that Sampson ‘was speaking to 
everyone in general’. According to the sixth prosecution witness, Corporal (6237) C. 
A. H. Wilcox, nine of the accused marched into the Nucleus around 11.30am on the 
21st  and  made  no  statement.  The  final  prosecution  witness,  Lieutenant  A.  N. 
Backhouse, said that five of the accused had joined a party under his command some 
five miles from the front line on either the 21st or 22nd September.
97   
Although the prosecution’s case against the accused was stronger than in previous 
trials, the accused offered little in the way of defence. Out of the thirteen accused only 
one man, Private (2177) A. Mullins, a stretcher-bearer, gave evidence, and his sworn 
statement was contained in only four lines. He told the court that he was not warned of 
the attack on the 21st and the reason he was not present on the morning of the attack 
was because he saw men leaving and decided to leave with them. Examined by the 
prosecutor he said he had heard rumours of an attack on the 21st but did not discuss it 
with anyone. He left the line with the accused Privates Handcock and Lawrence.
98  
Before the finding in this case the court dealt with the first charge against Private 
(7723) J. Earle that ‘When on active service, endeavouring to persuade persons in 
H.M. Military Forces to join in a mutiny’. For the prosecution, Captain J. C. Bootle 
told the court that on the 23rd, a day after the men had marched into the Nucleus, he 
held a parade of 1st Battalion Details and that the accused was standing with his pack 
resting  on  his  rifle.  Bootle  claimed  he  told  him  several  times  ‘to  stand  at  ease 
properly’. The accused was alleged to have replied, ‘if I have to stand at ease I am 
going to take my pack off’. Bootle told him again to keep his pack on. Earle is then 
alleged to have half-turned to the rest of ‘B’ Company and said, ‘Come on, let us get 
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off parade’. All the accused stayed on parade but Earle did not obey the order. Bootle, 
when cross-examined by the accused, told him he had turned half right and not had 
mentioned that his shoulder was sore and that he would like to take off his pack. 
Examined by the court Bootle said the men around could hear what the accused said 
and Sergeant Hasthate was standing within two yards of him. Earle, in his defence, 
denied ‘using the words alleged by Captain Bootle’. He told the prosecutor that the 
pack was hurting his shoulders and denied saying anything to the men, but admitted 
taking his pack off without permission. The defence called two witnesses, Handcock 
and Noad, who swore that Earle did not use the words, ‘Come on, let us get off 
parade’, although Handcock did say that when Bootle ordered Earle to ‘fall out’ Earle 
had replied ‘I’ll stop here now’.
99 Earle was found not guilty on this charge, but was 
found guilty of desertion and received three years’ penal servitude for desertion. His 
conduct was assessed as being ‘indifferent in and out the line’.
100 
After the finding Lieutenant Sampson spoke up for Private Handcock saying he 
was a good soldier and had volunteered for patrols at Meteren and Merris. Sergeant W. 
E. Higden said he had known most of the accused for a considerable time and that they 
have been ‘good front line soldiers and are not men of bad character’.
101  
Of the convicted, three were 1915 men whose conduct was classified as good in 
the line, with one bad and one indifferent out of the line. Of the four 1917 men, only 
one man’s conduct was graded as good, with two indifferent and one fair in and out of 
the line. Three of the five 1918 men were graded good, the other two indifferent and 
fair. Overall, the conduct of eight men was considered good in the line and only six 
men had their conduct classified as good out of the line. Five of the convicted had only 
been in France a few months; four were men who had seen action in 1917; one in 
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1916; and there were three 1915 men.
102 What is significant in ‘B’ Company is that 
none of the NCOs were prepared to walk out of the line with these men. Whether that 
was a consequence of the perceived character of the convicted is not clear, but as noted 
above, the mutineers of ‘B’ Company were a mixed bag when it came to character and 
length of service.  
 
The trial of forty-five members of ‘C’ Company 
The trial of forty-five members of ‘C’ Company proves quite revealing as a picture 
emerges of the mood of the men and a sense of an industrial dispute developing with 
the men willing to go out in support of another Company. Included in the accused 
were  Temporary  Corporal  (6949)  T.  J.  Blackwood,  Lance-Corporals  (2928)  E. 
Walker, (3801) E. M. Porter, (3953) R. Bardney, (1382) R. Beggs, and (3812) L. 
Pettit, and Corporals (6084) F. R. Smith and (3966) R. H. C. McKay.
103 Lieutenant L. 
J.  Whipp,  commander  of  No.  12  Platoon  ‘C’  Company,  was  the  first  prosecution 
witness. He told the court that on September 18 ‘C’ Company had taken part in an 
attack and after reaching their objective had stayed in the front line until the night of 
the 20th. They were relieved that evening and made their way to the sunken road some 
350 yards from the front line. Whipp told his platoon, which consisted of eleven men, 
to ‘extend along the sunken road’. Around 6pm he told Corporal Blackwood, in the 
presence of five or six of the accused, ‘that we were drawing ammunition for an 
attack’. Blackwood and seven of the accused obeyed the order to draw ammunition. 
Around  3am  on  the  21st,  only  one  member  of  his  platoon  was  present  when  the 
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Company assembled for the attack. The rest were absent and remained so throughout 
the attack on the 21st. 
When examined by the Prisoners’ Friend, Whipp conceded that when he told 
Blackwood  of  the  proposed  attack  it  was  possible  that  some  of  the  men  standing 
around did not hear him. Further, up to 6pm on the night of the 20th, he had ‘surmised’ 
that the Company was going to be relieved that night. He told the court that he did not 
see Corporal Blackwood until September 22 and that he had offered no explanation as 
to why he had left the sunken road.
104 
The second prosecution witness, Lieutenant S. G. Ward, commander of No. 10 
Platoon, had three members of his fifteen-strong Platoon on trial. He explained to the 
court that he had told his Platoon around 4.30pm on the 20th that they would be 
relieved from the front line but warned them they would be involved in the attack the 
following morning. Ward’s Platoon arrived in the sunken road around 9.30pm and he 
instructed them to stay there while he went to Battalion Headquarters. On his return, at 
12.30am  on  the  21st,  he  saw  a  number  of  men  marching  out  of  the  sunken  road 
towards the rear. On checking his platoon he found it was still intact. He said to his 
men they would be involved in the attack and told them to stay in the sunken road. 
Ward said the men discussed amongst themselves whether they would ‘go or stay’. 
When the Company moved to a forward position for the attack around 3am three 
members of his platoon were absent: Privates (7344) W. James, (7038) A. Robinson, 
and (372a) E. Boland. Ward did not see them again until several days later when they 
were in custody. Under examination by the Prisoners’ Friend, Ward said that he was 
certain all three accused were present when he warned the platoon of the attack. When 
he gave the warning he alleged that Private James remarked to him ‘that he didn’t 
think it fair to go into action again’.
105 
                                                 
104 Ibid., p. 1. 
105 Ibid., p. 2.  
151 
Corporal (3996) E. A. Davis, the third prosecution witness, who was in charge of 
a Section of No. 10 Platoon, said he was present when Ward warned James of the 
attack. He told the court that on the march back to the sunken road there was a lot of 
‘discussion’ in the Company. Soon after they arrived at the sunken road they heard 
that ‘D’ Company was ‘not going over’.  He said that some of his Company ‘seemed 
inclined to go out in sympathy with D Company’. Davis said that he did not see any of 
the accused leave, but that Privates Bowman and Darling were the first to go and have 
remained absent since. He told the Prisoners’ Friend that James was warned in the 
second dugout [sunken road] but could not say for certain whether Robinson was 
warned.
106 
The fourth prosecution witness, Lieutenant S. R. Trail, was in charge of No. 11 
Platoon  in  the  front  line  up  until  11am  on  the  20th.  He  then  took  charge  of  ‘A’ 
Company. This platoon had thirteen men accused including Corporal (6084) F. R. 
Smith and Lance-Corporal (3801) E. M. Porter. Trail’s evidence was limited to telling 
the  court  that  the  accused  were  with  him  in  the  front  line  up  to  the  time  of  his 
departure.
107 
Private W. C. Morgan, a ‘C’ Company runner, was the fifth prosecution witness, 
and he identified four of the accused Privates as being present on the 20th and absent 
at 3.00am on the 21st. The sixth prosecution witness, Lieutenant Kelleway, Officer 
Commanding ‘C’ Company, told the court that the whole of No. 9 Platoon, which 
included Corporal McKay, Temporary Corporal Bardney, Lance-Corporal Pettit and 
six Privates were all absent at 3am on the 21st. All the accused had been present the 
previous evening, including two Privates from Company headquarters who were also 
among  the  accused.  Kelleway  explained  to  the  Prisoners’  Friend  that  Lieutenant 
Hudson was the platoon’s commander but had since been wounded.
108  
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The tenth prosecution witness, Lieutenant R. U. Sampson, told the court that 
around 2am on the 21st he heard Corporal McKay remark, ‘Oh I’m going out, my 
Platoon is going, so I’m going with them’. McKay then left the sunken road and 
walked towards the rear. Sampson told the Prisoners’ Friend that the remark was made 
in a loud voice as McKay was making his way towards the rear and not the assembly 
point.  The  final  prosecution  witness,  Sergeant  H.  D.  Andrews,  stated  that  all  the 
accused had ‘straggled’ into the Nucleus on the morning of the 21st.
109 
The  prosecution  had  presented  evidence  that  the  men  were  involved  in 
discussions among themselves as to whether they would refuse to attack. Lieutenant 
Ward’s  Platoon  No.  10  suffered  the  least  with  only  three  absentees.  In  the  other 
platoons there was almost a total walkout with ten out eleven men of No. 12 Platoon, 
and No. 9 and No. 11 Platoons reporting all their men absent.  
The defence’s first witness, Corporal Blackwood, told the court that when they 
were relieved from the front line and in the sunken road they had a hot meal and were 
told to spread out. He and the accused Private Anderson were in a dug out together and 
stayed  there  until  they  heard  somebody  say,  ‘Put  your  gear  on  and  move  out’. 
Blackwood said that they did not see anyone else from the platoon, so they moved out 
thinking the whole Battalion was moving out. In his defence Blackwood stated that he 
was not warned of the attack and he did not hear Lieutenant Whipp tell him about the 
attack. Examined by the prosecutor, he said he drew ammunition on Whipp’s orders, 
but he did not hear Whipp say there was going to be an attack. He told the prosecutor 
they had arrived at the sunken road around 10pm and he and Anderson stayed until 
around midnight. He said he had heard rumours of an attack and had not discussed this 
with anyone. Blackwood claimed that before moving out he had looked for Lieutenant 
Whipp but could not find him or any men from his Section.
110 
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Private (7344) W. James, the second defence witness, stated that around midnight 
on the 20th/21st he heard somebody say, ‘Put your equipment on and file out’, which 
he did not hesitate to do. Examined by the prosecutor, he stated that he was not told 
about the attack, nor had he heard rumours of an attack. He admitted he had not 
received orders from an N.C.O. to move out of the sunken road, and only became 
aware that a mistake had been made when he paraded at the Nucleus before Major 
McKenzie.
111 
The third defence witness, Corporal Smith, told the court he was in a dug out with 
Private Ham on the night of the 20th when word was passed along the line to put on 
their gear and move out. At the same time there was a group of men moving out and 
when he asked who they were they replied they were ‘1st Battalion moving out’. On 
hearing this both he and Private Ham followed them out of the sunken road towards 
the rear. Smith explained that his platoon was scattered along the sunken road due to 
the shellfire, and that no other members of his platoon accompanied them as they 
moved towards the rear. Examined by the prosecutor, Smith said he had heard rumours 
of an attack but he had not mentioned this to anyone. He admitted to not receiving an 
order from his platoon sergeant to move out nor did he look for him before doing so, 
although he did look for two men in his Section. He told the prosecutor that he heard 
no discussion about the attack or the relief. It was only on reaching the Nucleus that he 
realised that they had come out in error. Smith told the prosecutor he had been an 
NCO for a year and with the Battalion for two years.
112 
Corporal McKay, the fourth defence witness, told the court that on the night of 
the 20th he was asleep in a shell hole in the sunken road and when he awoke and 
checked his platoon they had all gone. He then met a machine gunner who informed 
him that the Battalion ‘had moved out and was about 7 minutes ahead’. On moving out 
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he met up with about five members of his platoon, including Temporary Corporal 
Bardney,  who  told  him  that  they  had  received  orders  to  move  out.  He  told  the 
prosecutor that although he had heard rumours of an attack he had not received a 
warning concerning the attack and had not discussed this with anyone. Further, he had 
no definite orders to leave the sunken road nor did he issue any orders to members of 
his platoon to leave. Examined by the court, McKay said he had not learned of his 
mistake until he reached the Nucleus. He denied making the remarks or anything like 
them  attributed  to  him  by  Lieutenant  Sampson,  who  in  his  evidence  claimed  that 
McKay had said his platoon was moving out ‘so I’m going with them’.
113 
The fifth defence witness, Temporary Corporal Bardney, said he agreed with 
McKay’s evidence. He told the prosecutor he left the sunken road on hearing they 
were to file out and that no other members of his Section were with him. He did not 
look for his platoon sergeant and moved out with a crowd of about fifty men. He 
claimed he had heard no rumours ‘whatever’ of an attack and that his platoon had not 
discussed it, as he would have heard them. Bardney told the court that on moving out 
the men did not know where they were going, but after talking it over decided to go to 
the Nucleus.
114 
The final defence witness, Private (1715) E. F. Stokes, who along with Private 
(3700) L. G. Beckman, was a stretcher bearer attached to ‘C’ Company H.Q. Stokes 
told the prosecutor that he had heard rumours of an attack and had left the sunken road 
without orders to do so. He had moved out following a crowd of around fifty to sixty 
men who said they were ‘C’ Company.
115 The other accused declined to give evidence, 
but before the finding in this case there was a further charge to be heard against Private 
(1234) W. Case who faced a charge of ‘When on active service, causing a mutiny in 
forces belong to H.M. Military Forces’.    
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Lieutenant H. Trail, the only prosecution witness, claimed that around midnight 
on the 20th/21st in the sunken road he heard Case say, ‘Come on let us get away while 
the going is good’. Trail said he was about fifteen yards from Case when he heard him 
speak, and although it was fairly dark he was certain it was the accused. Case is then 
alleged to have marched out with four or five men. Trail told the Prisoners’ Friend that 
he knew the accused very well and although he could not swear he saw the accused 
speak he had previously been in the place from which the voice came. In his defence, 
Case denied using the words attributed to him, claiming he was in his dugout around 
midnight. He told the prosecutor that he knew of ‘no attack and had not discussed the 
attack with anybody’. He called Private (6077) A. J. Rook in his defence (one of the 
accused) who stated that Case was in the sunken road until about 1.30am on the 21st
 
when about four or five of them had moved out together.
116 Case was found not guilty 
on this charge, but like the others, found guilty of desertion.  
After the finding Captain R. Somerset, 1st Battalion, testified to the excellent 
character of twenty-three of the convicted Privates as well as Lance Corporals Beggs, 
Walker, Porter, Pettit, Temporary Corporal Bardney, Corporals Smith, Blackwood and 
McKay. He described the NCOs as having demonstrated keenness, and that they ‘have 
proved reliable men’. Private Case (accused on the second charge) was praised as a 
willing worker and good soldier ‘under fire’.
117 
What emerges from examining the service records of the convicted NCOs is a 
pattern  similar  to  ‘D’  Company’s,  with  most  having  been  previously  wounded  in 
action and receiving their final promotion only weeks before the mutiny. Temporary 
Corporal  Thomas  John  Blackwood  was  twenty-one-years-old  when  he  enlisted  in 
October 1916. He was wounded in action in late 1917, promoted to lance corporal in 
April  1918  and  to  temporary  corporal  on  August  31,  just  three  weeks  before  the 
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‘walkout’ of 1st Battalion men. Blackwood had an unblemished disciplinary record 
and his three weeks as a temporary corporal resulted in him receiving eight years’ 
penal servitude.
118  
Lance Corporal Ernest Walker was twenty-five-years-old when he enlisted in 
June 1915. He was wounded in action in November 1916, suffering a gunshot wound 
to the neck, which kept him away from his unit for four months. He was appointed 
lance corporal on August 3, 1918, and the gallantry and leadership he displayed on 
August 23 earned him the Military Medal. In August 1917 he had faced a District 
Court-Martial in England charged with striking his superior officer and was found 
guilty  and  awarded  sixty-four  days’  detention.  Like  the  other  convicted  lance 
corporals, he was awarded five years’ penal servitude.
119  
Lance Corporal Richard Beggs was twenty-five-years-old when he enlisted in 
November 1914, making him one of the longest serving of the convicted men. He was 
appointed  lance  corporal  in  September  1917  and  rejoined  his  unit  in  France  in 
February 1918. Beggs was wounded in action in April, suffering a gunshot wound to 
the back of his right foot which kept him away from his unit until the end of July. He 
was awarded five years’ penal servitude for his part in the mutiny. 
Lance  Corporal  Edward  Maitland  Porter,  was  twenty-one-years-old  when  he 
enlisted in August. He was promoted to lance corporal in on July 7, 1916, and just ten 
days later was wounded in action, receiving gunshot wounds to both arms. He spent 
several months recovering from this severe wound and afterwards was assigned to 
postings in England. He was only able to rejoin his battalion in the field in March 
1918. On August 2 he was promoted to temporary corporal, only to revert back to 
lance corporal later that month. He received five years’ penal servitude for his part in 
the mutiny.
120 
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Corporal Reginald. H. C. McKay was twenty-two-years-old when he enlisted in 
September 1915. He was appointed lance corporal in January 1917 and was wounded 
in  action  in  July  of  that  year,  receiving  a  serious  gunshot  wound  to  his  face. 
Recovering from this wound and being re-classified as A3 meant that he was away 
from his battalion in France until May 1918. In August he was promoted to corporal 
and was seven weeks in his new position before his involvement in the mutiny. His 
disciplinary record was free of charges, and despite his short experience as a corporal 
he received ten years’ penal servitude.
121  
Corporal Fred Rowe Smith was twenty-one-years-old when he enlisted in March 
1916. He was appointed corporal on August 3, 1918 and rejoined his battalion on 
August 16. No charges appear on his record except for the eight years’ penal servitude 
he received for taking part in the mutiny.
122 
Lance Corporal Leonard William Pettit was nineteen-years-old when he enlisted 
in August 1915. His appointment to lance corporal came in March 1917, and he was 
wounded in action in April 1918, receiving a gunshot wound to his right arm. This 
wound kept him away from his battalion until August 17, just five weeks before the 
mutiny. He was awarded five years’ penal servitude by the court and there are no other 
charges against his name.
123 
Temporary Corporal Richard Bardney was almost twenty-one-years old when he 
enlisted in October 1916. He was promoted to lance corporal in February 1918 and 
was wounded in action on April 18 and would not return to his unit until July 27. His 
appointment to temporary corporal came three weeks before the mutiny, and despite 
his short period at that rank, he was awarded eight years’ penal servitude.
124 
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Of the twenty-nine Privates convicted twelve, or 41.37 per cent of the convicted 
Privates, were men who had only been involved in operations in France in 1918. 
Thirteen had been in operations since 1917, and five since 1916. Adding the 1917 and 
1918 men we have 86.2 per cent of men with just over a year’s operational experience. 
The conduct of the convicted Privates in and out of the line as given the court was 
classified in every case as good. This must be treated with some suspicion and may 
reflect the fact that a man’s previous conduct, whether good, fair, indifferent or bad, 
made  no  difference  in  the  uniformity  in  sentencing  Privates  to  three  years’  penal 
servitude. It is significant that a sizeable proportion of the men convicted were recent 
arrivals (41.37 per cent) with only a few months of actual combat experience. 
  
The trial of nineteen members of ‘A’ Company 
The trial of nineteen members of ‘A’ Company provides more detail of the unrest in 
the sunken road on the night of the 20th. Among the accused were Corporal (4466) W. 
H. Pittock and Lance Corporals (6975) E. B. Davis and (3712) S. F. Carr.
125 The 
prosecution’s first witness, Lieutenant H. A. Heatley, had ten members of his No. 4 
Platoon accused. He told the court that on the 18th his Company acted in support of an 
attack  and  was  in  the  front  line  until  around  10pm  on  the  20th.  They  were  then 
relieved by the 6th Battalion and moved back to the sunken road. He told his men to 
‘dig in’ to the bank of the sunken road and ‘make themselves comfortable’, detailing 
some  men  to  ammunition  and  ration  fatigue.  Heatley  heard  confirmation  of  ‘A’ 
Company’s involvement in the morning attack at 11pm and then walked along the 
sunken road warning the men of his platoon. Heatley could not recall whom he warned 
but remembered speaking with the accused Corporal Pittock. He told Pittock they were 
participating in the attack the following morning and asked him ‘whether there was 
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any talk in the Company of the men leaving or striking’. He explained to the court that 
at that time he had heard ‘something about “D” Company’. Pittock replied ‘that the 
men were worn out and tired’, with Heatley gaining the impression that the men would 
take  part  in  the  attack.  Heatley  said  he  warned  the  men  about  the  attack  and 
recommended that they get as much sleep as possible. He added that some members of 
his platoon were in groups ‘discussing the situation’. Between 1am and 2am on the 
21st, when Heatley gathered his platoon, only three men were present.
126 On further 
examination by the Prisoners’ Friend and the court, Heatley said he first knew of the 
Company’s involvement in the morning attack around 7pm on the 20th, and up to that 
time he thought they were being relieved. When they were in the sunken road he had 
said nothing to his platoon about being relieved, adding that normally when there is a 
relief he leads his men out.
127 
Sergeant (1915) W. J. Pritchard, the second prosecution witness, told the court he 
was in charge of a platoon of about twenty, with five members of his platoon among 
the accused, including Lance-Corporal Carr. He said his platoon had arrived in the 
sunken road around midnight for a hot meal and that he told his platoon, including the 
five accused, that they would be ‘doing a stunt in the morning’. He said no remarks 
were made and the Platoon dispersed to get some rest. Examined by the Prisoners’ 
Friend, Pritchard said his platoon was told on the 20th they were being relieved and 
would be moving back to the sunken road. He restated the accused were present when 
he warned them of the attack, adding that when a platoon is relieved it is normal for 
the platoon commander to lead his men out.
 128  
The third prosecution witness, Company Sergeant-Major (2480) T. B. McBarron, 
was in charge of a platoon and had two of his men accused. McBarron explained to the 
court his platoon had left the frontline arriving at the sunken road at 11pm where they 
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were told to have some ‘tea and a rest’ and await instructions concerning an attack the 
following morning. He told the Prisoners’ Friend that he was certain the two accused 
were present when he told the platoon about the attack.
129 
Captain Bootle, the fourth prosecution witness, told the court the accused had 
marched into the Nucleus and paraded before him. When he asked for representatives 
to explain what the trouble was four men came forward. One of them, Bootle could not 
recall who, said ‘that they had come out of the line as they were too tired to do another 
attack, and that they would be doing somebody else’s job’.
130  
Corporal Pittock was the first of ten witnesses for the defence. He told the court 
that on the 19th the Company was under the impression they were being relieved but 
on the 20th Lieutenant Heatley told him the relief was cancelled. He recalled Heatley’s 
enquiry as to the condition of the men late on the 20th and had replied that ‘they are 
pretty tired, but a couple of nights sleep will fix them up’. Pittock explained that whilst 
in the sunken road he found a place to sleep and was wakened by troops moving out 
and that he heard somebody say, ‘Put your gear on ‘A’ Company and file out’, which 
he did. Moving towards the rear he met up with Private Coupe, who told him he had 
seen Lieutenant Heatley ‘putting his gear on and no doubt he was in front’. Pittock 
said there were troops from all Companies filing out. He told the prosecutor that he 
had been a corporal for four months and that Lieutenant Heatley had not given him 
any orders regarding the attack, although he had heard rumours of one. He said he 
moved off between 1.30 and 3am alone, not taking any of his Section with him, nor 
did he issue orders for his men to move out. He told the court he made no effort to see 
his platoon commander or sergeant before moving out.
131 
The next five witnesses for the defence, all Privates, gave approximately the same 
evidence stating they had heard rumours of an attack, had not discussed the situation 
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with  anyone,  and  had  moved  out  when  word  was  passed  down  the  line  for  the 
Company to put their gear on and move out. When Lance Corporal Davis was called 
he said his evidence was the same as Corporal Pittock’s. He told the prosecutor that 
neither Lieutenant Heatley nor Sergeant Nichols had warned him about the attack. 
Further, he could not remember much about what happened at the Nucleus when he 
paraded before Captain Bootle saying, ‘the whole thing is a blank to me’. 
132 The ninth 
witness, Lance Corporal Carr, said that Sergeant Pritchard, who was in charge of his 
platoon, did not warn him of the attack. He did concede under examination from the 
court  that  Pritchard  said  ‘he  thought  we  were  doing  a  bit  of  a  stunt  but  it  was 
unofficial’, but had not discussed the ‘rumour’ with anyone. He could not remember 
much about the parade before Captain Bootle at the Nucleus or whether he was one of 
the representatives who stepped forward, claiming he had ‘lost his memory’ by the 
time he paraded 9am. Two more Privates gave evidence stating they had not received 
official notification of an attack, and both could remember little of the parade before 
Captain Bootle as to who stepped forward as representatives or what was said.
 133 
After  the  finding  Lieutenant  F.  H.  Gorham  spoke  of  the  trustworthiness  of 
Corporal  Pittock  and  mentioned  Lance  Corporal  Carr  as  having  been  involved  in 
daylight patrols with his Platoon. All the other accused, he said, ‘had done their job’ in 
the 18th September attack.
134 
The pattern continues in ‘A’ Company of NCOs who had been promoted only 
weeks before the mutiny and who had spent little time back with their units before the 
mutiny. Also, there is a remarkable similarity when the operational experience of the 
convicted Privates is compared with those convicted in other companies. Corporal 
William Holland Pittock was twenty-three-years-old when he enlisted in September 
1915. He was wounded in action in France in July 1916 (gassed), but was able to 
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rejoin his Battalion two months later. He was promoted lance corporal in May 1917 
and  was  made  a  full  corporal  in  July  1918.  On  August  24  he  was  posted  to  1st 
Division Guard Duties and rejoined his Battalion on September 7. Like many of the 
accused NCOs he had a short spell back with his platoon before being involved in a 
refusal to attack. He was a very inexperienced corporal with no previous convictions 
against him, but this did not prevent him receiving a sentence of eight years’ penal 
servitude for desertion.
135 
Lance Corporal Davis was born in England and was thirty-two-years-old when he 
enlisted in October 1916. He was appointed lance corporal in July 1918. His lack of 
experience as an NCO was perhaps taken into account but still resulted in a sentence 
of five years’ penal servitude.
136 
Lance Corporal Sydney Francis Carr was nineteen-years-old when he enlisted in 
September 1915. He was appointed lance corporal in April 1918, and attendance at 
Corps School and leave in the UK saw Carr away from his Unit until September 7, just 
two weeks before taking part in the mutiny. His disciplinary record is free of charges 
except for the five years he received for his part in the mutiny.
137 
Of the sixteen privates convicted, seven had been with the Battalion a short time 
and only involved in operations in 1918. Six had operational experience since 1917, 
and three since late 1916. A sizable proportion, 43.7 per cent, had only a few months 
with the Battalion, and taking the 1918 and 1917 men together, 81.25 per cent of the 
convicted had about a year’s operational experience.  
 
What were the causes of mutiny in the 1st Battalion? 
When the 1st Battalion assembled for the attack around 3am on the morning of the 
21st of September, 1918 they could only muster three Companies, which amounted to 
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ten officers and eighty-four men. The attack had to be bolstered by Lieutenant-Colonel 
B.  V.  Stacy,  senior  Brigade  and  Battalion  commander,  and  his  staff  from 
headquarters.
138 Part of the blame for the mutiny can be laid at the door of the army 
hierarchy for causing confusion over the proposed relief. The officers commanding 
individual companies seemed to be aware at different times whether they were to be 
involved in the attack on the 21st. Lieutenant Sampson, commander of ‘B’ Company 
was the only commander reported to have told his men that the planned operation was 
to be a minor affair. As Sampson was aware of this fact, one may assume the other 
company commanders knew it as well. And if these commanders had conveyed this 
knowledge to their men, this could have had a major bearing on the number of men 
who  walked  to  the  rear.  Most  of  the  Company  commanders,  from  the  evidence 
presented, were under the impression they were actually being relieved before they 
made their way to the sunken road on the 20th, and it is little wonder their men thought 
so too. No doubt the men, occupying the front line trenches, knee deep in water in 
some cases, would have been looking forward to being relieved. Their spirits must 
have sank when told they were ‘hopping over’ again the following morning. 
The September mutiny brings into question the reasons why men keep fighting in 
the first place. After the Second World War the belief that men were motivated to fight 
for patriotic or ideological reasons was replaced by a simpler and more general theory: 
that men fought because they were part of a group that fights. In that sense, they were 
fighting for each other – their mates – and failure to fight not only put their own lives 
at risk but those of their comrades with whom they had built up bonds of ‘mateship’. ‘I 
hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry 
soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a 
comrade’, wrote S. L. A. Marshall in his study of Americans fighting in the Pacific,
139 
                                                 
138 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: vol vi, p. 934. 
139 Quoted in Simon Wessely, ‘Twentieth-century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 2006, 41, p. 268.  
164 
borrowing the psychoanalytical concept of the primary group or small group identity 
as a way of explaining motivation or unwillingness to fight. There remains a fine line 
between the group that has been together a while and built up social ties and is combat 
effective with the group that has been pushed too far, causing physical and mental 
exhaustion and refusal to fight.
140 The men who mutinied in the 1st Battalion had 
argued that they had been asked to do too much and the question remains whether they 
fit into the mould of the primary group theory in terms of bonding with their comrades, 
to the extent that they were prepared to combine together because they felt they had 
been pushed too far. 
Fatigue is often put forward as the major cause of the mutiny, with British war 
historian  John  Terraine  describing  the  walkout  of  1st  Battalion  men  as  a  ‘fatigue 
mutiny’
141. There is little doubt that the men thought they were doing too much and 
that if they attacked they would be doing other people’s work. It remains problematic 
how they could make a meaningful comparison with their efforts and those of their 
allies  in  the  confusion  of  battle.  The  Australians  as  a  larger  group  had  displayed 
characteristics of primary group thinking by identifying themselves as different from 
the  rest  of  the  British  Army  with  whom  they  made  unfavourable  comparisons 
regarding  fighting  ability.  What  is  questionable  in  the  refusal  to  fight  of  the  1st 
Battalion men was whether they were actually being asked to do too much. In Steen’s 
evidence he states that in the operation on September 18 the Company suffered only 
slight casualties.
142 Nowhere in the evidence presented was sympathy expressed by 
any officer for the men’s cause. The NCOs convicted did not have the time or the 
combat experience with their men to build the bonds of mateship. Indeed, that was also 
the case with many of the Privates who were returning from hospital and leave, as well 
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141 Dale Blair, Dinkum Diggers, p. 160. 
142 AWM 51, 122, part 6, Field General Court-Martial of Corporal (3341) (L/Sgt.) Milton Hasthorpe, 
held on October 15, 1918 in the Field, p. 1.  
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as the large contingent of 1918 recruits, which does suggest that the social ties, borne 
out of combat, did not have time to flourish. A study of the mutiny by J. J. MacKenzie 
revealed that 50 per cent of all the men who mutinied had returned to the Battalion six 
months before the proposed attack after being in hospital (it is not clear whether from 
wounds or sickness). Furthermore, 50 per cent of those who mutinied had joined the 
Battalion after Bullecourt, around the middle of 1917.
143 A major feature of the records 
examined here is the surprisingly rapid turnover of men in the Battalion, either through 
injury, leave, sickness or training, and maintaining and building esprit de corps in the 
Battalion must have been difficult. Further, as Strachan has pointed out, the problem of 
the small group theory is that it takes no account of high casualties in the short term.
144 
To that we can add frequent comings and goings that resulted in some NCOs being 
unfamiliar  with  men  under  their  command.  The  paradox  here,  especially  in  ‘D’ 
Company, is that apart from one man, they came together displaying characteristics of 
the primary group by standing by their mates – not in battle – but in refusing to fight. 
The service records of the privates who were convicted indicate they had been 
stationed on the Somme since August 8, and the intensity of the fighting during this 
period cannot be understated. There is some support for the role of fatigue, as two days 
before the attack Stacy had confided to his personal diary that he thought the men were 
‘not up to concert pitch’.
145 Other battalions of British and Dominion troops, however, 
were involved in the same battles and they did not mutiny. Further, the records of the 
convicted NCOs show that many were actually away from their units for long spells 
throughout their service, with several having limited time with their units in 1918 (see 
Table 5.2, below). The convicted NCOs were therefore not continually involved in 
                                                 
143 J. J. MacKenzie, ‘A Disabling Minority’, Tables 3-5, pp. 61, 65, quoted in Dale Blair, Dinkum 
Diggers,  p.  160.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  50  per  cent  who  had  returned  from  hospital  had  been 
wounded in action or were recovering from sickness. 
144 Hew Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War, Journal of Contemporary History, 2006; 41; 
211, pp. 211-13. 
145 1st Australian Infantry Brigade Diary, appendix, report by Lt-Col. B. V. Stacy, p.48, quoted in 
Dale Blair, Dinkum Diggers, p. 156.  
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battle  since  August  and  would  have  been  unfamiliar  with  the  men  they  had  to 
command. Significantly, almost two-thirds of the convicted NCOs had been promoted 
from  June  to  August  1918,  with  close  to  a  third  of  the  men  receiving  their  final 
promotions in August. Of the others who had been promoted earlier, many had been 
away from their battalions for long periods. Their lack of experience was a major 
contributing factor in the mutiny, as the majority of them had only weeks in their role 
before having to deal with large numbers of their men threatening to refuse to fight. 
Table 5.2 
Shows the date of enlistment of the convicted NCOs, whether they were wounded in action 
and the date of their known last return to their Battalion before the ‘mutiny’. 
 
Enlisted  Wounded in 
Action 
Last 
Promotion 
Last date of 
return to Unit 
in 1918 
Cpl. A. E. Alyward  June 1915    June 1918  September 
T/ Cpl. H. E. Slater   May 1916    August 1918  July 
Cpl. R. Cooney, M.M.  June 1916  July 1916  August 1918  January 
L/Cpl. E. A. Besley  June 1915  July 1916  August 1918  January 
Cpl. R. C. Taplin  July 1916  August 1917  June 1916  August 
L/Cpl. E. C. Preston  Jan. 1916  April 1917  May 1918  March 
L/Cpl. J. R. Dawson  Sept. 1915  August 1916  Sept. 1916  June 
L/Cpl. C. W. Muir  July 1915  April 1917  Nov.1917  March 
L/Cpl. D. W. Humphreys  July 1915  July 1916  Nov. 1917  August 
L/Cpl. D. N. Steele  Feb. 1916  October 1917  June 1918  February 
T/ Cpl. T. J. Blackwood  October 1916  1917  August 1918  January 
L/Cpl E. Walker, M.M.  June 1915  Nov. 1916  August 1918  June 
L/Cpl. E. M. Porter  August 1915  July 1916      July 1916  August 
T/Cpl. R. Bardney  October 1916  April 1918  August 1918  July 
L/Cpl. R. Beggs  Nov. 1914  April 1918  Sept 1917  July 
L/Cpl. L. Pettit  August 1915  April 1918  March 1917  August 
L/Cpl. F. R. Smith  March 1916    August 1918  August 
Cpl. R. H. C. McKay  Sept. 1916  July 1917  August 1918  May 
Cpl. W. H. Pittock  Sept. 1915  July 1916  July 1918  September 
L/Cpl. S. B. Davis  October 1916    July 1918  March 
L/Cpl. S. F. Carr  Sept.1915    April 1918  September 
L/Sgt. M. Hasthorpe  July 1915  Nov. 1916  August 1918  August  
Cpl. G. F. Wethered  March 1916  April 1917  July 1918  September 
Of the twenty-three convicted NCOs, eighteen had been wounded in action, and 
fear of being wounded again could have been a factor in making the men candidates 
for mutiny. Twelve of the convicted had enlisted in mid 1915 and were in France in 
the spring of 1916. Nine who enlisted in 1916 would not see France until early 1917;  
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and the one man (Beggs) who had enlisted in November 1914 had seen action at 
Gallipoli before France. On average, the convicted had been in France for two years 
and simple war weariness and homesickness must have affected them. Most men, 
whether  wounded  before  or  not,  would  have  been  mindful  they  could  killed  or 
wounded in the next battle.  
What does emerge from the trials of the Companies of the 1st Battalion is that 
senior NCOs exerted a greater degree of control over their men than did the officers in 
charge  of  individual  platoons.  The  exception  to  this  was  Sergeant  Wilemett,  who 
appeared to have made little effort to dissuade the men from walking out and declared 
that the men in his platoon ‘were strangers to him’ owing to his three-month absence 
from  the  Battalion  prior  to  the  attack.  His  ‘D’  Company  experienced  a  near  total 
walkout with thirty-nine men convicted, only one man remaining. Amongst them were 
three corporals, one temporary corporal, and six lance corporals.
146 Their two officers, 
Steen and Blake, as stated earlier, were both wounded around 2.15am on the morning 
of the attack but were there in the afternoon when they became aware of the trouble 
brewing. The fact that Steen did not act by calling in senior officers to speak with his 
men when he had the chance was a critical factor. A placated ‘D’ Company could well 
have defused the whole dispute, with other Companies less likely to initiate action.  
The commanding officer of ‘B’ Company, Lieutenant Sampson, was the only 
officer to tell his men that in the proposed attack they ‘had not far to go and did not 
expect much opposition’.
147 In this Company the NCOs held firm and refused to walk 
out with their men. These two factors contributed to the relatively low number of ‘B’ 
Company men, thirteen out of forty-four, walking out.  
                                                 
146  AWM  51,122,  part  4,  1st  Battalion  AIF  Field  General  Court-Martial.  Joint  trial  of  five  non-
commissioned officers of ‘D’ Company, p. 2. 
147 AWM 51, 122, part 2, 1st Battalion AIF Field General Court-Martial. Joint trial of thirteen Privates 
of ‘B’ Company, p. 1.  
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Bean’s inference in the Official History that the loss of officers in ‘D’ Company 
was a contributing factor in the men’s refusal to fight is open to challenge when 
considering ‘C’ Company. Of the four platoons referred to in this trial, each had an 
officer in charge, yet this Company experienced the biggest walkout in the Battalion. 
Forty-five men were convicted, including one corporal, one temporary corporal and 
five lance corporals. Lieutenant Whipp’s platoon had ten out of eleven walking to the 
rear, and Lieutenant Ward lost three out of his fifteen-strong platoon. Lieutenant Trail 
had  thirteen  convicted  in  his  platoon,  and  Lieutenant  Kelleway  reported  that 
Lieutenant  Hudson  (who  was  later  wounded)  suffered  a  complete  walkout  of  his 
platoon. The loss of so many men must bring officer-man relations in this Company 
into question.  
In ‘A’ Company, Sergeant Pritchard lost five out of twenty in his platoon, with 
Company Sergeant Major McBarron suffering the loss of only two men from his. In 
contrast, Lieutenant Heatley’s platoon had ten out of thirteen refusing to fight. Of the 
nineteen who refused to fight (two were stretcher bearers not included in the platoons) 
there was one corporal and three lance corporals.
148 Senior NCOs in this Company, as 
in ‘B’ Company, were able to draw on their experience and were more successful than 
most officers in keeping their platoons viable. 
The occupational background of all the convicted mutineers came under scrutiny 
in MacKenzie’s study in an attempt to show whether men from certain occupations 
were more likely mutiny than others. A comparison was made with the occupations of 
all the mutineers and non-mutineers (see Table 5.3, below). The table indicates that 
professional and clerical workers were less disposed to ‘take industrial action’, which 
has historically been the case, and this group represented around 4 per cent of the 
mutineers as opposed to their nearly 17 per cent representation in the non-mutineers’ 
                                                 
148 AWM 51, 122, part 5, 1st Battalion AIF Field General Court-Martial. Joint trial of three non-
commissioned  officers  and  sixteen  Privates  of  ‘A’  Company,  pp.  1-7.  Two  1st  Battalion  stretcher-
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group.  As  industrial  action  is  normally  associated  with  the  groups  listed  under 
industrial and manufacturing’, ‘labourer’ and ‘tradesmen’, it is not surprising to find 
that nearly 63 per cent of the mutineers belong to these groups, while in the non-
mutineers they made up nearly 44 per cent. The civilian occupations of the convicted 
NCOs were predominantly labour-intensive and included five labourers, two farmers, 
a grocer, a tailor, a bank clerk and the rest tradesmen. The social background of the 
mutineers  is  a  factor  to  be  taken  into  account,  but  the  fact  remains  that  this 
occupational composition would have been similar in other battalions that did not 
mutiny. 
Table 5.3 
 Comparison of occupations of mutineers and non-mutineers in 
the 1st Battalion, September 1918
149 
Occupation  Non-Mutineers  Mutineers 
  (%)  (%) 
Professional  5.33  0 
Clerical  11.33  4.03 
Tradesman   14  15.32 
Labourer  18.66  33.87 
Industrial and manufacturing  11.33  13.70 
Transport  8  7.25 
Commercial  3.33  2.41 
Rural  18  12.90 
Seafaring  2  2.41 
Mining  0.66  4.03 
Domestic  4  2.41 
Other/Unstated  3.33  3.21 
Total  99.97  99.54 
It is also difficult to find any common factor in the backgrounds of the convicted 
NCOs that would predispose them to mutiny. The men’s age at enlistment ranged from 
                                                 
149 Dale Blair, Dinkum Diggers, p. 161. These figures are based on the examination of the attestation 
and embarkation records of 150 non-mutineers and 124 mutineers.  
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nineteen to late twenties. Similarly, with their religion as stated on enlistment, the vast 
majority were Church of England, followed by Methodist, Presbyterians, etc., with 
only  two  Roman  Catholics,  which  does  seem  to  indicate  that  the  men’s  religious 
affiliation did not influence their decision to walk-out.  
The dilemma the AIF faced before the trials was that if the men were found guilty 
of mutiny the court would have had the option of imposing the death penalty. This was 
overcome with 118 men being convicted of the non-capital offence of desertion (one 
was cleared). Throughout these trials the prosecution and the court did not press the 
mutiny case, and this policy could have been pre-determined before the trials. They 
could have asked more questions when evidence was presented that some of the men 
did discuss the situation amongst themselves as to whether to attack or not, something 
one would have expected the prosecutor and court to seize upon if pursuing a mutiny 
conviction.  The  court  seemed  more  interested  in  the  desertion  charge,  which  was 
easier to prove. Mutiny required evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the men had 
combined among themselves. In some cases this could have been proved, and in others 
it was not so clear-cut. Also, a mutiny conviction would have presented problems of 
imposing the death penalty. By the time of the trials in October the men were fully 
aware of the seriousness of their situation and their testimonies were careful to claim 
that little discussion took place amongst them regarding whether they would attack. 
The court settled for uniformity in sentencing with Privates given three years’ penal 
servitude, whether their character was classified as ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘indifferent’, a 
rating that was provided to the court before they handed down their sentences. Ninety-
two of the 102 men charged were classified as being of ‘good’ character,
150 as were the 
all NCOs on trial. This made no difference in sentencing, nor did being previously 
decorated for bravery make a difference. Lance Corporals received sentences from five 
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to seven years, indicating the court took some account of the length of time a man had 
been an NCO. Corporals were given the severest sentences with most receiving ten 
years’ penal servitude. The army hierarchy, through the court, was sending a clear 
message to anyone contemplating similar action of the consequences that would flow 
from refusing frontline duty. On the other hand, there appears to have been some 
unofficial  collusion  to  ensure  that  the  more  serious  offence  of  mutiny  could  be 
avoided. 
In  the  Official  History,  Bean  makes  no  mention  of  the  sentences  the  men 
received. One gets the impression of detention at school, as he described the convicted 
men as following the 1st Battalion round for ‘several weeks’ until their sentences were 
finally remitted. After the sentences were handed down the recommendation of the 
Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion and both the GOC 1st Infantry Brigade and 
the  GOC  1st  Division  felt  that  ‘in  view  of  the  nature  of  the  offence  and  the 
circumstances under which it was committed and for the purposes of discipline the 
recommendation that the sentence be put into execution is a strong one’. The men’s 
sentences were finally suspended on April 25, 1919. Lieutenant-General Sir H. C. 
Sclater, GOC-in-Chief Southern Command, signed the orders for the suspension of the 
sentences.  After  the  trials  the  prisoners  were  held  in  a  Corps  Compound  until  19 
December 1918, before their transfer to No. 11 Military Prison in France (Audricq).
151 
They embarked for England on March 30, 1919, under escort, to serve the remainder 
of their sentences at HM Prison Portland. By June many of the convicted 1st Battalion 
men were on their way home to Australia to be discharged on arrival at their base 
command. According to Bean, ‘General Glasgow would not recommend remittance of 
the sentences, though General Monash tried to induce him to do so’.
152 Eventually, 
General Hobbs recommended remittance, which finally came through on April 25, 
                                                 
151 AWM 51, 122, 1st Battalion AIF Field General Court-Martial. See first page of each trial. 
152 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: vol. vi, p. 940.  
172 
1919. The Official History is silent on the sentences the convicted men received, their 
imprisonment in France, and their transfer, under armed escort, to an English prison. It 
is hard to escape the conclusion that Bean put the best possible ‘spin’ on the mutiny of 
1st Battalion men. 
Throughout these trials the language reportedly used by both officers and men 
leading up to the mutiny bears a striking resemblance to an industrial dispute and not a 
mutiny. None of the officers involved warned the men that their actions would result 
in a court-martial, and if found guilty of mutiny would face a firing squad. The closest 
any officer got to saying something of the sort was Lieutenant Mortlock, who was 
reported as shouting to men of ‘D’ Company as they were leaving that ‘they were 
deserting like a lot of cowards’. When Lieutenant Steen told his NCOs ‘that orders 
must be carried out’, there was no mention of the consequences that would flow if they 
were not. This was also the case when Steen walked along the Company lines and 
asked the men if they were taking part in the attack and was told openly by some of 
them that ‘they would go out with the mob’. In ‘C’ Company Lieutenant Ward’s 
platoon was still intact at 12.30am on the 21st when he told his men to get ready to 
move forward. He told the court the men discussed the situation amongst themselves 
as to whether they would ‘go or stay’. Three of Ward’s platoon went out but there is 
no record of Ward intervening in the discussion to remind them of the consequences of 
their actions if they left. Corporal Davis, who was in charge of a section in Ward’s 
platoon, said that on arrival at the sunken road his men were aware that ‘D’ Company 
was ‘not going over’ and that some men of his Company ‘seemed inclined to go out in 
sympathy  with  ‘D’  Company’.  Lieutenant  Sampson  reported  he  heard  Corporal 
McKay remark ‘ . . . my platoon is going out, so I’m going with them’, but no record 
of Sampson saying anything to him about the seriousness of such an action. In ‘A’ 
Company Lieutenant Heatley, who had heard of the trouble in ‘D’ Company, asked 
Corporal Pittock after warning him of the attack ‘whether there was any talk in the  
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Company  of  the  men  leaving  or  striking’;  not  whether  the  men  would  mutiny. 
Throughout these trials the men convicted of desertion appeared ignorant of what 
would  naturally  follow  when  they  broke  this  most  serious  of  military  laws.  Their 
officers, too, failed to understand the gravity of what was happening and should have 
spelled out to the men who were considering leaving that they would face a mutiny 
charge with all the ensuing consequences.  
Blair, in his study of the 1st Battalion, thought the absence of the death penalty 
did not influence the mutineers in their decision. Rather, he thought they were acting 
on their perception that they were being asked to do too much and they did not dwell 
on the consequences that would follow.
153 This view is questionable as the Australians 
were fully aware they were not subject to the Army Act in full and therefore must have 
felt less constrained in flexing their ‘industrial’ muscle. Moreover, it is doubtful that 
the  exchanges  between  men  and  their  officers  reported  in  these  trials  concerning 
refusal of frontline duty would have occurred if the Australians had been subject to the 
death penalty like the rest of the British Army. However, from the trial evidence it 
seems clear both officers and men appeared ignorant of the fact that mutiny was a 
capital offence in the Australian Army. NCOs are an important conduit between other 
ranks and their officers concerning morale. At the same time they are subject to Army 
regulations and are therefore not shop stewards. The taking of industrial action, in the 
form of refusing duty, appeared to have become an option in the 1st Battalion, an 
action the men thought could be taken without the risk of serious consequences. 
September 1918 had proved to be a difficult month for the AIF. The mutiny at 
Péronne, the September 21st mutiny, and the disbandment mutinies can be seen as 
symptoms of this. There are striking similarities with the Péronne and September 21st 
mutinies, as a planned relief was the trigger for both. At Péronne, after a hot meal the 
men were called back to the line and refused to go. In this case their officers supported 
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them in their action. Bean, who had a habit of relegating unpleasant facts about the 
Australians to footnotes, said there had been similar incidents, but on a small scale.
154 
Word of these ‘incidents’ would have got round the AIF, through stretcher bearers and 
runners, and the men would be aware of these actions, just as the men of Companies 
relieved in the line on the 20th were fully aware of the trouble in ‘D’ Company. 
Within two days of the September 21st mutiny the mutinies over disbandment took 
place. Bean had made much of the loyalty the men felt towards their Battalions and 
their  refusal  to  disband  seemed  to  Bean  to  be  a  display  of  a  natural  born  virtue. 
However, as we have seen in the 1st Battalion, men were away from their units for 
long  periods  and  when  they  were  returned  the  composition  of  their  Battalion  had 
changed. One can assume that similar comings and goings occurred in the Battalions 
that refused to disband. It has been generally accepted that the men who refused to 
disband were acting out of loyalty to their Battalion, and for no other reason. In the 
climate that existed in the AIF in September the refusal to disband can be seen as an 
industrial dispute, a symptom of the unrest that existed in the AIF. It is not unusual for 
strike action to be taken where the focus of the dispute is not the real issue. Underlying 
discontent is usually at the heart and surfaces to rally round a cause. Ostensibly, this 
was about disbanding. But it was more than that; it was about making a protest, a 
‘safe’ protest, in the sense that the stated cause was one that elicited sympathy. At the 
same  time,  the  men  had  disobeyed  lawful  commands,  taking  over  the  running  of 
battalions, and showed solidarity typical of well-run industrial disputes. Blair, in his 
study  of  the  1st  Battalion,  concluded  from  the  diaries  and  letters  of  the  men  that 
Battalion  loyalty  did  not  figure  prominently  as  a  motivating  force.  Although  they 
keenly felt their Australian identity within the British Army throughout the war ‘the 
soldiers exhibited less consistency in their allegiance to the Battalion’. The Gallipoli 
veterans were more inclined to define their ‘soldier identity’ with the 1st Division, but 
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even this, according to Blair, ‘diminished with the expansion of the AIF and influx of 
later reinforcements.’
155  
The unrest in the AIF had caused concern to the British High Command with 
Haig telling the Adjutant-General on October 25 ‘to keep in closer touch with the 
Australians’. Referring to the Australians, Haig confided to his diary the same day that 
‘it is said the 2 divisions are likely to decline to go into the line if ordered’. At the time 
Haig wrote this the convicted men would have only recently been informed of their 
sentences and the deterrent effect of these would not have had time to be felt within 
the AIF. Haig also wrote that the Australian Prime Minister (Hughes) ‘had told the 
Australian troops they would not be used in the line again for some months’. Haig did 
not consider the Australians were being over-used and produced comparative figures 
(below) of the infantry casualties since March 21, 1918.
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                                                                                             Average 
English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish per battalion  45 officers  l088 other ranks 
Australian  36                    704     ,,       ,,  
Canadian  42                 956     ,,       ,, 
These figures do not compare battalion numbers, and, as discussed above, the 
Australian battalions had struggled to find replacements. Nevertheless, Haig thought 
‘the Australians have the least claim of any therefore for consideration on account of 
losses . . .’. Haig had planned for the Australians to move into a sector ‘quite soon’,
 157 
but two weeks after his diary entry the Armistice came into force and the Australians 
were not deployed. 
In the Official History, Bean had downplayed the mutiny in the 1st Battalion. By 
inference he had laid some of the blame for it on British inability to keep up with the 
Australians, and in so doing diverted us from dwelling on the unrest within the AIF. 
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His  over-emphasis  on  battalion  loyalty  in  the  disbandment  mutinies  was  a  further 
distraction. The AIF in September and October, when Haig’s comments are taken into 
account, was experiencing internal strife. This dissatisfaction found expression in the 
Péronne mutiny, the 1st Battalion mutiny, as well as the disbandment mutinies. Bean’s 
much-vaunted Australian officer-man relations did not hold up in the 1st Battalion. 
This together with a combination of poor communication at senior officer level and a 
very inexperienced group of NCOs who could not exert influence over a disgruntled 
group of other ranks, made the 1st Battalion vulnerable to a walkout. The convicted 
men saw their actions as industrial rather than mutinous. The fact that they could 
consider refusing frontline duty as an option was owing to them not being under the 
Army Act in full. With no death penalty to act as a deterrent, no precedent of an 
Australian suffering more than imprisonment or Field Punishment for a military crime, 
and with the example of the Péronne mutiny in which no one was punished, the men of 
the 1st Battalion must have felt that they could take this action without bringing down 
on themselves the full weight of military law. When the sentences were handed down 
in October 1918 they found out how wrong they were. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
177 
C h a p t e r   6  
THE MEN AND THE MUTINY AT NO. 7 MILITARY PRISON, VENDROUX 
LES ATTAQUES, CALAIS 1919 
If those court-martialled from the 1st Battalion managed to avoid a conviction for 
mutiny in September 1918, other Australian prisoners were less fortunate as several 
were convicted a few months later. In March 1919, four months after the signing of the 
Armistice, ninety-seven men were charged and convicted of joining in a mutiny in 
forces  belonging  to  His  Majesty’s  Military  Forces.  The  mutiny  occurred  at  No.  7 
Military Prison, Vendroux Les Attaques, Calais on March 11, 1919. Most of the men 
charged were members of the AIF with a few Canadian and Imperial prisoners. They 
were  charged  with  ‘combining  among  themselves  not  to  fall  in  after  having  been 
warned by proper authority to do so’.
1 In essence a riot occurred in the prison on the 
evening  of  the  March  9,  with  further  disturbances  the  following  evening.  This 
prompted  the  Governor  of  the  prison,  Major  J.  J.  Hardinge,  to  call  in  troop 
reinforcements on the evening of the riot to restore order. During the two days of 
unrest the majority of the men refused to parade as ordered. On March 11, backed by 
armed troop reinforcements, the Governor entered the huts of the Compound and read 
the Riot Act to the men, leaving those who refused to parade facing the charge of 
mutiny.
2 As a consequence of refusing to parade as ordered, the men were charged 
with mutiny and tried by field general court-martial. All were convicted and received 
sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years’ penal servitude. The sentences imposed 
came as a severe blow to these men, who prior to the mutiny were expecting an 
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amnesty on the prison sentences that had led them into No. 7 Prison in the first place. 
They were looking forward to their repatriation to Australia. Instead, they were to 
leave France, handcuffed, under military escort to detention centres in England.  
The men did not accept the court-martial sentences and appeals were made for a 
hearing to Prime Minister Hughes
3 and the General Officer Commanding the AIF.
4 
These  appeals,  which  were  accompanied  by  a  list  of  complaints  regarding  prison 
conditions, were treated seriously by the AIF in London who took statements from the 
men as they passed through their headquarters on their way to Portland Prison. Their 
statements, and letters of appeal, were passed on to the Prime Minister’s Department at 
Australia  House  in  the  Strand  and  the  War  Office.
5  In  these  statements  the  men 
emphasized the severity of the prison regime at No. 7 Military Prison, revealing deep 
tensions between the Australian prisoners and the prison administration staff, which 
included Australian military police. They complained that the court that tried them 
consisted  of  only  one  Australian  officer,  believing  that  a  court  consisting  of  all 
Australian officers would not have convicted them of mutiny. Moreover, they held that 
an  all-Australian  court,  having  heard  the  evidence  of  alleged  conditions  and  ill 
treatment  meted  out  to  prisoners,  would  have  held  an  enquiry  and  demanded  an 
explanation from its chief administrator, Governor Hardinge. The AIF headquarters in 
London  asked  the  War  Office  to  conduct  an  investigation  and  report  back.  The 
statements  obtained  from  the  prisoners,  along  with  the  letters  of  appeal,  were 
                                                 
3 Ibid., item 3. The letter to the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. W. M. Hughes, dated April 18, 1919 
and addressed to Warwick House, London, was signed by ‘one of the prisoners’, Private (1190) J. 
Wallace. The letter was typewritten and its composition indicates that the convicted men were being 
given legal advice. (The accused were jointly tried by Field General Court-Martial.)  
4 Ibid., item 6. This was also the case in the letter written to the Officer Commanding Australian 
Troops in London a day later which was signed by the following prisoners: Privates (2769) H. R. Hall 
45th Btn; (2942) D. C. Gregg, 10th Btn; (3940) E. Rogers, 18th Btn; (5654) C. L. Brissenden, 18th Btn; 
(1802) W. H. Webb, 56th Btn; (3203) P. A. Woodbury, 1st Pnrs Btn; (2398) H. R. Powardy, 50th Btn; 
(5343) A. S. Broadhead, 58th Btn; (4459) A. W. Nicholls, 23rd Btn; (4219) C. Bunting 23rd Btn; and 
Sapper (6603) O. Jansen, 3rd AL, RFC. 
5 Ibid., item 2. Letter sent from Administrative Headquarters, AIF, was addressed to H. W. Perryman 
Esq., Prime Minister’s Department, Australia House, Strand, London.  
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forwarded to the Australian Prime Minister’s Department at Australia House.
6 The 
War  Office  responded  by  forwarding  to  the  AIF  a  report  they  had  received  from 
France on the mutiny.
7 This report forms the basis of the discussion that follows. This 
is the version from the Governor and staff at No. 7 Prison, and covers the mutiny and 
the Governor’s reply to the prisoner’s complaints.  
An examination of this mutiny sheds light on prison conditions, often seen as a 
soft option compared to the rigours of trench life. It also reveals tensions that existed 
between the Australians and the British officers and staff who administered the prison. 
Private (1190) J. Wallace, who signed the letter of appeal to the Australian Prime 
Minister, stated in his letter that: 
We have all done our bit in this War and was [sic} also at Amiens last year and saved the 
situation when England received the biggest blow in this War. We are now on our way to 
Portland  Prison,  and  we  were  all  looking  forward  for  Peace  to  be  signed.  But  since 
yesterday things look very black for us all and as we are all Military Offenders [sic].
8 
In their letter to the GOC Australian Troops the men claimed that ‘in practically 
all cases’ they were soldiers who had experienced trench life and were imprisoned for 
military offences committed after the signing of the Armistice.
9 The Governor would 
take issue with this assertion later when asked to report on the prisoners’ complaints.
10 
The military records of some of the signatories to the appeal allow us to follow their 
own journey to No. 7 Military Prison, or more accurately, the crimes that led them to 
be incarcerated. It can be said at the outset that their claim that they were imprisoned 
for  committing  military  crimes  after  the  signing  of  the  Armistice  is  demonstrably 
untrue.
11 On examining the service records of these men it is clear they were not 
                                                 
6 Ibid., letter from AIF Headquarters to The Secretary, War office, dated April 29, 1919 included the 
appeal made to GOC, AIF. A further letter was sent from AIF headquarters to the Prime Minister’s 
Department on May 8, 1919 that included statements taken from the prisoners en route to prison.  
7 Ibid., letter from War Office to AIF, dated July 18, 1919. 
8 Ibid., item 3 
9 Ibid., item 4, this forms part of the statement made at AIF Headquarter, April 20, 1919. 
10 Ibid., Major Hardinge had originally attached the service records of the convicted men with his 
report on the mutiny, but these are not with the file. 
11 This view is based on reading the service records of the signatories to the appeals and is expanded 
upon later in the chapter.  
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hardened criminals but men who consistently broke military laws and thus avoided 
frontline action. Nevertheless, the convictions for desertion, which many of them had, 
and more than once, could have got them executed if it were not for the fact that they 
were Australian soldiers and were not subject to the Army Act in full. However, it will 
be recalled that under the Defence Act (Section 98) mutiny remained one of the very 
few  offences  that  attracted  the  death  penalty.
12  On  paper,  at  least,  the  convicted 
mutineers  could  have  been  sentenced  to  death  as  conditions  of  active  service  still 
existed four months after the signing of the Armistice. We can also see the lack of 
conformity in sentencing and the administration of a disciplinary code that appeared 
impotent in the face of the habitual offender.  
The men charged with mutiny, especially as they were, on paper at least, facing a 
custodial  sentence  of  anything  from  eleven  to  fifteen  years,  were  faced  with  the 
prospect of being treated like common criminals and imprisoned in a country far from 
home. As there was a strong belief amongst the offenders that at war’s end a general 
amnesty would apply and their sentences remitted, the severity of the sentences must 
have caused a great deal of anxiety. The twelve signatories to the letter to Hughes had 
been charged with offences during the course of the war, with the majority of the 
charges  being  for  absence  and  desertion.  It  seems  clear  that  these  men  were  no 
‘desperadoes’,
13  but  in  most  cases  they  were  ‘absentees’  who  tested  the  military 
disciplinary code to its limit. They can be seen either as failed absentees, for they were 
caught, tried and convicted; or their actions could also be viewed as a very successful 
technique to avoid the danger of frontline duty. In all this they were aided and abetted 
by an Army authority, although unable to inflict capital punishment, which seemed 
                                                 
12 The relevant part of the Defence Act (Section 98) states: ‘No member of the Defence Force shall be 
sentenced  to  death  by  any  court-martial  except  for  mutiny,  desertion  to  the  enemy,  or  traitorously 
delivering up to the enemy any garrison, fortress, post, guard, or ship, vessel, or boat, or traitorous 
correspondence with the enemy’. 
13 AWM 10, 4304/7/60, item 6. The prisoners claimed that the sergeant of their escort had told them 
that  the  Governor  of  the  Prison,  Major  Hardinge,  had  described  the  prisoners  as  ‘desperados  and 
criminals of the vilest type’.  
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bent on dishing out custodial sentences rather than Field Punishment. Many of the 
offenders  were  men  who  had  enlisted  in  1915  and  ‘fatigue’  as  a  motive  for  their 
behaviour  is  a  factor  for  consideration.  They  left  France  under  military  escort, 
handcuffed, to be escorted to Parkhurst and Lewes Detention Barracks. When their 
sentences were eventually remitted under the terms of the amnesty
14 they would lose 
their  entitlement  to  their  medals  and  have  their  army  service  terminated  with  the 
initials SNLR (Services No Longer Required) on their record to indicate that they had 
been treated as disciplinary cases. 
 
Anatomy of a mutiny 
The initial perspective on the mutiny comes from the Governor, his administrative 
staff and the officers of the armed troop reinforcements. The prisoners’ version is 
pieced together from the contents of their appeals to the Australian Prime Minister and 
Australian Army authorities and amounts to a justification for their actions, as their 
refusal to ‘fall in’ was not disputed. It is clear that the Governor and his staff were not 
dealing with a minor disturbance in March 1919, as approximately 300 armed solders 
were deployed to keep a prison population of over 400 in check. 
The  trouble  started  on  Sunday,  March  9,  1919  in  No.  7  Military  Prison 
Compound around 7.30pm. Sergeant-Major Morhen of the Military Police reported 
that between twenty and thirty men had congregated near the centre of the compound 
making a great deal of noise and demanding that the gate be opened. He told them this 
was not possible, but ‘he would hear what any of them had to say’ if they would fall in 
and  keep  quiet.  They  again  shouted  ‘open  the  gate’  and  started  throwing  ‘large 
                                                 
14 The amnesty came into force on April 25, 1919 and generally applied to military crimes. Many of 
the men returning to Australia as disciplinary cases had their sentences remitted just before embarkation 
and remained in prison after April 25. In many cases it was left to the army authorities in Australia to 
decide if remittance was appropriate. See A471, 2041 Slater, H. E., Service No. 4963, 1st Battalion, AIF.  
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stones’.
15 He informed the Governor and by the time both men got to the Compound 
the crowd had increased. The Governor stated that ‘bricks and stones were flying in all 
directions’ with one striking him on his left knee. Assessing that the situation was 
beyond  the  control  of  the  small  prison  guard,  he  called  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  O. 
Nelson of the Worcestershire Regiment requesting armed troop reinforcements. On 
returning to the Compound the Governor found the attitude of the men to be ‘hostile 
and aggressive’, with prisoners shouting ‘Down with tyranny and the rotten British 
Government’.
16 
In a vulnerable position until armed reinforcements arrived, the Governor offered 
to hear their grievances on condition they moved back from the gate. They complied 
with his request and they aired grievances over food, with demands for a more varied 
diet.  Jam  and  tea  were  mentioned.  They  also  requested  that  the  men  in  cells  be 
released.  Private  Pritchard  was  reported  as  saying  that  it  was  time  they  were  all 
released as the war was over. The Governor quoted Pritchard as saying ‘that he would 
never again shoulder a rifle for the rotten British Government and he hoped for the day 
when he could shoulder one against it’. With the arrival of armed reinforcements the 
Governor ended his parley with the prisoners and told them bluntly that ‘their demands 
could not be gratified’, and that if they wished to make a complaint they could remain 
from work the next day to make it at the office.
17 Morhen reported that some of the 
men appeared to be placated, but others at the back of the crowd became abusive and 
shouted ‘Take the leg-irons and chains off and put them on yourselves’. The Governor 
responded by warning them as to their conduct. Further shouts of ‘rush the gates’ led 
Morhen  to  believe  that  a  breakout  was  imminent;  only  the  timely  arrival  of 
reinforcements preventing this.
18  
                                                 
15 AWM 10, 4304/7/60, statement by (W/1619) Sergeant-Major J. Morhen, MPSC. 
16 Ibid., statement by Major J. J. Hardinge, Governor of No. 7 Military Prison, Les Attaques, Calais. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., statement by (W/1619) Sergeant-Major J. Morhen, MPSC.  
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The crisis had reached a critical point. The Governor’s admission that he ended 
his parleying when he was in a position of strength could well have been a missed 
opportunity to defuse the situation. He could have met there and then with a delegation 
of the prisoners to hear their grievances. The fact that he chose not to was surely a 
contributing factor in what happened next. Nelson, who had arrived with 250 armed 
troops, had doubled the prison guard and surrounded the prison with his troops. They 
must have felt confident they could put down any further disturbances with force. By 
11pm they did just that as the prisoners began breaking up the camp, knocking down 
the  dividing  fences  and  building  a  fire.  Nelson  gave  an  order  to  Hardinge,  who 
repeated Nelson’s order to the prisoners, ‘that if all the men did not get back to their 
huts within 10 minutes, I would fire a volley’.
19 The prisoners replied using foul and 
abusive language, according to the Governor, who was told by one prisoner ‘to fire the 
volley up your fucking arse’.
20 The men did not move and ten minutes later Captain A. 
C. W. Cranko, commanding the 19th Garrison Company, carried out the order, sending 
a volley into the fire. The men ran off and no one was injured. The situation calmed 
down as the men returned to their huts. But there were further disturbances that night 
as some prisoners risked all to feed the fire. Cranko spotted one and alerted a sentry 
who fired, wounding a prisoner in the leg.
21 A stretcher was passed through to the 
Compound and the man taken to hospital. The Governor made no further mention of 
his condition but the men believed that this prisoner later died of his wound.
22 This 
shooting ended the disturbances for the night. 
The following morning, March 10, the Governor ordered reveille at 7am and ‘fall 
in’ at 7.30am. Between twenty and thirty men obeyed the order to parade. During the 
                                                 
19  Ibid.,  statement  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  O.  Nelson,  Worcestershire  Regiment,  OC  Troops, 
Vendroux. 
20 Ibid., statement by Major J. J. Hardinge. 
21 Ibid., statement by Captain A. C. W. Cranko, OC 19th Garrison Company. 
22 The man shot was not named making it difficult to confirm the prisoners’ belief that he died of his 
wound.  
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disturbances in the night the prisoners had raided and wrecked the cookhouse, leaving 
the Governor little choice but to issue bread rations for the day. He described the 
prisoners as being in a quiet and ‘sullen’ mood for most of the day. By evening, 
shouting  and  stone  throwing  recommenced,  and  provocatively,  a  red  flag  was 
hoisted.
23  Although  the  disturbances  were  less  severe  than  the  previous  night,  the 
prisoners were still in a defiant mood. 
This defiance continued into the following day, with the majority of men refusing 
to  ‘fall  in’  at  7.30am.  At  10am  the  Governor  took  action.  He  entered  each  hut 
accompanied by members of his staff, his sergeant major, and a company of armed 
troops commanded by Lieutenant T. P. Harris, 11th Somerset Light Infantry, whom 
Nelson had called in as reinforcements. The Governor called each man by name and 
gave the order to parade at the medical hut, taking the names of those who openly 
refused. He only managed to take the names of four men who categorically refused to 
obey the order.
24 Morhen says on reaching the third hut men started to run away and 
congregate in the centre of the Compound. When the Governor addressed them he was 
greeted with abuse and boos. While the Governor was in the third hut a noisy crowd 
had gathered in No. 2 Compound. Shouts of ‘Come on, lads out with him’ greeted the 
Governor as he approached the crowd. Demanding a hearing the Governor warned 
them of the consequences of their conduct and told them he would give them until 3pm 
to ‘think it over’. After that time he would read the Riot Act (Section 7 of the Army 
Act and paragraph 4 of the notes to the section on page 385 of the Manual of Military 
Law). Those who failed to comply with the order would have committed mutiny.
25 
No prisoners responded when the ‘fall in’ was sounded at 3pm. At 3.30pm, the 
Governor, accompanied by Captain Harris and Sergeant-Major Morhen visited each 
                                                 
23 AWM 10, 4304/7/60, statement by Major J. J. Hardinge. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
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hut and explained to the men that he had come to read the Riot Act to them. On 
leaving  the  last  hut  the  Governor  noted  that  many  of  the  men  had  ‘capitulated’, 
parading  behind  the  armed  troops  that  had  been  strategically  placed  for  their 
protection. The men who refused to parade were removed to four huts, in a separate 
Compound, and surrounded by armed troops. A roll call was taken revealing that 
ninety-seven  men  refused  to  parade  and  would  be  charged  with  mutiny.
26  These 
prisoners were kept separate from each other until March 14. On March 19 they were 
tried by field general court-martial. 
With 250 armed troops at his disposal the Governor was in a position to put down 
a  full-scale  riot  and  prevent  a  wholesale  breakout.  The  prisoners  knew  this  well 
enough. They exercised the only power they had by stubbornly refusing to parade. 
How unanimous this was is difficult to gauge as pressure could have been exerted 
upon those who wished to do so. After the reading of the Riot Act those who paraded 
sought protection behind a company of armed troops. There is little in the Governor’s 
statement  that  suggests  he  was  prepared  to  give  an  inch.  The  parleying  abruptly 
stopped with the arrival of armed troops. He certainly did not create the environment in 
which  men  would  have  felt  safe  confronting  him  with  their  complaints  the  day 
following a night of rioting. 
The field general court-martial was held on March 19, 1919 and it was only when 
the convicted men were about to embark for England on April 19 that they learned of 
their sentences. On this day eleven of the convicted wrote to the GOC Australian 
Troops, London, giving notice that they were going to appeal their sentences, believing 
they had not received justice and that their case demanded an investigation. They 
argued the outcome of their trial would have been different if a court consisting of 
                                                 
26 Ibid.  
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Australian officers had tried them.
27 It is difficult to see how an Australian court could 
have found them not guilty of mutiny, as their refusal to obey the direct order of Major 
Hardinge had not been contested. They did expect an all-Australian court to be more 
sympathetic  to  their  plight,  taking  more  notice  of  their  grievances  and  complaints 
regarding  conditions  and  treatment  of  prisoners.  No  doubt  they  hoped  that  an 
Australian  court  would  recommend  a  full  enquiry.  Instead,  a  court  consisting  of 
Imperial  officers  and  one  Australian  colonel  had  tried  them,  finding  all  guilty  of 
mutiny as charged.
28 On the advice of the solicitor defending them they included the 
other charged mutineers in their appeal. Interestingly, they used the argument that the 
court should have realised that only a few men had led the crowd, and that if they were 
re-tried  a  future  court-martial  would  agree.  A  new  trial  was  demanded,  and  they 
believed that a Court of Inquiry would ‘expose the irregularities and injustices of No. 7 
M.P. Camp’. They were incensed when a sergeant, acting as escort to England, told 
them the Governor described the prisoners as ‘all desperados and criminals of the 
vilest type’. This was a ‘grave accusation’ they thought, to make against men ‘who 
have defended their homes and country so dear to them’. Finally, they claimed they 
were  not  medically  examined  when  leaving  France,  which  should  be  normal 
procedure, allowing the possibility of carrying with them diseases to England.
29  
In  his  letter  to  Prime  Minister  Hughes,  Private  Wallace  claimed  that  prison 
conditions were ‘scandalous’ and that the refusal by the prisoners to parade was a 
consequence of the Governor not meeting their requests for improvements. According 
to Wallace, prisoners were treated like ‘idiots’, and if a prisoner made a complaint he 
ended up in the cells. Therefore, the men combined and put together seven requests to 
the Governor. They were as follows: 
                                                 
27 Ibid., item 6, letter of notice of appeal from eleven of the convicted mutineers addressed to the 
Officer Commanding Australian Troops, April 19, 1919.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
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1. That the Food be improved and dished up clean. 
2. That we be allowed to write one letter a week instead of one a month. 
3. That we be allowed our parcels. 
4. That leg irons and figure 8 be abolished in the cells. 
5. That we be allowed one drink of tea, coffee or cocoa a day. 
6. That proper Medical Attention be provided. 
7. That we Australians get a definite answer regarding draughts [sic] leaving the prison 
on remission.
30 
Wallace  made  no  mention  of  the  rioting,  just  the  refusal  to  parade  as  a 
consequence of the Governor giving them no satisfaction to their requests. He does, 
however, shed some light on what happened when the Riot Act was read. He claimed 
the ringleaders paraded, leaving ninety-seven in their huts to be charged with mutiny. 
In his letter to the Prime Minister he wrote that it was only yesterday that twenty-four 
of them learned of their sentences, which ranged from seven to twelve years. Wallace 
claimed that ‘we have all done our bit in the War’, emphasising that their original 
offences were military in nature. He asked Hughes for his assistance in securing their 
release.
31 
A more detailed account of their complaints was addressed to the GOC, AIF, 
London on 20 April by twelve of the convicted mutineers. They referred to the riot at 
the prison, which they claimed was caused by the treatment they received as prisoners. 
The convicted men, they stated, ‘in practically all cases, were men, who had seen 
trench life, and were undergoing sentences, through breaking Military rules, since the 
signing of the Armistice’.
32 Furthermore, they claimed that the evidence given against 
them at their trial came from Imperial prisoners, who in ‘many instances’ did not tell 
the  truth,  an  indication  of  the  tension  that  existed  between  Australian  and  British 
                                                 
30 Ibid., letter signed by Private (1190) J. Wallace addressed to the Australian Prime Minister, W. M. 
Hughes, dated April 18, 1919. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., this statement signed by twelve of the prisoners on behalf of all ninety-six men convicted was 
written  while  the  men  were  passing  through  AIF  headquarters  in  London.  It  was  addressed  to  the 
General Officer Commanding AIF, London and dated April 20, 1919.   
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prisoners. Referring to the volley shot down the Compound they re-affirmed their 
belief that the soldier who was wounded in the thigh, later died of his wound.
33 How 
they would know this is not clear, and the Governor made no comment on whether the 
man recovered. The thrust of their appeal centres on their account of prison conditions 
and is presented as a justification for their refusal to parade. The list of complaints, 
below, and the Governor’s response provides an insight into conditions in a military 
prison in 1919. It will be remembered that although the Armistice had been signed 
some four months earlier the prison regulations were those that were in force under the 
conditions  of  active  service  and  therefore  would  have  been  similar  during  the 
hostilities.  
The list of their grievances made to the GOC was passed on to the Governor who 
was asked to make a report on the appeal. The men claimed that the food was:  
1.  Unclean,  unwholesome  and  diet  never  varying  and  always  improperly  cooked. 
Potatoes, unwashed and often rotten, were always cooked with the stew-meat. Porridge 
was like water at breakfast. At dinner time we were give a quarter of a tin of corned beef 
and a drink of hot water. Tea time we were given a stew, being, as mentioned above, 
dirty and unwholesome, and watery. This was the same day after day, no variety in any 
way at all, and we knew very well, that we never received our allotted rations.
34 
The Governor thought the whole paragraph on food to be false, apart from the 
monotony of the diet. He said the rations issued conformed to the rules laid down for 
Military Prisons in the Field (para. 97), and ‘particular attention was always given to 
the food, also the cooking’ with all troops drawing from the same local Detail Issue 
Store. He went on to say that complaints about food were rare, and that he investigated 
any that were made. He noted that nobody mentioned the concession he made of ‘the 
half-ounce of lime juice and quarter-ounce of sugar per man daily which was mixed 
with the hot water’.
35 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. (The grammar and punctuation of this appeal is reproduced in its original form throughout.) 
35 On June 3, 1919 the Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge was asked to report on the appeal of the men 
sentenced for mutiny. At the time of making this report Major Hardinge held the position of Governor, 
Military Prison, Army of the Rhine, Siegburg.  
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2 MEDICAL TREATMENT: No general medical inspection of men ever took place. 
Cases of venereal and scabies after complaints, have been found very much in evidence, 
amongst the prisoners. Some of these cases after discovery, have not been isolated. The 
medical treatment, was, in most cases, managed by a N.C.O., without consultation with a 
doctor. A prisoner requiring medical treatment, – say tomorrow – had to report such, to a 
N.C.O. this evening – otherwise there was no chance of receiving attention.
36 
The whole of this paragraph ‘is absolutely false’ stated the Governor. Venereal 
cases were sent to hospital and men suffering scabies or other skin diseases were 
always isolated in a separate part of the Compound and locked in after working so as 
not to come in contact with the others. Sick parades were held morning and night and 
any man reporting sick saw the medical officer that morning. He went on to explain 
how ‘every precaution was taken to ensure that every man was kept as fit as possible 
and ready to join his Unit in the Line’.
37 
3 AUSTRALIAN DRAFT: The usual procedure was to call out, an Australian Draft and 
these men were sent out of the prison, about two or three weeks later. The trouble, about 
this draft, in question, was, after being read out, they were nearly, two months, before 
marching away. They continually paraded to the Officials, but received no satisfaction.
38 
The Governor addressed this issue by stating that the Australian Authorities were 
responsible for any delay in the Australian draft leaving prison, and he had explained 
this to the prisoners in detail.
39 
4. CONDITION OF CELLS: The condition of the cells, during the cold weather was 
unbearable, and freezing. Icicles hung from the iron ceiling. The cell was built of iron, the 
floor being of cement. Three blankets was supplied. The sanitary tins were always in the 
cells, day and night in the hot weather also.
40 
In response, the Governor said the cells were of the same design in all military 
prisons in the field and he and the medical officer visited all prisoners in cells daily. 
Prisoners had visits from chaplains three times a week as well as periodic visits from 
visiting officers from the Base Commandant in Calais. Further, the Director or Deputy 
Director of Military Prisons ‘made frequent visits, and made a very minute inspection, 
speaking with every man in the cells, making the closest enquiries of each man as to 
                                                 
36 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London.  
37 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report.  
38 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London. 
39 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report.  
40 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London.  
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how he was getting on and for what reason he was in cells’. Four blankets were issued 
in  cold  weather,  with  men  being  allowed  to  keep  their  greatcoats.  The  sanitary 
arrangements, he stated, ‘were the best possible and everything was kept scrupulously 
clean’, being periodically inspected by the medical officer, the ADMS and the Senior 
Sanitary Officer.
41 
5. UNJUST TREATMENT OF PRISONERS: Figure eights were placed on men and 
were only removed for meals. There was no provocation on the part of the prisoners to 
necessitate such treatment. During the days these cuffs were placed behind the prisoners 
back, and at night were made to sleep with arms locked across the body, in such a way, 
that the blankets could not even be pulled up. Such treatment was meted out for petty, 
and trivial affairs such as a button being missing from an overcoat etc., men have been ill 
treated with whips in their cells, causing them to yel [sic] with pain, and teeth have been 
knocked out with no just cause whatsoever.
42 
 These  represent  the  most  serious  complaints  made  by  the  prisoners  and  one 
would  have  expected  a  more  detailed  reply  from  the  Governor.  He  conceded  that 
figure-of-eights were used but only for ‘violent and dangerous prisoners’. As for the 
inconvenience this caused the prisoner he pointed out that the President of the Court 
that tried the men had been placed in ‘figure-of-eights and was convinced that a man 
so restrained did not suffer the inconvenience alleged’. He stated ‘that no man was 
ever  awarded  a  punishment  of  any  description  by  me  for  a  missing  button’.  The 
Governor claimed he was only aware of one complaint of violence against a prisoner. 
This was made to the Director of Military Prisons in the Field on a routine visit, who 
was unable to take action owing to the lapse of time.
43 
6. REFUSING TO GRANT INTERVIEW WITH AUSTRALIAN STAFF OFFICER: 
Just after riot occurred the Governor of the Prison was approached and was asked, that an 
Aust Staff officer be sent for, for explanatory purposes. The request was refused, – the 
Governor’s  words  being  to  the  effect  that  he  would  always  refuse  us  permission  to 
interview an Australian Officer, even if an Aust. General was waiting outside the Prison 
Gates for admittance.
44 
                                                 
41 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report.  
42 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London. 
43 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report.  
44 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London.  
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 In his response Hardinge did not dispute his alleged reference to the Australian 
General at the prison gates. He did say that reasonable applications, ‘made in the 
proper manner’ were never refused. He claimed that when the men made demands 
they became abusive and used foul language. He did, however, enquire whether the 
men required legal assistance, and after consulting with each other, one man shouted 
‘will he be Australian?’ He would be a solicitor or a barrister, the Governor told them, 
and his appointment would be a matter for a higher authority, ‘and on his arrival they 
could make their explanations to him’.
45 
7. MAIL MATTER: We were only allowed to write one censored letter a month. No 
envolops [sic] was supplied, with the paper, therefore we cannot say whether those letters 
ever left the prison. These letters were only supposed to be censored by the Governor, 
were  in  many  cases  read  by  a  N.C.O.  to  whom  they  were  handed.  This  was  not 
permissible,  but  was  done  very  often.  On  receipt  of  a  parcel  from  Australia  and 
elsewhere, they were all opened and we were only allowed soap and toothpaste, but no 
food, not even the tinned foods from Australia, no reading material was ever allowed.
46 
The Governor referred to paragraph 101 of Rules for Military Prisons, which gave 
him the discretion to ‘allow any Prisoner to write a letter and receive a reply’. He 
allowed a prisoner to write one letter within seven days of admission, and then one a 
month thereafter. As a concession, he granted over 500 requests for ‘special letters’ 
between December and March, demonstrating that the welfare of the men under his 
command ‘was placed before personal consideration’. He stated that he adhered to 
Paragraph  14  which  required  the  Governor  to  ‘read  every  letter  addressed  to  and 
written by a Prisoner’, and it was the duty of Section Commanders to check that the 
letter  was  folded  as  directed  and  addressed  in  the  proper  manner.  In  cases  where 
censorship regulations were not complied with the letter was returned to the prisoner. 
Food was confiscated from prisoners’ parcels, the Governor explained, and anything 
perishable was given to men being released. Items of sentimental value were stored 
                                                 
45 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report. 
46 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London.  
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and would be given to men on release, or in the case of men still under sentence being 
transferred would accompany them to their new prison.
47 
8.  SANITARY:  The  General  Sanitation  of  the  camp  was  very  much  neglected.  No 
Medical Officer ever inspected the condition of the latrines which were fully exposed to 
all prisoners and staff, in fact, no privacy in any way regarding arrangements. From 12 to 
20 men were made to wash in one dish of water, – there being no necessity for such as 
there was no shortage of water. Little or no soap was allowed. In instances the same 
water had to be used over and over again, that is, the water we used in the morning had to 
be used again in the evening. Regarding washing of clothes, all clothes were washed in 
one  lot,  including  those  of  the  men  suffering  from  scabies,  and  other  diseases.  No 
disinfection took place after this occurred.
48 
The Governor refuted all these complaints. He explained how he inspected the 
Prison daily, and the Medical Officer did so weekly. In the first three months of 1919 
the only remarks in the Sanitary Diary recorded by the Senior Medical Officer was 
‘Shaving brush in Staff Kitchen’ and ‘Window ledges of huts dusty’. The latrines were 
constructed, enclosed on three sides, afforded privacy and allowed observation for 
prison staff. A plentiful supply of water was on hand and all bowls, twenty-five in each 
Compound, were removed and cleaned daily. Each man received a hot bath and a 
change of clothes once a week, with the box fumigator being employed on a daily 
basis, with clothes from men suffering from scabies or suspected skin diseases being 
treated separately.
49 
9: PERSONAL BELONGINGS: Men on entering prison wore Aust clothes. These are 
taken from the prisoners. The Prison staff wear Aust boots puttees and riding breeches, 
and we were re-issued with Imperial clothes, tunic, slacks and caps in place of Aust 
clothes, handed in. Separate complaints are being sent to you, regarding rings, money and 
watches, not being returned on leaving prison.
50 
On entering prison, the Governor explained, each man was given a bath and 
change  of  clothes.  Australian  uniforms  were  taken  from  them  and  preserved  until 
release, and Imperial clothing was issued, making all prisoners dressed alike with no 
distinguishing Divisional or Corps insignia. Prison staff was required to be ‘properly 
                                                 
47 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report. 
48 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London. 
49 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report. 
50 Ibid., statement signed by twelve of the convicted addressed to the GOC AIF, London.  
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dressed according to the arm of the Service to which they belonged’. Men transferred 
to the United Kingdom under sentence had their valuables sent to the prison to which 
they were transferred with money being sent to the Base Paymaster who credited the 
man with the amount.
51 
In Major Hardinge’s general remarks he states that each man was made aware of 
what was expected and what course of action he should take in making a complaint or 
an application. He strongly challenged the statement made by the signatories that they 
were  undergoing  sentence  for  breaking  military  rules  since  the  signing  of  the 
Armistice. To back this up he enclosed a nominal roll of the offences and dates of 
sentences  of  the  men  who  signed  the  appeal.
52  He  denied  that  he  ever  made  the 
comment  attributed  to  him  by  the  escort  sergeant  that  the  prisoners  were  ‘all 
desperadoes  and  criminals  of  the  vilest  type’.  Further,  claims  that  no  medical 
inspection was carried out before embarking for England were false, as each man 
needed to have a certificate to say he was clear of scabies, and without it could not 
embark. Hardinge claimed he took a personal interest in every man in his charge. His 
prison was seen as an ‘ideal example as to how a Camp should be run’, as on many 
occasions the Officer Commanding local troops sent officers from local units to be 
shown over No. 7 Military Prison. Finally, the complaint that except for one officer the 
composition of the court was Imperial, he pointed out that there were also Imperial and 
Canadian soldiers among the accused.
53 
In many ways Major Hardinge fits the stereotypical image of the British officer so 
often portrayed in Australian mythology of the war. It seems clear that he held a poor 
opinion of the prisoners under his charge, knowing that their crimes had got them out 
of  trench  warfare.  Also,  as  a  British  officer  he  probably  would  not  have  been 
                                                 
51 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report.  
52 Ibid., this nominal roll of offences was not included in this file. 
53 Ibid., Governor, Major J. G. Hardinge’s report. 
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accustomed to being on the receiving end of the sort of abusive language that was 
directed to him by Australian prisoners, although they usually abused him from the 
safety of the crowd. His handling of the mutiny can be questioned on the basis of his 
refusal to continue the parley with the prisoners when in a position of strength, which 
may have ended the disturbances and avoided a mutiny. In his reply to the mutineers’ 
complaints  he  presented  his  prison  as  the  ideal  establishment  of  its  type,  thus 
conceding nothing to them. It seems clear that conditions at the prison were austere. To 
act as a deterrent they had to be, and Hardinge was not prepared to make life any easier 
for the prisoners, apart from the half-ounce of lime juice and sugar and the odd extra 
letter. The prisoners had a hard task proving that abuses took place against a prison 
staff that had closed ranks, together with a higher army authority that was less than 
sympathetic  to  complaints  from  men  who  had  transgressed  several  times  and  so 
avoided the hardships and dangers of the front. What counts in Hardinge’s favour in 
handling the disturbances was that he waited until the third day before reading the Riot 
Act. He also provided an armed guard to protect those who wished to parade from 
intimidation. It is hard to see how he could have waited any longer to regain control of 
his prison. 
Hardinge’s prison regime does suggest that it was not an environment in which to 
make a complaint, as the fear of retribution was real. To get to the Governor the 
complainant  would  have  to  go  through  the  administrative  staff  first,  and  in  many 
military  prisons  the  NCOs  were  a  law  until  themselves.
54  Apart  from  the  serious 
complaints  about  the  use  of  figure-of-eights  and  violent  abuse,  the  prisoner’s 
grievances centred on food and drink, which takes on a crucial importance in prison, as 
well  as  complaints  over  sanitary  conditions  and  mail.    However,  what  was  really 
behind the disturbances was the fact that the Armistice had been signed in November 
                                                 
54 See Christopher Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell, pp. 97-103.  
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and now, four months on, they were fully expecting an amnesty on military crimes 
committed during the war (and after in some cases) and a swift return to Australia.
55 
They were not the only ones frustrated at not returning home, as many Australian 
soldiers found themselves in the same position and would not see Australia until late in 
1919. The claim that at their trial Imperial prisoners lied when giving evidence was 
never substantiated. Intimidation probably played a part in the men’s refusal to parade; 
however,  they  claimed  the  ringleaders  paraded,  leaving  them  to  face  a  charge  of 
mutiny.  In  that  case  the  intimidation  would  have  ceased  and  once  the  ringleaders 
capitulated they would have been free to chose to parade or not. In their appeals to 
Hughes and the Australian High Command the signatories presented themselves as 
men who had previously done their duty, had seen trench life, and who happened to 
fall foul of military regulations and wound up in prison. It is the records of some of the 
signatories to the appeals that will be examined to see what sort of crimes led them to 
be incarcerated.  
 
The journey to No. 7 Military Prison, Vendroux Les Attaques, Calais 
Private (3238) Alan Storm Broadhead, of the 58th Battalion, was a most reluctant 
soldier. His road to No. 7 Prison provides an interesting case study on how a habitual 
absentee was dealt with under the military code. From the time he enlisted in July 1915 
to his discharge on 4 January 1920 there was hardly any significant period in which he 
avoided trouble with the military authorities. During this period he was convicted of 
wilfully maiming himself so as to render himself unfit for service, wilful defiance of an 
order from a superior officer, with both offences attracting prison sentences of two 
years and one year IHL respectively. His transgressions continued after his conviction 
for mutiny when he attempted to escape from the transport ship H.M.T. Port Sydney, 
                                                 
55 An amnesty came into force on 25 April, 1919. Many prisoners had their sentences remitted at this 
time, but some cases had to be reviewed on being returned to Australia. See AWM 27, 363/2 .  
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receiving a serious bayonet wound in the stomach, inflicted by a sentry in an attempt to 
prevent his escape.
56 
Broadhead  was  thirty-one-years-old  when  he  embarked  for  Egypt  in  October 
1915. A glassblower by trade, he was married, and lived in Victoria. After only one 
month in Egypt he was admitted to hospital in December where he absented himself 
for five days and was awarded fourteen day’s detention on 25 January 1916. Just over 
three weeks after his release he was tried by FGCM in Egypt on three counts: ‘(1) 
disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer; (2) failing to appear at the 
place appointed by his CO, and (3) AWL from 15/2 till 25/2’ and was awarded forty-
two days’ Field Punishment No. 2. A month after his release his battalion was posted 
to France where immediately he was in trouble by failing to entrain at Marseilles after 
previously being warned to do so. This time he was awarded fourteen days’ Field 
Punishment No. 1. On August 8 he marched out to active service but by the 15th was 
charged with disobeying the order of an NCO in that he refused to proceed to the 
support trenches when ordered to do so and was awarded twenty-eight days’ Field 
Punishment No. 1. He committed further offences over the latter part of 1916 and early 
1917 included short, unauthorised absences that resulted in forfeiture of fourteen days’ 
pay and fifteen days’ pay. He also was admitted to hospital with scabies in February 
1917, being discharged five weeks later. Up to his FGCM in January 1918 for self 
maiming  he  had  been  awarded  Field  Punishment  No.  1  four  times,  which  was 
exceptional, and Field Punishment No. 2 twice, as well confinements and forfeitures of 
pay.
57 What is striking about the early period of Broadhead’s disciplinary record is the 
fact that, despite the seriousness of most of them, he was not awarded a custodial 
sentence. The officers who comprised the courts martial dealing with Broadhead were 
                                                 
56 NAA: B2455, Broadhead A S, service record (the findings of the Court of Enquiry held at sea are 
contained within this file); A471/7693, Broadhead, Allen [sic] Storm (Private): date of court-martial 
January 7, 1918.  
57 NAA: B2455Broadhead, A S, service record.   
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indeed following the guidelines laid down by the British High Command by not giving 
custodial sentences and thus rewarding offenders. Broadhead had shown a remarkable 
resilience to Field Punishment, which had not acted as a deterrent to further crimes as 
his record until his discharge indicates. 
Précis of service of Private A. S. Broadhead (3238), 58th Battalion from 
January 7, 1918 until his discharge on January 4, 1920.
58 
7/1/18  FGCM  held  at  Havre.  Wilfully  maiming 
himself  with  intent  thereby  to  render  himself 
unfit for Service. 
2  years  In  Hard  Labour  (I.H.L.), 
total forfeiture of 805 days’ pay, 
£201 and 5/-. 
27/1/18  Sentence of 2 years I.H.L awarded by FGCM 
on 7/1/18 has been suspended. 
 
2/5/18  FGCM held in the Field. Disobeying in such a 
manner as to show wilful defiance of authority, 
a lawful command given by a superior officer.   
12 months I.H.L. 
26/6/18  Admitted  to  No.  7  Military  Prison.  First 
sentence  2  yrs  I.H.L.  awarded  2/5/18,  2nd 
sentence 12 months I.H.L awarded 2/5/18. First 
sentence suspended 27/1/18. Sentence now put 
into  execution  and  to  run  concurrently  with 
latter sentence. 
 
24/3/19  FGCM. Held at No. 7 Military Prison, Calais. 
Joining in a mutiny in forces belonging to H.M. 
Military Forces. At Calais on 11/3/19 joined in 
mutiny by combining amongst themselves not 
to fall in after having been warned by proper 
authority to do so. 
13  years  Penal  Servitude  (P.S.) 
Forfeiture concurrent 24/5/19. 
19/4/19  Transferred to U.K. to serve sentence in H.M. 
Prison, Parkhurst 
 
22/9/10.  Left England for return to Australian per H.T. 
“Port  Sydney”.  –  Disciplinary  reasons. 
Undergoing sentence. 
 
5/11/19  Whilst a prisoner undergoing sentence on H.T. 
“Port  Sydney”  attempting  to  escape.  Was 
bayoneted  by  sentry.  Evacuated  to  hospital, 
Fremantle. Abdominal wound. 
 
4/1/20  Discharged  from  the  AIF  in  Melbourne. 
Services No Longer Required (S.N.L.R.) 
 
  Medals refused.   
Broadhead’s trial for a self-inflicted wound is an interesting case at it reveals the 
ingenuity of some men to make themselves unfit for active service Also, this case 
                                                 
58 NAA: B2455, Broadhead, A S, service record, item 85, Précis of Service for the information of the 
Medal Board.  
198 
demonstrates the quite extraordinary lengths that were taken by the military authorities 
to secure a conviction of self-maiming. At his field general court-martial held at Havre, 
on January 7, 1918, Broadhead pleaded not guilty to the charge of self-maiming: 
1st Charge. Sect. 18 (2A) A.A. When on active service wilfully maiming himself with 
intent thereby to render himself unfit for service (at Havre on or about the 24th October, 
1917. Injecting petrol into his left knee.) 
2nd  Charge  (Alternative)  Sect.  40  A.A.).  When  on  active  service  as  an  act  to  the 
prejudice of good order and military discipline in that he at Havre on or about the 24th  
October,  1917  caused  an  injury  to  his  left  knee  thereby  rendering  himself  unfit  for 
service.
59 
The reason for the alternative charge under Section 40 is because wilful self-maiming 
had proved difficult to establish beyond reasonable doubt, whereas conduct to the 
prejudice was easier to prove and attracted a similar sentence to self-maiming.
60  
The Court heard that the services of a lieutenant in the Special Police were called 
upon, and ‘acting on instructions’, posed as a patient in the same hospital and ward as 
Broadhead. This witness claimed that the accused had confided that ‘he had purchased 
a hypodermic syringe from a French chemist for the sum of 7 Fr’ and that he had used 
it to inject petrol into his left knee. Further, Broadhead told the witness that ‘he had no 
intention of going up the line’.
61 This conversation allegedly took place on November 
3 whilst the two were playing cards. However, there was no one to corroborate the 
witness’s account, and the following day the Special Policeman left hospital. Two 
doctors,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rawling,  RAMC  and  Capt.  R.  L.  Scott,  examined 
Broadhead, who had been admitted to hospital on October 25. Rawling stated that 
Broadhead had a swelling at the back of his left knee. He noticed a ‘puncture mark’ in 
the inflammation area that was ‘emitting a few drops of matter’. As there was no 
‘browning  or  abrasion  of  the  skin’  Rawlins  concluded  that  the  injury  was  not 
                                                 
59  NAA:  A471,  7693,  Broadhead,  Allen  [sic]  Storm  (Private):  Service  Number  3238,  unit  58th 
Battalion, AIF, date of court-martial January 7, 1918.  
60 This point is discussed in chapter 4. 
61 NAA: A471, 7693, Broadhead, A. S. (3238), testimony of (P1375) Lieutenant. E. T. Malows (name 
unclear), items 8-10.  
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consistent with Broadhead’s claim that he got the injury falling down some steps.
62 
Scott was more direct in his evidence and told the Court that on first examination he 
believed the accused had injected petrol into the back of his knee.  When examined by 
the  court,  Scott  claimed  there  ‘had  been  four  cases  of  this  type  in  the  last  two 
months’.
63 This goes some way towards explaining the undercover operation and the 
necessity of securing the self-maiming conviction. The message needed to get out to 
those considering the same deception that the medical officers were alive to it and that 
their actions would result in a court-martial conviction. 
In his defence, Broadhead claimed the injury had been caused by a fall. He told 
the court: 
I  was  coming  out  of  the  Dry  Canteen,  5th  Division  at  7.15p.m.  Tuesday  evening 
23.10.17, when I slipped down the steps my [sic] feet slipped from under me, and I fell 
on my “behind”. I had one litre of beer and I was quite sober. I did not feel anything at all 
at the time, but got up and walked to bed. At about 10.30 p.m. I woke up with a pain in 
my leg. Nothing stuck into my leg to the best of my knowledge, and I did not think there 
was anything the matter with my leg until I woke up in the night.
64 
Broadhead refuted the evidence of the first witness, denying saying any of the 
statements attributed to him. He told the court he had not had the opportunity to leave 
camp and therefore could not have been in a position to buy a syringe. He stated that 
he had chronic bronchitis that had kept him out of front line duty, intimating there was 
no need to maim himself to avoid this.
65 However, the court found him guilty on the 
first  charge  of  self-maiming,  sentencing  him  to  two  years’  IHL.  His  self-inflicted 
injury put him in hospital for two months and his court-martial had tied up the services 
of crucial medical and military personnel. Just twenty days after his conviction his 
sentence  was  suspended.  The  policy  of  not  rewarding  self-maimers  with  custodial 
sentences was applied in this case. He rejoined his unit on April 10, and on the 11th he 
                                                 
62 Ibid., testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel S. Rawling, RAMC, items 10-11. 
63 Ibid., testimony Captain R. L. Scott, RAMC, items 11-12. 
64 Broadhead’s signed testimony appears in NAA: B2455, Broadhead, A S, item 92 (it should have 
been filed in (NAA) A471, 7693, Broadhead, A. S. (3238). 
65 (NAA) A471, 7693, Broadhead, A. S. (3238), testimony of Private A. S. Broadhead, items 12-13.  
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was charged with refusing to obey an order of his superior officer. This caused another 
court-martial  to  be  convened  on  May  2,  1918.  He  was  officially  charged  with 
‘disobeying  in  such  a  manner  as  to  show  a  wilful  defiance  of  authority  a  lawful 
command given personally by his superior officer in the execution of his office’.
66 
The evidence of the first witness, Lieutenant E. J. Ryan reveals to some degree 
Broadhead’s state of mind. Ryan had ordered Broadhead to ‘get on his equipment’ and 
join a working party. He refused the order telling Ryan ‘I am not going to I [sic] have 
had no pay for 6 months and I’m not going to do anything now’. In short, Broadhead 
had ‘downed tools’. After he was found guilty he told the court in mitigation, ‘If I am 
given a chance I will play the game’. No more chances were given him and he was 
sentenced to twelve months’ IHL, an award that automatically brought into execution 
his  previously  suspended  sentence.  It  seemed  there  was  little  more  the  military 
authorities could do with Broadhead except award him a custodial sentence. On June 
6, 1918 he was transferred to No. 7 Military Prison where he joined in the mutiny in 
March 1919 and was sentenced to thirteen years’ penal servitude. But Broadhead’s war 
was not over yet and further dramas were to follow the attempt to get him home to 
Victoria  on  board  H.M.T.  Port  Sydney.  It  would  prove  a  difficult  voyage  for  the 
Officer Commanding Troops on board, as we shall see later in the chapter. 
Other signatories to the appeal 
The examination of the service records of nine other signatories to the appeal reveals 
that there was only one man who could claim that the crime that got him imprisoned 
occurred after the signing of the Armistice. Questions that do emerge in examining 
these  records  are  whether  these  prison  sentences  could  have  been  avoided?  Did 
imposing a prison sentence then suspending it store up trouble when dealing with a 
 
                                                 
66 (NAA) B2455, Broadhead, A S, item 63.  
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Table 6.1 
Disciplinary records of nine of the signatories of the appeal and the crimes that got them 
incarcerated in No. 7 Military Prison, Calais. 
       
Name and sentence 
for mutiny 
FP 
No. 1 
FP  
No. 2 
 
AWL 
 
Crime 
 
Sentence 
Powardy, H. R.  
(12 years’ PS)            
    Aug 4 to 
Sept 9, 1918 
Desertion  7 yrs’ PS 
not susp. 
Jansen, O. 
( 9 years’ PS) 
  7 days 
28 days 
  Altering 
paybook 
Jan 1919 
6 months’ 
IHL 
Nicholls, A.W. 
(11 years’ PS) 
    Nov 1916 to 
March 1917 
 
Mar 16,’18 
for 5 days 
Desertion 
 
 
Desertion 
(Unit in line) 
10 yrs’ PS 
Susp. Dec.  
1917 
15 yrs PS 
Wallace, J. 
(11 years’ PS) 
56 days 
reduced to 
20 days 
FP No. 2 
3 days 
7 days 
May 31 to 
July 17, 
1918 
AWL  2 yrs’ IHL 
Gregg, C. D. 
(10 years’ PS) 
  28 days 
28 days 
7 days 
20 days 
60 days 
July 24 to 
Sept 11, 
1918 
AWL  6 months’ 
IHL 
Brissenden, C. L. 
(10 years’ PS) 
  22 days  Aug 25 to 
Sept 17,’18 
AWL 
(escaping) 
2 yrs’ IHL 
Bunting, C. 
(13 years’ PS) 
    Dec 28, 
1916 to Jan 
2, 1917 
 
July 20 to 
Nov 11,’18 
AWL 
 
 
 
Desertion 
3 yrs’ PS 
com. 2 yrs’ 
susp. April 
1918 
4 yrs’ PS 
Gay, E. H. 
(10 years’ PS) 
  30 days   
 
 
July 17 to 23 
July 1918 
Unlawfully 
wounding a 
comrade 
AWL 
12 months’ 
IHL susp. 2 
weeks later 
1 yr IHL 
(brought in 
previous 
sentence) 
Woodbury, P. A.  
(9 years’ PS) 
    Aug 12 to 
Sept 14, 
1918 
AWL  12 months’ 
IHL 
future offence? And was there inconsistency in the sentencing of offenders? Of the 
nine signatories to the appeal examined here six were 1915 men, two 1916 (which  
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includes one enlisted in 1914 but who was returned to Australia as a venereal disease 
case  in  1915)  and  one  enlisted  in  1917.  Table  6.1  (above)  shows  the  crime  and 
sentence the man received that got him imprisoned at No. 7 Military Prison, and is not 
a complete disciplinary record of these men. In the cases examined there are many 
instances of men being sentenced to detention for absence, and these are not reflected 
in this table. What is recorded is the number of times a man was sentenced to Field 
Punishment, and it is immediately noticeable that Field Punishment No. 1 was rarely 
given,  a  reflection  of  the  reluctance  of  Australian  courts  to  impose  this  kind  of 
punishment. In these records, too, we find that soldiers were reluctant to report that 
they had been imprisoned, which caused a great deal of anxiety to their next-of-kin 
back home in Australia, who starved of news of their loved one, feared the worst. 
 Australian  courts  faced  a  real  dilemma  in  dealing  with  absentees  as  the 
convening  of  a  field  general  court-martial  for  men  charged  with  absence  usually 
resulted  in  a  prison  sentence  being  imposed.  Private  (2309)  H.  R.  Powardy,  for 
example, had kept a relatively clean disciplinary record up to him being declared an 
illegal absentee on August 4, 1918 (see Appendix v for more detailed records of the 
signatories of the appeal). He was absent until 9th September and at his court-martial 
on  November  5  he  was  convicted  of  desertion  and  received  seven  years’  penal 
servitude.
67 This, of course, kept him out of action, and rewarded him for his absence 
by keeping him out of harm’s way. The Armistice came into force soon after his trial 
so there was no need to suspend his sentence to make him available for duty. If his 
period of absence had been dealt with summarily by his CO and Field Punishment 
awarded, Powardy, who would have got off lightly, would still have been available for 
duty and would not have been swelling the prison numbers.  
                                                 
67  NAA:  B2455,  Powardy,  H  R,  owing  to  a  typist’s  error  he  was  originally  discharged  TPE 
(Termination of Period of Enlistment), which was amended in February 1921 to SNLR on account of his 
receiving twelve years’ PS for his part in the mutiny.  
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Private (6603) Oscar Jansen could justifiably claim that his more serious military 
offences occurred after the hostilities had ended. His two periods of Field Punishment 
were awarded for insubordination and not absence. Jansen’s first court-martial was 
held in January 1919 when he was charged with ‘altering his paybook with intent to 
defraud’. He was found guilty and sentenced to six months’ IHL.
68 If the war had still 
been in progress this sentence could well have been suspended and Jansen would have 
avoided his incarceration in No. 7. Military Prison. One can speculate that the sentence 
of  six  months’  IHL  suggests  that  the  crime  was  not  a  serious  one  and  a  more 
appropriate sentence other than imprisonment could have been awarded. 
It is hard to see how the courts could have acted differently with Private (4459) A. 
W. Nicholls, who had picked up two desertion convictions before his conviction for 
mutiny. His first desertion conviction was for being absent from November 1916, after 
being warned his platoon was going to the front line, until his arrest in March 1917. At 
his court-martial the court heard evidence from platoon Sergeant James Alliston who 
stated, ‘I warned my platoon that we were going to the front line & accused was 
present at the time’. Two hours later, when the platoon was lined up a roll call was 
made and Nicholls was absent.
69 Nicholls was captured on March 27 by a patrol of 
military police, who found him living rough in disused huts belonging to the Field 
Ambulance AIF. The arresting military police officer thought the huts looked like 
someone had lived in them for some considerable time. When the court questioned 
Nicholls he claimed that he had only spent three nights in the huts and that he was in 
Buire for a month. Nicholls told the court that: 
On the 14th November at Carlton Camp having been suffering from nervousness, I had 
the inclination to get away from all the noise. I went to the canteen and had some drink. 
The next day I did not feel any better, and was then afraid to return to my unit. 
                                                 
68 NAA: B2455, Jansen, Oscar, service record. 
69 NAA: B2455, Nicholls, Arthur William, service record, see item 55 for FGCM.  
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Nicholls’ demonstrated his naivety when he told the court that he ‘never thought 
when I was back at Buire that I would be posted as missing, or a “deserter” with my 
Battn’.
70  He  was  awarded  ten  years’  penal  servitude,  which  was  suspended  nine 
months  later  and  he  rejoined  his  battalion  on  December  23,  1917.  Nicholls  went 
missing again on March 16 when a roll call was taken at 11.30pm, prior to his unit 
going into the line. At his court-martial in April 1918 Nicholls was charged with 
desertion. The court heard from Sergeant H. H. Burnell, who stated that his unit was in 
the line for five days and Nicholls was absent for that period. Sergeant D. McPhee, 
giving evidence, stated that he was in Romain when ‘the accused came to me and said 
he wished to give himself up’. In his defence Nicholls stated that he ‘left on account of 
my nerves. I could not stand the strain any longer. I was not giving [sic] a fair deal 
because I was 20 months in France without leave.’
71 He was convicted of desertion and 
given fifteen years’ penal servitude, which could not be suspended because of the 
suspension of his previous sentence. 
Private (1190) John Wallace, who signed the letter to Prime Minister Hughes, and 
who had claimed ‘we have all done our bit in this War and was [sic] at Amiens last 
year and saved the situation when England received the biggest blow of this War’.
72 
Wallace  had  embarked  for  overseas  in  October  1915  and  had  a  relatively  clean 
disciplinary  record  up  to  1918.  He  had  previously  picked  up  three  days’  Field 
Punishment No. 2 for disobeying an order and seven days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for 
an absence of three days. In February 1918 he was charged with ‘disobeying the lawful 
order of a superior officer’ for which he was awarded fifty-six days’ Field Punishment 
No. 1, which was subsequently reduced to Field Punishment No. 2, with thirty-six days 
                                                 
70 Ibid., items 56-57, contain Nicholls’ testimony.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
71 Ibid., item 65, FGCM April 22, 1918. 
72 AWM 10, 4304/7/60, item 3, letter to the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. W. M. Hughes, dated April 
18, 1919 signed by Private (1190) J. Wallace.  
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of his sentence remitted.
73 But on May 31 Wallace absented himself until he was 
apprehended on July 17. At his court-martial he was found not guilty of desertion but 
guilty of absence without leave for which he was awarded two years’ IHL. The court 
in this case determined that this period of absence was not desertion, unlike the finding 
for Private Powardy, discussed above, who was absent for a similar period of time and 
was  convicted  of  desertion  and  received  seven  years’  penal  servitude.  Wallace’s 
sentence was not suspended and he went straight to No. 7 Military Prison where he 
joined in the mutiny and received eleven years’ penal servitude.  
Private (2942) Charles Darwin Gregg’s disciplinary record is littered with charges 
for absence and disobedience (see Table 6.1 for Field Punishment awards). He was 
awarded Field Punishment No. 2 six times, but never Field Punishment No. 1. This 
could have been on health grounds as Gregg was a bronchitis sufferer, and being tied 
up and exposed to the elements could well have aggravated his bronchial condition. In 
1918, after a spending a period in England sick, he rejoined his unit at the end of June. 
But on July 24 he was declared an illegal absentee, only rejoining his unit two months 
later on September 11. While awaiting trial for this period of absence he absconded for 
two days from October 10. At his court-martial on November 30 he was found not 
guilty  of  desertion  but  guilty  of  being  absent  without  leave  and  sentenced  to  six 
months’ IHL.
74 The leniency of this sentence is surprising as he was absent for nearly 
two months at a critical period in the prosecution of the war. This case highlights the 
inconsistency in defining the offence of desertion and absence without leave and the 
disparity in sentencing when Gregg’s sentence is compared to those Powardy and 
Wallace received. 
Private (5654) Clarence Leslie Brissenden was barely eighteen-years-old when he 
enlisted in March 1916. In September 1917 he was wounded in action, receiving a 
                                                 
73 NAA: B2455, Wallace, J, service record. 
74 NAA: B2455, Gregg, C D, service record.  
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gunshot wound to his left arm that caused his evacuation to hospital in England. He 
was discharged on October 25, 1917, and while still in England he was convicted of 
his first military offence in March 1918 for being absent from February 21 to March 3. 
He  was  awarded  twenty-two  days’  Field  Punishment  No.  2  for  this  absence,  and 
shortly after serving this sentence he was absent again and was declared an illegal 
absentee. At his District Court-Martial (England) he was convicted of being absent 
from May 27 until July 5 and received the sentence of the forfeiture of thirty days’ pay. 
He rejoined his battalion in France on August 10, 1918 only to be declared an illegal 
absentee again by the 23rd. He was arrested on September 24 and faced two charges at 
his court-martial of being absent from August 25 until September 17, and escaping 
from confinement. Brissenden was found guilty of absence without leave and given a 
sentence of two years’ IHL that was not suspended.
75 Overall, Brissenden was treated 
quite leniently for his absences when compared to some of the other signatories of the 
appeal. 
Private (4219) Clarence Bunting faced his first court-martial on January 5, 1917. 
He pleaded guilty to being absent from December 28 until January 2, 1917. The court 
heard that his battalion was moving to the front from Cow Lane on December 27 and 
that  Bunting  was  present  at  the  time.  The  following  morning  at  roll  call  he  was 
reported  missing.  Despite  Bunting’s  guilty  plea  he  was  given  three  years’  penal 
servitude, later commuted to two years’ IHL. The severity of this sentence was a 
consequence of his unit moving to the front trenches. He did not serve his full sentence 
and was discharged from prison in April 1918 with the remainder of his sentence 
suspended. Bunting was with his unit less than three months when he was reported an 
illegal absentee in July. He did not return to his unit until November 11. He was tried 
                                                 
75 NAA: B2455, Brissenden C J, service record.  
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on November 18 for deserting from July 20 until November 11 and awarded four 
years’ penal servitude.
 76  
The sentence Bunting received for his first court-martial offence highlights the 
difficulty the Australian military faced in dealing with absence from the front line. 
Bunting was only twenty-years-old at the time and the court could have taken some 
account of his age. Convicting him of a lesser offence to allow Field Punishment to be 
awarded may have been more appropriate. It would have given him a second chance, 
and thus avoided the possibility of him becoming tainted by mixing with the hardened 
cases in prison. From early January 1917 until his discharge on November 12, 1919, 
apart  from  his  voyage  home,  Bunting  would  spend  less  than  three  months  out  of 
prison.
77 
Private (5343) Ernest Henry Gay joined the 27th Battalion in France in January 
1917 and in March was promoted to lance corporal and to corporal by September. Gay 
did not pick up his first court-martial conviction until May 1918 when he was found 
guilty of ‘unlawfully wounding a comrade’. For this offence he was awarded twelve 
months’ IHL and reverted to Private. This sentence was suspended two weeks later. In 
August he faced a court again, this time charged with desertion, for being absent from 
July 17th to the 23rd. He was found not guilty of desertion but guilty of absence 
without leave and given thirty days’ Field Punishment No. 2. In this case the awarding 
of  Field  Punishment,  instead  of  a  custodial  sentence,  prevented  his  previously 
suspended sentence being executed, thus keeping Gay available for duty as his Field 
Punishment could be completed when his unit was out of the line.  
This sentence also indicates that Field Punishment was an option open to the 
courts when dealing with cases of absence. However, Gay was not available for duty 
long as a month later he was again charged with desertion for a sixteen-day absence. 
                                                 
76 NAA: B2455, Bunting, C, service record. 
77 Ibid., item 34.  
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As before, he was cleared of desertion, but found guilty of absence, and this time 
awarded twelve months’ IHL that could not be suspended because of his previous 
conviction. Gay had faced three courts martial on serious charges from May to August 
1918 that blemished his otherwise good record.
78 
Private  (3202)  Percy  Arnold  Woodbury  was  twenty-years-old  when  he  was 
wounded in action on October 30, 1917, receiving a gunshot wound to his ankle that 
was diagnosed as ‘severe’. He was hospitalised in England and not declared fit for 
duty until April 1918, rejoining his battalion in France the next month. By August, he 
was declared ‘an illegal absentee’ and was arrested later on September 8. He escaped 
confinement the very next day and was not back with his unit until September 14. At 
his  court-martial,  which  was  delayed  until  December,  he  was  found  not  guilty  of 
desertion but guilty of absence without leave and escaping from confinement for which 
he received twelve months’ IHL.
79 Perhaps the ending of hostilities influenced the 
court in not giving this young man a desertion conviction. 
The claim made by these signatories to the appeal that their military crimes were 
committed after the signing of the Armistice is clearly wrong, except in the case of 
Private  Jansen.  It  seems  clear,  too,  that  the  definition  of  desertion  as  opposed  to 
absence without leave was open to interpretation by the court. It does suggest that the 
courts could exercise flexibility, in that many of the cases examined here appear, on 
paper at least, clear cases of desertion but which resulted in a conviction for absence 
without leave. In only one of these convictions for absence was Field Punishment 
awarded which avoided bringing in a previously suspended sentence and sending a 
man to prison. Field Punishment was an option open to the courts but one that they 
rarely used to punish serious cases of absence. By not using the options and powers 
                                                 
78 NAA: B2455, Gay, E H, service record. 
79 NAA: B2455, Woodbury, Percy Arnold, service record  
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they possessed Australian courts were contributing to the comparatively high rates of 
imprisonment of Australian soldiers. 
Soldiers sentenced to imprisonment faced the dilemma of what they should tell 
their  loved  ones  back  home.  Families  faced  a  period  when  there  was  little  news 
coming  their  way  during  the  process  of  waiting  for  trial,  conviction  and  finally 
incarceration in a military prison. No doubt this uncertainty was contributed to by the 
convicted themselves who would have had a natural reluctance to inform their relatives 
of their crime and imprisonment. As discussed earlier, prisoners were allowed one 
letter on arrival at a military prison, and if they could not bring themselves to pass on 
their news to their next-of-kin then another month would pass before they would have 
the opportunity to do so. Contributing to these problems was the fact that paperwork 
concerning convicted soldiers took some considerable time to be processed at Base 
Records, which meant that they were sometimes unable to give a definitive reply to 
anxious relatives. Next-of-kin would not normally be informed of the imprisonment of 
their relative, unless they specifically asked for his whereabouts and those records 
were at hand. This was the case with Private Bunting’s wife and father in Australia. 
They were unaware he was undergoing prison sentence and their letters were returned 
marked “Unable to Trace”. Anxious letters were written to Base Records in Melbourne 
requesting  an  explanation  and  they  were  given  the  address  of  the  23rd  Battalion 
(Abroad). Bunting had written to his wife telling her that he had only permission to 
write one letter a month, but from her letters to Base Records it seems clear she was 
unaware of his imprisonment.
80 
Private Nicholls' relatives in Australia, having not heard from him for some time 
and  having  their  letters  returned  marked  ‘sick  in  hospital’  or  ‘left  hospital’,  were 
becoming increasingly anxious, too. His brother wrote to the officer in charge of Base 
                                                 
80 NAA: B2455, Bunting, C, service record, item 21.  
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Records in July 1917 to enquire if he had been wounded, or worse. He stated that the 
portion of his brother’s pay that was paid to his mother had stopped, with no reason 
given. He went on to write, quite poignantly, ‘that such an occurrence causes us great 
anxiety, and I would be pleased to know the best or worst of him, so as I can relieve 
my parents’ minds somewhat’.
81 He received a reply in August from Base Records that 
his brother’s name had not come up on any injured list and that the subject of his pay 
had been referred to the military paymaster in Melbourne.
82 No mention was made of 
his court-martial. This could be due to Base Records being behind in paperwork, or the 
officer in charge unwilling to disclose the desertion conviction. His brother’s letter was 
a powerful one in that it conveyed the anxieties felt by all relatives who fear the worst 
when deprived of news. This is a recurrent theme in the archival records of convicted 
soldiers. One can imagine the shock and bewilderment they felt when they received 
news of a family member who had volunteered to serve in the AIF and was now 
convicted of a serious military crime and was in prison. 
The  convicted  mutineers  had  their  sentences  remitted  under  the  terms  of  the 
amnesty and embarked for Australia in the latter part of 1919. They were officially 
discharged  ‘Services  No  Longer  Required’  instead  of  the  normal  ‘Termination  of 
Period of Enlistment’, a reflection of the fact they were disciplinary cases. However, 
returning  disciplinary  cases  back  to  Australia  by  ship  was  not  always  a  smooth 
passage, especially with convicted men on board with a proven track record of causing 
trouble. This proved to be the case with H.M.T. Port Sydney where there was trouble 
throughout the voyage. A riot broke out on board when the ship docked at Fremantle. 
Two men escaped, and Private Broadhead, who had tested the disciplinary system to 
its limit, was bayoneted as he tried to escape.  
                                                 
81 NAA: B2455, Nicholls, Arthur William, service record, item 31, letter from Mr. A. P. Nicholls to 
the Officer in Charge, Base Records Office, Melbourne, July 31, 1917. 
82 Ibid., item 21, reply from Officer in Charge, Base Records, Caulfield, August 9, 1917.  
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Troubled voyage home 
Broadhead began his journey back to Victoria on September 23, 1919 on the troopship 
H.M.T.  Port  Sydney,  along  with  other  disciplinary  cases,  many  of  whom  had 
previously  been  incarcerated  in  Loos  Gaol,  France  and  Lewes  detention  barracks, 
England. It was while the ship was docked in Fremantle that a ‘serious disturbance’ 
took  place  in  which  two  prisoners  escaped  and  Broadhead  received  a  serious 
abdominal wound whilst trying to overpower a sentry.
83 Meanwhile, Broadhead’s wife 
had written to the Defence Department asking when she could see her husband again. 
She was told that he was returning to Australia ‘for disciplinary reasons’ and that he 
would be detained on arrival in Victoria until it was ascertained ‘whether his case 
comes  within  the  provisions  of  the  amnesty  granted  in  certain  cases’.
84  After 
Broadhead was wounded she was informed that he was ‘seriously ill’,
85 but not told of 
the bayonet wound.  
Maintaining discipline throughout the voyage had proved difficult, according to 
Major F. C. Hardie, who was appointed by the Defence Department to investigate the 
wounding  of  Broadhead.  He  reported  that  the  Officer  Commanding  Troops, 
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Currie, stated ‘that there are about 100 men aboard who are of 
bad  character’,  and  that  Currie  had  dealt  with  cases  of  ‘assault  and  robbery  with 
violence’ during the voyage.
86 Because of this, Currie sought permission to disembark 
prisoners at Fremantle, who he described as ‘desperate characters’. Permission was 
refused,
87 and the Port Sydney sailed on to South Australia and Victoria. While at sea, 
                                                 
83 NAA: B2455, Broadhead, A S, service record (contains findings of Court of Enquiry held at sea), 
item 66, cable, headed ‘Defence, Melbourne’. 
84 Ibid., item 49, letter from the Officer I/C Base Records to Mrs. E. Broadhead, September 30, 1919. 
85 Ibid., item 66, Defence Department cable. 
86 Ibid., item 67, letter to The Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, November 10, 1919 and 
signed by Major F. C. Hardie for Lieutenant-Colonel Administering Command, 4th Military District. 
87 Ibid., item 66 Defence Department Cable (no date).  
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the Adjutant General directed Currie, by radio, to hold a court of inquiry into the 
circumstances leading up to the serious wounding of Broadhead.
88 This investigation 
reveals the difficulty in maintaining discipline at sea, especially with prisoners who 
had a proven track record of causing trouble and who had freedom of movement on 
board, apart from a few who were in the cells. 
At the Court of Enquiry it emerged that eight prisoners, who had joined the ship 
from Lewes detention barracks, were held in cells. Four were held because they were 
to complete their sentences in Australia, and the others, although under suspended 
sentences, were being held because they received additional sentences from courts 
martial  on  board  ship.  A  further  sixty  soldiers  from  Lewes  were  returning  under 
suspended sentences, and according to Captain G. L. Allen, had ‘throughout the trip 
had been giving continual trouble, and who always worked together as a gang.’
89  
Lieutenant S. R. Downe, the Orderly Officer, in his evidence to the Court of 
Enquiry, stated that the ship was berthed within easy reach of the wharf at Fremantle 
and that around 8.30pm on November 4 a number of men were gathered around the 
two portholes in the guardroom vicinity. According to Downe, the men were ‘hauling 
in something’ which later proved to be bottles of beer, which were passed through the 
bars to the prisoners in the cells. He reacted to this situation by placing guards on the 
wharf to prevent alcohol being passed up the side of the ship. At midnight, Downe 
stated ‘that many of these soldiers seemed to be drunk’.
90 By this time he was dealing 
with a serious situation, as the men in cells became abusive and started cutting down 
the woodwork panels and attempting to kick-in the door. Downe was ordered to use 
force if necessary by his commanding officer and he told the prisoners ‘that armed 
force would be used against them’ if they broke out. Downe reported that around the 
                                                 
88  Ibid.,  item  65,  cable  addressed  to  Officer  Commanding  Troops,  Port  Sydney,  from  Adjutant 
General, November 7, 1919. 
89 Ibid., item 81, testimony of Captain L. G. Allen, M.C., 28th Battalion, AIF, at the Court of Inquiry. 
90 Ibid., items 79-80, testimony of Lieutenant S. R. Downe, ASBAC, AIF, at the Court of Inquiry.  
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guardroom a ‘considerable crowd all more less drunk’ had gathered, most of them 
‘hostile to the guard’. In an attempt to return a prisoner to the cells the door was forced 
open and five prisoners got out. The guard closed in on them and in the ensuing 
struggle Broadhead was bayoneted ‘wrestling with a sentry’. He was carried away to 
the  ship’s  hospital  by  one  of  the  prisoners.  The  ‘hostile  onlookers’  became  more 
infuriated and rushed the guard who could not prevent four of the prisoners escaping. 
All this took place in darkness, Downe explained, as some of the light bulbs had been 
smashed and the ‘onlookers’ had easy access to the light switch. The prison guard 
spent  the  next  hour  ‘defending  themselves’  and  preventing  further  escapes  until 
reinforcements arrived.
91 Two of the escapees were captured on board while the other 
two were pursued on the wharf and remained at large when the ship sailed for South 
Australia. 
Lieutenant F. A. D. Watts had entered the guardroom area around 12.15am on the 
5th and saw the prisoners attempting to ‘kick the outer wall down’ the court heard. As 
there  was  no  other  officer  present  at  the  time  he  instructed  the  guard  ‘to  use  the 
bayonet on the first man who came out through the door or the hole’; also warning the 
prisoners that this order had been given the guard. He described the majority of the 
‘onlookers  to  be  in  favour  of  the  prisoners  and  who  were  in  a  state  of  great 
excitement’.
92  Watts  left  before  the  wounding  incident,  leaving  Downe,  who  had 
returned, to take charge. 
The sentry who had bayoneted Broadhead, Lance Corporal W. Barrett, had made 
a  statement  soon  after  the  incident  to  Captain  Allen.  Barrett  described  how  four 
prisoners had rushed the cell door after the guard had tried to return a prisoner who had 
been allowed to the latrines. When Broadhead tried to wrest a rifle from a sentry, 
Barrett picked up a rifle and bayonet and warned Broadhead ‘that if he didn’t let go I 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., item 81, testimony of Lieutenant F. A. D. Watts, 26th Battalion, AIF, at the Court of Inquiry.  
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would stick him – he continued and I did stick him’.
93 Allen considered Barrett’s life 
was now in danger and that he was in need of protection from the ‘threatening attitude 
of the ex Lewes men’. Therefore arrangements were made for Barrett to disembark at 
Fremantle and to catch later transport to his own military district. Allen opted against 
searching  the  ship  for  the  escaped  prisoners  favouring  placing  ‘a  strong  patrol  of 
sergeants’ on the wharf. He feared that further bloodshed would have resulted trying to 
return the prisoners to their cells in the darkened conditions onboard.
94 By morning the 
disturbances had ended and two of the escapees were found onboard. 
Captain  G.  W.  Holmes,  the  Orderly  Medical  Officer,  carried  out  the  medical 
examination  of  Broadhead.  He  told  the  Court  that  in  his  opinion  the  bayonet  had 
entered the ‘back of the right side’ and exited ‘in the front of the mid-line’ causing a 
wound about half and inch in length. Holmes judged that the wound was serious and 
he observed that Broadhead’s ‘breath smelt slightly of alcohol’.
95 
The Court of Enquiry found: 
That ‘under the exceptional circumstances described in the evidence, every reasonable 
precaution was taken by the O.C. Troops on board H.M.T. “Port Sydney” to prevent 
prisoners  from  escaping;  that  the  Orderly  Officer  and  the  Guard  did  all  that  could 
reasonably be expected of them and that therefore no blame can be attached to anyone on 
board in connection with the escape of the prisoners in question. 
That Private Broadhead came by his wound in attempting to escape with violence from 
the Guard-room, having been emphatically warned beforehand of what he might expect; 
and that Corporal Barrett inflicted the wound upon the prisoner in the execution of his 
duty, using no more force than was necessary.
96 
These findings are not surprising. Two warnings were given by officers of the 
intention  to  use  force,  and  then  one  by  Barrett  before  he  bayoneted  Broadhead. 
Broadhead, who was hospitalised in Fremantle, could not give his version at the Court 
of Enquiry and there is no record of any statement being taken from him. As he was 
unable to face a court there was no charge brought against him for trying to escape. His 
                                                 
93 Ibid., item 84, written statement by (1519) Lance Corporal W. Barrett, AIF, at the Court of Inquiry. 
94 Ibid., item 82, testimony of Captain L. G. Allen, MC, 28th Battalion, AIF, at the Court of Inquiry. 
95 Ibid., item 82, testimony of Captain G. W. Holmes, AAMC, AIF, at the Court of Inquiry. 
96 Ibid., item 83, the Finding of the Court of Inquiry.  
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discharge  on  January  4,  1920  stated  that  his  services  were  no  longer  required. 
Broadhead had tested the disciplinary code to its limit during his service. The military 
authorities  had  done  their  best  not  to  reward  his  military  crimes  with  custodial 
sentences.  In  the  end  the  army’s  disciplinary  code  became  impotent  against  his 
determined efforts. There was nothing to frighten him with. He had weathered Field 
Punishment No. 1 and imprisonment and was prepared to spend further periods in 
custody if necessary. Broadhead’s poor disciplinary record caused the forfeiture of all 
his rights to medals and his claim for War Gratuity was rejected. 
The two escapees, Private (1114) Hugh Leslie Smith and Private (3535a) Thomas 
L. Winstanley, who remained at large when the Port Sydney sailed, had histories of 
escaping from confinement (see Appendix vi for more detailed records of the men 
involved  in  the  rioting  on  board).  Smith’s  record  is  a  sad  one  in  that,  at  nearly 
nineteen-years-old when he enlisted, this young man was in trouble from the outset, 
with his crimes getting progressively worse. In June 1916 he was convicted by court-
martial of being absent for one day, drunkenness, and escaping from confinement, for 
which  he  was  awarded  forty-two  days’  Field  Punishment  No.  2,  which  was  later 
commuted  to  twenty-eight  days.  One  week  after  his  release  he  was  charged  with 
drunkenness and was severely dealt with, being sentenced to twelve months’ IHL
97. 
This draconian sentence was not commuted or suspended and sent this youngster down 
the spiral path. He was released from prison on July 13, 1917 but was declared an 
illegal absentee on July 21. He was returned to custody on September 9 and escaped 
nine days later. At his court-martial he was found guilty of absence and sentenced to 
two years’ IHL, which was subsequently suspended. He returned to his unit and within 
a month he ‘accidentally injured himself’ by falling into a shell hole and breaking his 
leg, which caused him to be evacuated to England. After recovering, Smith picked up 
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one sentence after another and had to face two separate trials in civil courts charge 
with theft and assault. His final court-martial appearance on charges of escaping from 
confinement,  attempting  to  escape  from  custody,  making  a  false  statement,  and 
absence from April 16 to May 20, 1918 had to wait until his release in November from 
a civilian prison. Smith was found guilty on all these charges and was awarded seven 
months’ detention, which brought into operation his previously suspended sentence 
from 9 October 1917. Smith added to his troubles while aboard the Port Sydney. He 
faced a DCM at sea and was convicted on two counts of ‘violently assaulting another 
soldier’ and stealing money. For these offences he was sentenced to two years’ IHL.
98 
Smith had good reason to believe that he would be spending the near future in jail and 
had not much to lose by escaping. His service record shows that his initial discharge 
was July 21, 1920 (desertion), but this was amended in October to read SNLR.
99 It is 
not clear when Smith made it back home, but there is no record of any further action 
taken against him. At nineteen-years-old Smith had been given a one-year custodial 
sentence with hard labour for drunkenness. This sentence illustrates the inconsistency 
in sentencing offenders, as he served the full year in custody. It is interesting to note 
that Field Punishment No. 1 was not awarded to Smith for any of his crimes.  
Private  Winstanley,  who  remained  at  large  with  Smith,  embarked  for  active 
service in October 1915. In July 1916 he fell foul of the civil authorities and was tried 
at Dorchester Assizes for felony. He was found guilty and sentenced to three months’ 
IHL. In November, on his return to France, he was awarded twenty-eight days’ Field 
Punishment No. 1 for ‘(1) Being in town with a pass (2) Being improperly dressed.’ 
He spent a few weeks with his battalion before a further absence led to his desertion 
                                                 
98 Ibid., Précis of Service for the information of the Medal Board, but see references throughout his 
service record. 
99 Ibid., item 27, letter from Base Records Victoria to Headquarters 3rd Military District asking for 
clarification on Smith’s discharge. On Routine Order No. 84/20 he was discharged on July 21, 1920 
(desertion) and on Routine Order 87/20 he was described as being discharged SNLR on July 18, 1920. 
His discharge on the ‘Précis of Service’, a much later document, shows he was discharged July 21, 1920 
‘as a consequence of being illegally absent from 4.11.19’.  
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conviction for being absent from February 23, 1918 until apprehended on April 9. He 
was sentenced to penal servitude for life, which was later commuted to two years’ 
IHL. He escaped from No. 10 Military Prison in September 1918 and was at large for 
seven weeks until apprehended. On the voyage home on Port Sydney he escaped from 
confinement in Cape Town for a day and was awarded nine months’ IHL by a DCM 
held at sea. It is not clear whether he was apprehended in Fremantle or gave himself 
up, but he embarked on the Pakeha a week after the Port Sydney sailed.
 100  
Private (1799) Henry Nash, who had escaped, but was recaptured on board, was 
also absent at Cape Town, failing to re-embark on the first vessel that had tried to get 
him home. Nash had enlisted in 1915 and picked up his first court-martial offence 
when  transferred  to  France  in  April  1916,  being  sentenced  to  sixty  days’  Field 
Punishment No. 2 for ‘(1) drunkenness (2) Insubordinate language (3) and conduct to 
the prejudice etc.’ Nash was involved in the fighting, however, being wounded in 
action in July 1916, and returning to duty a week later. In September he distinguished 
himself  in  battle  and  was  Mentioned  in  Despatches  ‘for  participation  in  a  very 
successful raid on the enemy trenches on 30.9.16’.
101 Nash had no further charges until 
March 1917 when he faced a court-martial for being absent for one week and escaping 
from confinement. The sentence of three years’ IHL, although commuted to two years, 
seems particularly harsh, although this sentence was suspended a month later. Six 
weeks after rejoining his unit in the field he was charged with wilfully self-inflicting a 
gunshot wound to his left forearm for which he was sentenced to fifteen months’ IHL. 
This caused his previously suspended sentence to come into execution, and in this way 
Nash was ‘rewarded’ for his self-inflicted wound.
102 The guidelines for punishing self-
                                                 
100 I NAA: B2455, Winstanley, Thomas, service record. In October 1946 Winstanley sought help from 
The Sailors’ & Soldiers’ Distress Fund who wrote to the Base Records office for particulars of his 
service. 
101 NAA: B2455, Nash, Henry, service record. 
102 Ibid.  
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maimers could not be followed in this case, being hampered by the severity of the 
previous sentence, a crime that could have been dealt with by the awarding of Field 
Punishment. For his part in the disturbance on Port Sydney he was awarded twenty-
eight days’ detention. 
Another soldier named in the disturbance onboard was Private (6273) William 
John Gleeson who had been awarded fifteen years’ penal servitude in December 1918 
for desertion, a sentence that was later commuted to two years’ IHL. Gleeson had 
picked up his first custodial sentence in May 1918 whilst a patient in a venereal disease 
hospital. At his trial the court was told that Gleeson, along with Sapper (4091) Hugh 
Ball and Private (6037) Edward James Betts were patients in 29th General Hospital 
undergoing venereal disease treatment. The three were part of a fatigue party that was 
handed over to the NCO in charge of the laundry, Sergeant E. Tucker. All three were 
ordered to take off their coats and start working in the laundry. Each man in turn 
refused.  As  each  had  had  their  money  stopped,  they  objected  to  doing  laundry 
alongside men who were being paid. Sergeant Tucker stated that he waited about 
twenty minutes for his order to be obeyed before handing the men over to the provost 
sergeant. Sapper Ball, on behalf of the accused, told the court that they ‘were under the 
impression that fatigues by Australian soldiers in the Hospital were quite voluntary’.
103 
All three were found guilty, and in mitigation each of them claimed to have had clean 
disciplinary  records  up  to  that  point.  Nevertheless,  all  were  sentenced  to  eighteen 
months’ IHL. Ball and Betts had no previous convictions and their sentences were 
suspended a month later.
104 Gleeson had previously served periods of detention for 
drunkenness and absence and had been awarded twenty-eight days’ Field Punishment 
No. 1 by his commanding officer for using abusive language to a superior officer.
105 
                                                 
103 NAA: B2455, Gleeson, W J, items 47-49 deal with the court-martial 
104 NAA: B2455, Ball, H, service record 
105 NAA: B2455, Gleeson, W J, service record.  
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Betts and Ball, who had good disciplinary records before the trial, now had quite 
unnecessary court-martial convictions against their names.
106 The charge of disobeying 
a direct order could have been avoided if the guidelines on laying charges had been 
followed. As sufficient time had not been given for the order to be obeyed, in this case 
it was only twenty minutes, the lesser charge of hesitating to obey a lawful command 
could have been laid. The court-martial could have been avoided if the commanding 
officer had followed the guidelines of preferring lesser charges so he could deal with 
the matter summarily, instead of the costly business of convening a court-martial.
107  
Private (5045) Frances James Barker, 13th Battalion, was also involved in the 
disturbances on Port Sydney. His first conviction for desertion occurred in 1916 when 
he was absent from August 29 until September 2, and was sentenced to twelve years’ 
penal servitude, which was subsequently commuted to two years’ IHL.
108 He remained 
in prison until May 19, 1918, rejoining his unit in June. In July he was wounded in 
action for the second time receiving multiple shrapnel wounds which kept him away 
from his unit for two months. Further unlicensed leave offences resulted in detention 
and forfeiture of pay. In early January 1919 he was sentenced by a court-martial to 
ninety days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for ‘conduct to the prejudice’. By April 1919 he 
had added another court-martial conviction that of ‘Escaping from escort 2/3/19 . . .and 
A.W.L. from 24/3/19 to 17/4/19’, receiving a sentence of six months’ IHL. For his part 
in the disturbance onboard a DCM was convened charging him with: ‘Striking his 
superior officer in the execution of his duty, in that he at Fremantle on H.M.T. ‘Port 
Sydney’ on 5/11/19 struck with his fist in the face Lieut. L. D. R. Snellgrove, 3rd Div. 
Engrs, who was endeavouring to quell a disturbance on board’. He received a sentence 
                                                 
106 NAA: B2455, Betts, E J, service record. 
107  AWM  233/1  Administrative  Instruction  No.  56,  September  9,  1916,  R.  Jackson,  Lieutenant-
Colonel, AA & QMG, Third Australian Division.. 
108 NAA: B2455, Barker, F J, items 15-17, contains the main particulars of Barker’s service. He had 
submitted a request for the re-issue of his RS Badge, which the Adjutant General approved. See items 
30, 32 and 35.   
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of two years’ IHL but only served nine months’ of this sentence. Barker’s war was 
finally over when he was released in August 1920.
109  
The  most  striking  feature  of  the  service  records  examined  above  is  the  large 
number of courts martial, which in most cases resulted in custodial sentences being 
awarded. The framing of the charge was the critical factor in whether a court-martial 
had to be convened. Charging a man ‘with using insubordinate language to a superior 
officer’ or ‘disobeying a lawful command’ are charges that normally have to be dealt 
with by court-martial. However, in these two examples lesser charges could have been 
laid such as ‘making an improper reply to an NCO’ or ‘hesitating to obey an order’, 
charges that could have been dealt summarily by a commanding officer. Many of the 
soldiers examined here were sent to trial on the charges outlined above, were convicted 
and imprisoned. Although many of these sentences were suspended after a few weeks 
in less serious cases, the fact that a man had been awarded a sentence meant that any 
future  court-martial  conviction  would  automatically  bring  into  execution  his 
previously  suspended  sentence.  If  the  commanding  officer  had  dealt  with  the 
offender’s initial crime summarily this would have been avoided, and kept offenders 
out of prison.  
The failure of so many Australian commanders to follow the guidelines to enable 
them to deal with these types of charges summarily, although they were continually 
urged  to  do  by  senior  British  commanders,  contributed  in  great  measure  to  the 
extraordinarily high numbers of Australian soldiers in prison. The awarding of Field 
Punishment  Number  1,  and  of  course  the  ultimate  sanction  of  the  death  sentence, 
helped  reduce  British  and  other  Dominion  imprisonment  rates.  Another  feature  of 
these service records is that once a man had been imprisoned within a short period 
                                                 
109 Ibid., item 17, on his particulars of service it shows that Barker was discharged from the AIF on 
December 30, 1919. However, on the same document, in handwriting, it states he was not released until 
August 10, 1920.  
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after his release he was re-offending. These records also show that in many cases 
prison did not act as a reforming or deterrent measure; in fact it had the opposite effect. 
Field Punishment, distasteful as it was, kept offenders mixing with, and becoming 
influenced by, the more hardened types that were imprisoned because of the severity of 
their  crimes.  The  reluctance  of  many  Australian  commanders  to  award  Field 
Punishment No. 1 is a factor in the unnecessary convening of costly trials, and the 
needless tainting of soldiers’ service records with courts martial convictions. 
It  seems  clear  from  the  records  of  the  men  examined  that  they  were  no 
‘desperados’, but in the majority of cases men who habitually offended, and too many 
times were ‘rewarded’ with custodial sentences that kept them away from the front 
line. Significantly, almost all the men enlisted in 1915 or early 1916, and their offences 
for absence increased in the mid part of 1918, when the war was at its height. There is 
also a sense of an ‘industrial dispute’ going on between men who no longer wanted to 
serve and an army authority determined to thwart their efforts to avoid duty. However, 
nowhere in these records did ‘battle fatigue’ emerge as mitigation in any of the cases 
resulting in convictions. What the records do reveal is an inadequacy on the part of 
Australian disciplinary procedures to deal with men who were serial offenders. 
Without the ultimate sanction of the death penalty maintaining discipline among 
Australian troops inevitably relied on the consent of the soldiers themselves. But the 
army authorities were in the end powerless to deal with soldiers who were prepared to 
treat Field Punishment and imprisonment as occupational hazards in their attempt to 
avoid frontline duty. These problems associated with dealing with habitual offenders 
only reinforced the British High Command’s view that the death penalty was really the 
only deterrent to keep men in line and that Field Punishment No. 1 was an effective 
way of dealing with lesser offences to keep men available for front line duty.  
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 The brother of one of the convicted mutineers, Nicholls, wrote to the authorities 
and asked for news ‘of the best and the worst of him’.
110 The worst in this study ranges 
from the inadequate to the downright calculating. It is as well we assess this behaviour 
for what it was and not attach to it useless labels such as larrikinism, or the display of a 
fiercely  civilian  attitude,  or  worse,  a  frontier  ethos  that  has  an  alleged  healthy 
disrespect for authority. In contrast, the ‘best’ of them, the majority, gained the respect 
of allies and enemy alike. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 (NAA) B2455, Nicholls, Arthur William, item 31, letter from Mr. A. P. Nicholls to the Officer in 
Charge, Base Records Office, Melbourne, 31st July 1917. 
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CONCLUSION 
Australian troops on the Western Front believed that the death penalty would never be 
applied to them. They also believed that at war’s end a general amnesty would apply to 
all military crimes. They were to be proved correct in both beliefs. At the same time 
GHQ  and  senior  Australian  officers  held  the  view  throughout  the  war  that  their 
inability to impose the death penalty on Australians was the major cause of Australian 
indiscipline away from the front, in particular the most prevalent crimes of absence 
and desertion. On the evidence presented here it can be argued that they were also right 
in  their  belief.  It  will  be  recalled,  as  an  approximate  guide,  that  one  in  fourteen 
Australians, one in fifty New Zealanders, and one in twenty-five Canadians faced a 
court-martial, figures that were reflected in the comparatively high imprisonment rates 
for Australians. Although the evidence points to a clear case that Australians were 
offending more than any other group within the Army, their high rates of court martial 
and imprisonment need qualifying.  
The  High  Command,  although  they  were  alarmed  at  the  high  numbers  of 
absentees in the AIF and fought long and hard to get the Australians under the Army 
Act in full, were not pressing for stiffer prison sentences that would reward absentees 
with custodial sentences. They were urging Australian courts to use the powers they 
possessed, in particular, to award Field Punishment No. 1, which could be imposed 
summarily by a Commanding Officer without the need to convene a court-martial and 
thus avoid giving the offender a prison conviction. Sir William Robertson made this 
point when he was canvassed for his views on the efficacy of Field Punishment No. 1  
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in 1919, and thought the nature of the punishment needed to be ‘distasteful’ for it to act 
as a deterrent. As a punishment it had the benefit of preventing men from receiving the 
taint of a prison sentence for a military crime, kept them available for duty, and had the 
effect  of  not  rewarding  crime.  Although  it  can  be  argued  that  Field  Punishment, 
properly  administered,  was  a  deterrent  in  itself  and  the  tying  up  of  men  was  an 
unnecessary degradation, the fact that Australian courts preferred not to sentence men 
to this form of punishment meant in practice that they were needlessly sending men to 
prison. From the examination of the service records in this study of men convicted for 
absence without leave and desertion, there appeared at times to be no clear distinction 
between the two. Some courts did exercise a degree of flexibility in downgrading what 
appeared to be clear-cut cases of desertion to the lesser charge of absence without 
leave  to  avoid  imposing  a  hefty  prison  sentence.  Nevertheless,  the  lesser  charge 
usually attracted a prison sentence and not Field Punishment.   
Once a man was given a prison sentence, even if that sentence was subsequently 
suspended, it would count against him in any future court-martial he faced that resulted 
in a conviction. If the court did not exercise the option of awarding Field Punishment 
for his subsequent conviction and imposed a prison term instead, then his previously 
suspended sentence would have to be put into execution. By doing this Australian 
courts were adding to the Australian prison population. British imprisonment rates had 
been high in 1915, reaching five per 1,000, before the introduction of suspension of 
sentences, which helped to reduce this number dramatically. This rate of imprisonment 
of British soldiers does suggest that they were not as servile and subservient as Bean 
thought. The British imprisonment rate was kept down further, in part, by commanding 
officers exercising their prerogative to deal with offences summarily, as by 1916 they 
had the power to impose up to 28 days’ Field Punishment No. 1 without the need of a 
court-martial.  Their willingness to impose Field Punishment No. 1 and deal with  
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offences summarily gave them more flexibility than Australian courts were prepared to 
exercise and kept many British soldiers out of prison. But the main deterrent for British 
and other Dominion soldiers was the threat of facing the death penalty for absence – 
which  could  be  construed  as  desertion  –  and  so  discouraged  men  from  repeat 
offending. By comparison, an Australian knew no matter how many convictions he 
chalked up for his absences he would not face the death penalty. It is a feature of the 
records examined here that many of the Australians convicted of crimes were repeat 
offenders. 
Bean  did  not  give  a  reason  why  Australian  authorities  could  not  as  readily 
suspend sentences. In this study there is evidence that most men awarded their first 
prison sentence had it suspended, but that suspension usually came after a man had 
spent a considerable time in prison. The problem was that Australian courts were too 
willing to imprison in the first instance. At the same time they seemed reluctant to 
convict in cases of crimes against inhabitants, as the figures for courts martial offences 
provided by the Adjutant General indicate. It is not clear why Australian courts would 
do this, and more research is needed to illuminate this point, but by 1918 GHQ were 
afraid that when hostilities ended, and large numbers of Australian were still in France, 
there would be serious incidents with the French civilian population. 
The intense interest shown by the Commander-in-Chief, and successive British 
Secretaries of State for War, Lord Milner and Churchill, in the alleged murder of a 
French citizen by Private Banks was not just an expression of the fear of troubled 
relations with the French once the fighting had stopped; it was more to do with them 
getting the example they felt they needed to rein in Australian indiscipline. The fact 
that they spent so much time and energy on this case when the war was at its height is 
an indication of the importance they attached to getting an Australian tried for his life. 
The  Australian  government  would  not  budge  on  the  death  penalty,  and  with  their  
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concession that penal servitude for life would be the maximum sentence for murder, 
they were able to maintain the privileged position the Australians enjoyed. Private 
Banks probably spent the rest of his life blissfully unaware of all the attention his case 
had attracted from GHQ and senior British political figures. He also probably never 
knew just how close he came to being tried for his life in a British or French court, and 
if  found  guilty  Australian  authorities  would  have  had  no  power  to  commute  the 
sentence. 
Prison was meant to be a deterrent, and the examination of the regime that existed 
in No. 7 Military Prison shows that life for the inmates was made as miserable as 
possible.  No doubt it did work as a deterrent for many, but the Adjutant General 
thought that although it dissuaded many British soldiers from transgressing again it 
had  little  in  the  way  of  a  reforming  effect  on  Australians.  His  remark  that  the 
Australians tended to cause more trouble in prisons and while in hospital than all the 
other  troops  put  together  in  many  ways  indicates  that  the  Australians  did  identify 
themselves as separate and different from other troops. This group identity could keep 
each other going in times of battle, and at the same time be the cause of endless trouble 
while they were imprisoned, hospitalised, or on troop ships. 
Were the Australians significantly different from British troops and less amenable 
to  being  disciplined?  Haig,  although  he  accepted  they  came  from  a  freer  society, 
thought this was not an excuse for indiscipline and wanted them treated the same as 
everyone else. The incorrigible civilian attitude attributed to Australian troops has been 
advanced to explain away indiscipline as a natural reaction of independent, free men to 
a  harsh  and  intrusive  British  Army  disciplinary  code.  If  the  Australian  national 
character  was  the  product  of  a  frontier  ethos  with  mateship,  individualism,  and  a 
civilian attitude as its central tenets, then surely other colonial troops from Canada, 
South Africa and New Zealand could claim the same, and yet their disciplinary record  
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away from the front was much better than that of the Australians. Comradeship in 
battle, or mateship, was not exclusive to Australians. The Australians did display a 
more civilian attitude towards soldiering than the rest of the Army, mainly because 
they were allowed to, owing to the fact that two levels of discipline operated on the 
Western Front. 
The Australians, however, did see themselves as being different and superior to 
other  armies,  especially  English  troops,  with  whom  they  made  unfavourable 
comparisons  concerning  battle  performance.  Although  there  was  no  firm  basis  for 
believing  that  English  troops  were  under-performing,  and  no  meaningful  way  of 
assessing that, it was a belief that was held and amounted to ‘group think’ among 
Australians. This belief may well have had a positive effect in bolstering group or 
national identity, by seeing themselves as different and superior to other troops. The 
negative side of this thinking can be seen in the September 21st mutiny when the 
general complaint of those convicted was that they thought by returning to the line 
they would be doing ‘other peoples’ work’. Bean thought they would be too, alluding 
to the British inability to keep up in the Official History version of the mutiny. Further, 
there  is  an  undertone  of  this  attitude  in  some  of  Bean’s  accounts  of  British 
performances in the field, which Edmonds had challenged him over when checking the 
draft  chapters.  This  type  of  thinking,  which  appeared  to  be  widespread  among 
Australians, could well have been instrumental in 1st Battalion men, who previously 
had  good  military  and  disciplinary  records,  talking  themselves  into  what  they 
considered industrial action, but which was in essence mutiny. 
Haig had conceded that Australian battle discipline held up during the war despite 
the problems with discipline away from the front. Fighting a modern industrialized war 
required the acquisition of a military professionalism, which could only be achieved 
through training, discipline, leadership and a general improvement in tactics. This was  
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true  of  the  Army  in  general,  and  was  something  Edmonds  had  alluded  to  in  his 
exchanges with Bean. Edmonds had told Bean that the Australians were a far better 
outfit in 1918 than when they first arrived on the Western Front in 1916, mentioning 
their excellent staff work, and their having the advantage of remaining in their own 
Divisions. In many ways Edmonds’ views fit neatly into theories of modern warfare, 
which argue that units that train together and stay together become a more effective 
fighting  force.  Therefore,  other,  more  important  factors  were  the  real  cause  of 
Australian battle success than any alleged Australian traits.  
The Army authorities tried to cover every avenue to prevent men avoiding duty. 
They were alive to attempts at self-maiming, with every accidental wounding arousing 
suspicion, and if found to be owing to negligence attracting the same punishment as 
self-inflicting  a  wound.  They  tried  to  keep  the  venereal  disease  rate  down  by 
education, but in that personal area of men’s lives they were powerless. The high 
venereal disease rate among Australians suggests that the men at times were being 
reckless. Contracting venereal disease was one of the few loopholes in the system that 
would take men out of action for as long as two or three months without fear of serious 
disciplinary consequences. It is difficult to establish for certain whether men did take 
advantage of this loophole, but the high venereal disease rate, despite the thorough 
education campaign that was mounted, needs to be explained. It would be surprising if 
they did not take advantage, considering what some men were prepared to do to avoid 
duty at the front. 
There was little uniformity in punishing crime on the Western Front. The death 
penalty  was  a  powerful  deterrent  for  the  rest  of  the  Army,  but  its  absence  for 
Australian troops meant that there was little with which to frighten them. Even when 
their actions, such as the mutiny in the 1st Battalion, could have resulted in the death 
penalty being imposed, it never occurred to Australian senior officers to remind the  
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men who were walking to the rear of that fact. It seemed they were of the view that this 
immunity applied to all crimes, even mutiny for Australians.  
In the end an army can only function with the consent of the men under their 
command. The vast majority of Australian troops who volunteered freely gave that 
consent. When writing the Official History Bean had burdened the Diggers with his 
conceived notion of what he believed the national character should be. He helped 
create the Anzac Legend which has had a profound and far lasting influence upon the 
historiography  of  Australian  involvement  in  the  First  World  War.  A  concern 
throughout this study has been that by focusing on the negative side of behaviour – 
indiscipline – that this could somehow tarnish the reputation of the many thousands of 
men who volunteered and who did themselves and their country proud. However, the 
Australian medical historian, Butler, quoted also in chapter four, had made a very 
perceptive comment when discussing the high venereal disease rates among Australian 
soldiers.  His  words  are  relevant  to  the  main  focus  of  this  study  and  the  concern 
expressed. He wrote: ‘The figures will discourage those who (doing a great disservice) 
attach unwanted haloes to the very human heroes who fought and died in the Great 
War’.  
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A p p e n d i x   i  
SERVICE RECORDS OF THE CONVICTED NCOS 
OF ‘D’ COMPANY 
Corporal A. E. Alyward, a grocer, was twenty-one-years-old when he enlisted in June 
1915. He embarked for Alexandria in November that year and bouts of sickness would 
keep him out of action for several months during 1916 and 1917. In February 1917 he 
joined  the  1st  Battalion  in  France,  but  by  May  he  was  hospitalised  with  malaria. 
Recurring bouts of malaria and pleurisy kept him unfit for duty until November 1917, 
he only rejoining his Battalion in February 1918. Alyward’s record of service in 1918 
demonstrates just how inexperienced he was, not just as a combatant, but as well as a 
non commissioned officer. Alyward spent his first month back in France being re-
trained, returning to his Battalion on March 2. He was appointed lance corporal on 
April 13 and by 8 June had progressed to temporary corporal, being promoted to 
corporal later that month. On August 17 he went to Corps School and only returned to 
his Battalion on September 7. Within two weeks of his return from Corps School he 
was facing a refusal from his Platoon to attack. He clearly had little time to gain 
experience as a corporal and what sort of frontline experience he gained is not clear 
from the record.  
Alyward, despite his clean record, received ten years’ penal servitude and was 
admitted to Military Prison Audricq. In March 1919 he left France under escort to 
England to serve the remainder of his sentence at HM Prison Portland. Alyward, like 
the other military offenders, had his sentence remitted under the amnesty that came 
into effect on April 25, 1919 by order of the General Officer Commanding (GOC)  
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Southern  Command.  He  embarked  for  Australia  in  July  1919,  and  was  finally 
discharged on August 17, 1919.
113  
Corporal H. E. Slater’s experience as a non commissioned officer was as limited 
as Alyward’s. He was born in Kent, England, and was twenty-three-years-old when he 
enlisted at sea on board HMAT Oraova, eventually arriving in England on June 7, 
1916. He joined the 1st Battalion in France in November that year and was appointed 
lance corporal in September 1917. In January 1918 he accidentally wounded himself, 
without negligence, causing lacerations to his hand. This wound and an outbreak of 
boils would keep Slater away from his Battalion until May 11, 1918. Within three 
weeks he was admitted to hospital again suffering from boils and was not fit to rejoin 
his Battalion until July 6. On August 31 he was promoted to temporary corporal, just 
three weeks before he was involved in the refusal to attack. Apart from one unlicensed 
leave from hospital, for which he incurred the loss of seven days’ pay, Slater had no 
previous convictions against his name. Slater’s three weeks as a temporary corporal 
got him awarded seven years’ penal servitude and not the ten years which was the 
norm for corporals.
114 
Corporal Rollo Charles Taplin was eighteen-years-old when he enlisted in July 
1916. Although he had no trade or calling listed on his attestation paper, Taplin must 
have impressed his senior officers for he was appointed lance corporal in March 1917 
and promoted to corporal by June that year. He was wounded in action in France in 
August 1917 but recovered in a few days to rejoin his unit. In 1918 he suffered from 
influenza and was sick from June to July, and other duties kept him absent from his 
unit for a period of three months up to 3 August. His service record is clean, up to  
September  21,  with  no  charges  of  any  kind  being  laid  against  him.  He  was  the 
youngest of the NCOs convicted but still received ten years’ penal servitude. His war 
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medals (1914/15 Star, British War Medal and Victory Medal) were initially denied 
him, but were later restored.
 115  
Lance Corporal E. A. Besley, a coachbuilder by trade, was twenty-one-years-old 
when  he  enlisted  in  the  AIF  in  June  1915.  He  was  in  Gallipoli  for  a  month  in 
November 1915 then embarked for Alexandria and joined the BEF in France in March 
1916. In July 1916 he was wounded in action (gas poisoning) but was discharged to 
duty a month later. He would spend two months in hospital in 1917, and married in 
London in August that year. In December 1917 he was transferred to 1st Training 
Battalion in England only rejoining his battalion in France on June 27, 1918. Apart 
from receiving seven days’ detention Besley’s record is free of any military crimes. 
Like many of the accused, Besley had returned from a spell away and had spent little 
time back with his Battalion before the mutiny. Although only a lance corporal, Besley 
received ten years, a sentence usually reserved for corporals. He probably attracted the 
full sentence because of his role as spokesmen for the men at the Nucleus Camp. As a 
disciplinary case he forfeited his right to medals, but restoration was recommended in 
a note on his service record.
116 
Corporal Roger Cooney, a labourer, was twenty-one-years-old when he enlisted 
in June 1915. While in France he was wounded in action in July 1916, suffering a 
gunshot wound to the abdomen, but returned to his unit a month later. In September he 
was wounded in action again receiving a gunshot wound to his left ankle that caused 
him to be evacuated to England where he stayed for most of 1917. In August of that 
year he faced a DCM and was found guilty of using insubordinate language to a 
superior officer for which he received 78 days’ detention. In late January 1918 he was 
back  with  his  battalion  and  in  April  was  promoted  to  lance  corporal,  in  June  to 
temporary corporal and to full corporal on August 29. There is some irony in the fact 
                                                 
115 NAA: A471, 2349, Taplin, R. C., Service No. 3490, 1st Battalion, AIF.  
116 NAA: B2455, Besley E A, Service No. 2562, service record.   
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that Cooney’s bravery in 1918 was acknowledged with the awarding of the Military 
Medal, the gazetting of this occurring while he was in prison. Cooney’s bravery and 
his three weeks as a corporal were barely taken into account as he received a sentence 
of eight years’ penal servitude.
117 
Milton Hasthorpe, a labourer from New South Wales, was thirty-years-old when 
he enlisted in July 1915. He was with the 1st Battalion in France by the end of March 
1916 and appointed lance corporal in July of that year. Later that year in October he 
was wounded in action, receiving a gunshot wound to his back. This wound kept him 
away  from  his  unit  until  mid  February  1917.  He  became  an  instructor  and  was 
transferred to England for part of 1917. In February 1918 he rejoined his Battalion and 
was promoted temporary corporal on March 30. Training would keep him away from 
his  unit  for  several  weeks  until  he  rejoined  his  unit  on  August  1  with  his  final 
promotion to lance sergeant on August 29. Hasthorpe had no disciplinary charges 
against  his  name  and  he  received  ten  years’  penal  servitude  for  his  part  in  the 
mutiny.
118 
George F. Wethered, a machinist, was twenty-one-years-old when he enlisted in 
March  1916  and  joined  his  Battalion  in  France  in  November  that  year.  He  was 
wounded in action in April 1917 suffering a gunshot wound to his ankle that kept him 
away from his unit until October 21, 1917. He was appointed lance corporal on March 
30, 1918, temporary corporal on June 8 and corporal on July 20. Corps school and an 
ear infection kept Wethered away from his Unit until September 7. He therefore had 
two weeks as a practising corporal before having to deal with a walkout of his men. He 
had a clean disciplinary record and received eight years’ penal servitude for his part in 
the mutiny.
119 
                                                 
117 NAA: B2455, Cooney R, Service No. 3563, service record. 
118 NAA: B2455, Hasthorpe M, Service No. 3351, service record. 
119 NAA: B2455, Wethered G, Service No. 3661, service record.  
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Lance Corporal C. W. Muir, a labourer, was just over eighteen-years-old when he 
enlisted in July 1915. In February 1916 he was with the 1st Battalion at Tel-el-Kebir 
and undertook training as a Lewis machine gunner. His duty in France began in March 
1916 and little is recorded of his progress that year. In April 1917 he was wounded in 
action receiving gun shot wounds to his right calf and left thigh that kept him away 
from  his  unit  until  November  1917.  The  same  month  he  was  promoted  to  lance 
corporal. In 1918 he was with his battalion from March 30 onwards having spent some 
weeks at corporal school. Muir, whose disciplinary record was clean, received five 
years’ penal servitude for taking part in the mutiny.
120 
Lance Corporal Edward Clifford Preston, an orchardist, was almost twenty-five-
years-old  when  he  enlisted  in  January  1916.  He  joined  the  battalion  in  France  in 
November 1916 and was wounded in action in April 1917, suffering gunshot wounds 
to both thighs. This serious wound kept him away from his unit until late October 
1917. Bouts of sickness plus training leave meant he could not rejoin his battalion until 
March 1918. His promotion to Lance Corporal occurred in May 1918, and like so 
many of the accused NCOs he had limited experience. He received five years’ penal 
servitude for his part in the mutiny, and apart from a forfeiture of five day’s pay there 
were no other disciplinary charges against him.
121  
Lance Corporal David Watkins Humphreys, a miner, was aged twenty-six when 
he enlisted in July 1915. His first posting was to Tel-el-Kebir, then on to France in 
March 1916. In July of that year he was wounded in action receiving a gunshot wound 
to his arm, which kept him away from his unit until January 1917. He was appointed 
Lance Corporal in November 1917, and married in England in February 1918. He had 
long spells away from his battalion in 1918 only returning in August. He received the 
                                                 
120 NAA: B2455, Muir C W, Service No. 3407, service record. 
121 NAA: B2455, Preston E C, Service No. 3077a, service record.  
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standard five years’ penal servitude for lance corporals for his part in the mutiny and 
his disciplinary record was clean up to that point. 
Lance  Corporal  James  Robert  Dawson,  a  labourer,  was  twenty-one-years-old 
when he enlisted in September 1915. He was stationed in Te-el-Kebir in March 1916 
before proceeding to France where he was wounded in action (not serious) in August 
the same year. His promotion to lance corporal was in September 1916, but he spent 
most of 1917 in England with spells in hospital suffering from trench foot. In 1918, 
bouts of sickness and recurring trench foot kept him away from his unit for most of the 
year  until  late  June,  severely  limiting  his  experience  as  an  NCO.  His  disciplinary 
record shows no previous charges against him, and he was awarded five years for his 
part in the mutiny.
122  
Lance Corporal Dudley Neale Steele, a farmer, was twenty-eight-years-old when 
he enlisted in February 1916. He was in France in late 1916 and was wounded in 
action in October 1917, suffering gunshot wounds to his left knee and arm, which 
caused him to be away from his unit until February 1918. His appointment to lance 
corporal was in June 1918 and like the other lance corporals he received five years’ 
penal servitude for his part in the mutiny. 
123 
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Temporary  Corporal  Thomas  John  Blackwood,  a  farmer,  was  almost  twenty-one-
years-old when he enlisted in October 1916. He joined the Battalion in France in May 
1917 and was wounded in action later that year. His wound and bouts of sickness kept 
him from his unit until January 1918. He was appointed lance corporal in April 1918 
and  promoted  to  Temporary  Corporal  on  August  31  just  three  weeks  before  the 
‘walkout’ of 1st Battalion men. Blackwood had a clean disciplinary record without a 
single charge against him. He received eight years’ penal servitude, and not the full ten 
years which was the going rate for convicted corporals.
124  
Lance Corporal Ernest Walker, a tile layer, was twenty-five-years-old when he 
enlisted in June 1915. He was in France in the spring of 1916 and was wounded in 
action in November that year suffering a gunshot wound to the neck, which kept him 
away from his unit for four months. In August 1917 he faced a DCM charged with 
striking  his  superior  officer  and  was  found  guilty  and  awarded  sixty-four  days’ 
detention. He was back with his unit in France from November 1917 until March 
1918, but hospitalisation at various times resulted in him rejoining his battalion at the 
end of June. He was appointed lance corporal on August 3, seven weeks before the 
mutiny.  Walker  was  awarded  the  Military  Medal  for  gallantry  and  leadership  he 
displayed on August 23, 1918. Nevertheless, he received the same sentence of five 
years’ penal servitude as many of the other convicted lance corporals.
125  
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Lance Corporal Richard Beggs, a labourer, was twenty-five-years-old when he 
enlisted in November 1914.  He was in Gallipoli in May 1915 before his posting to 
France, making him one of the longest serving of the convicted men. In May 1915 he 
was convicted of drunkenness and was awarded twenty-one days’ Field Punishment 
No. 2. He was appointed lance corporal in September 1917 and rejoined his unit in 
France in February 1918.  Beggs was wounded in action in April, suffering a gunshot 
wound to the back of his right foot which kept him away from his unit until the end of 
July. He was awarded five years’ penal servitude for his part in the mutiny. 
Lance  Corporal  Edward  Maitland  Porter,  a  printer,  was  twenty-one-years-old 
when he enlisted in August 1915 and spent time in Tel-el-Kebir before proceeding to 
France. He was promoted to lance corporal on July 7, 1916, and just ten days later was 
wounded in action receiving gunshot wounds to both arms. He spent several months 
recovering from this severe injury and afterwards was assigned to postings in England. 
Eventually, he was able to rejoin his battalion in the field in March 1918. In July he 
became a victim of the influenza outbreak and was sick for nearly three weeks. On 
August 2 he was promoted to temporary corporal, only to revert back to lance corporal 
later that month. Although he had held the rank of lance corporal since mid-1916 he 
had little time in which to gain experience in that role. He received five years’ penal 
servitude for his part in the mutiny.
126 
Corporal Reginald. H. C. McKay, a tailor, was twenty-two-years-old when he 
enlisted in September 1915. In February 1916, while in Tel-el-Kebir, he suffered a 
gunshot wound to his hand from which he quickly recovered. He was appointed lance 
corporal in France in January 1917, and was wounded in action in July of that year 
receiving a serious gunshot wound to his face. Recovering from this wound and being 
re-classified as A3 meant that he was away from his battalion in France until May 
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1918. In August he was promoted to corporal and was seven weeks in his new position 
before getting involved in the mutiny. His disciplinary record is free of charges, and 
despite his short experience as a corporal he received ten years’ penal servitude.
127  
Corporal  Fred  Rowe  Smith,  a  bank  clerk,  was  twenty-one-years-old  when  he 
enlisted in March 1916. He had short spells in the field with his battalion in 1917 and 
was assigned for many months to administrative duties. His movements in 1918 are 
not clear from his service record but he was appointed corporal August 3, 1918 and 
rejoined his battalion on August 16. No charges appear on his record except for the 
eight years’ penal servitude he received for taking part in the mutiny. Like so many of 
the convicted NCOs his experience was limited.
128 
Lance Corporal Leonard William Pettit, a labourer, was nineteen-years-old when 
he enlisted in August 1915. His appointment to lance corporal came in March 1917, 
and he was wounded in action in April 1918, receiving a gunshot wound to his right 
arm. This wound kept him away from his battalion until August 17, just five weeks 
before the mutiny. He was awarded five years’ penal servitude by the Court and there 
are no other charges against his name.
129 
Temporary Corporal Richard Bardney, a labourer, was almost twenty-one-years- 
old when he enlisted in October 1916. He was taken on strength with the 1st Battalion 
in France in May 1917 and was promoted to lance corporal in February 1918. He was 
away from his Unit from November to April 1918, owing to hospitalisation and leave. 
He was wounded in action on April 18 and would not return to his unit until July 27. 
His  appointment  to  temporary  corporal  came  three  weeks  before  the  mutiny,  and 
despite his short period at that rank, he was awarded eight years’ penal servitude.
130 
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Corporal William Holland Pittock, a carter by trade, was twenty-three-years-old when 
he enlisted in September 1915. After spending the early part of 1916 in Alexandria he 
was transferred to France where he was wounded in action in July 1916 (gassed), but 
was able to rejoin his Battalion two months later. He was promoted lance corporal in 
May 1917 and was made a full corporal in July 1918. During this year he had only 
returned to his Battalion in May after spells of training and illness. On August 24 he 
was posted to 1st Division Guard Duties and rejoined his Battalion on September 7. 
Like many of the accused NCOs he had a short spell back with his platoon before 
being involved in a refusal to attack. He was a very inexperienced corporal with no 
previous convictions against him, but this did not prevent him receiving a sentence of 
eight years’ penal servitude for desertion.
131  
Lance Corporal Davis, a labourer, was born in England and was thirty-two-years-
old when he enlisted in October 1916. He joined his battalion in France in May 1917 
and throughout his service there are no disciplinary charges against him. In March 
1918 he rejoined his unit after training and was appointed lance corporal in July. His 
lack of experience as an NCO was taken into account but still resulted in a sentence of 
five years’ penal servitude.
132 
Lance Corporal Sydney Francis Carr, a miner, was nineteen-years-old when he 
enlisted in September 1915. He spent long periods in England during 1916 and in 1917 
suffered a fractured hand that restricted his time with his battalion. He was back with 
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his unit in February 1918 and appointed lance corporal in April. Attendance at Corps 
School and leave in the UK saw Carr away from his unit until September 7, just two 
weeks before taking part in the mutiny. His disciplinary record is free of charges 
except for the five years he received for his part in the mutiny.
133 
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Private  (2309)  Herbert  Rogers  Powardy,  a  twenty-five-year-old  horse-driver  from 
Brompton,  South  Australia,  was  keen  enough  to  enlist  in  September  1914.  He 
embarked  for  overseas  a  month  later  but  was  returned  to  Australia  as  a  venereal 
disease case in September 1915. Over a year later, in December 1916, he re-embarked 
for active service, eventually proceeding to France and joining the 30th Battalion in 
July  1917.  Powardy  kept  a  relatively  clean  disciplinary  record  up  to  him  being 
declared an illegal absentee on August 4, 1918. He was absent until September 9 and 
at his court-martial on November 5 he was convicted of desertion and received seven 
years’ penal servitude. This sentence was not reduced or suspended, and Powardy was 
admitted to No. 7 Military Prison on January 30, 1919. For his part in the mutiny in 
March  1919  he  was  awarded  twelve  years’  penal  servitude.  This  sentence  ran 
concurrently with his previous award of seven years but was commuted to two years’ 
IHL in August 1919. When he embarked for Australia in October 1919 the unexpired 
portion of his sentence was remitted under the amnesty. He received treatment for 
venereal  disease  while  at  sea  and  was  eventually  discharged  services  no  longer 
required on December 1, 1919.
134  
Private (6603) Oscar Jansen could justifiably claim that his more serious military 
offences occurred after the hostilities had ended. He was born in Sweden and was 
twenty-two-years-old  when  he  enlisted  in  October  1915,  embarking  overseas  to 
Alexandria in March 1916. There he picked up a minor charge of leaving his work 
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without permission and was fined five days’ pay. He proceeded to France in October 
1916 and was wounded in action (gassed) in July 1917. His only offence in 1917 
occurred in December when he was awarded seven days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for 
‘refusing to give his name when asked to do so’. In May 1918 Jansen was promoted to 
lance  corporal,  but  reverted  to  his  substantive  rank  of  sapper  by  order  of  his 
commanding  officer  in  July  1918.  In  September  1918  he  was  charged  with  using 
insubordinate language to a superior officer and sentenced to twenty-eight days’ Field 
Punishment No. 2. Jansen’s first court-martial was held in January 1919 and he was 
charged with ‘altering his paybook with intent to defraud’. He was found guilty and 
sentenced to six months’ IHL.
135 For his part in the mutiny he received nine years’ 
penal servitude, which was subsequently suspended on December 16, 1919. On his 
release he contracted venereal disease that required seventy-eight days’ recovery, thus 
delaying his departure to Australia until April 1920. Jansen was unlucky in that before 
his mutiny charge he had no noteworthy offences against him. He was discharged as a 
disciplinary  case  (SNLR)  and  his  Returned  Service  Badge  was  returned.  He 
automatically forfeited his medals. The army authorities, however, perhaps taking into 
account his war record, recommended to the Medals Board that they be restored.
136  
Private (4459) Arthur William Nicholls, a motor driver, was twenty-years-old 
when he enlisted in July 1915. He did not embark for active service until March 1916 
joining the 23rd Battalion in Belgium in October 1916. A month later Nicholls was 
reported as being absent and remained so until his arrest on 27 March, 1917. At his 
court-martial held in April he was convicted of desertion and awarded ten years’ penal 
servitude, which a month later was commuted to two years’ IHL.
137 Nicholls’ sentence 
was suspended nine months later and he rejoined his battalion on December 23, 1917. 
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137 NAA: B2455, Nicholls, Arthur William, service record, see item 55 for FGCM.  
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But on March 16 Nicholls was missing when a roll call was taken at 11.30pm, prior to 
his unit going into the line. At his court-martial in April 1918 Nicholls was convicted 
of desertion and given fifteen years’ penal servitude. He was awarded eleven years’ 
penal servitude for joining in the mutiny in March 1919 that was commuted to two 
years’ IHL in August 1919. On embarking for Australia in October 1919 the unexpired 
portion of his sentence was remitted. Nicholls’ war came to an end when he was 
discharged  on  November  27,  1919.  His  services  were  no  longer  required,  and  he 
forfeited any claims to medals and entitlement to war gratuity.
138 
Private (1190) John Wallace, who signed the letter to Prime Minister Hughes, 
embarked  for  overseas  in  October  1915  to  join  the  9th  Light  Horse  Regiment  in 
Hellopolis. He was thirty-one-years-old when he enlisted, unmarried, and gave his 
occupation as a labourer. Wallace had a relatively clean disciplinary record up to 1918, 
having previously picked up three days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for disobeying an 
order  and  seven  days’  Field  Punishment  No.  2  for  an  absence  of  three  days.  In 
February 1918 he was charged with ‘disobeying the lawful order of a superior office’ 
for  which  he  was  awarded  fifty-six  days’  Field  Punishment  No.  1,  which  was 
subsequently reduced to Field Punishment No. 2, with thirty-six days of his sentence 
remitted.
139 But on May 31, 1918 Wallace absented himself until he was apprehended 
on July 17. At his court-martial he was found guilty of absence without leave for 
which he was awarded two years’ IHL. This sentence was not suspended and he went 
straight to No. 7 Military Prison where he joined in the mutiny and received eleven 
years’  penal  servitude.  This  sentence,  like  those  of  his  fellow  mutineers,  was 
commuted  to  two  years’  IHL.  The  remainder  of  his  sentence  was  remitted  in 
November 1919 as he embarked for Australia. Wallace’s own record, by comparison 
with the other mutineers, was relatively good up to mid-1918. He was discharged 
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SNLR.  on  December  13,  1919,
140  and  like  the  other  mutineers  his  sentence  was 
remitted. 
Private (2942) Charles Darwin Gregg was twenty-five-years-old when he enlisted 
in June 1915. He was a labourer, and married with one child. Gregg’s disciplinary 
record is littered with charges for absence and disobedience. He embarked for active 
service in September 1915 and picked up his first conviction while he was in Cairo, 
being awarded twenty-one days’ detention for being drunk, absent without leave and 
breaking camp. A further fourteen days’ detention was imposed on him in February 
1916 ‘for creating a disturbance, interfering with natives, and being out of bounds’. 
After  embarking  for  France  he  joined  the  10th  Battalion  on  July  31,  1916.  By 
September 2 he was awarded twenty-eight days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for being 
absent.  Immediately  after  serving  this  sentence  he  picked  up  another  twenty-eight 
days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for being drunk and absent again. After serving this 
sentence  he  was  hospitalised  suffering  from  bronchitis  that  caused  his  transfer  to 
England. He was discharged from hospital on January 12, 1917 and given a period of 
furlough before proceeding to Perham Downs. By March 23 he was awarded seven 
days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for displaying threatening behaviour to an NCO. Just 
three weeks after completing this sentence he was awarded six days’ Field Punishment 
No.  2  for  absence  and  neglecting  to  obey  an  order.  Shortly  after  completing  this 
sentence he was absent again from May 16 until May 28, picking up another twenty 
days’ Field Punishment No. 2. June was spent serving this sentence, but on August 21 
he faced a District Court-Martial at Perham Downs, charged with: 
That he on 6.5.17 in a document signed by him, made a false statement, by stating that 
his pay book was lost, while knowing that such was false. (2) An act to the prejudice etc. 
in that he deposited his pay book with the Station Master at Bournemouth as security for 
the payment of 9/3 [9s 3d] advanced for Railway fare, which amount has not yet been 
paid. (3) Using insubordinate language to a superior officer. 
                                                 
140 Ibid. 
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Gregg was found guilty on all three charges and was fortunate to receive only 
eleven days’ detention considering his track record. As these crimes were committed 
in England they attracted less severe sentences than breaches of discipline in France. In 
October Gregg embarked for France, rejoining his unit on October 21. A month later, 
on November 27, he was reported as an illegal absentee and was apprehended on 
December  9.  At  his  court-martial  on  January  11,  1918  he  was  charged  with  this 
absence and faced a further charge of conduct to the prejudice as he was wearing a 
sergeant’s  chevron  when  he  was  arrested.  He  was  sentenced  to  sixty  days’  Field 
Punishment No. 2, but how much of this sentence he served is not clear as he was 
reported absent on February 28, reporting back on March 3. By March 18 he was 
admitted to hospital sick and transferred to England, being discharged on April 10 to 
furlough and ordered to report to No. 4 Command Depot on April 24. He absented 
himself from this date until his apprehension on May 11. For this absence and for 
being  in  possession  of  another  soldier’s  pass  he  was  awarded  twenty-eight  days’ 
detention. He proceeded to France on June 12, rejoining his unit later that month. But 
on July 24 he was declared an illegal absentee, only rejoining his unit two months later 
on September 11. While awaiting trial for this period of absence he absconded from 
October 10 for two days.
141 At his court-martial on November 30 he was charged with 
desertion for these absences. He was found not guilty of desertion but guilty of being 
absent without leave and sentenced to six months’ IHL. He was transferred to military 
prison on January 25, 1919. For his part in the mutiny he received ten years’ penal 
servitude, disembarking for England on April 4 under escort. Gregg’s war was over on 
November 6, 1919 when he was discharged SNLR.
142 He had spent precious little time 
with his unit, sickness accounted for some of it, but his military service was punctuated 
with absences. Interestingly, he was awarded Field Punishment No. 2 six times, and 
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never Field Punishment No. 1. This could have been on health grounds as Gregg was a 
bronchitis sufferer, and being tied up and exposed to the elements could well have 
aggravated his bronchial condition. Private (5654) Clarence Leslie Brissenden, a civil 
servant, was barely eighteen-years-old when he enlisted in March 1916. He embarked 
for active service in August, joining the 19th Battalion in France on December 18. A 
day later he was hospitalised with venereal disease and was not discharged to duty 
until February 25, 1917, his period of treatment lasting seventy days. In September 
1917 he was wounded in action receiving a gunshot wound to his left arm that caused 
his evacuation to hospital in England. He was discharged on October 25, and it was 
while still in England he was convicted of his first military offence in March 1918 for 
being absent from February 21 to March 3. He contracted venereal disease during his 
unauthorised leave that detained him in hospital for thirty-nine days. He was awarded 
twenty-two days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for this absence, and shortly after serving 
this sentence he was absent again and was declared an illegal absentee. At his District 
Court-Martial (England) he was convicted of being absent from May 27 until July 5 
and received the lenient sentence of the forfeiture of thirty days’ pay. He rejoined his 
battalion in France on August 10, 1918 only to be declared an illegal absentee again by 
the 23rd. He was arrested on September 24 and faced two charges at his court-martial 
of being absent from August 25 until September 17, and escaping from confinement. 
Brissenden was found guilty and given a sentence of two years’ IHL that was not 
suspended. He was transferred to No. 7 Military Prison a month later. Brissenden 
would be amongst the youngest of the mutineers at twenty-one-years-old but this did 
not  stop  the  court  awarding  him  ten  years’  penal  servitude.  Like  the  others,  his 
sentence was remitted and he was officially discharged late in December 1919 and 
forfeited his entitlement to medals.
143 
                                                 
143 NAA: B2455, Brissenden, C L, service record.  
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Private (4219) Clarence Bunting was nineteen-years-old when he enlisted in the 
AIF in August 1915, embarking for overseas in March 1916 and joining the 23rd 
Battalion in France in August of that year. At his first court-martial held on January 5, 
1917 Bunting pleaded guilty to being absent from December 28 until January 2, 1917 
(114 hours). The court heard that his battalion was moving to the front from Cow Lane 
on December 27 and that Bunting was present at the time. The following morning at 
roll call he was reported as missing. Despite Bunting’s guilty plea he was given three 
years’ penal servitude, later commuted to two years’ IHL. The severity of this sentence 
was a consequence of his unit moving to the front trenches. He did not serve his full 
sentence and was discharged from prison in April 1918 with the remainder of his 
sentence suspended. He was with his unit less than three months when he was reported 
an illegal absentee in July. He did not return to his unit until November 11, 1918. He 
was tried on November 18 for deserting from July 20 until November 11, 1918 and 
awarded four years’ penal servitude. From early January 1917 until his discharged on 
November 12, 1919, apart from his voyage home, Bunting would spend less than three 
months out of prison.
144 For his part in the mutiny he was awarded a further thirteen 
years’ penal servitude, which was commuted under the amnesty when he embarked for 
Australia. 
Private (5343) Ernest Henry Gay, an engine cleaner, was twenty-three-years-old 
when he enlisted in April 1916. He joined the 27th Battalion in France in January 
1917. By March, Gay was promoted to lance corporal and to corporal by September. 
Gay did not pick up his first court-martial conviction until May 1918 when he was 
found guilty of ‘unlawfully wounding a comrade’. For this offence he was awarded 
twelve months’ IHL and reverted to private. This sentence was suspended two weeks 
later. In August he faced a court again, this time charged with desertion, for being 
                                                 
144 NAA: B2455, Bunting, C, service record. 
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absent from July 17th to the 23rd, 1918. He was found not guilty of desertion but 
guilty of absence without leave and given thirty days’ Field Punishment No. 2. In this 
case the awarding of Field Punishment, instead of a custodial sentence, prevented the 
previously suspended sentence being re-imposed, thus keeping Gay available for duty 
after his Field Punishment was completed. However, Gay was not available for duty 
long as a month later he was again charged with desertion for a sixteen-day absence. 
As before, he was cleared of desertion, but found guilty of absence, and this time 
awarded twelve months’ IHL that could not be suspended because of his previous 
conviction. Gay had faced three courts martial on serious charges from May to August 
1918 that blemished his otherwise good record. In the early part of his service he had 
shown aptitude and leadership, qualities that were recognised with his promotion to 
corporal. He was transferred to No. 7 Military Prison and received ten years’ penal 
servitude for taking part in the mutiny, a sentence that was not remitted until January 5, 
1920.
145 
Private (3202) Percy Arnold Woodbury was nineteen-years-old when he enlisted 
in June 1916. His trade is listed as farming, which may account for him being posted to 
the 1st Battalion Pioneers. Woodbury was wounded in action on October 30, 1917, 
receiving  a  gunshot  wound  to  his  ankle  that  was  diagnosed  as  ‘severe’.  He  was 
hospitalised in England and not declared fit for duty until April 1918, rejoining his 
battalion in France the next month. By August, he was declared ‘an illegal absentee’ 
and was arrested later on September 8. He escaped confinement the very next day and 
was not back with his unit until September 14. At his court-martial, which was delayed 
until December, he was found not guilty of desertion but guilty of absence without 
leave and escaping from confinement for which he received twelve months’ IHL. He 
received nine years’ penal servitude for taking part in the mutiny, which was later 
                                                 
145 NAA: B2455, Gay, E H, service record.  
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remitted under the amnesty and he was discharged on September 19, 1919.
146 Although 
his  previous  trial  was  a  month  after  the  Armistice,  Woodbury’s  illegal  absence 
occurred while the war was in progress.  
                                                 
146 NAA: B2455, Woodbury, Percy Arnold, service record.  
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A p p e n d i x   v  
SERVICE RECORDS OF MEN WHO CAUSED TROUBLE 
 ON BOARD HMT PORT SYDNEY 
Private (1114) Hugh Leslie Smith, who remained at large when the Port Sydney sailed, 
had previously escaped from confinement. Smith’s record is a sad one in that at nearly 
nineteen-years-old when he enlisted this young man was in trouble from the outset, 
with his crimes getting progressively worse. He contracted venereal disease while in 
Alexandria in March 1916 before embarking for France to join the BEF. In less than 
one month in France he was convicted by court-martial of being absent for one day 
from June 6, drunkenness, and escaping from confinement, for which he was awarded 
forty-two days’ Field Punishment No. 2, which was later commuted to twenty-eight 
days. One week after his release he was charged with drunkenness and was severely 
dealt with, being sentenced to twelve months’ IHL
147. This draconian sentence was not 
commuted  or  suspended  and  sent  this  youngster  down  the  spiral  path.  After  five 
months  serving  his  sentence  he  was  admitted  to  hospital  suffering  from  venereal 
disease.  He  escaped  from  hospital  on  January  21,  1917  and  declared  an  illegal 
absentee, being re-admitted to prison on February 13, 1917. He was released from 
prison on July 13 but was declared an illegal absentee on July 21. He was returned to 
custody on September 9 and was absent nine days later. At his court-martial he was 
found  guilty  of  absence  and  sentenced  to  two  years’  IHL.  This  sentence  was 
suspended, which is surprising considering his previous sentences. He returned to his 
unit and within a month he ‘accidentally injured himself’ by falling into a shell hole 
and breaking his leg, which caused him to be evacuated to England. On recovering, 
and a period of furlough, he lasted only four days with Command Depot at Sutton 
Veny before absenting himself on December 23 and was apprehended on the 28th. For 
                                                 
147 NAA: B2455, Smith, H L, service record.  
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this offence he was awarded twenty-four days’ Field Punishment No. 2 but escaped 
again undergoing this sentence and was given a further ninety days’ IHL by a DCM 
held on February 4, 1918. As soon as he was released he was absent again from April 
4 to May 25. He was further charged by a civil power on the May 29 for shop breaking 
and  given  a  six-month  sentence.  His  court-martial  charges  for  escaping  from 
confinement,  attempting  to  escape  from  custody,  making  a  false  statement,  and 
absence from April 16 to May 20, 1918 had to wait until his release in November from 
a civilian prison. Smith was found guilty on all these charges and was awarded seven 
months’  detention.  But  this  meant  that  the  previously  suspended  sentence  from 
October 9, 1917 would be put into execution. In March 1919 he was tried again by a 
civil power, this time at Westminster Police Court, and found guilty of assaulting a 
prison officer. He was awarded a further six weeks’ IHL to run after his two-year 
sentence finished. Smith added to his troubles while aboard Port Sydney. He faced a 
DCM at sea and was convicted on two counts of ‘violently assaulting another soldier’ 
and  stealing  money.  For  these  offences  he  was  sentenced  to  two  years’  IHL.
148 
Whether this last sentence would run concurrently is not clear, but he had good reason 
to believe that he would be spending the near future in jail and had not much to lose by 
escaping.  His  service  record  shows  that  his  initial  discharge  was  July  21,  1920 
(desertion), but this was amended in October to read SNLR.
149 It is not clear when 
Smith made it back home, but there is no record of any further action taken against 
him.  
Private (3535a) Thomas L. Winstanley embarked for active service in October 
1915 and joined the BEF via Alexandria and Marseilles in March 1916. In May, he 
                                                 
148 Ibid., Précis of Service for the information of the Medal Board, but see references throughout his 
service record. 
149 Ibid., item 27, letter from Base Records Victoria to Headquarters 3rd Military District asking for 
clarification on Smith’s discharge. On Routine Order No. 84/20 he was discharged on July 21, 1920 
(desertion) and on Routine Order 87/20 he was described as being discharged SNLR on July 18, 1920. 
His discharge on the ‘Précis of Service’, a much later document, shows he was discharged July 21, 1920 
‘as a consequence of being illegally absent from 4.11.19’.  
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suffered a gunshot wound to his shoulder and was evacuated to England to recover. He 
returned to duty in November 1916 to No. 2 Command Depot in Weymouth. His first 
offence  occurred  in  March  1917,  while  still  in  England,  where  he  faced  a  DCM 
charged with: ‘(1) A.W.L. from 21.12.16 to 2.1.17. (2) Escaping from confinement on 
6.1.17 (3) Escaping from custody on 8.1.17 and remaining absent until 16.1.17’.
150 He 
was found guilty and sentenced to detention for one day and forfeited ninety-eight 
days’ pay. The extraordinary leniency of this sentence is hard to fathom but it may be 
because the offence took place in England, away from the front, and that Winstanley 
had previously been wounded, although on his service record there is no indication that 
he was wounded in action. In April he was awarded fourteen days’ Field Punishment 
No. 2 for breaking out of hospital and being absent for three days. In July he fell foul 
of the civil authorities and was tried at Dorchester Assizes for felony. He was found 
guilty and sentenced to three months’ IHL. In November he embarked for France and 
within four days was awarded twenty-eight days’ Field Punishment No. 1 for ‘(1) 
Being in town without a pass (2) Being improperly dressed.’ He spent a few weeks 
with his battalion before a further absence led to his desertion conviction. Winstanley 
was convicted of deserting from February 23, 1918 until apprehended on April 9 and 
was sentenced to penal servitude for life, which was later commuted to two years’ 
IHL. He escaped from No. 10 Military Prison in September 1918 and was at large for 
seven weeks until apprehended. In December he was admitted to hospital suffering 
from  venereal  disease.  On  the  journey  home  on  Port  Sydney  he  escaped  from 
confinement in Capetown for a day and was awarded nine months’ IHL by a DCM 
held at sea. It is not clear whether he was apprehended in Fremantle or gave himself 
                                                 
150 NAA: B2455, Winstanley, Thomas, item 55, Précis of Service for the information of the Medal 
Board.  
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up, but he embarked on the Pakeha a week after the Port Sydney sailed. His services 
were no longer required and he was discharged at the 4th Military District.
151  
Private (1799) Henry Nash, who had escaped, but was recaptured on board, was 
also absent at Capetown, failing to re-embark on the first vessel that had tried to get 
him home. When he originally embarked for Australia the unexpired portion of his 
sentence for self-wounding had been remitted. Nash had enlisted in 1915 and joined 
his battalion in May of that year at Gallipoli. From September through to November he 
had spent most of the time sick in hospital. He picked up his first court-martial offence 
when  transferred  to  France  in  April  1916,  being  sentenced  to  sixty  days’  Field 
Punishment No. 2 for ‘(1) drunkenness (2) Insubordinate language (3) and conduct to 
the prejudice etc.’ Nash was involved in the fighting, however, being wounded in 
action in July 1916, and returning to duty a week later. In September he distinguished 
himself  in  battle  and  was  Mentioned  in  Despatches  ‘for  participation  in  a  very 
successful raid on the enemy trenches on 30.9.16’.
152 Nash had no further charges until 
March 1917 when he faced a court-martial for being absent for one week and escaping 
from confinement. The sentence of three years’ IHL, although commuted to two years, 
seems particularly harsh, although this sentence was suspended a month later. Six 
weeks after rejoining his unit in the field he was charged with wilfully self-inflicting a 
gunshot wound to his left forearm for which he was sentenced to fifteen months’ IHL. 
This  caused  his  previously  suspended  sentence  to  come  into  execution.
153  The 
guidelines  for  punishing  self-maimers  could  not  be  followed  in  this  case,  being 
hampered by the severity of the previous sentence. For his part in the disturbance on 
board Port Sydney he was awarded twenty-eight days’ detention. 
                                                 
151 Ibid. In October 1946 Winstanley sought help from The Sailors’ & Soldiers’ Distress Fund who 
wrote to the Base Records office for particulars of his service. 
152 NAA: B2455, Nash, Henry, service record. 
153 Ibid.  
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Another soldier named in the disturbance onboard was Private (6273) William 
John Gleeson who had been awarded fifteen years’ penal servitude in December 1918 
for desertion, a sentence that was later commuted to two years’ IHL. Gleeson had 
picked up his first custodial sentence in May 1918 whilst a patient in a venereal disease 
hospital. At his trial the court was told that Gleeson, along with Sapper (4091) Hugh 
Ball and Private (6037) Edward James Betts, were patients in 29th General Hospital 
undergoing venereal disease treatment. The three were part of a fatigue party that was 
handed over to the NCO in charge of the laundry, Sergeant E. Tucker. All three were 
ordered to take off their coats and start working in the laundry. Each man in turn 
refused.  As  each  had  had  their  money  stopped  they  objected  to  doing  laundry 
alongside men who were being paid. Sergeant Tucker stated that he waited about 
twenty minutes for his order to be obeyed before handing the men over to the provost 
sergeant. Sapper Ball, on behalf of the accused, told the Court that they ‘were under 
the  impression  that  fatigues  by  Australian  soldiers  in  the  Hospital  were  quite 
voluntary’.
154 All three were found guilty, and in mitigation each of them claimed to 
have had clean disciplinary records up to that point. Nevertheless, all were sentenced 
to eighteen months’ IHL. Sapper Ball had no previous convictions and his sentence 
was suspended a month later.
155 Private Betts had only five days’ confinement to his 
name and his sentence was also suspended. Gleeson’s claim of not being in trouble 
before was not true and he would serve his sentence. He had previously served periods 
of detention for drunkenness and absence and was also was awarded twenty-eight 
days’ Field Punishment No. 1 by his commanding officer for using abusive language 
to a superior officer.
156 Betts and Ball, whose disciplinary record was clean before the 
trial, now had quite an unnecessary court-martial conviction against their names.
157  
                                                 
154 NAA: B2455, Gleeson, W J, items 47-49 deal with the court-martial 
155 NAA: B2455, Ball, H, service record 
156 NAA: B2455, Gleeson, W J, service record. 
157 NAA: B2455, Betts, E J, service record.  
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Private (5045) Frances James Barker, 13th Battalion was also involved in the 
disturbances on Port Sydney. His chequered military career began when he enlisted in 
September 1915. He was wounded in action in August 1916 and had remained on 
duty. Soon afterwards he absented himself from his unit, which was in the front line at 
the time, from August 29 until September 2, 1916. He was found guilty of desertion 
and sentenced to twelve years’ penal servitude, which was subsequently commuted to 
two years’ IHL.
158 He remained in prison until May 19, 1918, with the remainder of his 
sentence being suspended, rejoining his unit in June. In July he was wounded in action 
for the second time receiving multiple shrapnel wounds which kept him away from his 
unit  for  two  months.  Further  unlicensed  leave  offences  resulted  in  detention  and 
forfeiture of pay. In early January 1919 he was sentenced by a court-martial to ninety 
days’ Field Punishment No. 2 for ‘conduct to the prejudice’ in that he ‘bought drinks 
and  cigars  from  Madame  Scaillet  and  did  not  pay  for  same’.  This  brought  into 
execution his previously suspended sentence. By April 1919 he had added another 
court-martial conviction that of ‘Escaping from escort 2/3/19 . . . and A.W.L. from 
24/3/19 to 17/4/19’, receiving a sentence of six months’ IHL. On October 22, 1919, the 
day  he  embarked  on  the  Port  Sydney,  the  unexpired  portion  of  his  sentence  was 
remitted. For his part in the disturbance onboard a DCM was convened charging him 
with: ‘Striking his superior officer in the execution of his duty, in that he at Fremantle 
on H.M.T. ‘Port Sydney’ on 5/11/19 struck with his fist in the face Lieut. L. D. R. 
Snellgrove, 3rd Div. Engrs, who was endeavouring to quell a disturbance on board’. 
He received a sentence of two years’ IHL but only served nine months of this sentence. 
Barker’s war was finally over when he was released in August 1920.
159  
                                                 
158 NAA: B2455, Barker, F J, items 15-17, contains the main particulars of Barker’s service. He had 
submitted a request for the re-issue of his RS Badge, which the Adjutant General approved. See items 
30, 32 and 35.  
159 Ibid., item 17, on his particulars of service it shows that Barker was discharged from the AIF on 
December 30, 1919. However, on the same document, in handwriting, it states he was not released until 
August 10, 1920.  
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